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Abstract 
At the tactical level of war the Germans are widely regarded as having had the most 
innovative and proficient army of World War I. Likewise, many historians would agree that 
the Germans suffered from serious, if not fatal, shortcomings at the strategic level of war. It is 
at the middle level of warfare, the operational level, that the Germans seem to be the most 
difficult to evaluate. 
Although the operational was only fully accepted in the 1980s by many Western 
militaries as a distinct level of warfare, German military thinking well before the start of 
World War I clearly recognized the Operativ, as a realm of warfighting activity between the 
tactical and the strategic. But the German concept of the operational art was flawed at best, 
and actually came closer to tactics on a grand scale. The flaws in their approach to operations 
cost the Germans dearly in both World Wars. 
Through a thorough review of the surviving original operational plans and orders, this 
study evaluates the German approach to the operational art by analyzing the Ludendorff 
Offensives of 1918. Taken as a whole, the five actually executed and two planned but never 
executed major attacks produced stunning tactical results, but ultimately left Germany in a far 
worse strategic position by August 1918. Among the most serious operational errors made by 
the German planners were their blindness to the power of sequential operations and 
cumulative effects, and their insistence in mounting force-on-force attacks. 
The Allies, and especially the British, were exceptionally vulnerable in certain 
elements of their warfighting system. By attacking those vulnerabilities the Germans might 
well have achieved far better results than by attacking directly into the Allied strength. 
Specifically, the British logistics system was extremely fragile, and their rail system had two 
key choke points, Amiens and Hazebrouck. During Operations MICHAEL and 
GEORGETTE, the Germans came close to capturing both rail centers, but never seemed to 
grasp fully their operational significance. The British and French certainly did. After the 
Germans attacked south to the Marne during Operation BLUCHER, they fell victims 
themselves to an inadequate rail network behind their newly acquired lines. At the 
operational level, then, the respective enemy and friendly rail networks had a decisive 
influence on the campaign of March-August 1918. 
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With regard to operational history, it becomes too 
easy to lose sight of battles and campaigns as 
means to higher ends and to overlook alternative 
paths not taken which might have led to very different 
outcomes. 1 
Colonel Richard M. Swain 
CHAPTER I 
THE FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WORLD WAR I 
"Why bother with World War I? What's the point? " I frequently get this question 
from junior officers, and quite often from more senior ones. Why indeed? In the broader 
context there is very little question about the historical significance of World War I. The war 
marked the death of an entire way of life in Europe, and the true beginnings of the modern 
era. When World War I ended, four of the world's five great empires were dead, and the fifth 
was mortally wounded. The war marked the start of the shift of global power from the center 
of Europe to America and Russia on the flanks. In his 2001 book, Forgotten Victory, Gary 
Sheffield called the Great War, "the key event of the twentieth century, from which 
everything else flowed. " 2 
Yet despite its social, political, and economic significance, popular history has given 
the military aspects of World War Ia very bad reputation. The conventional image of that war 
is one of a senseless blood bath--a dull and grinding war of attrition conducted by 
incompetent, even criminally stupid generals, without a trace of strategic thought or tactical 
innovation. Thus, many believe that World War I has nothing to teach the modern soldier, 
especially in comparison to World War II, with its fast-moving armored and airborne 
divisions. Any detailed study of World War I seems largely irrelevant by comparison. 
Much of the existing image of World War I is based on the vivid descriptions of 
contemporary poets and popular writers, many of who experienced directly the horrors of the 
Great War. The writings of Erich Maria Remarque (All Quiet on the Western Front), Robert 
Graves (Good-bye to all That), Siegfried Sasoon (Memoirs of an Infantry Officer), Vera 
Brittain (Testament of Youth), and especially C. S. Forester (The General) have left a lasting 
imprint on the popular mind, and to some extent have influenced the scholarly mind as well. 
With few exceptions, the most notable being Germany's Ernst Jünger (Storm of Steel), the 
World War I writers and poets cast their own experiences in a largely anti-heroic light, which 
profoundly influenced the way people looked at war in general for the remainder of the 20th 
century. 3 As Professor Brian Bond has pointed out, the literary writers either ignored, or 
failed to address convincingly, the larger historical, political, and strategic questions of the 
war. What was it about and why was it fought? 4 
The observations of the military historians and theorists who wrote during the 1920s 
and 1930s were even more critical of the Great War's significance and conduct. In his 1987 
book, The Killing Ground: The British Army, The Western Front and the Emergence of 
Modern Warfare, 1900-1918, Tim Travers identified two basic British schools of thought that 
had emerged by the 1930s. Although Travers referred specifically to the evaluation of the 
British Expeditionary Force (BEF), his model applies to the historiography of the entire war. 5 
The "Internal Factor, " or "Mud and Blood" school of thought, holds that the slaughter 
on the Western Front was caused by the incompetence of the generals, with their bloody- 
mindedness, their physical and intellectual distance from actual front-line conditions, and 
their Victorian-era insensitivity. Among the most influential books of this school are Liddell 
Hart's The Real War and Lloyd George's War Memoirs. More recent contributions from this 
school include John Ellis' Eye Deep in Hell: Life in the Trenches, 1914-1918, and Lyn 
MacDonald's They Called it Passchendaele and To the Last Man: Spring 1918. The approach 
of this school is appealing because it is easy to understand in human terms. It also is far too 
2 
simplistic, too pat. The notion that Germany, Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, and Russia all 
simultaneously produced complete higher officer corps full of idiots requires too much of a 
stretch. 
The "External Factor" school blames the Western Front deadlock on a combination of 
inexperienced staff officers, the technical difficulties of mastering new technology, the 
impressive tactical fighting ability of the Germans, and the interference of political leaders in 
strictly military affairs. The significant contributions from this school include the fourteen 
volumes of the British official history edited by Sir James Edmonds, and John Terraine's 
Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier. But the arguments of this school are overly simplistic 
as well, and serve as apologists for the genuinely incompetent commanders the war did 
produce. 
The past twenty-five years have seen the emergence of a third school of thought, 
which Travers calls the "Realists. " The writers of this school take a more balanced approach 
to the study of World War I. The general thrust of their argument holds that the clash 
between old ideas and new weapons and technology, combined with the huge scale of the war 
and a lack of combined arms coordination, caused serious tactical and operational problems 
on all sides. While the new technology was an external factor, the inability to integrate the 
new weapons was an internal flaw. 
In The Killing Ground, Travers also describes the paradigm shift from muscle- 
powered warfare to machine-powered warfare that is perhaps the most recognizable 
characteristic of World War I. It was a paradigm shift that occurred so fast that most military 
commanders and staff officers were unable to come to grips with it within the course of the 
war. Moreover, it was a shift that occurred unevenly, and this more than anything else caused 
the deadlock on the Western Front. 
The two basic elements of combat power are fire and maneuver. Throughout military 
history the two have been locked in a constant struggle for dominance. Rarely has one gained 
the upper hand, or held it for very long. Yet by 1914 firepower technology was far ahead of 
mobility technology. Machine guns and rapid-firing artillery had truly mechanized firepower 
by 1914, but battlefield mobility was still based primarily on human and horse muscle power. 
This would begin to change by 1918, with the emergence of combat aircraft, the tank, and 
increased use of motor vehicles; but for most of World War I, firepower retained the upper 
hand. 
The writers of the realist school point out just how difficult it was for even the most 
talented and intelligent of the Great War's military planners to come to grips with these 
changes that came on a "future shock" scale. They also argue that by 1918 the tactical and 
technical solutions were starting to emerge. World War I ended in exhaustion before the new 
solutions could be brought to fruition, but they formed the seedbed for the mobile tactics and 
operations of World War II. 
One of the strongest and most concise arguments for the significance of World War I 
in the history of warfare can be found in Jonathan Bailey's 1996 pamphlet The First World 
War and the Birth of the Modern Style of Warfare. Bailey argued that between 1917 and 
1918 "a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) took place which, it is contended, was more 
than merely that; rather it amounted to a Military Revolution which was the most significant 
development in the history of warfare to date, and remains so. " 6 
Bailey built a strong and logical argument to support this seemingly radical thesis. He 
drew a sharp distinction between a Revolution in Military Affairs and a Military Revolution. 
According to one definition, an RMA is "a discontinuous increase in military capability and 
effectiveness arising from simultaneous and mutually supportive change in technology, 
systems, operational methods, and military organizations. " 7A Military Revolution, 
according to Bailey, "embodies a more fundamental and enduring transformation brought 
about by military change. " 8 The key distinction is that a Military Revolution introduces an 
entirely new concept in war fighting, rather than just quantum improvements in current ways 
of operating. 
Bailey argued that the period on the Western Front from 1917 to 1918 introduced such 
a Military Revolution that brought about the birth of the modem style of warfare, "with the 
advent of three dimensional artillery indirect fire as the foundation of planning at the tactical, 
operational, and strategic levels of war. " The result was something fundamentally different 
and new in warfare--operations in three dimensions and in depth. 9 
Essentially then, Bailey argued that the World War I paradigm shift was far more 
extensive than the muscle to machine shift described by Travers. Bailey suggested that the 
1917-1918 shift to the Modem Style of Warfare was so revolutionary that the subsequent 
introductions of armor, air power, and information age technology have amounted to no more 
than complements to it. These advances have been incremental, technical improvements to 
the efficiency of the conceptual model of the Modem Style of Warfare. 
Bailey also showed it was the Indirect Fire Revolution that grew out of the 
experimentation in the years just prior to World War I that made possible the conceptual leaps 
to three dimensional warfare and deep battle. The supporting technologies of 1917-1918, 
however, were not up to the potentials of the indirect fire model. Specifically, transportation 
capabilities were inadequate for artillery to move forward rapidly and be re-supplied over 
rough terrain, and communications were inadequate to maintain decentralized command and 
control of the fire plan once an operation started. As a consequence, contemporary popular 
wisdom accepts that artillery dominated the battlefield in World War I. Few really 
understand, as Bailey argued, that artillery fire was the key to maneuver rather than the agent 
of stalemate. The technical solutions to these problems emerged in the years between the 
world wars and proved themselves on the battlefields of World War II and since. As Bailey 
noted; "Clearly between 1914 and 1918 something of extraordinary historical profundity and 
enduring military significance had happened. It was the indirect fire revolution and the birth 
of the Modem Style of Warfare. " 10 
According to Bailey, the RMA we are experiencing today is essentially an echo of 
World War I and hardly revolutionary by comparison. Key elements of today's RMA include; 
precise standoff strikes; real-time Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and 
Intelligence (C41); information operations; and non-lethality. In 1917-1918 terms these 
would have been called; accurate indirect fire; improvement in command and control and 
intelligence; the means of acting upon it; and the munitions and techniques of neutralization 
and suppression. 
Other works from the "Realist" school include Gary Sheffield's Forgotten Victory: 
The First World War Myths and Realities; Shelford Bidwell's and Dominick Graham's Fire- 
Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945; Bruce Gudmundsson's 
Stormtroop Tactics; Jonathan Bailey's Field Artillery and Firepower, Rod Paschall's The 
Defeat of Imperial Germany, 1917-1918; Bill Rawling's Surviving Trench Warfare: 
Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918; and my own Steel Wind: Colonel Georg 
Bruchmüller and the Birth of Modern Artillery. 
THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
It is not the primary objective of this study to suggest ways in which the Germans 
could have won World War I, or at least could have achieved a battlefield victory in 1918. 
Rather, the primary objective is to use German offensive operations and planning in 1918 as a 
laboratory to examine and analyze the Operational Level of War. In the course of this 
analysis, alternative courses of action will be considered as a means to explore the flaws in 
German operational planning and execution. 
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The central purpose of the German military effort between March and July 1918 was 
Ludendorffs attempt to stage a knockout victory in the west. In four of the five offensives 
actually launched, however, impressive tactical gains failed to lead to operational results, 
much less strategic success. In the fifth operation, the Germans even failed to achieve tactical 
success. After the failure of Operations MICHAEL and GEORGETTE, the subsequent 
offensives were supposed to set the conditions for the never-launched Operation HAGEN. 
Operationally, first MICHAEL, then GEORGETTE, and then HAGEN were supposed to 
knock the British out of the war, which would then lead to the strategic result of an Allied 
collapse in the west before enough fresh American forces could arrive to tip the strategic 
balance. 
Ludendorffs ultimate strategic objective, however, was to achieve a decisive and 
unconditional military victory over the Western Allies, rather than establish a position of 
relative strength from which to negotiate a conclusion to the hostilities that would be 
favorable to Germany on the balance sheet. Most historians agree that such a decisive military 
victory was far beyond Germany's capabilities and resources in 1918. This perhaps, was the 
fatal flaw or "disconnect" between the strategic and operational levels that doomed 
Ludendorffs offensives from the start. With more realistic strategic objectives and better 
operational design, however, Germany just might have been able to conduct a series of 
operationally successful campaigns and end the war in a far better strategic position than it 
actually did. 
The tactical outcomes of Ludendorffs offensives are well known. The objective here 
is to compare the results with the plans and the process at the operational level, to identify the 
flaws, and to explore possible alternatives. This study attempts to answer the following 
questions: 
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1. What were the German planners and decision makers thinking, and what did the 
operations orders say? 
2. How did the execution vary from the plans, and what impact did this have in the 
short and long term? 
3. Given that the operational objectives did not support the strategic realities of 
1918, could the German strategic and operational objectives have been modified to improve 
the chances of success? 
4. Did the operational design maximize the tactical realities of 1918? 
5. Why did each (and all combined) of the Ludendorff Offensives fail to set the 
conditions for HAGEN? 
6. Were the failures ones of planning or of execution? 
7. What were the objectives and details of the HAGEN plan? 
8. With the proper conditions, could HAGEN or any of the other offensives have 
succeeded--and if so, how? 
9. Was Germany's military position after the offensives better or worse than it 
otherwise might have been? 
10. At the operational level, what lessons did Germany learn or mis-learn from 
1918? 
Question Number 7 is especially intriguing. To my knowledge, no scholarly study has 
ever been made of the HAGEN plans. 
RESEARCH SCOPE 
My research focuses on German offensive operations and planning on the Western 
Front from November 1917 through July 1918. The discussion includes the Eastern Front, 
defensive operations in 1918, and overall operations in 1914-1917 only insofar as necessary 
to explain the plans and actions of the five Ludendorff Offensives actually executed, plus 
Operation HAGEN that was never launched. I have conducted the analysis from the point of 
view of the Germans. I have, of course, considered and described the responses of the 
Western Allies--the British, French, and Americans--but I have not analyzed their plans nor 
critiqued their actions. 
The main purpose of this study is to analyze the 1918 offensives at the operational 
level of war. In order to establish the framework for the analysis, I have devoted a 
considerable amount of discussion to the theory and development of Operational Art. I also 
have examined Operational Art as it was understood in the German Army before and during 
World War I. It is impossible to divorce completely the operational from the strategic and 
tactical levels. Thus I also have considered the German strategic situation in 1918 and the 
tactical and technical realities of World War I. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
In conducting the research, I have relied on both secondary and primary sources. I 
have consulted published books, magazine and journal articles, official histories, and both 
contemporary and present-day doctrinal manuals. I also have examined all of the surviving 
German plans and records of the five Ludendorff Offensives, and the planning files for 
Operation HAGEN. As described in the section below on primary sources, most of those 
records are in German. 
In attempting to reconstruct the German decision-making and planning process, I have 
applied many of the tools and techniques of the military intelligence officer--a specialty in 
which I have some practical experience. Both the military historian and the military 
intelligence officer face similar challenges, and in many cases they can use similar analytical 
tools. While the military historian tries to reconstruct and understand the past, the military 
9 
intelligence officer works in the opposite temporal direction in an effort to predict future 
actions. Both, however, are concerned with identifying the capabilities, intentions, 
institutional culture, leadership, and courses of action of a military force. Both work at these 
tasks from a distance, and both are faced with the similar challenge of working from partial, 
often conflicting, and sometimes intentionally misleading information from a wide variety of 
sources of varying accuracy and reliability. The ultimate objective for both is to produce the 
best possible analysis from the best information available. This process can be as much an art 
as it is a science. 
In analyzing the Ludendorff Offensives at the operational level, I have focused on the 
systems and assets that intelligence analysts rely upon to develop an enemy's operational 
signature. In World War I these would have included air power, long range and heavy 
artillery, and rail transport. Artillery is an especially important element of this analysis 
because it was in World War I that artillery firepower first acquired an operational role. By 
1918 the Germans had a clear understanding of the difference between the close and the deep 
battle and the need to coordinate the two. 
I also have considered the operational options, the plan, the preparations, and the 
execution for each of the operations. In assessing these operations, it is necessary to evaluate 
them against a model of a framework of the operational art. Unfortunately, no universally 
agreed upon framework exists. Even the doctrinal manuals of a single country are often in 
conflict. Furthermore, many of today's operational concepts would not have been understood 
by commanders in 1918. For these reasons, in the following chapter I propose a Framework 
of The Operational Art for use throughout this study. 
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THE PRIMARY SOURCES 
Since the end of World War Ia great deal has been written about the German offensives of 
1918. This is particularly true of the first and last offensives, Operation MICHAEL (21 March-5 
April) and Operation MARNESCHUTZ/REIMS (15-18 July). The three middle operations, 
GEORGETTE (9-29 April), BLÜCHER (27 May-13 June), and GNIESANAU (9-13 June) have 
not been covered as extensively. The thoroughly planned but never launched Operation HAGEN 
only receives passing mention in the existing literature. 
Much of this analysis has focused on the tactical level of war; on the planning, the conduct, 
and the results of the battles themselves. Several writers have placed the Ludendorff offensives in 
the strategic context, showing very clearly the impossibility of the German situation in 1918, 
despite what happened on the battlefield. To date, there has never been a thorough analysis at the 
operational level of war--that vital link between the strategic and the tactical. Some of the previous 
writings touch on various elements of the Operational Art, and some describe German planning 
and decision making at the operational level. None, however, have conducted a systematic analysis 
at the operational level, nor has there been a consideration of possible alternatives within a 
framework of more realistic German strategic objectives. 
Much of what has been written in English about the German side in 1918 has been based on 
secondary sources, and much of that was published originally in German. Researching the German 
records today is a challenging proposition. The German Army in World War I kept fairly complete 
and accurate records. At the conclusion of the war, however, not all the records went to the 
Reichsarchiv in Potsdam. The records of Bavarian Crown Prince Rupprecht's Army Group, 
including those of the Sixth but not the Fourth Army, were sent instead to the Bayerisches 
Kriegsarchiv in Munich. 
In 1944 many of the original World War I records in the Reichsarchiv were destroyed in a 
fire when Potsdam was bombed. After World War II, the bulk of the surviving World War I 
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records became part of the Bundesarchiv collection in Koblenz. Some of the surviving records in 
Berlin, however, fell into Soviet hands and wound up in the Kriegsarchiv of the German 
Democratic Republic (DDR). In the 1960s, all the West German-held military records were 
relocated to the newly established Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv (BA/MA) in the southwestern 
university town of Freiburg. 
After the reunification of Germany, the records in the DDR Kriegsarchiv were consolidated 
with those of the BA/MA in Freiburg. Fortunately, the records in the Bayerisches Kriegsarchiv 
survived the World War II bombing of Munich, and they remain in that city. These records include 
Rupprecht's units in Operation MICHAEL, virtually all of GEORGETTE, and all of the planning 
files for HAGEN. During the course of my research, I spent two weeks in the Bayerisches 
Kriegsarchiv and almost five months in the Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv studying the records in 
their collections. 
The BA/MA also holds several important collections of personal papers (Nachlass in 
German). Some collections, including the professional papers of Colonel Georg Bruchmüller, were 
lost in the Potsdam fire. Bruchmüller's personal papers (N/275) survived, however, and are 
currently in Freiburg. Other important collections in the BA/MA relevant to the 1918 offensives 
include the papers of Hans von Seeckt (N/247); Friedrich Graf von der Schulenburg-Tressow 
(N/58); Hermann Geyer (N/221); Hans von Haeften (N/35); and Joachim von Stülpnagel (N/5). 
Although many of the key original documents were destroyed in 1944, copies of some of 
those records have survived. Under the terms of a bilateral agreement between Germany and the 
United States, both sides had unrestricted access to the other's World War I military records until 
well into the 1930s. Between 1919 and 1937, the U. S. Army War College Historical Section 
maintained a senior American officer and a small locally hired clerical staff in Potsdam, 
transcribing selected records. The first officer assigned to this duty was Major Walter S. Krueger. 12 
Born in Germany and fluent in German, Krueger would later command the U. S. Sixth Army in the 
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Pacific in World War 11. Other officers assigned as "Representatives of the Historical Section" 
included Colonel Lewis S. Sorley (1922-1926); Major Bertram Cadwalader (1926-1928); 
Lieutenant Colonel C. H. Müller (1928-1932); Major J. O. Wagner (1932-1936); and Major J. P. 
Ratay (1936-1937). Ratay closed the mission and left Potsdam in December 1937--almost five 
years after Hitler came to power. I am especially grateful to Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. Sorley 
(U. S. Army, Retired) for sharing with me the section of his grandfather's unpublished 
reminiscences that deal with his time as head of the Potsdam mission. 13 
The American effort focused almost exclusively on the Western Front from about mid-1917 
through the end of the war--the period of direct American involvement. As a result of these efforts, 
many of the most important German records of the Ludendorff Offensives and the later 1918 
battles have survived. The records of many significant eastern front battles, such as Riga in 
September 1917, were not copied by the Americans and were lost forever in the 1944 fire. 
The American team in Potsdam did not translate any documents. They transcribed them 
word-for-word in the original German, typewritten with multiple carbon copies (at least two 
copies), using the brownish, semi-transparent, brittle copy paper of the day. After the transcribed 
documents were sent back to the Army War College, then located in Washington, they were split 
into two groups. Almost all the records from Operation BLÜCHER on were sent to Fort 
Leavenworth. There they were translated into English and used for lesson plan material throughout 
the 1920s at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. In 1923, many of the documents 
relating to Operation MARNSCHUTZ/REIMS were published by the General Service Schools 
Press at Fort Leavenworth in a book titled The German Offensive of July 15,1918 (Marne Source 
Book). 
The plan may have been to translate the records prior to BLÜCHER at some later date, but 
that apparently did not happen. The copies of the transcribed records eventually went to the U. S. 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), where they form the core of Record 
l 
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Group 165. This entire record group is now on microfilm. During the 1970s, the NARA gave the 
BA/MA what appears to be a complete set of carbon copies of the transcribed documents to help 
rebuild the collection lost in 1944. Copies of the translated documents, however, are not in the 
BA/MA. As near as I have been able to determine, the U. S. NARA does not have copies of the 
documents that were translated into English at Fort Leavenworth. 
As of 1997, some copies of the translated documents were still in the Combat Arms 
Research Library (CARL) at Ft. Leavenworth. At the time, they were part of an uncatalogued 
collection of World War I material sitting on a shelf at the back of the library. From my earlier 
work on the book Steel Wind: Colonel Georg Bruchmüller and the Birth of Modern Artillery, I 
recognized immediately that many of these records did not exist in the BA/MA in Freiburg. I 
believe I have been successful in obtaining photocopies of all the existing translated records at 
CARL with the kind cooperation of the staff. Of the slightly more than 900 documents I used for 
this analysis, some 200 of them, especially from Operations BLOCHER and GNEISENAU, are 
from the CARL holdings. To the best of my knowledge they exist nowhere else. 
RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND RISKS 
One of the most serious errors in historical analysis is to impose current thinking and 
values on the past. Yet, the very concepts of the Operational Level of War and the 
Operational Art are relatively recent constructs. The Soviets coined the term "Operational 
Art" in the 1920s, and the U. S. Army only recognized the operational as a distinct level of 
war in 1982. 
On the other hand, there has long been an understanding of certain distinct military 
activities that existed either at the high end of the tactical spectrum, or at the low end of the 
strategic. The term "Grand Tactics" was in vogue for some time. Likewise, many of the 
specific concepts we now associate with the Operational Art have been understood and 
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appreciated for many years. Culmination and Center of Gravity, for example, are 
Clausewitzian notions, while both Jomini and Clausewitz discussed Decisive Points. Even 
Clausewitz's narrow definition of Military Strategy comes very close to what we would today 
call Operational Art: "the use of engagements for the purpose of the war. " 14 
Although not necessarily called the "Operational Level of War, " the German Army 
first started to pay serious attention to this category of activities from about the time of 
Moltke the Elder. Thus, the challenging aspect of this study will be to evaluate the six 
operations against a framework of operational art as it would have been understood in by the 
Germans 1918. As German historian Hans Delbrück noted, the history of every military 
institution should be written within the context of its national history. 15 
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I object to the word "operations. " We 71 
just blow a hole in the middle. The rest 
will follow of its own accord. 
General of Infantry Erich Ludendorff 
CHAPTER II 
THE OPERATIONAL ART 
As noted in the Introduction, the concepts of the Operational Level of War and the 
operational art are constructs that started to evolve in the late nineteenth century and were 
only fully accepted in the West within the last thirty years. There remains today, moreover, a 
considerable amount of discussion among military theorists as to what these ideas really 
mean, what their components are, and how they fit into the scheme of the much older notions 
of strategy and tactics. 2 During the period of World War I, most armies in varying degrees 
had some understanding of many of the basic components of the operational art, but they all 
lacked an overall conceptual framework. 
Prior to analyzing the German 1918 offensives at the operational level, therefore, it 
will be necessary to consider exactly what operational art is; its evolution in military thought 
and practice; and how it was understood and practiced in the German Army up through 1918. 
In order to develop a full understanding of the operational art, it also will be necessary to 
discuss briefly its development and evolution since World War I and up through the present. 
Finally it will be necessary to review the key elements of the operational art as they currently 
are understood and practiced today. From these elements we will construct a framework to 
analyze the 1918 German offensives. 
THE TACTICAL-STRATEGIC LINK 
The purpose of tactics is to win battles. The purpose of strategy is to win wars. The 
purpose of the operational art is to win the campaigns, which are based upon battles and 
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which in turn contribute to strategic victory. 3 Put quite simply, then, the operational art is the 
vital link between tactics and strategy. The U. S. Army Command and General Staff College 
employs a simple graphic device to illustrate this point. The entire spectrum of warfighting 
activity is likened to a medieval morning star. The spiked ball that delivers the blow 
represents tactics. The wooden handle that directs the blow represents strategy. The flexible 
chain that connects the two represents operational art. 
It is an effective analogy, but it is one that comes apart if pushed too far. While in 
most cases tactical successes form the building blocks of operational success, and successful 
operations lead to strategic victory, this is not always the case. Nathaniel Greene's 1784 
Southern Campaign in the American Revolution provides a clear example of a general who 
lost every battle but still won the campaign. In more recent history, the U. S. Army won 
virtually every one of its battlefield engagements in Vietnam, yet America still lost the war. 
This, then, indicates that the relationships and the linkages among tactics and the operational 
art and strategy are all very dynamic and situationally dependent. 
For that reason, "operational art" remains a far better name for this category of 
activities than does "operational science. " Shimon Naveh wrote that it is only at the 
operational level that the extremes of the abstract strategic and the mechanical tactical can be 
fused. This, in turn, generates a certain amount of dynamic tension. 4 The 1918 Ludendorff 
Offensives offer one of the starkest yet complex examples of a string of stunning tactical 
successes that led nowhere. 
This still does not answer the question of what exactly the operational art is? ATP 35 
NATO Land Forces Tactical Doctrine defines the operational level of war as... 
The operational level provides the vital connection between the 
military strategic objectives and the tactical employment of 
forces on the battlefield through the conceptions, planning, and 
execution of major operations and campaigns. 
The 1993 edition of the U. S. doctrinal manual FM 100-5 Operations defines the operational 
art as... 
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The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or 
operational objectives within a theater through the design, 
organization, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, 
campaigns, major operations and battles. Operational art 
translates theater strategy and design into operational design 
which links and integrates the tactical battles and engagements 
that, when fought and won, achieve the strategic aim. Tactical 
battles and engagements are fought and won to achieve 
operational results. No specific level of command is solely 
concerned with operational art. 6 
The last sentence is particularly significant. Operational art was once thought to 
describe battlefield actions of the corps and higher levels. The real focus, however, is on the 
linkage to strategic aims. Thus, even a small patrol sent out to obtain a piece of intelligence 
of strategic value might be regarded as having an operational mission. 7 The size and nature 
of the war itself also have some bearing on were the operational level begins. In the Vietnam 
War, American divisions mostly functioned at the operational level; while in last years of 
World War I on the Western Front and World War II on the Eastern Front most actions below 
the army group level were tactical. 
As most contemporary military theorists argue, the very nature of the operational art is 
significantly different from tactics. General Donn A. Starry, one of the leaders of the post- 
Vietnam American military reform, suggested that, "... one goal of the Operational Battle must 
be to lessen the probability of prolonged military operations. " This point has a special 
resonance when considering the operational art during World War I. Starry also suggested 
that the operational art should seek to deny the enemy access to the objectives he seeks; deny 
the enemy's follow-on reinforcement; and find the opportunity to seize the initiative by 
destroying the integrity of the enemy's operational scheme. 8 Naveh advanced a similar 
argument by maintaining that the aim of the operational art should be the disruption of the 
enemy's system. 9 
James Schneider suggested that the dominant characteristic of the operational art 
is the "distributed free maneuver of forces in a theater of operations. " Distributed free 
maneuver leads to the dispersion of combat force in space and time. This is opposed to 
19 
the dominant feature of military operations up to the time of Napoleon--"concentrated 
maneuver of forces in a theater of operations culminating in a single decisive battle. " 10 
Like Schneider, Naveh asserted that operational thinking is a significant departure from 
the Clausewitzian notion of the destruction of the enemy's force. (More on this line of 
thought in the following sections. ) Naveh also introduced the concept of "Interactive 
Cooperation. " He defined this as the interaction between the holding element and the 
striking element of a force, with the relationship between the two varying from the 
operational offensive to the operational defensive. In the operational offense the 
striking element is superior in weight, length, and velocity. In the operational defense the 
superiority in weight and resources are on the side of the holding element, with the striking 
element having a thin and shallow vector. In both situations, decision ultimately is attained by 
the dynamic action of the striking force. " Note the similarity between Naveh's concept of the 
operational defense and Clausewitz's "shield of blows. " 
Richard Simpkin stressed the importance of synergism at the operational level, where 
the whole of the operation must have a greater effect than the sum of its parts. In the modern 
context, operational synergy includes the integration of air, land, and sea forces. During 
World War I, however, military planners wrestled with the problem of synergy on the even 
more fundamental tactical level. By 1918, only a limited number of those planners were 
beginning to understand fully the intricacies of combined arms (also called all arms) warfare 
that synchronized the tactical effects of infantry, artillery, armor, air attack, engineers, and the 
supporting services. Each possesses a distinctive tactical quality--effect, dimension, range, 
duration, etc. The strength of one compensates for weakness of the others, while at the same 
time complementing the strengths of the others. 12 
There are a number of specific elements and components that constitute the 
operational art and which military planners must consider when developing the overall 
campaign plan. These will be discussed in detail at the concluding section of this chapter. 
But before a military commander or planner can begin to deal with that level of detail, a 
group of far more basic considerations must be addressed. These considerations are identified 
in the current version of U. S. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. These 
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considerations are so fundamental that they can be used to evaluate virtually any military 
action at the operational level of war. 13 
The Necessary Military Conditions: What is the definition of success? What is the 
desired end state? What are the goals? Without operational goals there is no basis for 
operational planning or decision-making. 
The Necessary Sequence of Events: In most circumstances it is unlikely that a 
strategic goal can be achieved with a single operational stroke. What, then, are the stepping- 
stones to get there? Because of the dynamics of the battlefield, these steps cannot be fixed. 
What then, are the branches and sequels to the operational plan? This recalls Moltke's famous 
dictum; "No operations plan will ever extend with any sort of certainty beyond the first 
encounter with the hostile main force. " 14 As A. S. H. Irwin noted, it is the sequencing of 
operations that constitute the precise difference between a battle and a campaign. 15 
The Necessary Resources: This includes both the combat power (manpower, weapons 
capabilities, etc. ) and the major logistical component (supplies, transportation, maintenance, 
etc. ) of the plan. At the operational level of war, the logistical realities dictate the combat 
possibilities far more than at the tactical level. As an intelligence indicator, the direction of 
the logistical tail more often than not points directly to the striking point of the combat teeth. 
These three key considerations equate exactly to the three elements of the general 
military strategy model developed by Colonel Arthur Lykke of the U. S. Army War College. 
According to Lykke, military strategy consists of balancing the equation... 16 
ENDS = WAYS + MEANS 
Compared to Joint Publication 3-0, Lykke's Ends equate to the necessary military conditions; 
Ways equate to the necessary sequence of events; and Means equate to the necessary 
resources. 
Even with all these considerations, it still can be very difficult to determine exactly 
where the tactical level ends and the strategic level begins. The three levels of war, in fact, are 
not discrete, and a fair degree of overlap occurs from situation to situation. Writing in 1993, 
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Irwin suggested three key tests to identify the operational level of war. A "yes" to one or more 
of these tests indicates that the actions are at the operational level. 
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Firstly, is there a political dimension? Simpkin noted that an operational mission 
should be only "one remove from the strategic objective. " 
IS In the case of the 1918 
offensives, Ludendorff wanted to collapse French resolve by knocking Britain out of the 
coalition. 
Secondly, does the action have a possibility of achieving a decision that will 
materially alter the situation in terms of the overall campaign? In 1918 Ludendorff wanted to 
eliminate the BEF before American troops arrived in force and tipped the strategic balance. 
And thirdly, does the action have a possibility of achieving a decision that will 
materially assist in achieving the strategic goals? Rather than ending the war with a 
negotiated peace, Ludendorff believed that he could actually achieve a decisive military 
victory that would leave Germany in control of the strategic Belgian coast. 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF THE OPERATIONAL ART 
Strategy and tactics have long been identified as distinct albeit connected spheres of 
military theory and action. The notions of the operational art and the operational level of war 
are of far more recent origin. The military theories underlying the operational art did not 
evolve uniformly; rather they progressed in stages over the course of the last two centuries. 
Among many of the world's great armies during this period, major defeats provided the 
impetus for intellectual advances in doctrine. This is particularly true of Prussia following 
Jena; the Soviet Union following Warsaw in 1920; Germany following World War I; and the 
United States following Vietnam. 19 
These particular examples line up nicely with the four key landmarks in the evolution, 
of operational theory suggested by Naveh. The first is the period of 19th Century Military 
Thought, which Naveh called the "roots of operational ignorance. " This period ended in the 
1920s and was characterized by an "attempt to manipulate tactics on a major scale. " Soviet 
Deep Operations Theory followed, which finally broke with the Clausewitzian paradigm of 
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the battle of annihilation (Vernichtungsschlacht). Then came the German so-called Blitzkrieg, 
which Naveh and others have argued lacked the fundamentals of true operational thought. 
And finally, American AirLand Battle, which formed the basis of the overwhelming Allied 
success in the 1991 Gulf War. 20 
The 19th Century: 
The operational art is a distinct product of the modern age, with roots imbedded firmly 
in the Industrial Revolution. As the range and lethality of modem weapons increased, the 
battlefield expanded by necessity. Technological improvements made it increasingly less 
necessary to achieve massed effects with massed formations of troops. Simultaneously, those 
same improvements in weapons transformed the tightly packed massed formations of old into 
far more vulnerable and lucrative targets. As armies grew, modem warfare also became 
increasingly dependent upon the will and resources of the entire populations of nations. 21 
Although there is no rigid connection between unit size and the operational level of 
war, the operational art clearly is concerned primarily with the deployment, movements, and 
actions of larger units. Large-scale battlefield operations in the modern sense first emerged 
with the levee en masse and Napoleon's mass armies. Some would even argue that Napoleon 
actually created the prototype of the operational art with his maneuver of multiple corps 
formations on a grand scale. 22 The structure and organization of armies were never the same 
after Napoleon. Throughout the 19th century and into the 20th, large armies continued to be 
regarded as one of the principal factors for success in war. Writing on the eve of World War I, 
General Friedrich von Bernhardi noted; "Numbers seem to the present generation the decisive 
factor in war; " and, "... all states of Europe are dominated by the mania for numbers. " 23 
In the years following Napoleon his two major interpreters, Antoine Henri Jomini and 
Carl von Clausewitz, contributed much to the foundations of the operational art as we 
understand it today. Jomini hinted at an intermediate level of war, and he used the term 
"grand tactics" to describe it. His description of grand tactics is very close to the modern 
notion of the operational art: "The art of making good combinations preliminary to battles, as 
well as during their progress. " 24 
23 
Clausewitz emphasized the distinction between strategy and tactics, but a close 
reading of On War suggests that when Clausewitz spoke of "policy" he was speaking of what 
we now call strategy; and when he spoke of strategy he was really talking about what we now 
call operations. As he noted: "According to our classification then, tactics teaches the use of 
armed forces in the engagement; strategy the use of engagements for the object of the tivar. " 
(emphasis in the original)25 In one passage in On War Clausewitz clearly identified three 
distinct levels of war in both time and space: "The concepts characteristic of time--war, 
campaign, and battle--are parallel to those of space--country, theater of operations, and 
position. " 26 
Historians are split on whether or not Clausewitz really had a clear grasp of the 
operational as distinct from the tactical and strategic. Bradley Meyer noted; "Clausewitz, like 
Moltke, used the term strategy to describe a phenomenon that would generally be described as 
operational art today. " 27 Naveh, on the other hand, contended that while Clausewitz 
recognized an intermediate sphere of military activity that synthesized mechanics with 
cerebration, he never understood the distinctive problems of the operational level of war. He 
thus, according to Naveh, relegated the operational level to an auxiliary one, designed to give 
tactical battle some of its technical requirements. 28 
Naveh's criticisms of Clausewitz's operational thinking often seem take on a post facto 
character, almost as if Clausewitz should have been writing with fully developed 20th century 
military technology in mind. Naveh, for example, criticized Clausewitz for placing greater 
value on operational destruction than on mobility. 29 And Clausewitz did in fact write: 
"Destruction being a more effective factor than mobility, the complete absence of cavalry 
would prove to be less debilitating to an army than a complete absence of artillery. "30 In 
Clausewitz's day, however, there was a great deal of truth to this. 
Technology clearly is a major factor that influenced the development of operational 
theory. Improvements in battlefield mobility and communications have made possible speed 
and maneuver on vast scales while simultaneously maintaining control of units over a wide 
area. As technological capabilities evolved, operational theory evolved with them. The 
military use of the railway was perhaps the most influential technological change in the 
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second half of the 19th century. Railways made possible rapid movement of large masses of 
troops and equipment; the correspondingly shortened transit time reduced feeding and 
billeting requirements; troops and horses arrived in relatively fresh condition; and improved 
logistical support made possible the sustainment of mass conscript armies in the field. The 
first operational use of military railways occurred in 1849, when a Russian corps moved from 
Warsaw to Vienna to protect the city from Hungarian rebels. 31 During the American Civil 
War, two Union corps--more than 20,000 troops, their equipment, and horses--moved 1,230 
miles by rail in just eleven days in September 1864.32 Moltke made a careful study of the 
lessons of the American Civil War, and in 1870 the Germans made far more masterful use of 
their rail system than did the French. 
There is some debate, however, on the influence of railways on the operational art. 
Naveh suggested that the railways were a means of strategic movement, but not of operational 
maneuver. He further argued that efforts to use rail in the service of a strategic offense 
resulted in such distortions that operational maneuver could not be applied. These distortions 
were caused by the technical limitations of the rail system, which imposed its broad linear 
patterns on any deployment, thereby dooming true operational maneuver. 33 Moltke himself 
believed rail was an inflexible instrument, its effective use based on strict timetables. While 
this may have been true in 1870, European trackage tripled between 1871 and 1914. At the 
start of World War I the rail net in Europe was so dense that there was a far greater amount of 
flexibility in its use. By 1913 Germany had 12 kilometers of track for every 100 square 
kilometers of territory; France had 10; Austria-Hungary had 7; and Russia had only 1.34 
Advances in communications technology also made possible command and control of 
units spread across the battlefield on a scale previously unimaginable. First the electric 
telegraph, then the telephone, and then radio made "real time" control possible over great 
distances; but these innovations also generated a false illusion of absolute control. In 1870 
Germany had 1,000 telegraph stations; by 1911 it had 637,000. Early electronic 
communications technology, however, also had something of a retarding effect on operational 
maneuver. Permanent telegraph lines to a German army headquarters in the field could be laid 
at the rate of only five miles per day--which almost never could keep pace with the rate of 
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advancing units. And the ability to communicate often led directly to a tendency to over- 
control and micromanage--a problem that most armies still grapple with at the start of the 
21st century. By 1917 the average British field army's daily communications traffic averaged 
something like 10,000 telegrams, 20,000 telephone calls, and 5,000 messenger-delivered 
dispatches. 35 How much of that volume, one wonders, was really necessary for the planning ; 
and conduct of battlefield operations? 
By the final decades of the 19th century, the Napoleonic concept of the "strategy of a 
single point" had given way to Moltke's concept of the "extended line"--which in turn finally. 
reached its logical conclusion in the extended trenches of World War I. As battle lines 
expanded, the ability to control them directly decreased. Even with the improvements in 
communications technology, command and control increasingly became more indirect, 
through added layers of subordinate echelons. 6 At the start of the 20th century, the Russo- 
Japanese War provided a brief foreshadowing of the technological "future shock" and the 
resulting tactical and operational problems that would come in World War I. The battlefield, 
in Manchuria assumed previously unimagined levels of breadth and depth. The main problem ; 
became one of conquering space and time to bring about a concentration of combat power at 
the decisive point 37 In 1904 the available technical means of mobility, communications, and 
control were not equal to the demands of the battlefield--nor would they be ten years later. 
Although we will later discuss in detail German operational art in World War I, it is 
necessary here to fit the Great War briefly into the overall discussion. World War I in general,. 
and the Western Front in particular, present a problem for the student of the operational art. 
After Germany's failure to win a quick and decisive victory, the Western Front fell into a 
stalemate that lasted almost until the end of the war. Until 1918, the operational art "had more 
to do with orchestration than with maneuver. " 38 
The experience of World War I dramatically demonstrated that single operations no 
longer guaranteed the successful outcome of a campaign, and that cumulative tactical success', 
was no guarantee of strategic success. Decision could only brought about by "successive 
operations linked by intent, location, allocation of resources, and concerted action . 
09 This, 
however, only became clear after the end of the war. Between 1914 and 1918, most military 
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leaders surrounded by the fog of war repeatedly tried to plan and conduct single battles of 
annihilation that would produce decisive strategic results. 40 
Writing in the years immediately after World War I, J. F. C. Fuller made one of the 
most significant contributions in the West to the evolution of the theory of the operational art- 
-which Fuller called "grand tactics. " According to Fuller: "This is the duty of the grand 
tactician; he takes over the forces as they are distributed and arranges them according to the 
resistance they are likely to meet. i41 Fuller also was one of the first military theorists in the 
West to articulate clearly that the primary targets of the operational plan should be the 
enemy's plan and the will of the enemy commander. For Fuller, the object of "grand tactics" 
was the "destruction of the enemy's plan. " 
Fuller also believed that it was an error for the grand tactician to think only in terms of 
destruction. He argued that when Clausewitz wrote about destruction of the hostile force, he 
meant it as a means to enforcing policy. Fuller believed that this key point was glossed over 
by most of Clausewitz's followers, with the result that destruction became an end in itself, 
rather than a means. Fuller further noted that while an objective of destruction was useful at 
the tactical level, at the level of "grand tactics" it was an serious error. The decisive point, he 
concluded, was not the body of an enemy's army, but rather it was "the will of the enemy's 
commander. " "To paralyze this will we must attack his plan, which expresses his will--his 
reasoned decisions. Frequently, to do so, we must attack his troops, but not always. " 42 
The grand tactician does not think of physical destruction, 
but of mental destruction, and, when the mind of the 
enemy's commander can only be attacked through the 
bodies of his men, then from grand tactics we descend to 
minor tactics, which, though related, is a different 
expression of force. 
We see, therefore, that grand tactics is the battle between 
two plans energized by two wills, and not merely the 
struggle between two or more military forces. 43 
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Soviet Deep Operations Theory: 
In the years following World War I, Soviet theorists made many significant 
contributions to the evolution of the operational art as we know it today. Even prior to World 
War I, Russian military writers around 1907 introduced the concept of Opertika. 44 
Following the disastrous defeat of the Red Army at Warsaw in 1920, two opposing of schools 
of thought emerged among the Soviets. One was led by Marshal Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky, 
the Red Army front commander at Warsaw. Tukhachevsky, who read Fuller's works, became 
the champion of the "annihilation" school of Soviet military thought. Annihilation depended 
upon the ability to conduct large-scale, immediate, decisive operations. It required a war 
industry in being, and a large standing army. 45 In 1924 Tukhachevsky delivered a paper on 
Maneuver and Artillery that had a strong influence on the Frunze Reforms of 1924-25. Those 
ideas were later formalized in the Field Service Regulations of 1927.46 
The opposing school of thought was led by Major General Aleksandr A. Svechin, a 
Soviet General Staff officer. In his influential 1926 book, Strategy, Svechin advocated the 
doctrine of "attrition, " which relied more on Russia's traditional deep resources of space, 
time, and manpower. Svechin also introduced the concept of operations as distinct from 
strategy and tactics. He argued that tactics made up the steps from which operational leaps 
were assembled, "with strategy pointing out the path. " 47 Within a year of Svechin 
introducing the concept, the Soviets established a Chair on the Conduct of Operations within 
the Department of Strategy at the Military Academy of the Red Army. 48 
Both Svechin and Tukhachevsky were murdered in Stalin's purges of the 1930s, but 
their opposing theories were synthesized by Vladimir K. Triandafillov in his book The Nature 
of the Operations of Modern Armies. Published in 1929, the book is now regarded as one of 
the seminal works in Soviet military thought. Triandafillov too had read the works of many of 
the post World War I Western writers, and his own view on the operational use of artillery 
was influenced at least indirectly by the ideas of Germany's Georg Bruchmüller. 49 
Triandafillov was the first to introduce the planning "norms" that became one of the 
benchmarks of Soviet operational planning. He also laid out the theory of successive 
operations and deep operations (glubokaia operatsiia), with the result that several successive 
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operations were linked into one single continuous deep operation. Thus, the point of 
Napoleon and line of Moltke gave way to the vector in depth, with its multiple effects--both 
sequentially and simultaneously--in three dimensions. Another important concept introduced 
by Triandafillov was operational shock (udar), which echoed Fuller's ideas of striking at the 
enemy's system and plan. 50 
Although the operational art emerged during the inter-war years in the Soviet Union 
as a vibrant new field of military study, many of the operational concepts associated with it 
were stillborn or only partially developed. As David Glantz pointed out, the Red Army 
would learn this hard truth and suffer accordingly during the Winter War with Finland and in 
1941 during the opening months of the war with Germany. Soviet operational art only 
reached its highest level of development through trial and error in the crucible of World War 
II. And yet for all its final sophistication, the Soviets never fully developed the air and naval 
51 of the operational art. l 
Blitzkrieg: 
The widely held popular belief is that what the West called Blitzkrieg represented the 
most highly developed form of the operational art to that time. Many historians, however, 
have argued that Blitzkrieg was at best a deeply flawed expression of the operational art. 
Naveh described it as a "mechanized manipulation of tactical patterns; " a "simplistic attempt 
to magnify the tactical patterns of infiltration and encirclement; " and a tactical response to 
Hitler's incoherent strategy. 52 Menning described Blitzkrieg as a theory of combined arms 
tactics aimed at achieving rupture through the depth of an enemy's tactical deployment. 
Following the rupture, rapidly moving armored forces were to exploit the tactical penetration 
by driving into operational depth. Thus, while Blitzkrieg exhibited many of the features we 
now associate with the operational art, it focused too heavily on annihilation and rapid 
decision by a single bold stroke. 53 
Despite these criticisms of Blitzkrieg, the post-World War I German Army had a clear 
albeit imperfect understanding of a level of war between the tactical and the strategic. Writing 
in 1920, General Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven noted that among German General 
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Staff officers, the term Operativ was increasingly replacing the term Strategisch to "define 
more simply and clearly the difference from everything tactical. " 
54 The 1933 edition of 
Truppenführung, the primary German warfighting manual of World War II, distinguished 
" 
clearly between tactical and operational functions. Truppenführung's principal author, 
General Ludwig Beck, considered Operativ as a subdivision of strategy. Its sphere was the , 
conduct of battle at the higher levels, in accordance with the tasks presented by strategic 
planning. 56 Naveh even admitted that Truppenführung was the "best evidence confirming the 
existence of operational cognition prior to the year 1938. " 57 Curiously enough, when U. S. , 
Army intelligence made a rough translation of Truppenführung just prior to World War I, the 
term Operativ was translated throughout as "strategic. " 58 
AirLand Battle: 
Post-World War II American military doctrine focused almost exclusively at the 
tactical level. Although the U. S. Army and its British allies had planned and executed large 
and complex operational campaigns during the war, the mechanics of those efforts were 
largely forgotten by the early 1950S. 59 Nuclear weapons cast a long retarding shadow over 
American ground combat doctrine, and the later appearance of "battlefield nuclear weapons" 
seemed to render irrelevant any serious consideration of maneuver by large-scale ground 
units. The Soviets, meanwhile, continued to study and write about the operational art and the 
operational level of war. And while the American military intelligence community closely 
monitored and analyzed the trends in Soviet doctrine, American theorists ignored or 
completely rejected these concepts. Because of its dominant role in NATO, America's 
operational blinders were adopted for the most part by its coalition allies. 
In the early to mid-1970s American thinking began to change. The three major spurs 
,, 
to this transformation were the loss in Vietnam; the stunning new weapons effects seen in the 
1973 Middle East War; and the increasing need to fight outnumbered and win against the 
Warsaw Pact. 60 Initially, American sights remained fixed at the tactical level--"Win the First 
Battle"--with little consideration beyond that battle. 61 The first result of this re-thinking was 
the 1976 edition of FM 100-5 Operations, which introduced the notion of "active defense, " a 
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rather curious substitute for the tested concepts of mobile defense and defense in-depth. The 
1976 edition was wildly controversial even before it had been fully distributed to the field. 
The resulting debate, however, was uncannily similar to the robust German doctrinal debate 
of the 1920s, and sparked something of a renaissance in American military thinking. The 
reactions to the 1976 edition included the notion of follow-on-forces attack (FOFA), which in 
turn led to recognition of the operational depth of the battlefield. 
The concept of the operational level of war entered the debate when the influential 
defense analyst Edward Luttwak published the article "The Operational Level of War" in the 
winter 1980-81 issue of the journal International Security. 62 About the same time, Colonel 
Harry Summers' book, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, sparked a parallel 
renaissance in strategic thinking and the rediscovery of Clausewitz by the American military. 
The U. S. Army formally recognized the operational level of war with the publication of the 
1982 edition of FM 100-5, which also introduced the concepts of AirLand Battle and Deep 
Battle. 3 The operational art was first defined in the 1986 edition, along with the concept that 
commanders had to fight and synchronize three simultaneous battles; close, deep, and rear. 
The idea was that one's own deep battle would be the enemy's rear battle, and the converse. 
The close battle would always be strictly tactical, but the deep and rear battles would have 
operational significance. 64 
American conduct of the 1991 Gulf War was based on the 1986 edition of FM 100-5, 
which is arguably the best official formulation of American operational thinking to date. The 
1993 edition of FM 100-5 actually shifted the emphasis away from operations toward strategy 
and operations other than war (OOTW). Even the term "AirLand Battle" was dropped in favor 
of "Army Operations, " but this was more the result of bureaucratic in fighting between the 
Army and Air Force. A new edition of FM 100-5 in 1998 was supposed to shift the emphasis 
back to the operational art, but the final coordinating draft caused considerable internal 
controversy. The new manual finally was issued in June 2001 under a new numbering system 
as, FM 3-0 Operations. 
The British recognized the operational level of war in 1989. Current British doctrine 
distinguishes four levels of war, with strategy being split into grand strategy followed by 
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military strategy. 65 Actually, American thinking about the strategic level of war remains a bit, 
confused. Although they recognize only the strategic above the operational level, the 
Americans periodically issue separate documents for National Security Strategy and National, 
Military Strategy that closely parallel the British notions of grand and military strategy. 
Furthermore, various American doctrinal manuals mention something called "theater 
strategy" that really sounds more operational than strategic. At the dawn of the 21st century, 
theories of the operational art and the operational level of war are evolving still. 
GERMAN OPERATIONAL ART 
Military historians are in general agreement on their evaluations of the German Army, 
at the tactical and strategic levels. Between 1870 and 1945, the Germans set the standard for 
tactical excellence on the battlefield. Many of the innovations they introduced during that 
period are still with us today. Simultaneously, the pre-1945 German Army had serious 
problems dealing with the strategic level of war. This partially was the result of their belief 
that strategy, especially national or grand strategy, lay in the political realm and was not the 
proper concern of the professional soldier. The course of instruction at the Kriegsakadamie 
reflected this bias, and that august institution produced generation after generation of German 
General Staff officers ill-equipped to deal with strategic issues. When a political leader of 
Bismarck's capabilities was at the helm of the German state, this handicap did not necessarily 
prove fatal. But when incompetents or a madman were in control of strategy, as in World 
Wars I and II, the German military had no counterbalance to offer. The German officer 
education system simply was not designed to produce generals like Alanbrooke, George 
Marshall, or Colin Powell. Moltke the Elder probably was the closest the German Army ever . 
came. 
The middle ground of the operational level of war produces far greater division among, 
historians. Naveh dismissed almost all German operational art as merely tactical manipulation, 
on a massive scale, while Jehuda Wallach pointed to the overemphasis on--or the misreading 
of--Clausewitz's annihilation principle (Vernichtungsprinzip) as the source of German 
operational failure. Meyer, Simpkin, and Roland Foerster, on the other hand, have argued that 
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the German Army had a significant, if somewhat imperfect, understanding of the operational 
level from at least the time of Moltke the Elder. 
Germany conducted seven operational-level campaigns between 1864 and 1918: 
Denmark in 1864; Austria in 1866; France in 1870-71; France in 1914; France at Verdun in 
1916; Russia and Romania in 1916-17; and France and Britain in the first half of 1918. Six of 
the seven were against first class opponents. Four of the seven succeeded and two came close. 
Verdun was a radical departure from German practice, where they tried to win through 
firepower and attrition. 
In his book, The German Army, Herbert Rosinski wrote that German military theory 
alternated between stressing either operations or tactics. Scharnhorst emphasized tactics. 
Moltke balanced the two, although there was a significant operational component to his 
thought. Schlieffen tipped the balance heavily toward operations. And Ludendorff, with 
whom we are most concerned in this study, returned to the thinking that tactics took 
precedence over both the operational art as well as strategy. 66 
Moltke the Elder: 
Modern notions of the operational art developed under Moltke from the 1850s on, and 
its evolution was concurrent with the growth of the first modern general staff system. 7 
Rosinski maintained that under Moltke, the operations to set up the conditions for the battle 
and the tactical outcome of the battle were seen as separate entities. But recognizing the 
increased firepower of modern weapons in the defense, Moltke's objective was to achieve 
decision in war by operational rather than by tactical means. 68 Foerster and Christopher 
Bellamy noted that Moltke clearly distinguished the relationship between strategy, operations, 
and tactics in his 1871 work, Über Strategie--although Moltke resisted defining the concepts 
too sharply. 69 Michael D. Krause argued that, "Moltke's concept of operational direction was 
the beginning of the operational level of war. , 70 John English, on the other hand, suggested 
that Moltke seems to have used the concept Operativ almost exclusively in the sense of the 
movement of bodies of troops for the purpose of combining forces for decisive battle. 1 
Simpkin likewise noted that for Moltke, the purpose of the operational plan was to ensure that 
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the initial contact between the main bodies of the opposing forces occurred under the most .. 
favorable of circumstances, at which point tactics took over. 72 
Meyer advanced what is perhaps the most forceful argument that Moltke "was a 
practitioner of operational art as the term is understood today. 03 Meyer identified three main 
elements of the operational art as practiced by Moltke: a clearly defined goal or objective for 
the campaign; the selection of goals to which the operations would be directed; and, mastery 
of the mechanics of the operation at hand. 74 
Moltke was one of the first to understand that the battle, the campaign, and the war all 
had different, though related, aims. He also understood clearly that he was operating in an age 
of increasing firepower. The increased strength of the tactical defense, therefore, made it 
necessary to avoid frontal attacks--at least at the operational level. To accomplish this, 
Moltke's formula was one of "Fix, Encircle, Destroy, " (Umfassen, Einschliessen, Vernichten). 
Moltke's operational concept involved rapid deployment along exterior lines exploiting rail, ; 
movement, and a converging march of separated parts aimed at unification on the field of 
battle. As Moltke stated it, "march separated, fight concentrated, " (Getrennt marschieren, 
vereint schlagen). The first arriving elements of the force would be used to fix the enemy 
frontally, while the movements of the still separated elements of the force would be directed 
to the enemy's flanks. If a unit's action contributed directly to the course of action of the 
campaign, then its action was operational. If the action of a unit did not have the potential to 
affect the course of the campaign, then the action was tactical, regardless of the size of the 
action. 75 As Moltke himself wrote; "Many important purposes of war can be attained without 
battles, through marches, through the choice of positions, in short, through operations. " 76 
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Schlieffen and the Battle of Annihilation: 
German operational thinking after Moltke and through the start of World War I was . 
dominated by Schlieffen's focus on Cannae and his notions of envelopment on a grand scale . 
combined with rapid decision through a decisive battle of annihilation. Less well remembered 
than Schlieffen's concept of the Vernichtungsschlacht, however, is his notion of the total 
battle (Gesamtschlacht). The latter provided the rationale for the former. According to this 
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concept, the dynamics of operational forward movement would create the center of gravity 
and escalate into the annihilation of the enemy's force. The Gesamtschlacht combined 
separate actions and locations into an integrated operation in one joint and continuous 
movement. In so doing, Schlieffen replaced the arithmetical concept of operations that added 
battles up into a campaign with one of integrated, continuous, and expanding motion. 77 
Schlieffen took an opposite approach to Moltke, opting for a grand master plan to 
carry from mobilization right through to strategic victory. In so doing, he subordinated 
strategy to operations. By the time he retired in 1905, Schlieffen had developed a view of 
operations in which mobilization, deployment, and maneuver all flowed one from the other. 78 
But when Bismarck had been in control of diplomacy and national strategy, the German 
General Staff did not have to worry about fighting a two-front war. Bismarck's skillful 
diplomacy also managed to keep Germany's opponents diplomatically isolated. Yet while 
Bismarck had sought quick victories to his wars to forestall the intervention of other powers, 
the German war plans based on Schlieffen's principles virtually guaranteed that intervention. 
By 1914, eight years after Schlieffen's retirement, Germany still had only one basic 
war plan, despite the varied political circumstances that might bring it into war. This perhaps 
is the clearest of indicators of the German disconnect between operational and strategic 
thinking. During World War I, Germany for the first (but not for the last) time faced a 
coalition with greater resources than itself. Nonetheless, the German General Staff responded 
with an operational variation of the Wars of German Unification. The Germans tried to defeat 
the coalition one member at a time through operational campaigns. Although the strategic 
framework was entirely different, the operational approach never varied from the tried and 
true path. The traditional German operational solution focused on achieving a quick victory, 
and the General Staff never seemed to come to grips with the fact that they were in a long- 
term war. As Meyer noted: "The General Staff did not fight a four-year war, they fought four 
one-year wars. " 79 
In The Dogma of the Battle ofAnnihilation, Wallach argued that the key distortion in 
German operational thinking resulted from Schlieffen misreading Clausewitz and placing far 
too much emphasis on achieving military decision through the rapid annihilation of the 
35 
enemy force. 80 Naveh, on the other hand, argued that Schlieffen read Clausewitz correctly, 
for the most part, and that the so-called Schlieffen Plan "derived from Clausewitzian 
conceptual origin. i81 But in his book, After Clausewitz, Antulio Echevarria argued that 
Wilhelmine military theory, "had clearly broken free of the Napoleonic paradigm by the end 
of the Russo-Japanese War. " 82 The question remains, then, what exactly did Clausewitz 
mean by his Vernichtungsprinzip? 
In On War Clausewitz wrote; "The fighting force must be destroyed: that is, they must 
be put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight. Whenever we use the 
phrase `destruction of the enemy's forces' this alone is what we mean. " [emphasis in the 
original. ] 83 Is it really necessary, then, to annihilate a force to put it in a condition that it "can 
no longer carry on the fight"? Neutralization of an enemy force might accomplish this just as '. 
well. Schlieffen and his followers, however, drew the conclusion that it was not enough to be 
decisive, the enemy had to be annihilated. For Schlieffen this complete destruction could 
only be achieved by encirclement, and he therefore totally rejected the concept of 
breakthrough. But even Clausewitz himself was not exactly consistent on this point. In Book 
1 of On War, the emphasis is clearly on destruction. Yet by Books 7 and 8, the emphasis 
seems to shift to one of dislocation of the enemy. 84 
In analyzing German military thought, it is all too easy to try to build too much of a 
case on what Clausewitz may have meant on a given point, or how he may or may not have 
been misinterpreted. The views of the pre-World War I German General Staff were more 
often in line with Jomini than with Clausewitz. 85 The German Army actually rejected some 
of Clausewitz's most important concepts, such as the relationship between war and policy and 
the idea of defense as the stronger form of war. 86 In his book, How Germany Makes War, 
Bernhardi bluntly wrote, "Clausewitz considers the defensive the stronger form of conducting 
war. I do not share this opinion. 07 Ludendorff himself went to the farthest extreme in 
rejecting the theories of the Philosopher of War, arguing for the primacy of war over 
politics. 88 
Both Rosinski and Wallach have offered explanations of why the pre-World War I 
German Army progressively turned away from the ideas of Clausewitz. Rosinski pointed out 
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that increasingly after 1871, materialism, glorification of science and technology, and 
admiration of wealth and power replaced traditional German humanistic values. The 
consequence was an ever-more narrow and un-intellectual officer corps. While the officers of 
the era of Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Clausewitz were cultivated men with a wide range of 
intellectual interests, the generations between 1871 and 1914 tended to be technicians of 
power, with little interest in non-military matters. Thus, Schlieffen's "mechanical 
schematism, " and his creation of simple dogmas carried far greater appeal for German 
soldiers of the Wilhelmine era than did Clausewitz's cerebral reflections on the nature of 
war. 89 
Schlieffen by no means was the sole source of German military thought in the years 
preceding 1914. For almost 35 years before World War I officers of the General Staff and 
military historian Hans Delbrück engaged in a Strategiestreit (strategy debate) over 
Clausewitz's distinction between absolute and limited war. Delbriick argued that this duality 
corresponded to two broad types of strategy: Vernichtungsstrategie (strategy of annihilation), 
which aimed for the complete defeat of the enemy; and Ermattungsstrategie (strategy of 
attrition), which aimed more limited goals. According to Delbrück, battle was the only means 
of Vernichtungsstrategie, but both battle and maneuver were the means of 
Ermattungsstrategie. Delbrück, the civilian professor, irritated the members of the General 
Staff by arguing that Frederick the Great had pursued a strategy of attrition rather than 
annihilation. 90 
General Sigismund W. von Schlichting was an interpreter of Moltke and a theoretical 
competitor and critic of Schlieffen. In his turn-of-the-century book, Taktische und 
Strategische Grundsätze der Gegenwart, Schlichting emphasized the importance of using 
operational (Operativ) maneuver to achieve the purposes of war. But he also argued that 
breakthrough battles would be impossible to avoid, and that the necessity to combine forms of 
maneuver such as penetrations and envelopments required a less mechanistic approach to 
command. Following the Russo-Japanese War, Schlichting's works were translated into 
Russian in 1910 and studied at the Russian General Staff Academy. 1 
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Friedrich von Bernhardi was another independent thinker whose writings 
demonstrated a definite understanding of operational issues. In How Germany Makes War ; 
Bernhardi noted: "The tactical and strategic importance of reserves and the importance of the 
operative element in war must be minutely weighed. "92 In the chapter titled, "Time, Space, r, 
and Direction, " he wrote: "The art of war reckons with time and space, which have a distinct 
reciprocal effect upon each other. 03 This sentence shows a clear understanding of the 
multidimensional character of the modern battlefield--a distinct departure from Napoleon's 
point and Moltke's line. 
Ludendorff and World War I: 
Many of the technical battlefield problems that came to characterize World War I 
were foreshadowed in the Russo-Japanese War, and to some degree in the Balkan Wars of 
1912 and 1913. The major European armies studied those conflicts closely, but the Great 
War started before most of the lessons could be understood and integrated into existing force 
structure and doctrine. The changes since Moltke's day were significant, indeed. As modern 
firepower had increased, it took a smaller force to cover a given length of front with fire. The 
armies themselves were much bigger, and armies with broader fronts were much harder to 
flank. As World War I progressed, army groups made their first appearance on the battlefield. 
As previously noted, World War I also saw the advent of three-dimensional warfare, with 
both time and space acquiring a dimension of depth. 
This then, became the overriding operational problem of the Great War on the 
Western Front. The front was the easiest part of the enemy's force to attack, not the flanks or, 
rear. After the German failure at the Marne and the subsequent "Race to the Sea, " there were 
no longer any operational flanks to go around. The sea itself constituted a strategic flank. The,., 
only solution apparent to both sides was to attempt somehow to achieve and then exploit a 
tactical breakthrough of a strongly defended front. But as those fronts solidified to great 
depths, a breakthrough became almost impossible--although a break-in could always be 
achieved. The mobility and transportation technology of the day could not support the speed,,,, 
and distances required for a successful breakthrough and exploitation to operational depths. 
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Contemporary firepower technology, on the other hand, was quite capable of producing the 
volume, mass, and reach necessary to counter any attempted breakthrough. Thus, the 
technological imbalance between fire and maneuver capabilities combined temporarily to 
produce a period of both tactical and operational deadlock. 
The German General Staff began World War I seeking an operational decision in the 
west. When that failed, the Germans went on the strategic and operational defensive in the 
west and sought a victory in the east. In the 1916 campaign in Romania, both Falkenhayn and 
Mackensen performed brilliantly. That campaign showed dramatically that when given a field 
of maneuver and the opportunity to exercise the traditional tactics of open warfare, the 
Germans had no equal. 94 In September 1917 at Riga General Oskar von Hutier achieved a 
tactical breakthrough that led to clear operational results. And the follow-up amphibious 
attack against the Baltic Islands was one of military history's first great examples of a 
successful joint campaign executed by naval, land, and air forces. When the Germans finally 
succeeded in the east, they turned back to the west and once again sought an operational 
victory there. The only exception to this overall pattern of the war was Verdun in 1916, 
where under Falkenhayn the Germans tried to achieve victory through attrition. But being the 
power with the more limited manpower resources, attrition was the one method the Germans 
could not afford to pursue for long. 95 
With their traditional emphasis on achieving a decision through a single bold stroke, 
the Germans had a general inclination to opt for short-term solutions. They accordingly based 
their planning assumptions on the short term. More than once in the Great War this focus on 
achieving victory through a single stroke led to longer term strategic effects the Germans 
neither anticipated nor desired. In 1914 they invaded France through Belgium, accepting the 
entrance of Britain into the war on the assumption that the campaign would be over before 
Britain could mobilize and react. In 1917 the German leadership pushed for unrestricted 
submarine warfare, even though such a move was sure to being America into the war. The 
assumption--more like wishful thinking--was that the submarine campaign would knock 
Britain out of the war before America could bring its weight to bear. After the Russian 
collapse in 1917, the German leadership also rejected the idea of a strategic defensive in the 
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west coupled with a negotiated peace that might have preserved German gains in the east. 
They opted instead for an all-out offensive in the west, designed to produce victory in one 
swift strike before the U. S. Army could arrive in sufficient numbers to influence events on the 
battlefield. 96 
Ludendorff undoubtedly was one of the better battlefield tacticians of World War I. 
Typical of the wide majority of German officers of his era, he had little understanding of ; 
strategy. (The German strategic problems in World War I will be discussed in greater detail in, 
Chapter 4. ) As a practitioner of the operational art, Ludendorff presents a far more complex 
and contradictory picture. After Hindenburg and Ludendorff took charge at Oberste 
Heeresleitung (OHL), the First Quartermaster General did display some flashes of operational 
brilliance. These included the management of the Romania campaign and the sequencing of . 
operations in 1917 culminating with the victories at Riga, Caporetto, and the Baltic Islands. 
Operation ALBERICH in 1917 was a masterpiece of operational surprise in the defense. In 
April of that year units of Bavarian Crown Prince Rupprecht's Army Group withdrew from a 
120 kilometer-wide sector between Arras and Vailly-sur-Aisne. The German troops fell back 
twenty-five to forty kilometers to prepared positions on the Siegfried Line. The move was 
carried out with great secrecy and speed and caught the Allies by surprise. ALBERICH 
shortened the overall German front by 50 kilometers and freed-up thirteen divisions, which 
were added to the German reserve. 97 
The shortened lines gave the Germans a very strong position from which they could 
have stood on the defensive while attempting to negotiate a peace in the west with the war- 
weary French and British. Tactically and operationally that might have made perfect sense, 
but Ludendorffs strategic blindness and his belief in a military victory through a single bold 
stroke made it impossible for him to accept such an outcome. Thus, when the Germans went 
over to the operational offensive in March 1918, one of their major problems was caused by a 
result of the ALBERICH operation. In the course of that withdrawal, the Germans had carried 
out a scorched earth campaign to leave nothing in the area to the Allies. During the 
MICHAEL offensive eleven months later, German units had to attack over this same torn-up, 
and barren ground. 98 
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Under Ludendorff, the German Army shifted to the thinking that tactics took 
precedence over operational considerations, and even over strategy. Ludendorff himself 
developed such an obsessive focus on tactics that he all but ignored the operational level on 
the Western Front. When Bavarian Crown Prince Rupprecht, during one of the early 
planning conferences for the March 1918 attack, asked Ludendorff what the operational 
objective of MICHAEL was, Ludendorff responded with his famous quip about blowing a 
hole in the middle and the rest following of its own accord. At another conference at 
Rupprecht's headquarters on 21 January 1918, Ludendorff said: 
We talk too much about operations and too little about tactics. 
I have been involved in many operations. I never knew before, 
however, how an operation in fact turned out. Decisions had 
to be made on a daily basis. It cannot be predicted whether 
you will be able to direct a thrust in the desired direction or if 
you will be forced to change your course to somewhere else. 
It is not even predictable three of four days in advance. 
Meanwhile, the picture can change so much that the original 
intent cannot be implemented. Thus I warn you to commit 
your thoughts to one certain direction, the best one. That is 
why all measures have to concentrate on how to defeat the 
enemy, how to penetrate his front positions. Follow-on 
measures are in many cases a matter of ad hoc decisions. 
[emphasis added] Then the decision must be correct. I 
therefore advise you to deal more with tactical problems. 99 
Despite Ludendorffs apparent dismissal of the operational level, and the general 
German blindness for the strategic level, the German Army of World War I clearly 
recognized a body of warfighting activity that was neither tactical nor strategic. It did not 
necessarily think in terms of levels of warfare, as we would today. German doctrine of the era 
envisioned troops being mobilized and assembled for combat (the Aufmarsch), and eventually 
meeting and defeating the enemy (the Schlacht). Everything in between those two points fell 
to the realm or operations, in which the commander maneuvered his forces across the 
countryside in order to engage the enemy on the best terms possible. 100 But there was for 
more to the German concept of Operativ than just merely maneuvering and positioning prior 
to battle. Many German operations orders and staff studies in the last two years of the war 
identify separate and distinct tactical and operational objectives ("taktische und operative 
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Ziele "). 101 In their post-war memoirs, many of the senior German commanders frequently 
used the term Operativ in a manner similar to the way a modem commander would use the 
term. Among them were Rupprecht, Lossberg, Hindenburg, and even Crown Prince Wilhelm., 
Almost without exception, however, the term came out as "strategic" in any contemporary 
English translation. 
Tellingly enough, Ludendorff himself almost never used the word Operativ in any of 
his writings. In his own post-war memoirs, Ludendorff noted: "Tactics had to be considered 
over pure strategy [Strategie], which it is futile to pursue unless tactical surprise is possible. " 
102 Although Ludendorffs position and responsibilities in the German Army of 1918 made 
him one of their key operational decision makers, his mind and focus, at least on the Western 
Front, remained down in the trenches, at the level of a regimental or a divisional commander. 
THE FRAMEWORK OF THE OPERATIONAL ART 
There does not exist in the West today a single authoritative listing of the elements 
and components of the operational art. Even the doctrinal manuals of a single country, such as 
U. S. FM 100-5 and Joint Publication 3-0 give differing lists and emphasize different 
operational considerations and functions. For the purpose of this analysis, then, I have 
assembled a composite list, which is further divided into the two broad categories: Elements 
of Operational Design; and Elements of Operational Power. As we address each of these 
elements, we also will consider how military commanders would have understood them in 
1918. 
The Elements of Operational Design: 
Center of Gravity 
The center of gravity (Schwerpunkt) is one of the most enduring ideas of Clausewitz. 
Almost quoting from Clausewitz verbatim, the 1993 edition of FM 100-5 defines the center 
of gravity as; "The hub of all power and movement upon which everything depends. It is that 
characteristic, capability, or location from which enemy and friendly forces derive their 
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freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. " 103 In theory, the destruction or 
neutralization of an enemy's center of gravity is the most direct path to victory. 104 
According to FM 100-5, the essence of the operational art lies in being able to mass 
combat effects against the enemy's main source of power--his center of gravity. At any given 
point in time, however, the true center of gravity might not be immediately discernable, nor 
will it be easy to attack. '°5 Since an enemy will seek to protect his own center of gravity at all 
costs, it most likely will be the most difficult and costly point of direct attack. Very rarely will 
the center of gravity be a vulnerable point--a point easily accessible to attack. Vulnerable 
points can offer indirect pathways to gaining leverage over the enemy's center of gravity. 
Through the accumulation of operational circumstances, the creation of an operational 
vulnerability implies the identification of a situation inviting the delivery of a strike that in 
turn will threaten the enemy system's ability to accomplish its mission. 106 
In the course of this study I argue that the Allied center of gravity, at least up to June 
1918, was the British Army. Because of the correlation of forces in the field and Germany's 
overall strategic situation, a direct attack on the British stood little chance of success. On the 
other hand, a focused attack on a key vulnerability could very well have led to operational 
success. I also argue that the British logistics system in general, and the BEF's rail system in 
particular constituted just such a vulnerability. The German failure to exploit that 
vulnerability fully may well have been their single greatest operational failure in 1918. 
Decisive Points 
Both Clausewitz and Jomini discussed the notion of the decisive point 
(Entscheidungsstelle). In On War Clausewitz wrote: "It follows that as many troops as 
possible should be brought into the engagement at the decisive point. " 107 And: ".. the forces 
available must be employed with such skill that even in the absence of absolute superiority, 
relative superiority is attained at the decisive point. " 108 
In Jomini's The Art of War he states as his 3rd and 4th maxims for the fundamental 
principle of war: 
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3. On the battlefield, to throw the mass of the forces upon 
the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line 
which is of the first importance to overthrow. 
4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown 
upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the 
proper times and with ample energy. 109 
During the early period of operational reawakening in the West, there was a great deal 
of misunderstanding over the concepts of center of gravity and decisive point. The term 
"Schwerpunkt" was very much in vogue and often used interchangeably for the two ideas. 
The 1986 edition of FM 100-5 even confused and combined the two. ' 10 Actually, the 
Germans themselves did not and still do not use the term Schwerpunkt as Clausewitz defined 
it. Hindenburg once noted that an attack without a Schwerpunkt was like a man without 
character. Decisive point would seem to fit better here than center of gravity. And the 1933 
edition of Truppenführung used the two terms interchangeably, much in the same way FM 
100-5 would do fifty-three years later. "' The subsequent 1993 edition of FM 100-5 stated 
clearly; "Decisive points are not centers of gravity, they are the keys to getting at the centers 
of gravity. " 
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Decisive points are only decisive in relation to the center of gravity. Although the 
enemy can have only one center of gravity, multiple decisive points are possible. 113 In 
designing an operation, planners must analyze all potential decisive points and identify those 
that enable eventual attack of the enemy's center of gravity. Furthermore, a decisive point may 
or may not be a vulnerability. The key geographic features or important enemy functions and 
capabilities identified as decisive points become the objectives for a given phase of an 
operation, and commanders must and allocate resources to seize, neutralize, or destroy them. 
In all cases, the main effort of an operation must be directed at a decisive point. If the BEF's 
shallow rail system was one of its key vulnerabilities in 1918, then the German decisive 
points in successive order might have been the rail centers at Amiens, Hazebrouck, Abbeville, 
Abancourt, and finally St. -Omer. As we shall see, one of the greatest flaws in the MICHAEL 
plan was to failure to clearly designate Amiens as the operation's objective. 
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Culmination 
Culmination is the third major Clausewitzian concept in modem operational art. 14 In 
the attack, culmination occurs at the point in time or space when the attacker's effective 
combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender, or the attacker's momentum is no 
longer sustainable, or both. Beyond the culminating point, the attacker becomes increasingly 
vulnerable to counterattack and risks catastrophic defeat. In the defense, the defender reaches 
culmination when he no longer has the capability to shift over to the counteroffensive or to 
restore cohesion to the defense. The defensive culminating point occurs where the defender 
must withdraw to preserve his force. 115 
Culmination is closely linked to another Clausewitzian concept--"friction. " As 
Clausewitz described it, friction on the battlefield works in the same way that it works against 
the forward momentum of inertia in a mechanical system. The art of the attack at all levels, 
then, is to secure the objective before reaching culmination. 116 At the operational level that 
objective must be one that produces operationally decisive results. The Germans failed to do 
this in 1918. In each of five large-scale offensives they reached culmination and their 
stunning tactical gains led nowhere. After the fifth of those offensives, the position they were 
forced to defend was so overextended that they were in a state of defensive culmination ever 
before the Allies counterattacked. 
Lines of Operations 
Lines of operations define the orientation of the force in both space and time in 
relation to the enemy. According to Joint Publication 3-0, the two basic variations are interior 
lines and exterior lines. 
A force operates on Interior Lines when its operations diverge 
from a central point and when it is therefore closer to separate 
enemy forces than the latter are to one another. Interior Lines 
benefit a weaker force by allowing it to shift the main effort laterally more rapidly than the enemy. A force operates on 
exterior lines when its operations converge on the enemy. Successful operations on exterior lines require a stronger or 
more mobile force, but offer the opportunity to encircle and 
annihilate a weaker or less mobile opponent. 117 
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Lines of operations is another of Jomini's concepts that would have been familiar to 
World War I commanders. The definitions in Joint Publication 3-0, however, are not quite 
the same as those suggested by Jomini. In addition to interior and exterior lines, Jomini also 
identified concentric and divergent lines. In The Art of War Jomini wrote: 
Interior lines of operations are those adopted by one or two 
armies to oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a 
direction that the general can concentrate the masses and 
maneuver with his whole force in a shorter period of time 
than it would require for the enemy to oppose to them a 
greater force. 
Exterior lines lead to the opposite result, and are those 
formed by an army which operates at the same time on both 
flanks of the enemy, or against several of his masses. 
Concentric lines of operations are those which depart from 
Widely separated points and meet at the same point, either 
in advance of or behind the base. 
Divergent lines are those by which an army would leave a 
given point to move upon several distinct points. These lines, 
of course, necessitate the subdivision of the army. 
Thus, the Joint Publication 3-0 definitions seem to combine Jomini's interior and concentric 
lines, and his exterior and divergent lines. But as Jomini defined them, interior and exterior 
lines run to the friendly side of the line of departure, while concentric and divergent lines run 
from the enemy side of the line of departure. As we shall see, the German 1918 offensives in 
terms of Jomini's definitions were operating on interior, but divergent lines. 
Depth 
As already noted, the recent reawakening of the operational art in the West grew out 
of the need for follow-on forces attack and the recognition of the depth of the battlefield in 
both space and time. This brought with it the understanding that the immediate close battle 
might not necessarily be where the decision would be achieved. A corollary to depth is the 
abandonment of linearity and the adoption of non-linear tactics and operations. Simultaneity 
is a key feature inherent in the modern concept of deep operations. The intent is to bring 
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force to bear on the enemy's entire structure in a near simultaneous manner that is within the 
decision-making cycle of the opponent! 19 According to Simpkin, the Soviets regarded two 
actions as exerting simultaneous pressure if one followed the other within the enemy's 
response time, or his "decision loop. " 120 
The "decision loop" is a relatively recent construct as well. Lieutenant Colonel John 
Boyd, U. S. Air Force first introduced it in the West in the early 1970s. Boyd's model 
suggested that any fighting element, from a single tactical aircraft to an army group, goes 
through a distinct cycle of four steps in order to react to a change in the situation. 121 In 
general, smaller elements can cycle through the steps of Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act 
much faster than larger elements. A platoon on the battlefield can almost always react faster 
that a division or a corps. Advances in technology also have reduced the cycle time of the so- 
called "Boyd Loop" or "OODA Loop. " In Moltke's time, a deployed field army dependent 
upon telegraph communications might take weeks to complete the cycle. During World War 
II, field armies using radio could complete the cycle in days. By the 1991 Gulf War, major 
allied units using near-real time satellite C3I systems could react within hours. 
The concepts of simultaneity and the decision loop would not have been familiar to 
World War I commanders. Military planners of that era generally thought in terms of either 
single, or at best sequential operations. Depth and non-linearity, on the other hand, were 
concepts just starting to be understood in the last years of the war. In the defensive, the 
Germans had pioneered the flexible defense and the defense-in-depth. In the offensive, 
German infiltration or "Stormtroop" tactics were a clear abandonment of linearity--at least at 
the tactical level. Certain features of the 1918 German offensives also clearly addressed the 
issue of operational deep attack. These included German artillery task groupings whose sole 
mission was to attack Allied deep targets. These units may well have been the first to appear 
on the emerging modern battlefield with a specific deep attack mission. 122 
Timing, Tempo, and Sequencing 
Proper timing enables a commander to dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and 
operate beyond the enemy's ability to react. 123 Operational tempo is a concept first adopted 
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from the Soviets by Richard Simpkin. In the Soviet model tempo is a complex set of seven 
elements, all interacting, and all subject to Clausewitz's "friction. " These include: Physical 
mobility; Tactical rate of advance; Quantity and reliability of information; Command, control, 
and communications (C3) timings; Times to complete moves; Pattern of combat support; and, 
Pattern of logistic support. 124 
A phase in an operation represents a period during which a large portion of the force is 
involved in similar or mutually supporting activities. A transition to another phase indicates a 
shift in emphasis. Branches are options built into the basic plan. Such branches may include; 
shifts in priorities, changes in unit task organization, or even changes in the very nature of the 
operation itself. Sequels are subsequent or follow-on operations based on the possible 
outcomes of the current operation. 125 
This group of concepts, especially sequential operations, is central to the modem 
notion of the operational art. As noted, however, tempo is a relatively recent idea. Military 
commanders of 1918 would have had a basic understanding of timing, phases, and 
sequencing. As we shall see, timing was a major factor in the German decision making 
process. Likewise, Ludendorff initially considered sequenced operations, and then rejected 
that option on the basis that the Germans had only enough combat power for one great 
operation--one decisive knockout blow. When that failed, the Germans returned to sequential 
operations and somehow found enough combat power to launch four more major attacks. 
Even as the fifth offensive was failing, Ludendorff still clung to the belief that he could 
launch yet one more big push--Operation HAGEN. What would the results have been if the 
resources and power that the Germans squandered in five only haphazardly linked operations 
had been synchronized into one seamless operational sequence? 
Reach 
Reach is the distance over which military power can be directed and concentrated 
decisively. Reach affects the ability to conduct deep operations and it is influenced by the 
geography surrounding and separating the opponents. 126 Reach has a significant 
technological component. During World War I, the battleship was the only weapon system 
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with strategic (global) reach. Today, satellites, nuclear missiles, manned bombers, nuclear 
submarines, and aircraft carriers all have strategic reach--some more rapidly than others. At 
the start of World War I, the railway was perhaps the only military system with operational 
reach, but it was a fixed and relatively rigid system. By 1918, aircraft and some artillery 
systems were capable of operational reach, and the tank was just beginning to give hints of its 
potential. Operational mobility, however, was still largely limited to rail. 
The Elements of Operational Power: 
Firepower and maneuver have long been accepted as the two primary elements of 
combat power. Maneuver is the movement of combat forces to gain positional advantage, and 
firepower is the destructive force essential to defeat the enemy's ability and will to fight. At 
various times, military organizations have added other elements to this list, usually in order to 
reinforce a point of current doctrine. The 1993 edition of FM 100-5 added protection and 
leadership to the list. 127 The 2002 edition of FM 3-0 adds yet another element, 
information. 128 
Leadership may well belong on the list, but it is certainly unquantifiable, highly 
volatile, and situationally dependent. The addition of protection might be regarded as 
reinforcing the current American fixation on "force protection. " Simpkin, however, had a very 
solid argument for why it belongs on the list--except that he used the term survivability. 
Simpkin defined combat in pure mechanical terms as "an exchange of energy. " Firepower is 
the ability to transfer energy to the enemy, while maneuver is the means of bringing firepower 
to bear, or of avoiding enemy firepower and maneuver. Survivability--or protection--is the 
capability to absorb enemy fire or to withstand the effects of enemy maneuver. 129 
Firepower, maneuver, protection, information, and possibly even leadership may well 
constitute the primary building blocks of combat power at the tactical level, but do they at the 
operational level? Since the operational art is of a fundamentally different nature than tactics, 
I would suggest a slightly different listing of elements of warfighting power at the operational 
level. Each of these elements has a strong technological component. 
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Operational Maneuver 
At the tactical level the purpose of maneuver is to gain positional advantage. At the 
operational level its purpose is the unhinging of the enemy's entire operational plan. 130 As 
defined in Joint Publication 3-0, the function of operational maneuver is to concentrate forces 
at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and physical momentum. 131 At the 
operational level, the scheme of maneuver is described in the broadest terms of forms of the 
offense, patterns of the defense, or types of retrograde. 
There is a widely held belief that true operational maneuver did not appear on the 
battlefield until World War II, because up until then military technology had not delivered the 
prerequisites of mechanization. This view, however, is too simplistic and deterministic. 
Examples of operational maneuver prior to 1939 include Wellington in the Peninsular 
Campaign; Moltke in the second half of August 1870; the Germans in Romania in 1916, and 
132 at Riga and the Baltic Islands in 1917; and Allenby's march through Palestine in 1917-18. 
Nonetheless, the peculiarities of the Western Front did combine make that theater of 
war far more dependent than other theaters upon technological solutions to achieve 
operational maneuver. All armies entered World War I considering mounted (horse) cavalry 
units as their primary instrument of high mobility on the battlefield. These units by their very, 
nature, however, had relatively little hitting power--especially in relation to modem weapons. 
The first months of the war also showed that these lightly armed units were extremely 
vulnerable to the new firepower. By 1918 the German Army had all but abandoned the use of 
horse cavalry on the Western Front, although horses continued to be the primary transport 
motive power from the front lines forward. The British, on the other hand, clung to some of 
their mounted divisions in the vain hope of creating the breakthrough for them to exploit. 
This role would be taken over by tanks in later years; but in World War I the Germans had 
almost no tanks, and Allied tanks lacked the mechanical reliability to conduct sustained deep 
operations. 
Although the railroad was a fixed and relatively inflexible means of transport, it 
nonetheless was a major operational system in World War I. It was the key means of 
logistical support, of course, but it also played a role in what operational mobility was 
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achieved on the Western Front. Both sides had a well-developed and dense rail networks 
behind their lines; but the British rail system in Flanders had much less depth, and it had the 
additional complexity of having to tie into sea ports along the BEF's strategic lines of 
communications (LOCs). The German system, on the other hand, had far greater depth, very 
few if any significant choke points, and it ran straight back to the national base without 
having to link into seaports. The whole system was far more robust and less vulnerable. 
The Germans in 1917 and 1918 used rail for both strategic and operational mobility. 
Between November 1917 and the start of Operation MICHAEL in 21 March 1918, the 
Germans shifted by rail 48 divisions from the Eastern Front to the Western Front. From the 
start of January 1918 until the end of October, the Germans made an incredible 566 divisional 
moves from one point to another on the Western Front. This does not include the divisions 
that were transferred from one army to another because of a boundary shift. Many of the 
better divisions moved seven and eight times, and the 20th Infantry Division moved ten 
times. 133 Thus, rail clearly was a major factor in German operational maneuver--at least in 
the period up to the start of the tactical battle. 
Although technology is the great enabler of operational maneuver, it does not 
guarantee its success. From July 1918 until the end of the war, the Allies enjoyed increasing 
superiority over the Germans in both aircraft and especially tanks. Despite these great 
technological advantages on the battlefield, the Allies never came as close to achieving 
operational maneuver as the Germans had in the first half of 1918. More recently, of course, 
the Americans lost in Vietnam despite having overwhelming mobility and technical 
supremacy. 
Operational Fires 
Modem operational fire assets include both fixed and rotary wing aircraft, cruise 
missiles, artillery rockets, and some limited models of tube artillery. In littoral operations or 
operations against sea lines of communications, naval gunfire and mining operations also are 
included. At the operational level, firepower has three key functions: facilitate maneuver to 
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operational depth; isolate the battlefield by interdiction; and destroy enemy functions and 
facilities having operational significance. 134 
In the West there has been a long-standing general agreement that firepower by itself 
can never be decisive--at least on the tactical level. The Soviets, on the other hand, have long 
believed that artillery by itself can be decisive. 135 Some analysts in the West have argued that 
firepower can be decisive at the operational level. Naveh suggested that fire was actually an 
integral part of operational maneuver, producing what he termed "Operational Striking 
Maneuver. " 136 According to modern operational theory, operational fires are not the same as 
fire support, and operational maneuver does not necessarily depend on operational fires. 
Operational fires can be used to achieve a single operational objective. 137 In that sense, then, 
fires can prove decisive. 
During the final years of World War I, only aircraft, longer range tube artillery, and in 
certain situations naval assets were capable of delivering fires to operational depths. Aircraft 
were capable of striking far deeper, but because of their limited fuel capacities, high 
vulnerability to ground fire, dependence on weather conditions, and small load capacities they 
could produce only limited effects over relatively small areas of the battlefield. During the 
1918 offensives, the Germans made good use of their tube artillery within the ranges of the 
guns. In some cases they even achieved limited operational effects through the interdiction 
and destruction of key Allied functions and facilities, but that effort was not focused. 
Facilitating maneuver to operational depth was major problem. The mobility 
limitations of 1918 weighed far more heavily on the artillery than it did on the infantry. 
Moving over torn-up ground at the speed of a man, the infantry was at least able to advance. 
With no roads, cratered ground, few motor vehicles, and even a shortage of horses, the 
artillery could hardly advance at all. As soon as the maneuver elements advanced beyond the 
supporting range of their artillery, the possibility of maneuvering to operational depths 
diminished rapidly. 
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Operational Sustainability 
Operational sustainability hinges on the "tyranny of logistics. " At the operational 
level the various courses of action are either enabled or constrained by logistics to a far 
greater degree than at the tactical level. The synchronization of logistics with combat 
operations can forestall culmination and help the commander to control the tempo of his 
operations. The sustainment must be carried out in depth, both in space and time. 138 
World War I was the most prolonged period of massive and sustained military 
operations in history up to that time. The logistical effort to support the forces involved was 
nothing like any army had ever experienced before. Entire logistics systems and 
infrastructures had to be established rapidly, starting from almost nothing. With their limited 
national resources and their traditional focus on rapid decisions and short operations, the 
Germans never developed the logistics system their army required. Despite their superior rail 
network behind the lines, the German forces in the field never enjoyed the quantity or the 
quality of sustainment support as the Allies. This general weakness for logistics also carried 
over to the German Army of World War II. The Allies, on the other hand, had very robust 
logistical systems, but the British in particular had several key vulnerabilities in their system 
that the Germans never fully exploited. 
Operational Intelligence 
Simply put, knowledge is power. This is especially true on the battlefield. The three 
key components of military information, or "situational awareness, " are: information about 
the enemy; information about friendly forces; and the ability to communicate that 
information. The modem rubric for this collection of activities is C31 (Command, Control, 
Communications, and Intelligence. ) Another term gaining popularity in American military 
circles is Information Operations. 
Although the first forms of modem communications technology emerged during 
World War I, only those communications over very short distances came close to approaching 
what we would now call "real time. " Orders issued from a field army headquarters often took 
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more than 24 hours to reach the front line companies. Likewise, enemy and friendly 
information flowing back up from the front lines took just as long. 
Operational intelligence looks deeper--both in time and space--than does tactical 
intelligence. Rather than focusing on the immediate contact battle, it focuses more on the 
enemy's overall intent within the framework of his capabilities. The target of operational 
intelligence is the mind of the enemy commander. The objective is to create a picture of 
defeat in the other commander's mind. As Simpkin noted, "The outcome turns... on the 
pictures in the opposing commanders' minds. " 
139 
Going into World War I, commanders gained tactical intelligence by developing the 
situation once contact with the enemy was established. When trench warfare set in and a 
semi-permanent state of contact became the norm, commanders had to rely more and more on 
their reconnaissance and surveillance assets. Military intelligence came of age in World War 
I. At the start of the war, most armies regarded intelligence as an additional staff function, not 
a military specialty that soldiers trained in and studied. By the end of the war, all armies had, 
developed huge staff sections to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence from multiple 
sources. These included human intelligence from patrols and prisoners of war; signals 
intelligence from radio and telephone line intercepts; imagery intelligence from aerial 
photographs; and counter-battery target acquisition from sound and flash ranging stations and 
from shell crater analysis. Initially the intelligence focus was purely tactical, but as 
technologies improved, assets like aerial photography and sound and flash ranging began to 
acquire capabilities to operational depths. 
Operational Deception 
Deception is the enabler of surprise. Operational deception differs from tactical 
deception in target, timing, and scale. Operational deception usually must be sustained for 
protracted periods. Operational intelligence and deception are reciprocal functions, and the 
primary target of both is the mind of the enemy operational commander. Deception has both a 
passive and an active component. In today's terms, the passive component of deception is 
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called operational security (OPSEC). The Soviets too had a concept they termed 
"Operativnaya Maskirovka. " 140 
World War I commanders had a solid appreciation of deception, even at what we 
would today call the operational level. The preparations for the German 1918 offensives 
included a number of well-planned and intricate deception operations. For the five offensives 
launched between March and July, German passive deception measures were extensive and 
elaborate. 
Writing after the Great War, Fuller identified two different types of surprise at the 
operational level. Moral surprise he defined as a situation where the enemy does not know 
exactly where and when the attacker is coming. Material surprise is a situation where enemy 
knows the attack is coming, but can do nothing to stop it. Material surprise is what we would 
term today as "turning within the enemy's decision loop. 041 The Germans achieved materiel 
surprise over the Allies in the first three of the 1918 offensives--MICHAEL, GEORGETTE, 
and BLÜCHER. They failed to achieve surprise at all in the last two--GNEISENAU and 
MARNSCHUTZ/REIMS. Furthermore, the Allies achieved moral surprise over the Germans 
when they launched their counterattack of 18 July. 
Summary 
To summarize, military commanders in 1918 had a clear understanding, if not a fully 
developed one, of the level of war fighting between the tactical and the strategic. And the 
evidence suggests strongly that despite Ludendorff, the Germans had a better grasp of the 
operational level than their opponents. Most of the Elements of Operational Design were 
known and understood. These included centers of gravity, decisive points, culmination, lines 
of operations, timing, and sequencing. Furthermore, the concepts of depth and to a lesser 
extent reach were just beginning to be understood. The Elements of Operational Power as we 
would define them today were less well understood. German commanders in particular, 
however, had a good understanding of maneuver and deception at the operational level. 
Operational intelligence and sustainability were concepts that only began to emerge during 
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the Great War. By the start of 1918 some German commanders also had a good grasp of 
operational fires. 
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No matter how farseeing any regulations are 
constructed in their inception, they become 
obsolete after a time.... Emperor Na? oleon 
measured that time to be ten years. 
Lieutenant General William Balck 
It is in any case very difficult, if not impossible, 
to picture now whattorm a modern war in 
Europe would take. 
General Helmuth von Moltke, the Younger 
CHAPTER III 
THE TACTICAL REALITIES OF 1918 
Although this study focuses on the Operational Level of War, a brief overview of the 
basic World War I tactical problem and the tactical realities of 1918 is necessary to 
understand the possibilities and the limitations the Germans faced in planning their great 
1918 offensives. With a few notable exceptions, all the tools and techniques that we associate 
with modern 20th century warfare were present in 1918, but many of them were in a 
relatively immature state. Tacticians on both sides were still grappling with the implications 
of the emerging technologies as the war moved into its final year. 
THE TACTICAL PROBLEM 
The key problem facing attackers in World War I was not so much achieving a break- 
in of the enemy's positions. That could almost always be accomplished if the attacker was 
willing to commit the necessary resources. The key problem was what to do next. 3 Once the 
break-in was achieved, there were two basic options. One was to attempt a breakthrough and 
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a subsequent exploitation. The other was to consolidate the gains made at that position, and 
then hit the enemy again somewhere else, repeating this sequence over and over again until 
the cumulative effects of the attacks began to overwhelm the enemy. 
The former was a tactical approach on a large scale, the latter was the beginning of an 
operational approach. The Germans in the first half of 1918 opted for the former; the Allies 
after July 1918 succeeded with the latter. Still trying to achieve the Battle of Annihilation, the 
Germans continually sought to gain the fastest possible results at the decisive point. ° The 
problem with this approach was that nobody had sufficient mobility to make it work. The 
technology of firepower had temporarily outreached the technology of maneuver, and that 
was the primary cause of the tactical gridlock of World War I. 5 
FIRE and MANEUVER 
Prior to 1914 the tactical doctrines of most major armies generally stressed combat 
operations consisting of vast sweeping maneuvers and meeting engagements. And while 
neither side planned for a long and drawn-out static war on the scale that actually developed, 
many military thinkers did recognize the problems of modem warfare. In a five-volume book 
published in 1899 under the direction of Jan Bloch, the Polish civilian banker argued that 
modem weaponry was making offensive maneuver all but impossible. 6 But while some 
military thinkers believed that the new technologies reinforced the inherent superiority of the 
defense, others believed that they favored the offense. There seemed to be no immediate 
solution to the problem of fire and maneuver, and tactical thinking on all sides remained in a 
state of flux. Many planners, likewise, understood that any war on the continent would more 
than likely not be a short one, although that was what everyone hoped for. Despite the 
German emphasis on the battle of annihilation, Ludendorff as early as 1912 wrote that any 
62 
future war would be "a long-drawn out campaign with numerous difficult, long-lasting 
battles, before we can defeat any one of our enemies. " 8 
At the start of the war the density of forces along the German, French, and Belgian 
borders became so great that there was little room for maneuver and open flanks rarely 
existed. Added to that problem were the vastly increased volume, range, and lethality that 
technology had given to the new generation of weapons that appeared in the previous 40 
years. The Wars of German Unification ended in 1871. From then until 1914 there were no 
major wars in western or central Europe. During that same period a vast technological 
revolution produced entirely new types of weapons; smokeless gunpowder, recoiling and 
quick-firing artillery, magazine-fed repeating rifles, and the machine gun. All these weapons 
represented large-scale improvements in range, accuracy, volume of fire, and lethality that 
placed the soldier in the open at a distinct disadvantage to the soldier fighting from a 
protected position. Soldiers on all sides hated the spade, but the new firepower forced them to 
dig. 9 
Tactics are closely related to technology, and these new weapons should have 
radically altered the tactics of the day. But most of the European armies of 1914 had little 
recent combat experience against which to evaluate their old tactics. The indicators were 
there, however. During the Boer War the British got a taste of future warfare; and the Russo- 
Japanese War should have shown the Russian Army the wave of the future. The experiences 
of both conflicts were discounted to some degree, however, because the opposing combatants 
were not considered proper European armies. As World War I approached, the series of flare- 
ups in the Balkans also gave some hint of the future; but they came too close to 1914 to be 
analyzed and understood completely. 
Most of the major armies entered World War I with some variation of the linear 
tactics that had been in use since Napoleon's day. Since the German experience in the 
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summer of 1870, however, the density of the attacking formations tended to shift back and 
forth between open and close order in reaction new experiences and the appearance of new 
weapons. Tacticians saw the problem as one of trying to maintain a balance between 
formations dispersed enough to increase survivability, yet close enough to maintain cohesion 
and control of the mass conscript armies. 10 At the start of the war typical skirmish lines 
moved forward with one to three meters between soldiers. As World War I drug on the 
interval progressively widened until it reached five meters. (The French retained the one- 
meter interval until as late as 1916. ) 11 
The early battles of August and September 1914 were characterized by a great deal of 
maneuver. But as both sides jockeyed around searching for that ever-illusive open flank, 
firepower took its grim toll. The troops themselves soon realized the near impossibility of 
survival on the surface of the earth, and started digging. By the end of 1914 the Western 
Front had evolved into two roughly parallel lines of foxholes and hasty trenches running from 
the Swiss border to the North Sea. As time dragged on these defenses became more 
sophisticated and semi-permanent. With firepower technology gaining the upper hand over 
maneuver tactics, the result was trench warfare. The Eastern Front never quite bogged down 
into the static and rigid network of trenches and fortifications that characterized the Western 
Front. But the flat terrain and wide open spaces in the east, combined with the increased 
firepower yet limited mobility of the World War I armies, produced the Eastern Front's own 
special brand of stagnation. 
Many professional soldiers continued to believe that an aggressive spirit was the only 
chance the attacker had of overcoming the greater firepower. The cult of the offensive was 
especially strong in the French Army, with its doctrine of attaque ä l'outrance, advocated by 
Colonel Loyzeaux de Grandmaison and Brigadier General Ferdinand Foch. According to 
Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Lucas, writing after the war, "Our officers had absorbed the theory 
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of the offensive to the point where it had become a disease. " 12 Firepower and its advocates, 
like Colonel Henri Petain, were largely ignored. The cult of the offensive had become 
something of a substitute for any real body of doctrine. 13 
Commanders on all sides came to regard the static lines of fixed fortifications as an 
unnatural and temporary situation. They spent most of the war looking for a way to break 
through the enemy's defenses and restore the natural condition of maneuver warfare. The key 
flaw in this approach was that the military tacticians of the period failed to comprehend that 
the central paradigm of war itself had shifted. Rather than a contest between two opposing 
forces of blood, muscle, and bayonets, war had become a contest between two armies 
consisting of machines, where man's most important roles were the operation and direction of 
those machines. Muscle power had been replaced with mechanical power. Most of World 
War I, however, was taken up with trying to prevail with manpower in history's first truly 
mechanized war. 14 More importantly, the new technologies made coordination among the 
various arms more critical than ever. Gone were the days when large infantry units could win 
battles on their own. By the end of World War I the foundations of combined arms warfare 
would emerge, with infantry, artillery, and even armored fighting vehicles and airplanes 
complementing each other's strengths. 
After the failures of 1914 the Germans went over to the strategic defensive on the 
Western Front (with the notable exception of Verdun) and concentrated on knocking their 
Eastern Front opponents out of the war first. Thus until the end of 1917 the Western Allies 
focused on the problem of achieving that ever-illusive decisive break-through, while the 
Germans concentrated on preventing it. 
The rapidly evolving role of artillery created serious problems for coordinating it with 
the infantry on the battlefield. Indirect fire techniques and increased range of the guns, 
combined with the still primitive communications systems, made close support of the infantry 
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very difficult the farther it moved from the attack line of departure. Radio was still in its 
infancy. In defensive situations the telephone worked reasonably well, but in the attack 
requests for fire and corrections had to be conveyed by messenger, which sometimes took 
hours. One solution to the problem was to move the artillery fire forward on a precise 
schedule, controlled by phase lines on the map. That eventually evolved into the creeping or 
rolling barrage, with the advancing infantry trained to follow closely behind the moving wall 
of their own fire. Shrapnel, the projectile of choice in these barrages, burst in the air sending 
most of blast effect forward along the line of the shell trajectory. The infantry, therefore, 
could follow very closely behind it, often as close as 50 meters. Infantry commanders were 
encouraged to keep their troops as close to the barrage as possible, even though they might 
take some casualties from friendly fire. The belief was that such an approach resulted in 
fewer overall casualties in the end. 
The main problem with the creeping barrage and phase line techniques was that they 
wholly subordinated the infantry advance to the artillery schedule. 15 This in turn reinforced 
the use of the rigid linear tactics. Another effect of this system was that tactical decisions 
were centralized at higher and higher levels, which meant slower response times because the 
communications technologies could not support the greater centralization of control. Thus, 
front line infantry commanders ignored terrain in their planning, came to have less and less 
control of the tactical situations around them, and soon even forgot how to maneuver their 
forces on the battlefield. 
By the middle years of the war attack planning had been almost reduced to fixed sets 
of mathematical formulae--so many heavy guns per yard of front in the primary attack sector; 
so many machine guns; so many riflemen; so many rounds in the artillery preparation; etc. 
The enemy's first positions could always be taken, and usually his second positions--if the 
attacking commander was willing to pay the price in casualties and ammunition. The real 
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problem came when attempting to move deeper into enemy territory. By that stage of the 
attack the initial infantry force was totally depleted and the supporting artillery probably was 
at the maximum limit of its range. 
To advance, therefore, fresh infantry units had to be brought up and the artillery had 
to displace forward to extend its range. That took time, especially since those forces had to 
move over shattered terrain, blocked with the refuse of war. Such movements were always 
by foot, with sporadic horse transport. The defender, meanwhile, could reinforce the 
threatened area much more quickly by taking advantage of the roads and even rail networks 
in his own rear area. Motor vehicles generally could operate in the rear areas without 
problem, but not in the cratered and muddy morass of no-man's-land. The essence of the 
problem, then, was that the defender's strategic mobility worked against the attacker's lack of 
tactical mobility. 
Attack formations varied greatly during the war, but the principle was essentially the 
same. In some armies the regiments attacked in echelon, with two battalions in the first 
echelon, and one or two in the second. [Figure 3-1] In other armies whole regiments were 
committed to the first wave, while additional regiments made up the second and succeeding 
waves. 16 [Figure 3-2] Most armies, however, attacked using some variation of the wave 
system. The attacking soldiers moved across the tom-up terrain, through barbed wire, and 
against enemy fire carrying heavy loads. Each man in the first five waves typically carried his 
rifle, bayonet, gas mask, ammunition, wire cutters, a spade, two empty sandbags, flares, and 
two grenades. A soldier's individual kit weighed up to 70 pounds. The troops in the carrying 
platoons had it even worse. These men essentially were human pack animals. In addition to 
their individual kits, they carried heavy loads of ammunition, barbed wire, duckboard, and 
construction materiel to help fortify the objective, once captured. 17 
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During the early years of the war defensive tactics focused on rigid defenses with the 
bulk of combat power concentrated in the forward trenches--a concept known as forward 
defense. As the human cost of taking ground increased, it seemed almost sacrilegious to yield 
even a few inches of it. Thus the defensive credo became one of holding "at all costs, " 
regardless of the actual tactical situation. Allied commanders in particular felt that allowing 
units to withdraw under pressure (even when that made the most sense tactically) would be 
bad for morale and an inducement to mass cowardice. The fatal flaw of the forward defense, 
however, was that it was suicidal. It placed the bulk of the defender's combat power in 
densely packed areas well within the range of the attacker's artillery. Being on the defensive 
in the west, the Germans were quicker to recognize the problem, particularly as a result of 
their heavy losses on the Somme. 
By mid-1917 many Allied commanders had realized the decisive penetration was not 
to be. Petain, among others, began advocating limited objective attacks, designed to eat away 
at an enemy's position in small chunks. 18 Other tacticians, however, were thinking bolder 
ideas. In May 1915 French Captain Andre Laffargue wrote a pamphlet suggesting that 
specially trained teams of skirmishers precede main attacks. Armed with light machine guns 
and grenades, these teams would infiltrate into the German lines ahead of the main attack, 
locate and neutralize the German machine guns, and even penetrate deeply enough to attack 
the German artillery positions. The British and French largely ignored Laffargue's pamphlet; 
but the Germans captured a copy during the summer of 1916, translated it, and issued copies 
to their front-line units. 19 
Cavalry was a special problem in World War I. In the days before the advent of the 
motor vehicle, it was the primary source of mobility and high-speed maneuver on the 
battlefield. Its three principal missions were reconnaissance and security before the battle; 
shock action during the battle; and exploitation and pursuit after the battle. By the start of 
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World War I, however, many military leaders understood that modern firepower made 
cavalry shock action impossible 2° 
The Germans were quick to grasp that the days of horse cavalry were over, at least on 
the Western Front. They disbanded almost all their cavalry divisions and used the horses for 
much needed transport. The troopers were converted to infantry. The British, on the other 
hand, held on to their cavalry divisions until the end, hoping to use them as the exploitation 
force for the breakthrough that never came. On the other hand, in certain limited situations on 
the Western Front the mobility of cavalry did allow it to advance up to one thousand yards in 
front of the infantry, dismount, and hold the ground until the infantry caught up. 21 
As Lucas pointed out immediately after the war, none of the doctrinal publications 
issued under Ludendorff made any provisions for cavalry to exploit any of the decisive 
breakthroughs envisioned in the 1918 offensives. 22 John Terraine also criticized the 
Germans for launching the attacks without any cavalry to exploit. "Yet feeble as it was, the 
cavalry was the only exploiting arm that existed. To launch an offensive intended to win the 
war with none at all was not just foolish, it was criminal. " 23 As we shall see later in this 
analysis, Operation MICHAEL might have turned out differently if the Germans had had a 
mobile exploitation force, especially on 26 March. The fact remains, however, that by 1918 
the Germans did not have the horses to mount cavalry units, even if they had wanted to. Nor 
were the Germans especially worried about Allied cavalry on the Western Front. Writing 
after the war William Balck noted, "The French cavalry, without entirely doing away with the 
mounted attack, turned into mounted infantry... " 24 And as Lucas explained the apparent 
ineffectiveness of Allied cavalry on the Western Front: "If it was not used on this mission 
[exploitation] upon our front, it was either because it was materially impossible (its 
exhaustion at the battle of the Marne in 1914), or because the gaps which we made were not 
wide enough to let it get through. ' 25 
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TRENCH WARFARE 
Trench warfare was basically an extension of old style of siege warfare 26 Trench 
works were not new in World War I. They had appeared in certain static situations in the 
American Civil War, and somewhat more prominently in the Russo-Japanese War. But for 
the most part they had been exceptions to the rule, temporary emplacements until the normal 
flow of warfare could resume. Writing before the war, General Friedrich von Bernhardi 
stated bluntly, "There can, of course, be no question of sapping in active operations. " 27 Yet 
in World War I on the Western Front the trench line became the dominant physical feature of 
the battlefield. As Gary Sheffield pointed out, what was new on the Western Front was the 
"force-to-space ratio"-the sheer numbers of forces and advanced weapons crammed into a 
relatively restricted section of Belgium and northern France. 28 
The earliest trench systems were simple lines of fighting positions and slit trenches. In 
some areas where the ground water level was high, the soldiers put up birms and parapets 
above ground level. As the tactical situation on the Western Front became more static, the 
defenses were improved, reinforced, and became more elaborate. Allied commanders tended 
to push their lines as far forward as possible, believing that control of terrain mattered most. 
The Germans generally were more careful to place their trenches in the best positions to 
maximize concealment, fields of fire, and observation. 29 Before the start of the war French , 
and British soldiers had received almost no training in the construction of defensive positions, 
and their supply trains carried almost none of the required materials. In the French Army, 
only the pre-war engineer manual contained any detailed defensive information. 30 The 
Germans were a little better off. Although their pre-war doctrine had overwhelmingly 
stressed the attack as well, they did train a little bit in defensive techniques-perhaps as the 
result of the reports from the extensive network of observers they sent to the Balkan Wars. 
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By 1917 the fully mature trench systems had evolved. On the British side trench 
systems had three basic zones. The Forward Zone was a thinly held string of strong points 
and early warning positions, held together in some areas by connecting trenches, but usually 
not forming a continuous line. Two to three kilometers to the rear the Battle Zone consisted 
of three and sometimes more sets of roughly parallel trenches, reinforced with periodic 
strong-points, and holding up to two-thirds of the artillery. Through the spring of 1918 the 
Allies kept up to two-thirds of their combat power packed into the Battle Zone. Six to ten 
miles behind the Battle Zone was the Rear Zone, which held the counter-attack forces and 
also provided the final line of defense for the artillery positions. 31 The French system, based 
on Main's Directive Number 4 of 23 December 1917, was essentially the same with minor 
variations. 32 [The German system will be discussed below. ] 
The trenches did not run in straight lines, rather they were laid out in a zigzag or a 
castellated pattern, with sharp angles and the line as a whole running parallel to the front. 
There were two reasons for this. Firstly, it minimized the effect of a shell bursting at any 
point in the trench. Secondly, in the event of a trench raid by the enemy, a straight trench 
would have allowed a raiding party that gained a foothold to set up a machine gun and 
effectively clear the entire trench. With the angular pattern any raiding party had to fight its 
way from each straight stretch, called a bay, to the next. 33 
Trenches both within and between zones were connected by perpendicular legs called 
communications trenches. The whole system was entered from the rear by an access trench, 
which started beyond the enemy's line of sight. By 1917 it was theoretically possible to walk 
from the Swiss border to the Belgian coast without ever coming up above ground level. In 
practice, however, some sectors of the line were better constructed than were others. The 
more static the situation in a sector, the more permanent the trench lines became. Generally 
they were reinforced with wooden beams and sandbags to prevent them from collapsing 
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during enemy shelling, or under their own weight during the periods of heavy rain so 
common to that corner of Europe. Trenches were usually slightly deeper than a man's height, 
with a fire-step built into the forward wall to allow defenders to fire their rifles in the event of 
an attack. The floors of the better trenches were covered with duckboards, wooden slats that 
kept the soldiers out of the mud and water. 
The space between the forward edges of the opposing sets of trench lines (anywhere 
from 50 to 3,000 meters) was no-man's-land. Extending out into this area the front of the 
trench system was covered by massive entanglements of barbed wire to impede the forward 
movement of any attacker. The emplacements took two basic forms. Concertina wire came in 
pre-packaged coils about a meter in diameter. When spread out (like a concertina) it formed 
an open cylindrical line about ten meters long and waist-high. These lines were connected 
end-to-end and even laid on top of one another. The other form was an apron fence, with 
regular agricultural barbed wire strung between corkscrew steel poles screwed into the 
ground. Most wire complexes used both forms in combination and consisted of multiple 
lines. Wire complexes were designed with carefully concealed paths, to allow friendly patrols 
in and out. These paths were always covered by observation and fire, usually by machine 
guns 34 
Trench warfare also produced its own specialized weapons, some of which are still in 
use today. The mortar, a small, high-trajectory, short-range artillery weapon, had been around 
for hundreds of years, but was almost extinct by the time World War I started. With trench 
warfare the mortar came back into its own. Since it fired only at high angles, and all its recoil 
was directed into the ground, the mortar was an ideal source of heavy firepower for the 
forward trenches. Throughout the course of the war both sides built up large trench mortar 
organizations. 35 In some armies these trench artillery units were part of the artillery; in some 
they were part of the infantry; and in the German Army they were part of the pioneers 
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(combat engineers). The early World War I mortars bore little resemblance to the mortars of 
today, until the British introduced the Stokes Mortar, the forerunner of all modern 
"stovepipe" type mortars. 
Flamethrowers and hand grenades were weapons of trench warfare that are still very 
much a part of modem arsenals. The Germans were famous for their stick grenade, called the 
"potato masher" by Allied troops. The British Mills Bomb was the forerunner of the modem 
"egg" or "pineapple" type grenades. Most of the World War I grenades had a four to five 
second delay fuze. At first only specially trained soldiers called bombers were allowed to 
throw grenades. During an offensive every soldier in an attack wave might carry several 
grenades, but they were to be passed to the unit's bomber for actual use. As the Germans 
evolved their assault tactics, every soldier in the elite storm troop units carried and threw 
grenades. 36 
The grim hand-to-hand combat that trench fighting sometimes produced also resulted 
in a grisly assortment of more primitive weapons for quick and silent killing. A wide array of 
trench knives, blackjacks, and knuckle-dusters were fabricated right in the trenches and 
carried by most men. A form of mace even appeared, a weapon not seen on the battlefield 
since medieval times. 
When night fell the real work of trench warfare began. Under cover of darkness 
ammunition and supplies were brought up and repairs were made to whatever damage might 
have been sustained from the daily shelling. Patrols slipped out into no-man's-land. Wiring 
parties went out to repair damage to the wire entanglements, and stretcher parties went out to 
look for the wounded and recover the dead. In the sectors where no-man's-land was narrow, 
opposing parties sometimes ran into each other, resulting in fierce hand-to-hand fighting. 
Throughout the night both sides randomly shelled and sprayed sections of no-man's-land with 
machine gun fire, concentrating on those sectors where friendly patrols were not supposed to 
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be working. Both sides often fired parachute flares from mortars and artillery and dropped 
them from aircraft. If caught under the sudden light of a flare the best tactic was to freeze, 
because it was movement that attracted the enemy's eye. The flares stayed lit and aloft only a 
short time, and the eyes of any observing machine gunners took a few seconds to get adjusted 
to the light. 
The trench raid was a favorite nighttime operation of both sides. Trench raids were 
sent out to locate enemy machine guns and artillery, capture prisoners for interrogation, and 
just simply to terrorize the enemy. Some soldiers excelled as trench raiders, and specialized 
in that one activity. Some enjoyed working as lone operators, and some, no doubt, came to 
take a perverse pleasure in the killing. The size of a raid could be anything from a few men to 
an entire company, depending on the mission. 
Units did not remain in the trenches for months on end. Normally units were rotated 
in and out of the line on a routine basis. When out of the line a unit was supposed to relax and 
refit; but most of the time was taken up with intensive training on new weapons and tactical 
methods. Sometimes a soldier was able to get more rest in the line than out of it, but his 
living conditions out of the line were better generally. 
Trench warfare, like all other forms of combat, consisted of hours and hours of 
grinding boring routine, punctuated with brief intervals of sheer terror. During daylight hours 
anything that exposed itself above ground level drew instant fire from opposing snipers and 
machine gunners. There was always a danger of random shelling from artillery and mortars. 
Some soldiers snapped under the strain of the constant shelling, a psychological condition 
that came to be known as shellshock. 37 
In wet periods the trenches filled with water and mud making life miserable for the 
soldiers. The primitive sanitary facilities in the front, combined with the ever-present (but 
none too clean) water, produced serious health problems; frostbite, trench foot, trench mouth, 
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dysentery, etc. Complicating the health problems, the garbage, waste, and decaying and 
hastily buried bodies drew fleas and rats. Even during quiet periods a typical battalion while 
in the line might expect to take up to 60 casualties per month from wounds and disease-a 
phenomena known as "trench wastage. " As in all previous wars, the armies of World War I 
took more casualties through disease and sickness than through combat action. 38 
TECHNOLOGY 
The Germans in World War I had selective blind spots for technology, and that hurt 
them at both the tactical and operational levels. World War I was history's first high-tech war. 
As James Corum noted, it "... constituted the most rapid period of technological change in 
history. " 39 Between 1830 and 1910 two technological waves completely altered the face of 
battlefield tactics. In the first wave came breech-loading, rifled weapons; in the second wave 
came smokeless powder, repeating rifles, machine guns, rapid-firing artillery, and the internal 
combustion engine. The cumulative effect of these two waves was to make coordination 
between the various arms absolutely necessary for success on the battlefield. 0 With the 
culmination of these waves came Traver's paradigm shift from the muscle-powered, 
psychological battlefield to the machine-dominated, technological battlefield. 
Despite the impressive tactical and organizational innovations of the German Army 
(discussed below), the Germans never managed to overcome their blind spot for many of the 
technical possibilities, and pursued instead largely tactical solutions to many of the battlefield 
problems. 1 As Holger Herwig put it: "In short, the Germans ignored technical innovation 
and mass production in favor of the hallowed concept of'bravery in battle. ' In the process, 
they denied themselves mobility and flexibility at the operational level. " 42 To a large degree 
this streak of technophobia was exacerbated by the by the inter-branch feuding that 
characterized the pre-war German Army. 43 
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Writing immediately after the war, even as talented a tactician as William Balck still 
clung to the old paradigm when he noted: "Nothing could be worse than to place our reliance 
principally on technical means. The moral forces in the breast of the commander and in the 
soul of the entire people are the qualities which have finally turned the scales in war. " 44 
Nonetheless, other German analysts correctly identified the problem. Colonel Kurt 
Theobeck, writing for one of the study commissions established immediately after the war by 
General Hans von Seeckt, criticized the German General Staff for being full of tacticians but- 
having no technicians. It had no weapons specialists who really understood the limitations 
and tactical effects of technology, thus compounding the institutional blind spot. 45 Asa 
result of the von Seeckt reforms of the 1920s, the Reichswehr and later the Wehrmacht 
embraced military technology with a passion--at least at the tactical level. 
The Germans were not completely blind to technology and new weapons systems, of 
course. In some areas they held their own with the Allies and in some areas there were 
significantly ahead. Most of those areas fell into the firepower column-field artillery, heavy . 
artillery, mortars, machine guns. The mobility column was where they seem to have had the 
most problems, which is somewhat ironic considering their earlier embrace of the railroad. 
MACHINE GUNS 
The Germans did learn the lesson of the machine gun, as did most armies in World 
War I. In 1914 the German, French, British, and Austrian armies all had 24 machine guns per 
division. An Italian division had only eight. By 1918 a German division had 108 heavy and 
144 light machine guns; a French division had 108 heavies and 216 lights; and a British 
division had 64 heavies and 192 lights. The huge American divisions, which had a trench 
strength of almost three European divisions, had 168 heavy machine guns and 768 light 
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machine guns. 46 In 1914 the German Army had 323 machine gun companies with six guns 
each; by 1918 it had 2,500 machine gun companies with twelve guns each. 47 
The German emphasis on aggressive offensive action colored their attitude toward 
weapons. Because of the tendency of early machine guns to jam and their huge ammunition 
consumption rates, the Germans initially did not believe they would be effective in mobile 
warfare. Writing before the war, von Bernhardi did recognize: "It can scarcely be doubted 
that the machine guns, when used in numbers, will exercise a certain amount of influence on 
tactics. " He, nonetheless regarded machine guns as an auxiliary to the infantry, also noting: 
"Conditions favoring the effect of [the machine gun] will generally be found only in the 
defense. " 48 
German preoccupation with the accuracy of the fire from heavy machine guns made 
them reluctant initially to adopt light machine guns and automatic rifles. That changed when 
German troops started using captured Allied light machine guns. In 1915 the Germans 
introduced the MG 08/15 light machine gun. At 48.5 pounds, however, it was really too 
heavy. Nonetheless, by March 1917 the German infantry squad was completely reorganized 
around the light machine gun, with six per infantry company. The light machine guns were 
used in the firing line, while the heavy machine guns provided over-head fire for the 
advancing infantry. 49 
ARTILLERY and GAS 
Artillery and gas were two of the most powerful elements of the German tactical 
system of 1918. But in the years prior to the start of World War I field artillery on both sides 
had focused on mobility to the exclusion of almost everything else. Horse-drawn batteries 
trained to charge into action at some critical moment, fire off a few rounds of direct fire, and 
then rush off to some other decisive point on the battlefield. The basic forms of indirect fire, 
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counter-battery work, and meteorological corrections were possible in the years just prior to 
World War I, but the actual techniques were cumbersome and thus largely ignored as being 
incompatible with fast moving maneuver warfare 5° 
Once the war started all forms of firepower quickly gained the upper hand over 
maneuver and trench warfare set in. With two huge armies dug into the ground and facing 
each other across No Man's Land, artillery quickly became the primary means of prosecuting 
the war. As Ian V. Hogg noted, "The war of 1914-1918 became an artillery duel of vast 
proportions. "51 In a remarkable series of articles published in the 1920s in the Journal of the 
Royal Artillery, Lieutenant Colonel Alan F. Brooke identified four general phases of artillery 
employment experienced to varying degrees by all sides in the Great War: Inadequacy; 
Experimentation and Build-up; Destruction; and, Neutralization. 52 
Inadequacy 1914: 
Most armies entered the war regarding artillery as strictly an auxiliary arm whose job 
was to assist the infantry in the attack. There always had been a great deal talk about the 
notion of coordinating infantry and artillery actions, but very little real effort. During the 
early months of the war the results were dismal, with artillery firing on its own infantry all 
too often. Some units in the French Army even resorted to sewing large white patches on the 
backs of their uniforms, in the hope it would prevent their own guns from firing on them. 53 
Napoleon had demonstrated convincingly the power of massed artillery; but in 1914 
most armies continued to believe that mass firepower could only be achieved by physically 
massing guns well forward on the ground. The experiences of the Russo-Japanese War had 
proved both the value and the practicality of indirect fire to many artillerymen; but the idea 
was strongly resisted by the maneuver branches of most armies S4 They believed 
infantrymen needed the psychological reinforcement of seeing their own artillery right on the 
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front line with them, instead of hiding behind a hill somewhere in the rear. But when World 
War I combat operations started artillery turned out to be all too vulnerable to the new forms 
of small arms, especially the machine gun. As the Russian Army had learned in Manchuria, 
the firepower of these new weapons quickly drove artillery off the front line, increasing the 
distance between the gun and the target. The gunners thus were forced to resort to indirect 
f ire. 
Aside from the nebulous concept of the "artillery duel", there was very little 
systematic counter-battery doctrine before the war. The French High Command, and 
especially the French Infantry, were hostile to the very idea of a set-piece artillery duel, 
seeing it as a waste of firepower better spent in support of the infantry's attack. The French 
Field Service Regulations issued in 1913 specifically forbade their artillery from engaging in 
artillery duels. 55 
In 1914 there was very little real centralized command and control (C2) of artillery. In 
almost all armies the division was the highest level of artillery C2. The British Army did not 
introduce a divisional-level artillery commander until 1912, and the Royal Artillery entered 
the war with no experience in coordinating and controlling fires above the level of the 
artillery battalion (which the British at the time called artillery "brigades"). In most armies of 
1914 corps-level artillery existed only as a pool of assets, to be allocated among the divisions 
as the mission required. The senior artillery officers at corps-levels and above were merely 
advisors, rather than commanders. Even as late as 1917, the senior gunner in General Sir 
Hubert Gough's Fifth Army was not consulted on the plans for the Passchendaele attack 56 
The pre-war doctrine of high mobility required that the guns used by field artillery be 
mobile, which meant light. All nations were armed primarily with light flat-firing field guns. 
But the German 77mm, the Russian 76.2mm, the American 3-inch, the British 18-pounder, 
and the famous French 75mm were all too light to have any real effect against well-prepared- 
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field fortifications. 7 Once these guns were forced to move back off the front lines, they 
lacked the higher trajectories necessary for indirect fire, especially in rougher terrain. 
Experimentation and Build-up 1915: 
As the stalemate on the Western Front set in, all sides spent most of 1915 scrambling 
to develop new ordnance and new fire support techniques. But before those issues could even 
be addressed, all the belligerents ran into a more immediate and critical problem -- 
ammunition. 
Despite the evidence from recent conflicts, all armies entered World War I with far 
too little artillery ammunition. During the Russo-Japanese War the Russian Army averaged 
87,000 rounds for each month of combat operations in 1904. By the First Balkan War in 
1912, the Bulgarian Army was shooting 254,000 rounds per month 58 Yet the French Army 
started World War I with less than 5 million rounds on hand. The Russians were in a little 
better position with about 12 million rounds. The Germans seemed to be in the best shape 
with slightly more than 20 million rounds, but that had to be split between the two fronts. 
French plans called for an average consumption of 100,000 rounds per month; but the 
actual monthly average for 1914 was close to 900,000 rounds. By 1916 the French were 
shooting 4.5 million rounds per month; and by 1918 the Germans were averaging 8 million 
rounds. Industry could not keep up with the ever-growing demand, and the ammunition crises 
caused political scandals in Britain, Russia, and France. Throughout most of 1914 and 1915 
tactical plans were held hostage to the supply of artillery ammunition. 59 
Shrapnel was the standard round for the light field gun in 1914. Howitzers and 
heavier guns primarily fired high explosive (HE). Up until nearly the end of World War I the . 
HE round produced very little fragmentation and was used principally for its blast effect. The 
shrapnel round was packed with steel balls and a bursting charge that was triggered by a 
80 
hand-set, powder-burning time fuze. When the round went off in the air the bursting charge 
blew the nose cap off the front of the round and shot the balls forward -- something like a 
huge airborne shotgun. 
Under the control of a skilled observer, shrapnel could be deadly against troops in the 
open. But it was ineffective against dug-in troops, and virtually worthless against 
fortifications. Thus, HE increasingly became the round of choice. By the end of the war the 
metallurgical and chemical compositions of the HE round and its filler had been perfected to 
the point where an air burst of HE was as effective as properly adjusted shrapnel. After 
World War I the shrapnel round passed from the scene. 
Another source of early problems was the distinction that existed in most armies 
between the different branches of artillery. The U. S. Army had Field Artillery and Coast 
Artillery, and the British artillery was divided into the Royal Horse Artillery, Royal Field 
Artillery, and the Royal Garrison Artillery. 60 The German Army had a similar distinction 
between the Field Artillery and the Foot Artillery. German Field Artillery was mounted, 
armed with light field guns, and supported the maneuver forces. Foot Artillery units had little 
organic mobility and used heavy howitzers and siege mortars. Like the U. S. Coast Artillery 
and the Royal Garrison Artillery, the German Foot Artillery manned coastal defenses; but it 
also manned the guns of interior fortifications and was responsible for conducting set-piece 
sieges in the field should such an operation become necessary. The reduction of the Belgian 
forts along the Meuse River in 1914 was primarily a Foot Artillery operation. 
Although the difference between these two major categories of artillery seemed 
logical enough on paper, the distinctions started to blur during World War I, as the heavier 
guns of the foot and garrison branches were called upon increasingly to give direct support to 
combat operations. In most armies the two branches were barely on speaking terms. Field 
artillery emphasized speed and mobility, while heavy artillery stressed precision and 
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technical applications. 61 In the German Army the foot and field branches even had gun sights 
calibrated in different units of angular measurement. 2 Field gunners in all armies tended to 
look down upon their garrison and foot colleagues as "Dugout Artillerymen". 
The French started the war with almost no heavy artillery. Their pre-World War I 
doctrine rejected the howitzer entirely. They put all their faith in the M1897 75mm field gun.. 
This remarkable weapon was the world's first truly modem artillery piece. But the French 
believed it could accomplish any artillery mission on the battlefield. Whatever the gun 
lacked in hitting power could be more than compensated for by its high rate of fire (20 to 30 
rounds per minute). This was a very curious notion, considering the French entered the war 
with only 1,300 rounds for each of their 75mm guns--almost all of it shrapnel. 
By the end of the war the French view of heavy guns had changed drastically. In 
August 1914 they had 3,840 75mm guns; but they had a grand total of only 308 guns larger 
than 75mm. By November 1918 the French artillery had 4,968 field guns and 5,128 guns and 
howitzers above 75mm. Although the total size of the French artillery increased two-and-a- 
half times during the war, the increase in heavier guns was something on the order of 1,700 
percent. 63 
The Germans paid closer attention to the results of the Russo-Japanese and Balkan 
Wars and entered World War I with a higher ratio of howitzers and heavy guns. The famous 
gun works of central Europe, including Krupp and Skoda, conducted aggressive research and 
development programs in heavy artillery prior to the war. By 1914 Germany had 5,086 77mm 
field guns and 2,280 howitzers and larger pieces--outnumbering the French heavy hitters by 
more than seven-to-one. But even German heavy artillery grew during the war at a faster rate 
than the light field guns. By 1918 the German Artillery had 6,764 field guns and 12,286 
artillery pieces above 77mm--still outnumbering the French heavies by more than five-to- 
one. 64 
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The British had learned the value of the howitzer in their relatively recent Boer War. 
As a result, they had a higher proportion of howitzers and heavier guns than almost any other 
army. Throughout the war their ratio of light guns to howitzer and heavier guns changed only 
slightly. In 1914 the British Army as a whole had 1,608 light guns and 1,248 howitzers and 
heavies. Unfortunately, the ill-equipped British Expeditionary Force landed in France with a 
total of only 89 mediums and heavies, which included 24 old siege guns. By 1918 the British 
Army in France had 3,242 light guns and 3,195 howitzers and heavies. 65 
In the early part of the war the fire direction procedures for indirect fire were 
cumbersome and slow. As the various armies expanded, their pools of trained manpower also 
shrank through attrition. The gunnery problem grew technically more complex, but the large 
numbers of poorly and hastily trained replacements required even simpler methods. One 
solution to the problem was the establishment of phase lines on the ground to control the 
shifting of fires. The system was slow and rigid, but it worked. Requests to lift fires from one 
phase line to another often had to be carried by runner, and sometimes took hours to 
accomplish. 
Fire on the objective took the form of standing barrages along the enemy's trench 
lines. As the attackers overtook the leading trench line, the standing barrage would shift onto 
the next trench line back. The Germans quickly learned to counter the standing barrages by 
taking some of their machine guns out of the trenches and placing them on the ground 
between the trench lines. This led to the requirement for the artillery to sweep the intervening 
ground with fire as it moved from one standing barrage to the next. 
By 1916 on the Western Front (and most likely earlier on the Eastern Front) the 
standing barrages and the sweeping fire between them evolved into the creeping barrage (also 
called a rolling barrage), with the advancing infantry following closely behind a steadily 
moving wall of friendly artillery fire. But, as already noted, over-reliance on artillery phase 
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lines and creeping barrages had an adverse effect on maneuver tactics. Troops were trained 
to follow in straight lines behind the barrage. Infantry commanders at all levels began to 
ignore terrain and the old linear tactics returned in a new guise. 66 
Destruction 1916-1917: 
As the war moved into its third year the Western Front settled into a pattern of tactical 
stagnation. During this phase of the war artillery on both sides became a blunt instrument for 
indiscriminately pounding large sections of ground. The main functions of artillery on the 
battlefield had become destruction and annihilation--destroy the attacking enemy before they 
reached friendly lines, and destroy the defending enemy before attacking friendly troops 
reached the hostile positions. Special emphasis was placed on obliterating the enemy's 
fortifications, with artillery expected to cut his barbed wire. This only added to the steadily 
increasing rate of ammunition consumption. The prevailing philosophy of this third period 
became, "The artillery conquers, the infantry occupies. " 67 
The dominance of artillery on the battlefield naturally gave rise to counterbattery 
(CB) operations. Here the destruction philosophy dominated too, and CB work became 
almost the exclusive domain of the heavier guns. Counter-battery planning was carried out 
according to rigid mathematical formulas. 68 
The key offensive fire support technique during this period became the artillery 
preparation. The first large-scale preparation of the war took place during the British attack at 
Neuve Chapelle on 10 March 1915. In what was the greatest artillery bombardment in 
military history to that time, 354 British guns fired on the German positions for 35 minutes. 
The howitzers and heavy guns shot indirect fire against the German trenches, while the field 
guns concentrated on the barbed wire with direct fire. The attack was successful initially 
because the field guns did an adequate job against the wire. The fire of the howitzers, 
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however, was less than accurate because they fired from map data. Also, two late arriving 
howitzer batteries failed to engage effectively a 400-yard section of German trenches, and the 
machine gun fire from that section decimated two of the attacking British battalions. 69 The 
attack ultimately failed, and unfortunately, the wrong lessons were drawn. Focusing on the 
destruction of obstacles rather than the fire from the trenches covering the obstacles, the 
conclusion was that the artillery needed to destroy everything in the infantry's path. That 
meant larger and longer preparations. 0 
As the war progressed through 1916 and 1917 the artillery preparations grew longer 
and longer, lasting days and even weeks. Military leaders on both sides convinced themselves 
the more HE shells they dumped on an objective, the easier the infantry's job would be. In 
truth, however, the long preparations accomplished very little and actually caused more 
problems for the attacker. In the first place, a long preparation sacrificed surprise; it told the 
defender exactly where the attack was coming. The longer the preparation, the longer the 
defender had to take counter-measures. Quite often a defender was able to withdraw his 
front-line infantry entirely from the area being shelled, reinforce it, and re-insert it when the 
fire lifted. 71 
The long preparations generally did an uneven job of cutting the defender's barbed 
wire; but they were most effective in tearing up the terrain the attacker had to cross. 72 That 
made the ground not only difficult for the infantry to attack over, it made it almost impossible 
for the artillery to follow in support. That, in turn, practically guaranteed an attack would 
falter as soon as the infantry advanced beyond the range of their own stalled artillery. 
Destroyed road networks to the front also made it more difficult to bring up logistical support 
for any advance that might be made. The long destructive preparations actually created more 
obstacles for the attacker then they cleared. 
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The massive preparations also caused an enormous logistical drain that slowly bled . 
the national economies of the belligerents. By mid-1916 the Great War had degenerated into 
a dull grinding war of attrition--the Materialschlacht the Germans had feared most. The 
destruction by artillery doctrine reached its zenith (and finally demonstrated its own 
bankruptcy) during the apocalyptic battles of later 1916 and 1917 on the Western Front. In 
July 1916 the British Army started its attack at the Somme with a seven-day preparation, 
during which 1,537 guns fired 1,627,824 rounds. When the Tommies climbed out of their 
trenches to attack on 1 July, they moved forward in the traditional linear formations. The 
British generals believed nothing could have survived the awesome shelling. The German 
Landser, however, were far from eliminated. They swarmed out from beneath the rubble 
covering their deep bunkers (Stollen), set up their machine guns in the new shell holes, and 
proceeded to massacre the attackers. The British Army took 57,470 casualties that first day, 
including 19,240 killed. 73 
After fighting five months on the Somme the Allies had taken only about 125 square 
kilometers of ground. The campaign had cost the British 420,000 casualties and the French 
195,000. Although the German defenders actually suffered slightly higher total losses with 
650,000 casualties, they had stopped the attackers cold. The Allied offensive tactics (both 
infantry and artillery) had been a failure. 74 The British tried the same sort of attack on a 
large scale again at Passchendaele in July 1917. This time the size of the artillery preparation 
was doubled. Over the course of 13 days 3,168 guns of the Royal Artillery threw 4.3 million 
rounds at the German positions. By the end of the five-month long Third Ypres campaign 
British losses ran to nearly 400,000. A. J. P. Taylor once characterized the battle as "the 
blindest slaughter of a blind war. " 75 Gary Sheffield, however, presented a sound argument 
that the campaign, and especially General Sir Herbert Plumer's trio of victories, actually 
pushed Germany to the brink of defeat. 76 
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Neutralization 1917-1918: 
Throughout the course of the war leaders on both sides and at all levels searched for 
ways to improve tactics and break the deadlock. For artillery tactics, the most aggressive 
experimentation took place first on the Eastern Front. The key to the new fire support 
thinking was a belief that artillery fire was more effective when its tactical effect was 
neutralization rather than destruction. This idea, which meshed nicely with the evolving 
attack doctrine, was actually a return to pre-war tactical concepts. 77 
The most influential artillery tactician of the war was Colonel Georg Bruchmüller, a 
previously obscure, medically retired German officer recalled to active duty for the duration. 
It is necessary to review his tactical system thoroughly, because of the key role he played in 
fire planning for all of the 1918 German offensives. 8 Bruchmüller eventually received the 
Pour le Merite with Oak Leaves, which were awarded only 122 times, and only twice to 
"higher artillery commanders. " General Max Hoffmann called Bruchmüller, "an artillery 
genius, " 79 and Ludendorff called him, "one of the most prominent soldiers of the war. " 80 
Starting on the Eastern Front as early as 1915 and culminating in the 1917 battle of 
Riga, Bruchmüller experimented with various fire support methods that were radical 
departures from convention. Bruchmüller was one of the first to advocate a return to the 
principles of neutralization. He understood the counter-productive nature of the long, 
destruction-oriented preparations. Thus while the preparations in the West were lasting 
weeks, Bruchmüller planned and executed preparations in the East lasting only a few hours, 
yet achieving better effect. His preparations may not have been long, but they were incredibly 
violent--designed not to obliterate a defending enemy, but to stun him senseless. In his own 
words, "We desired only to break the morale of the enemy, pin him to his position, and then 
overcome him with an overwhelming assault. " 81 
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Bruchmüller was one of the first to organize artillery preparations into distinct phases, 
with each phase intended to accomplish a specific tactical purpose. The typical Bruchmüller 
preparation had three main types of phases: A short surprise strike (Feuerüberfall) on 
command and control and communications targets; A period of reinforced fire against the 
enemy artillery; and Attack in depth of the defender's infantry positions. Bruchmüller 
concluded the last phase with a short sub-phase of saturation fire against the leading enemy 
infantry positions. It did not take those on the receiving end long to realize that the saturation 
fire on the front line was the signal for the start of the infantry assault. As a counter, 
Bruchmüller inserted varying numbers of dummy saturation sub-phases into the first and 
second phases. That way the defenders never really knew for sure when the German 
preparation was over. 82 Both the U. S. and Soviet/Russian Armies still use variations of the 
Bruchmüller preparation model to this day. 
Bruchmüller was noted for his innovative use of gas, which was the perfect 
neutralization weapon. He was one of the first to match the effects of various types of gas 
against specific types of targets to get specific results. He used lethal, persistent mustard 
("Yellow Cross" markings on German shells) gas to screen the flanks of attacks and 
contaminate enemy artillery positions, thus taking the guns out of action for the duration of 
the fight. Most gas masks of World War I were effective against lethal, non-persistent 
"Green Cross" (choking) gas, but ineffective against non-lethal, non-persistent "Blue Cross" 
(vomiting) gas. Bruchmtiller's technique was to fire a mixture of both, which he called 
Buntkreuz (mixed-color cross), against the same target. The Blue Cross gas would penetrate 
the mask, forcing the wearer to remove it in the presence of the lethal Green Cross. 83 
Despite some claims to the contrary, Bruchmüller almost certainly did not invent the 
creeping barrage (Feuerwalze), but he did develop some interesting variations on it. On the 
Eastern Front he introduced the double creeping barrage, with the first wave of fire consisting 
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of non-persistent gas, followed by a second wave of shrapnel and HE. The gas was timed to 
dissipate just before the attacking infantry reached the objective. It was the first time that gas 
was ever used in direct support of attacking troops. 
At Lake Narotch in April 1916 Bruchmüller became the first in the German Army to 
plan and coordinate fires above the divisional level. 84 One of his greatest innovations was a 
system of task-tailored artillery groups, each with a specific mission to perform on the 
battlefield. The main mission of the counter-artillery groups (Artilleriebekämpfungsartillerie, 
or AKA) was to neutralize the enemy's artillery. While almost everyone else was using 
howitzers and heavy guns for counter-battery work, Bruchmüller used mostly light field guns, 
because of their high rates of fire and the plentiful supply of gas ammunition for them. This 
was another application of the neutralization principle. It was not necessary to destroy the 
enemy guns, it was sufficient to neutralize them by temporarily eliminating their crews and 
contaminating the equipment. The use of gas also required far less accuracy in the locations 
of the enemy batteries. 
The counter-infantry groups (Infantriebekämpfungsartillerie, or IKA) struck at the 
enemy infantry positions. During the reinforced counter-battery phase of the preparation, 
however, the IKA guns joined in with the AKA guns to overwhelm the enemy batteries. 
Bruchmüller was one of the earliest advocates of centralized fire planning and C2. 
The IKA units were controlled by the divisions, the AKA units were controlled by corps. At 
the field army level, Bruchmüller established special heavy artillery groups (Schwerste 
Flachfeuerartillerie, or SCHWEFLA). These units fired destruction missions against critical 
targets, like rail centers, bridges, and concrete-reinforced command posts. At the corps level, 
Bruchmüller also set up long-range artillery groups (Fernkämpfartillerie, or FEKA), whose 
mission was interdiction against reserves and other deep targets. Bruchmüller's FEKA groups 
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were among the first units to appear on the modern battlefield with a specific deep-battle 
mission, and were the first tube artillery units to deliver operational fires. 
Although not strictly artillery assets, Bruchmüller's fire planning also included the . 
fires of the trench mortars (Minenwerfer, or MW), the accompanying artillery batteries 
(Infantriebegleitbatterien, or IBB), and the infantry guns (Infantrie-Geschuestzbatterien, or -, 
IGB). In the German Army at the time, the MW were manned by pioneers. The IBB and IGB, 
although manned by artillerymen, were infantry assets. The difference between the two was 
that the IBB operated in four-gun batteries that moved forward 1,000 to 2,000 meters behind 
the infantry front wave. The IGB operated as single guns that moved with the infantry in the 
second line of the first wave. The IGB also became the initial antitank weapons of the 
German Army. 85 
Accuracy in artillery fire was, and still is, a problem. The primary way to achieve 
accuracy is to fire a registration against a target with a precisely known location. By 
comparing the "should-hit" firing data to the "did-hit" data a set of corrections can be derived 
and applied against future targets. The system works something like zeroing a rifle. The only 
problem is that in registering, an artillery battery gives away its position, and it usually 
becomes an instant counter-battery target in the process. Also, hundreds of batteries suddenly 
registering in a given area give a clear indicator that a major attack is in the works. 
On the Eastern Front Bruchmüller experimented with various methods to eliminate or 
abbreviate the registration and thereby avoid telegraphing the attack. When he came to the 
Western Front in late 1917, Bruchmüller became the principal champion of a newly develop 
technique to "predict" registration corrections from careful measurement of weather 
conditions and muzzle velocity characteristics of each gun tube. The system, developed by 
Captain Erich Pulkowski, required precise calibration data from each gun tube to determine 
its velocity error, which the Germans called "special influences. " The gun, however, did not 
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need to be fired in the line to obtain this data. It could be done in a rear area, where the 
calibration firing could not be observed by the enemy. The special influences were then 
algebraically combined with the weather, or "daily influences. " The Germans used a limited 
version of the "Pulkowski Method" in Operation MICHAEL, and the full version of the 
system in the remaining four of the 1918 offensives. They achieved stunning tactical surprise 
in the process 86 The basic mechanics of the Pulkowski Method are still used by all NATO 
armies today, albeit computerized. 
Bruchmüller was not the only artillery innovator of the war, of course; nor did he 
personally develop all of the techniques he used so effectively. He did, however, perfect 
many of them on the battlefield, and he was the first to make them all work in a 
comprehensive system. French artillerymen, for the most part, were always several steps 
behind the Germans. They were slow to accept a return to neutralization, and to understand 
the value of surprise. Several British Gunners, on the other hand, had been advocating many 
of the same principles as the war progressed. Foremost among that group were Lieutenant- 
General Sir Noel Birch, Major-General Sir Herbert Uniacke (known in Royal Artillery circles 
as "the British Bruchmüller"), and Brigadier-General H. H. Tudor. For the most part, they 
were held back by Haig's prejudices on artillery, and the more rigid British staff system. The 
British attack at Cambrai actually pre-dated the Germans in the use of a system to predict 
artillery corrections without registering. Technical errors in the application, however, 
produced mixed results. 
AIR POWER 
Perhaps no other weapon system ever went through a steeper growth curve than the 
aircraft in World War I. At the start of the war airplanes were used for reconnaissance only. 
By the end of the war, all sides had purpose-built aircraft for reconnaissance, bombing, and 
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air superiority roles. In 1917 the Germans introduced the Junkers J-1, armed with three 
machine guns and a bomb load. It was both the world's first all-metal aircraft, and the first 
one specifically designed for ground attack. The Germans later introduced the Hanover C-III, 
another ground attack model. 87 
In September 1915 aircraft losses on both sides of the Western Front totaled 37. By 
August 1918 that figure totaled 832 for both sides. Throughout the war the Germans 
produced some 47,637 aircraft of 150 types. The Allies produced 138,685 88 At any given 
time the Germans were outnumbered 2: 1 in the air by the Allies, but until the last months of 
the war the Germans were able to achieve local air superiority over the battlefield when they 
needed it. The Germans consistently shot down between two and three Allied aircraft for 
each of their own losses. Training deaths accounted for 25 percent of the total German pilot 
losses, while in the Royal Flying Corps the figure was closer to 50 percent. 89 
The Germans countered Allied numerical superiority by forming larger units and 
concentrating their forces in the sectors where they needed local air superiority. By the fall of 
1916 they had established a central headquarters (Kommandierender General der 
Luftstreitkräfte or Kogenluft). By the start of 1918, the German air forces were organized into 
four basic types of units. 90 
Fliegerabteilung and Fliegerabteilung A: The primary mission of these units was 
reconnaissance, liaison, and aerial photography. The Fliegerabteilungen designated -A also 
performed artillery aerial observation. The standard Fliegerabteilung had six aircraft, the 
Fliegerabteilung-A had nine. Fliegerabteilungen were allocated on the basis of one per front 
line division, and three to four per front line corps. The Germans, however, seldom had 
sufficient assets to allocate on the standard basis. The Fliegerabteilungen accounted for 
roughly 49 percent of all German aircraft. 
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Schutzstaffeln, later called Sclachtstaffeln: The Schutzstaffeln originally were 
established as security flights for the Fligerabteilungen. As the ground attack role increased 
in importance and aircraft specially designed for that role were introduced, their designation 
was changed to Sclachtstaffeln. Each squadron had six aircraft. By the start of 1918, some 10 
percent of German aircraft were in the Sclachtstaffeln. An entire section of the new German 
attack doctrine issued in January 1918 was devoted to air support for the ground forces. 91 
That doctrine was amplified further by a document issued on 20 February 1918, specifically 
dealing with the Sclachtstaffeln and their control under divisional command in the initial 
stages of the attack. 92 The new doctrine also stressed ground attack by multiple aircraft in 
formation, rather than individual planes. The Second Army air orders for MICHAEL required 
an entire Schutzstaffeln to attack in lines, two waves to a line. The first wave was to attack 
enemy artillery positions, and the second wave was to support the infantry attack. 93 
Jagdstaffeln: These were the standard air superiority and air defense fighters. Each 
squadron had fourteen aircraft. Four Jagdstaffeln were organized into a Jagdgeschwader. 
Both the Schutzstaffeln and the Jagdstaffeln were controlled at the field army level. The 
Jagdstaffeln accounted for about 34 percent of the German aircraft. 
Kampfstaffeln, later called Bombenstaffeln: These were the long-range bombers, 
accounting for roughly 5 percent of the German aircraft. Each squadron had six aircraft, with 
three Bombenstaffeln organized into a Bombengeschwader. One specialized unit, 
Kampfgeschwader 3 (Kagohl3) was dubbed the "England Wing. " Flying from five airfields 
around Ghent in the Fourth Army area, Kagohl3 on 25 May 1917 initiated the bombing 
campaign against England with a raid on Folkstone. Operating directly under the control of 
OHL, Kagohl3 flew the huge Gotha bombers with their 500-kilogram payload. 
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TANKS 
The tank was either the most decisive weapon of World War I, or the most overrated. 
Almost 85 years after the end of the war the debate continues. What is clear is that the 
Germans were slower than the Allies to recognize the potential of the new weapon system, 
and a number of factors contributed to this. Even before the start of the war the Germans 
had conducted trials with armored cars armed with light guns and machine guns. Bernhardi 
dismissed the whole thing, writing, "... no serious military value can really be attached to 
these experiments. " 94 The British used tanks for the first time on the Somme on 15 
September 1916. Committed in small numbers, they produced some initial surprise effect, 
which did not last long. The French first used them on 16 April 1917, but the results were bad 
because of poor terrain. 
The initial poor results led Ludendorff and many others at OHL to conclude that the 
tank was little more than a nuisance weapon that could be countered with the right tactics. 
They responded with special training for artillery crews, the construction of antitank 
obstacles, and the introduction of a 13mm antitank rifle that required a crew of two to 
operate. The first German manual on tank operations, published in January 1918, declared 
that the tank was an auxiliary weapon that could not decide battle on its own. Its primary 
mission was to assist the infantry in reaching its objectives. Ludendorff saw their primary 
value in reducing enemy wire and overrunning machine gun positions. 
Many at OHL, however, began to see the tank in an entirely different light after the 
British committed them in mass for the first time at Cambcit on20lio' mb et 19V . And 
after the A11iea counterattack of 1% My 191%, spearheaded by 759 tanks, 011L staff officer 
Colonel Albrecht von Thaer commented in his diary that "even Ludendorff' should now 
understand the power of the tank. 95 Nonetheless, in his post-war memoirs Ludendorff 
continued to insist; "The best arms against tanks are the nerves, discipline, and intrepidity. 
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Only with the decline in discipline and the weakening of the fighting power of our infantry 
did the tanks in their mass employment and in conjunction with smoke gain a dangerous 
influence on the course of military events. " 96 
Writing after the war Balck made the excuse that German industry could only have 
produced tanks at the expense of artillery, aircraft, and submarines. 97 Ludendorff claimed, 
with some justification, that the priority for German industry had to be the production of 
motor vehicles to relieve the horse shortage. 98 By October 1918, as the Allies were using 
tanks in greater and greater numbers, the Reichstag asked the War Ministry and OHL why 
they had not requested tank development in late 1917. OHL responded that it had looked into 
the issue and concluded that German industry was too heavily committed to higher priorities 
to be able to deliver tanks in any significant numbers before the summer of 1918.99 
Actually, OHL had made a request to the War Ministry for the development of tanks 
as early as October 1916. In 1917 construction started on 100 "caterpillar vehicles. " Only 
twenty were meant to be armored fighting vehicles, the rest were to be front-line transport 
vehicles. The result was the monstrous and cumbersome A7V. It was 24-feet long, weighed 
30 tons, and had a crew of eighteen. It was armed with a 57mm main gun and six machine 
guns. It had a speed of 5 miles per hour on level surfaces, and a range of only 15 miles. Five 
A7Vs were delivered to the army in January 1918, and another ten in March. The fifteen 
A7Vs and 75 captured tanks were the only German tanks to see combat in World War I. 100 
By the end of the war, the British had built 2,636 tanks and the French had built 3,900. 
Thousands more were on order for the 1919 campaign. 101 
The question remains just how effective the tank was? J. F. C. Fuller argued that the 
Germans would have won in early 1918 had they focused all their manufacturing resources 
on field guns and tanks. 102 Even General Hermann von Kuhl wrote that the March 1918 
offensive would have succeeded, "... if 600 tanks had cleared the way for our infantry. " 103 
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Ludendorff made the rather odd comment; " [Tanks] were merely an offensive weapon, and 
our attacks succeeded without them. " 104 [Emphasis added] 
Major-General Hubert Essame once posed the question that if tanks alone had been 
the panacea for victory in 1918, then how did the Germans manage to penetrate so much 
deeper without them than the Allies did with them? 105 And Terraine pointed out that the 
number of tanks the Allies could mass on the first day of an attack mattered little, regardless 
of how spectacular the results that day might seem. What really mattered was how many 
tanks were available for action on the second and subsequent days. Tanks in 1918 still had 
huge mechanical reliability problems, and as their experience against tanks increased, the 
German antitank measures became more sophisticated and effective. 
During the counterattack of General Charles Mangin's French Tenth Army on 18 July 
1918,346 tanks were available; 225 actually got into action; and 102 were knocked out. On 
the following day, 195 were available; and 50 were knocked out. By the third day the French 
had only 32 tanks available. During the British counterattack at Amiens on 8 August 1918, 
Ludendorff s "Black Day of the German Army, " 414 tanks were available for action on the 
first day; 145 on the second day; 85 on the third day; 38 on the fourth day; and by 12 August 
the British had only six tanks in action. 106 
These attrition rates raise serious questions about just how effective an exploitation 
weapon the tank would have been even if the Germans had mass numbers of them. The fact 
remains, however, that the Germans did not have tanks in 1918, and our analysis of their 
operational plans must focus on what was possible with what they had. 
COMMAND, CONTROL, and COMMUNICATIONS 
Communications provide the vital link that ties together fire and maneuver and makes 
possible the coordination and synchronization of many elements over a wide area. Effective, 
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secure, and rapid communications are an essential prerequisite for the successful prosecution 
of war at the tactical and operational levels. In many ways, it is even more important at the 
operational level. While the operational level often can move almost as fast as the tactical 
level, the size, scope, and number of diverse elements are far greater. Command, control, and 
communications systems (C3) are what tie them all together. 
The real-time and near-real-time communications systems modem soldiers take for 
granted did not exist during World War I. Wire was fairly well developed, but radio was in its 
infancy. All armies made extensive use of non-electronic communications systems that had 
been in use for hundreds, if not thousands of years. The faster electronic systems were more 
effective in the defense, the older and slower manual systems were more effective in the 
offense. This especially made responsive fire support difficult, as artillery observers moved 
forward with the advancing infantry. 
At the start of the war all forms of wire communications (voice and telegraph) were 
fairly well developed. Induction intercepts were technically feasible at distances up to three 
kilometers, and the Germans used this intelligence-gathering tool to good effect against the 
Russians at Tannenberg. By May 1917 the Germans had laid some 515,000 kilometers of 
wire in the West, and 349,000 kilometers in the East. Wire was very vulnerable to all sorts of 
enemy as well as friendly hazards, and the Germans required 62 kilograms of wire to 
maintain one kilometer of the Western Front for one month. At the start of the war radio 
transmissions were mostly Morse code, but by the end of the war radio voice transmissions 
had a range of up to 16 kilometers. By the end of the war each German division had a 
wireless battalion. The growing use of interception as an intelligence-gathering tool led to the 
increased use of code and the introduction of deceptive transmissions. 107 
The more primitive communications techniques were much slower, but also tended to 
be more reliable under combat conditions. Messengers, both foot and mounted, had the 
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highest casualty rates of any job in the war, but they were fairly reliable under fire--especially 
when used with redundancy. Carrier pigeons and messenger dogs were widely used by both 
sides. The dogs were very reliable within a 2-kilometer radius. The pigeons were relatively 
uninfluenced by fire and gas, but they required clear weather and were only good for front to 
rear communications. Early in the war the Germans abandoned the use of signal flags, but the 
use of signal lamps and flares proved fairly effective in combat situations. 
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All sides tried various ways to exercise effective command and control over a wide 
area with the primitive and slow communications technology of the day. The Allies generally 
tried to centralize both planning and execution at the highest levels, which in the end robbed 
subordinate commanders of all initiative and made it almost impossible to exploit rapidly 
tactical opportunities as they arose. 109 The Germans, on the other hand, retained a fairly high 
level of centralized planning, but pushed the execution down the chain of command as far as 
possible--at least at the tactical level. 
Contrary to the rigid and hierarchical nature of militaries in general, and German 
society in particular, the German Army developed and practiced several innovative and 
flexible command and staff techniques that many other armies have since tried to copy, but 
almost none have mastered. Weisungsführung (command by directive) allowed great latitude 
to higher-level subordinate commanders at the field army and in some situations at the corps 
level. Rather than issuing explicit and detailed orders, the OHL issued generalized statements 
of its intentions, which then provided the framework for independent initiative by the 
subordinate commanders. This technique capitalized on the local commander's superior 
knowledge of the situation to his front, and also compensated for the slow and unreliable 
communications systems of the day. 
Weisungsführung could only work if the commanders and their staffs at all levels 
operated on the same set of principles and worked through the tactical decision making 
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process with the same set of intellectual tools. The General Staff officers at each echelon of 
command provided the common link to ensure that happened. Many critics over the years 
have dismissed this system as nothing more than groupthink on a huge scale; but such an 
assessment is far too simplistic and misses the main point entirely. The system did not 
produce perfect solutions every time, but it almost always produced workable solutions. And 
it produced them quicker, which almost always gave the Germans a huge tactical advantage 
over their opponents. ' 10 As Bernhardi put it; "Acting with self-reliance in the sense and spirit 
of General Headquarters, and of the uniform plan of battle known to us, is the decisive factor 
in modem battle. " 111 
Closely allied with Weisungsführung was the concept of Vollmacht, an authority 
usually delegated to a staff officer to issue orders and shift units without consulting f irst with 
the commander. This technique too compensated for slow communications, and placed great 
faith on the staff officer on the spot to make the correct decisions. Vollmacht was an 
emergency procedure, normally only used in a crisis situation. Most often a staff officer was 
specifically delegated Vollmacht, but in some rare situations he assumed and exercised it 
based on the situation. Military historians to this day still debate whether Lieutenant Colonel 
Richard Hentsch had Vollmacht or if he was just carrying a Wiesung (directive) to the First 
Army during the First Battle of the Marne in 1914.1 12 
Following World War I, the Germans pushed the concept of Weisungsführung farther 
down the chain of command by expanding on the pre-war concept of Auftragstaktik. One of 
the most important military concepts of the 20th century, the term can be translated loosely to 
"mission-type orders, " but there is no real English equivalent that adequately conveys the full 
meaning. Auftragstaktik is based on the principal that a commander should tell his 
subordinates what to do and when to do it by, but not necessarily tell them how to do it. In 
accomplishing their missions, subordinate commanders are given a wide degree of latitude 
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and are expected to exercise great initiative. 113 Where Weisungsführung only entrusted 
commanders down to the field army or sometimes the corps level with broad discretionary 
powers in the execution of their missions, Auftragstaktik extended that principal down to the 
lowest squad leader and even, when necessary, to the individual soldier. 
For Auftragstaktik to work, a subordinate leader or even a common soldier given a 
mission must fully understand his commander's intent (Absicht)-and in most cases, the intent 
of the next higher commander. This, of course, implies that the subordinate leader must 
understand "why. " If he doesn't understand, he has the obligation to ask. Conversely, the 
superior leader issuing the order has the obligation to explain. Such a process does not f it the 
popular stereotype of military organizations in general, nor especially is it characteristic of 
German society. Although traditional German deference to higher authority and preference 
for well-defined procedures are the very antithesis ofAuftragstaktik, the post-World War I 
German Army made it work to a degree unsurpassed by any other army in history-and its 
roots were deeply embedded in the institutional culture of the World War I German Army. 
Another concept that was completely alien to most military hierarchies, and especially 
to class and status conscience German society, was the notion that function overrode rank: 1 14 
The Germans routinely appointed officers to command and staff positions far above the 
actual rank they held. Once in the position, 
however, the of ficet functioned w\th the cult 
authority of the position, regardless of the nominal ranks and pay grades of his functional 
subordinates. Corps chiefs of staff, who may have been lieutenant colonels, routinely passed 
orders unchallenged to general officers commanding subordinate divisions. During the final 
offensives in May through July 1918, Bruchmüller, though only a colonel, was designated as 
the artillery commander of the entire Western Front, while at the same time the typical army 
group artillery commander was a lieutenant general. Ludendorff himself never wore more 
than three stars. 
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GERMAN COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS 
Conventional wisdom has long held that the attacker must achieve a three-to-one 
superiority over the defender, at least at the decisive point. Yet there was no way that the 
Germans could have achieved this level of superiority over the Allies in 1918--at least in 
terms of the raw numbers. In On War Clausewitz noted: "... superiority of numbers admittedly 
is the most important factor in the outcome of an engagement so long as it is great enough to 
counterbalance all other contributing circumstances. " 115 But then he also said: "Superior 
numbers, far from contributing everything, or even a substantial part, to victory, may actually 
be contributing very little, depending on the circumstances. " 116 Thus, as Clausewitz 
indicated, raw numbers by themselves do not necessarily translate directly into relative 
combat power. His "other contributing circumstances" include factors such as weapons 
effectiveness, terrain, mobility, morale and training, etc. 
There have been many attempts over the years to reduce all such factors to 
quantifiable variables or constants that can be applied to various formulae that would predict 
the outcome of a battle. Early in the 20th century aeronautical engineer Frederick W. 
Lancaster introduced his Linear and Square Laws on the principal of concentration in combat 
aircraft design. 17 Fuller, among others, attempted to turn Lancaster's Equations into a more 
general model of combat. But Fuller added the caveat; "Superior moral or better tactics or a 
hundred and one other extraneous causes may intervene in practice to modify the issue, but 
this does not invalidate the mathematical statement. " 118 Expressing frustration that 
Lancaster's Equations could not be made to fit any actual historical data, Trevor N. Dupuy 
went on to develop his highly controversial Quantified Judgement Model. 119 Somewhere in 
between Clausewitz and Dupuy lie the Soviet concepts of planning norms and correlation of 
forces, and the later Cold War NATO notions of force multipliers. 
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Although the outcome of combat still continues to defy precise mathematical 
prediction, few historians would deny that there was something especially effective about the 
German Army between 1870 and 1945--at least at the tactical level. Many books have been 
written on the subject, including Dupuy's A Genius for War and Martin van Creveld's 
Fighting Power, a comparative study of the German and U. S. Armies between 1939 and 
1945. In applying his Quantified Judgement Model to Operation MICHAEL in 1918, Dupuy 
concluded that the Germans were 78 percent more effective than the defenders in the phase of 
the battle that ran from 21 to 26 March; and 27 percent more effective than the defenders in 
the 27 March to 4 April phase. 120 
Why then was the German Army so tactically effective during a period stretching 
over almost 75 years? In popular myth the Germans in general, and the Prussians in 
particular, have a peculiarly war-like and militaristic national character. Dupuy challenged 
that myth by arguing that in the 130 years following the Napoleonic wars Germany was 
involved in six wars. France was involved in ten. Russia was involved in thirteen. Britain was 
involved in at least seventeen. And even the United States was involved in seven. 121 A 
corollary myth holds that the Prussian system, based on harsh discipline, produced soldiers, 
who were efficient, but unimaginative and completely inflexible. That myth falls apart under, 
even the most cursory level of historical scrutiny. In trying to answer why the Germans were 
so tactically innovative in World War I. Tim Travers identified four competing theories. 122 
One theory holds that Germany had more than its share of great tacticians and talented. . 
staff officers; among them Georg Bruchmüller, Hermann Geyer, Fritz von Lossberg, Max 
Bauer, Willy Rohr, and Georg Wetzell. This is a central argument in Wynne's If Germany 
Attacks, and is a variation on the "great man" theory of history. 
Another theory argues that doctrinal development in the German Army was a 
corporate process, supported by institutional excellence deeply ingrained in the German 
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Army's culture. This is a central argument of Timothy Lupfer's Dynamics of Doctrine and 
many of Dupuy's books. 
Yet a third theory centers on the notion that necessity is the mother of invention. The 
Allies pursued a war of attrition based on their overall manpower and resources advantages. 
The Germans were forced by necessity into a policy of scarcity and therefore had to be more 
resourceful. This is an argument advanced by Norman Stone. 123 
Finally, Michael Geyer advanced a theory based on the relationship between the 
German Army, ideology, and society. The fundamental change in warfare became very clear 
around 1916 and coincided with the arrival of Ludendorff and the "machine culture" 
technocrats at OHL. But the German Army at that point was "locked into a procurement 
system, centered around heavy industry, that was hostile to new weapons systems, like 
tanks.... In the end, it proved easier to change the army than to crack the system of weapons 
procurement. " 124 Geyer's theory supports Traver's basic arguments and there is a great deal 
of validity to what Geyer has to say about the German industrial system. What is debatable-- 
especially in light of the 1920 report of Colonel Theobeck's commission--is the degree to 
which OHL actually converted to the technological/ machine power paradigm of warfare. 
There are elements of validity in all four of these theories. The Germans most 
certainly were forced by necessity to do things the Allies never had to. And as I argue in my 
book Steel Wind, Bruchmüller had a far greater (but by no means exclusive) influence over 
German artillery tactics than Lossberg, Geyer, or Rohr individually had over infantry tactics. 
Yet it was the corporate culture of the German Army and especially its General Staff system 
that allowed the lessons of war to be absorbed quickly and the doctrine and training to be 
changed accordingly. 
For the Germans, the key test of doctrine was what worked on the battlefield. They 
saw doctrine as a means to an end, and not an end in itself. Methodology was the key to the 
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doctrine process. They paid close attention to cause and effect relationships and they did not 
cloak fuzzy doctrine in fancy terms and catch phrases. 123 As Corum pointed out, the very 
word doctrine (Doktrin) is not at all common in the German language; and when used it does 
not imply the sense of the "proper way to do things, " as Americans tend to apply it to 
tactics. 126 Doctrine was not some sort of sacred talisman, as attaque ä l'outrance was for the 
French. 
Prior to launching his disastrous offensives in 1917, French General Robert Nivelle 
triumphantly proclaimed, "We have the formula! " 127 In his war diaries published after the 
war, Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria wrote; "There is no panacea. A formula is harmful. 
Everything must be applied based on the situation. " 128 
Despite his reputation as the ultimate Prussian, stiff-necked, rigid, and unimaginative, 
Ludendorff was a flexible and innovative tactician who presided over one of the most 
remarkable doctrinal transformations in the history of war. It was even more remarkable for 
the speed with which it was carried out, the training necessary to make it all work, and the 
fact that the whole process was executed amidst the chaos of the greatest war in history to 
that time. 
Despite Ludendorffs overpowering personality, he did not monopolize or dominate 
the process of reform. Rather, he encouraged and fostered a spirit of corporate effort and 
tolerated a remarkable degree of dissent within his group of talented staff officers. 129 In the 
end, however, the Germans in World War I were never able to escape the long shadow of the 
Vernichtungsprinzip-and it cost them dearly at the operational level. 
GERMAN DEFENSIVE TACTICS 
Although this study focuses on the great German offensives of 1918, a brief review of 
the development of German defensive tactics will prove beneficial for several reasons. First, 
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it provides insight into the German process of tactical doctrine revision that started first with 
the defensive, and then moved to the offensive. Second, Allied errors in applying the new 
defensive tactics, despite having grappled with them throughout much of 1917, contributed 
significantly to the German success in the March, April, and May offensives. Third, by June 
and July 1918 the Allies had almost completely adopted the German defensive tactics, which 
contributed in no small measure to the failure of the last offensive, MARNSCHUTZ-REIMS. 
130 And fourth, any evaluation of the HAGEN attack plan must be made on the assumption 
that the British would have been using the new defensive tactics. 
While he was Chief of the General Staff at OHL, General Erich von Falkenhayn 
pursued a ruthless strategy of exploiting the Allies' tactical doctrine of conducting rigid 
defenses with the bulk of their forces packed into the forward trenches. In those positions 
they became just so many targets for German firepower. Oddly enough, Falkenhayn himself 
followed the same defensive doctrine, insisting that German commanders hold the front line 
at all costs. There were two schools of thought among the staff officers at OHL, however. 
The debate revolved around where the defensive-battle should actually be fought--at the front 
line or behind it? Many of the junior officers at OHL, including Bauer and Geyer, favored a 
flexible defense fought behind the front line. Lossberg favored the rigid defense fought at the 
front line. 131 As one of the few officers at OHL with direct combat experience, Lossberg 
believed his OHL colleagues were too prone to overestimate the capabilities of combat units 
and underestimate the problems of front line combat. 132 
When the British attacked on the Somme in 1916, OHL posted Lossberg as chief of 
staff of the German Second Army. (Later re-designated the First Army. ) During his time on 
the Somme, Lossberg determined that it took anywhere between 8 and 10 hours for a 
message to travel one way in either direction between a divisional headquarters and the front 
line. The tactical situation usually changed drastically in the time that it took information to 
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flow up and the corresponding orders to flow back down. Lossberg concluded that the only 
way to improve tactical responsiveness was to give the front line battalion commanders total 
control of their own sectors. The higher headquarters, then, had the obligation to support the 
front line commanders' decisions. The battalion commander also would have operational 
control of any reinforcements committed to his sector, regardless of the size of the 
reinforcing unit or its commander's rank. This approach ensured continuity of command and 
exploited the front line battalion commander's superior knowledge of the terrain and the 
situation. 133 
Lossberg's innovations effectively shorted the chain of command. Under this system, ,, 
the regimental commander became a manager of reinforcements and logistical support. At the 
next higher levels the role of the divisional commanders mirrored that of the front line 
battalion commanders. The divisions controlled everything in their sectors without having to 
get permission from the corps. When a reinforcing division was committed, it came under the 
operational control of the commander of the reinforced division. 134 
When Ludendorff arrived at OHL in late 1916 he immediately initiated a complete, 
review of the way the German Army fought. The resulting reform process incorporated many 
of Lossberg's innovations. On 1 December 1916, OHL published the German Army's new 
defensive doctrine as Principles of Command in the Defensive Battle in Position Warfare 
(Grundsätze für die Abwehrschlacht im Stellungskrieg). The manual was based on lessons 
learned and actual practice, and it was compiled and written primarily by Bauer and Geyer. 
135 As early as September 1916, several months before the new manual was in print, the 
Germans were conducting a special month-long course in the new tactics for company and 
battery commanders. 136 
The new doctrine can best be described as flexible defense, or flexible defense-in- 
depth. It rested on three key principles: Flexibility, Decentralized Control, and Counterattack. 
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While the command and control of the Allied attacks became centralized at ever-higher 
levels, German commanders in the defense had an impressive amount of autonomy. A front- 
line battalion commander had the authority to withdraw from forward positions under 
pressure as he saw fit. More importantly, he had the authority to order the remaining 
battalions of his regiment (positioned to his rear) into the counterattack when he judged the 
timing right. 
The Germans recognized two distinct types of counterattacks. The hasty counterattack 
(Gegenstoss) was immediate and violent, designed to hit the attacking enemy immediately, 
before he had a chance to consolidate his newly won position or move up reinforcements. 
Locally planned and executed, the Gegenstoss was launched on the initiative of the front-line 
battalion commander. The deliberate counterattack (Gegenangriff) was centrally planned and 
more methodically prepared. It was only used when a Gegenstoss had failed or was 
unfeasible. Most importantly for our study, the counterattack tactics developed during this 
period had a great influence on the later development of the offensive tactics. 
The Germans organized their positions into three zones. The Outpost Zone 
(Vorfeldzone) was 500 to 1,000 meters in depth, and manned with sparsely located early- 
warning positions. The Battle Zone (Kampffeld), was up to 2,000 meters deep. And The 
Rearward Zone (Hinterzone), was where the reserves and counter-attack units were held, 
often in deep, reinforced bunkers. The leading edge of the Battle Zone was the Main Line of 
Resistance (Hauptwiderstandslinie), with three or more successive trench lines. Between the 
Battle Zone and the Rearward Zone came another line of multiple trenches that served as the 
protective line for the artillery. The Germans also decreased the strength of the forward 
positions. While the French were putting two-thirds of their combat strength into the first two 
lines, the Germans put only 20 percent into the same positions. The Germans even came to 
regard their forward-most trenches as useful only in quiet periods. During an artillery 
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bombardment prior to an Allied attack, the forces in the rear would move into their deep 
protected bunkers to ride out the storm. The troops in the thinly held outpost line would slip 
out of their trenches and take cover in nearby shell-holes--while the Allied artillery pounded 
the empty trenches. 
137 
By the latter half of 1917 the Germans started distinguishing between two types of 
divisions with different tactical functions. The defensive positions in the line were manned by 
"trench divisions" (Stellungsdivisionen). Farther back in the operational rear the Germans 
positioned their "attack divisions" (Angriffsdivisionen) to conduct the larger-scale, deliberate 
counter-attacks. When the Germans went over to the offensive in 1918 this distinction played 
a key role, with an entire attacking corps moving up into a sector of the line that had been 
held by a single trench division. 138 
When the Germans withdrew to the Hindenburg Line (which they called the 
Siegfriedstellung) in early 1917, they added a new twist to the flexible defense-in-depth. The 
Germans planned this withdrawal very carefully, and made extensive preparations of their 
new positions before occupying them. In as many places along the line as possible, the 
trenches of the main line of resistance were sited on high ground on the reverse slope facing 
away from the Allies. The concept of reverse-slope defense ran counter to tactical 
conventional wisdom of the time because it did not utilize the maximum range of the 
machine gun. Actually, it gave the defender significant advantages. It placed his positions out 
of the line of sight of the attacker's base position, thereby complicating the attacker's 
communications and the coordination of his artillery. At the same time, those positions 
remained within the line of sight of the defender's rear positions and artillery, giving the 
defending commanders the advantage in knowing where and when to move reserves and to 
counter-attack. 139 
z 
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Despite his own influence over the new doctrine, Lossberg believed that the 
December 1916 Principles were far too liberal in allowing front line units to yield ground in 
the face of a strong attack. He still believed that a ridged forward defense was the best 
defensive tactic, with the flexible defense-in-depth reserved for special situations only. 
Lossberg rebutted much of what was in Principles with his own analysis, Experiences of the 
First Army in the Somme Battles. In order to encourage a healthy professional debate over the 
new tactical doctrine in the best traditions of the German General Staff, Ludendorff had OHL 
reprint and widely distribute Lossberg's pamphlet. When the British captured a copy, they 
translated it and distributed 2,800 copies. 140 
Ironically, one of the German Army's strongest initial opponents of flexible defense in 
depth became the first to make it work in a large-scale battle. 141 The heavy German losses 
on the first day at Arras, 9 April 1917, caused Ludendorff and others at OHL to question the 
efficacy of the new defensive doctrine. Almost immediately, Ludendorff sent Lossberg to the 
German Sixth Army as its chief of staff. Upon arriving on the scene and seeing the ground, 
Lossberg saw clearly that the control of Vimy Ridge gave the British an overwhelming 
advantage in artillery observation that made a rigid forward defense all but impossible. 
Lossberg thus opted for a flexible defense-in-depth, lightly manning the forward positions, 
allowing them to give ground under heavy pressure, then counterattacking with strong 
reserves. Lossberg readily admitted that his defensive scheme ran counter to almost 
everything he had written in his pamphlet. Once Lossberg was on the scene and in control, it 
became obvious that the new doctrine was sound, but that errors in its application had been 
the problem. 142 
The German defensive tactics were fine tuned in the closing months of 1917, during 
the third battle of Ypres--widely known as Passchendaele. Prior to the British attack, OHL 
once again shifted Lossberg as chief of staff, this time to the Fourth Army. By this time 
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Lossberg had acquired the nickname of der Abwehrlöwe--the Defensive Lion. Passchendaele 
finally resolved the debate within OHL about whether the main defensive battle should be 
conducted in or behind the front line. The answer was both. The front line divisions fought in 
and for the front line; the counterattack divisions fought behind the front line. 
GERMAN OFFENSIVE TACTICS 
As previously noted, Captain Andre Laffargue's May 1915 pamphlet, The Attack in 
Trench Warfare, advocated many of the tactical techniques that later came to be associated 
with German storm troop, or infiltration tactics. The Germans, however, did not capture and 
translate a copy of the pamphlet until the summer of 1916, well after they had started their 
own experiments with new attack tactics. It has been widely reported that the British did not 
even bother to translate the pamphlet. Martin Samuels, however, reports that a copy of the 
translation does in fact exist in the Department of Printed Books, Imperial War Museum. 13 
On the German side of the line Captain Willy Rohr was one of the earliest leaders in 
the development of the new offensive tactics. In August 1915 Rohr took command of the 
recently formed Assault Detachment (Sturmabteilung) on the Western Front. Under Rohr the 
Assault Detachment conducted very successful counterattacks, using non-linear tactics drawn 
from the traditional tactics of the German Jäger units. The basic unit for such operations was 
the assault squad (Stosstrupp). Armed with grenades, automatic weapons, trench mortars, and 
flamethrowers, their tactics and techniques were very similar to those suggested by 
Laffarague. 144 
Rohr's detachment eventually grew into a Sturm battalion. After the initial attacks at 
Verdun, the Fifth Army started using Rohr's battalion as a training unit during the lulls in the 
fighting. In May 1916, at Bauer's suggestion, Falkenhayn directed selected Western front 
units to spend fourteen days training with Rohr's battalion. When Ludendorff arrived at OIIL 
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he expanded the program. By January 1917 each German field army had an assault company. 
By the end of 1917 each field army had an assault battalion that functioned as a training 
cadre. 145 
These special assault units became known as Storm Troops (Stosstruppen). The storm 
battalions were one of the earliest forms of a true combined arms task force. Typically their 
structure included: three to four infantry companies; a trench mortar company; an 
accompanying artillery battery; a flame thrower section; a signal section; and a pioneer 
section. 146 Meanwhile, by March 1917 the standard German infantry squad was restructured 
around a seven-man team as a maneuver element, and a four-man light machine gun team as 
the fire element. 147 
By 1917 Rohr's infiltration tactics became the official counter-attack doctrine on the 
Western Front. In September 1917 the Germans made their first attempt to apply the tactics to 
a large-scale offensive operation--on the Eastern Front at Riga. Instead of the typical attack 
formations of rigid lines, the German Eighth Army of General Oskar von Hutier attacked in 
fluid leaps and bounds, with one element moving forward while another element provided 
fire cover. Then the two elements would reverse roles and leapfrog each other. The forward- 
most units completely by-passed the defender's strong points, isolating them and leaving 
them for heavier follow-on forces to eliminate. Reserves were only used to reinforce success, 
rather than being thrown in where the attack was faltering. 
Riga was also the first time the new infantry tactics were combined with the new 
artillery tactics developed by Bruchmüller on the Eastern Front. The Germans also used 
similar tactics during their successful attack at Caporetto the following month. The new 
tactics, or more precisely their results, shocked the Western Allies. The French, in particular, 
looked for a single tactical mastermind as the source of the new tactics and settled on Hutier. 
Thus, they somewhat erroneously dubbed the new German tactics, "Hutier Tactics. " 148 
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The Cambrai counterattack on 30 November 1917 was the first large-scale use of 
storm troop tactics on the Western Front. The 20-division counterattack was almost as 
successful as the British mass tank attack ten days earlier. On 1 January 1918 OIIL formally 
issued the new offensive doctrine, The Attack in Position 11 iarfare (Der Angriff im 
Stellungskrieg), with Geyer again as the principal compiler. '; 9 The new manual followed 
very closely the after action report issued by Crown Prince Rupprecht's Army Group, Lessons 
of the Cambrai Counteroffensive. ISO 
The new doctrine envisioned the attack in two main phases: first, a methodical assault 
against the enemy's organized positions, which required detailed preparation and centralized 
control; and then an aggressive continuation of the attack to prevent the enemy's ability to 
reorganize and respond. The second phase was characterized by decentralized execution and 
initiative on the part of the subordinate commanders. This phase began in the intermediate 
zone, beyond the range of the creeping barrage. In the attack, as opposed to the defense, the 
higher echelons maintained tighter control of the follow-on forces. 151 
Depth and speed were the two keys to success. The flanks of the attacking elements 
would be secured by speed and depth. The immediate objective of the attack was to penetrate 
as far as possible into the enemy positions, at a minimum reaching and overrunning the 
enemy's artillery positions on the first day. The new doctrine stressed infantry-artillery 
coordination and the need to move artillery forward to sustain the attack. Artillery 
neutralization fire was emphasized over destruction. The intent was to disrupt the enemy's 
communications, and bypass and isolate his strong points. The new doctrine marked a key 
conceptual shift from destruction to large-scale disruption-%% hich is one of the basics of the 
operational art. 152 
While the Allies attacked in successive waves, in order to relieve the pressure on their 
lead units, the Germans continued to press the attack with the lead units in order to maintain 
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momentum. This, of course, burned out the lead units quickly. 153 Thinking in terms of the 
Vernichtungsschlacht, this approach might have made sense. But within a framework of 
sequential operations, it was counterproductive and had serious consequences for the 
Germans after March 1918. 
The Germans never lost sight of the chaotic nature of warfare or the need for front- 
line initiative and leadership. Thus, The Attack in Position Warfare contained passages that 
would be the basis for what later evolved into Auftragstaktik, and passages that would be 
reproduced almost verbatim in the 1933-34 German operations manual Truppenführung. 154 
Every attack offers the opportunity for initiative and decisive 
action at all levels down to the individual soldier. 155 
Everything depends on rapid, independent action by all 
echelons within the framework of the whole. 156 
The Germans considered the division the basic unit capable of conducting 
independent battlefield operations. In 1916 they reconfigured all their divisions from the 
square to the more flexible triangular structure. As noted above, they started distinguishing 
between trench and attack divisions in 1917. The Angriffsdivision started out as counterattack 
units, and eventually evolved into the principal units for the 1918 offensives. During the 1918 
offensives, the best trained and best equipped of the attack divisions were further classified as 
mobile divisions (Mob. Divisionen. ). 157 
Essentially they became entire storm troop divisions, but their standards and training 
were not as high as original assault battalions. Divisions were converted by being pulled out 
of the line and put through three to four weeks of special training at Sedan or 
Valenciennes. 158 Only half the heavy machine gun units of the Angriffsdivisionen were 
horse-drawn because of the shortage of animals. By March 1918 only 56 out of 192 German 
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divisions on the Western Front were classified as attack divisions. Ludendorff later came to 
regret the decision have two different divisional structures. ßs9 
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Superiority of numbers in a given engagement 
is only one of the factors that determine victory. 
The forces available must be employed with such 
skill that even in the absence of absolute superiority, 
relative superiority is attained at the decisive point. 
1 
Major General Carl von Clausewitz 
All the theories of Clausewitz should be thrown 
overboard. Both war and politics are meant to serve 
the preservation of the people, but war is the highest 
expression of the national will to live, and politics 
must, therefore, be subordinate to the conduct of war. 
2 
General of Infantry Erich Ludendorff 
CHAPTER IV 
THE STRATEGIC FOUNDATION 
By the end of 1917 almost no level of tactical or operational virtuosity could have 
saved Germany from military defeat. Going into World War I, the German military had a 
deeply flawed understanding of the strategic level of war, and that view became even more 
muddled when Ludendorff came to power. Germany's basic geopolitical disadvantage, 
combined with its Byzantine and incompetent internal political institutions and structures, 
resulted in shifting and incoherent war aims throughout the war. As the war entered its final 
year, the Germans made the decision to shift to the strategic and operational offensive in the 
west. The resulting Ludendorff Offensives were tactically brilliant, operationally flawed, and 
strategically bankrupt. 
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GERMAN CONCEPTS OF STRATEGY 
Clausewitz unambiguously stated that war is an instrument of national policy. 3 That 
fundamental concept, however, was resisted by many German soldiers in the 19th century-to 
the point where the 2"d edition (1853) of On War was deliberately changed. 4 Although 
German operational thinking may have been "realist" in its approach, it was built on a 
strategic foundation that flowed from early 19th century philosophies about war and the state. 
The German approach to strategy depended on the autonomy of the military as distinct and 
separate from civilian society. Strategy remained separate from military doctrine, which 
established the guidelines for the best use of weapons and troops. The former was the domain 
of politicians, the latter the domain of soldiers. Such strategic thinking, however, increasingly 
came under pressure with the rise of mass armies. S 
Moltke the Elder saw things a little more clearly. Understanding that in 1871 
Germany had achieved only a semi-hegemony on the Continent, Moltke did not believe that 
future wars could be decided by single battles. Any level of military victory would require 
political diplomacy to re-establish peace. Agreeing with Clausewitz, Moltke stated firmly that 
war and strategy served politics. 6 
Schlieffen, on the other hand, rejected the concepts of Moltke. Schlieffen believed 
that France was the most immediate threat to Germany, and therefore had to be the target of a 
quick knockout blow. This also meshed with the belief of the military elites of all countries at 
the time that war had to be limited, and thus controlled. That, of course, kept war in the 
professional domain. Schlieffen's solutions were the concepts of Vernichtungsschlacht and 
Gesamtschlacht. 7 (See the chapter on The Operational Art. ) 
The so-called Schlieffen Plan of 1905 was not in fact a war plan, rather it was a memo 
to his successor Schlieffen penned upon leaving office. In keeping with the practices of the 
German General Staff, the actual war plan in effect when Schlieffen retired was revised and 
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modified every succeeding year as the strategic and diplomatic situation shifted. Schlieffen's 
successor Moltke the Younger has been severely criticized for tampering with this supposed 
master plan. The truth is that the plan of 1905 would not have addressed the realities of 
1914.8 
Nonetheless, the German war plan that existed in 1914 was still firmly grounded in 
Schlieffen's principles and assumptions. The German plan, however, was not a 
comprehensive plan for war, covering all political, military and economic aspects. Rather it 
was a large-scale mobilization and deployment plan for German ground forces only. The 
plan's rigid timetable left no flexibility for diplomacy, and it also pitted the German weakness 
of lack of motor transport against the enemy strength of interior rail lines. It also ignored 
Moltke's famous dictum that no plan survives first contact with the enemy. The plan showed 
Schlieffen's disregard for the implications of violating Belgian neutrality, which he assumed 
would be violated by France or Britain first. The plan also seemed to ignore the importance 
of the British Empire and its major instrument of military policy, the Royal Navy. 9 
The German war plan appears to have been developed by the Great General Staff 
almost in a vacuum. There had been no coordination with the Foreign Office, even over the 
tripwire issue of violating Belgian neutrality. Displaying the same ineptitude for coalition 
warfare that would continue to plague the Germans in World War II, there was no real effort 
to integrate Germany's strategy with that of its Austro-Hungarian ally, with each side 
assuming the other would bear the major burden in dealing with Russia. 10 Nor was there any 
real coordination with the German Navy. Admiral Tirpitz apparently never even studied the 
possibility of basing the High Seas Fleet in the French Atlantic ports if the "Schlieffen Plan" 
had succeeded. In 1914 the Royal Navy moved eight British divisions across the Channel 
without any attempt at interference from the German Navy. 11 Referring to the overall 
influence of German naval power on the strategic situation, Admiral Reinhard Scheer wrote 
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in his postwar memoirs; "But so far as can be seen from the course of the war, no material 
change was made in the fundamental principles underlying our strategic operations on 
land. "2 
The two years following the failure of the "Schlieffen Plan" were characterized by a 
general lack of purpose in military operations. 13 Once it became clear that a decisive victory 
was beyond their grasp, German military planners were at a loss as how to use the manpower 
and weapons at their disposal. Any approach to German strategy was made more complex by 
the Byzantine world of German military administration, which divided command functions 
and administrative responsibilities among the Prussian War Ministry, the Kaiser's Military 
Cabinet, and the Great General Staff. Add the head of government, the Chancellor, to the 
equation and it was a recipe for chaos. In theory, any differences of opinion over policy fell 
to the king-emperor to resolve. 14 In the case of Frederick the Great the system might have 
worked. But in the case of Wilhelm II it was a disaster waiting to happen, especially when 
Ludendorff stepped onto center stage in the autumn of 1916. 
LUDENDORFF AND STRATEGY 
Despite the many books that have been written declaring Ludendorff to be something 
of military genius, he fell far short of that level. As Holger Herwig wrote; "The truth is that 
Ludendorff never rose above the intellectual level of a regimental colonel commanding 
infantry. " 15 Ludendorff was a direct reflection of the institutional strengths and weaknesses 
of the Imperial German Army. He was intelligent, disciplined, driven, and focused. Yet he 
also represented everything negative that the older generation of German officers saw in the 
rising generation at the turn of the century; bourgeois by birth, specialist by training, and 
boorish and materialistic by instinct. Yet he was also ambitious. lie was commissioned in the 
infantry at the age of 18, and eleven years later he qualified for the General Staff. 
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In 1908 Ludendorff was assigned to the Great General Staff as chief of the 
Mobilization and Deployment Section, where he was responsible for fine tuning the so-called 
Schlieffen Plan. Shortly after the outbreak of the war he commanded an infantry brigade in a 
key attack to capture the Belgian forts of Liege. That success earned him a Pour le Merite and 
assignment to the Eastern Front as the chief of staff to the newly appointed commander, Paul 
von Hindenburg. Many historians agree that Ludendorffs assistant chief of staff, Colonel 
Max Hoffmann, had already defined the main outline for the plan for the Battle of 
Tannenberg before Hindenburg and Ludendorff arrived on the eastern front; but nonetheless, 
the German success in that battle forever tied together in military history the duo of 
Hundenburg-Ludendorff. 
In August 1916 Hindenburg was appointed the chief of the General Staff at OHL in 
the west, and Ludendorff went with him as his deputy with the title First Quartermaster 
General. Despite their formal titles, they were the defacto commander and chief of staff of the 
German Army in the field. Yet, despite his stiff-necked and rigid personality, Ludendorff 
between late 1916 and early 1918 presided over a complete overhaul of German tactical 
doctrine. As discussed in Chapter 3, it was one of the most innovative and rapid 
transformations in military history, all the more remarkable for being carried out by an army 
fighting for its life in the middle of the greatest war in history to that time. Throughout the 
process, Ludendorff encouraged experimentation and vigorous debate among not only the 
officers of the General Staff, but from the combat leaders as well. 16 
There can be no doubt that Ludendorff was a gifted tactician. His abilities and 
performance at the operational and strategic levels are an entirely different matter, however. 
Ludendorff apparently believed that a local tactical victory, merely breaking the enemy's line 
somewhere, was all that was necessary for the Allied armies to disintegrate and then 
surrender. 17 He was bewildered by the storm of criticism that greeted his post-war comment 
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that "Tactics had to be raised above pure strategy. " 11 Ludendorff and I Iindenburg, then, also 
ushered in a period in which German strategic thinking declined, while strategic expectations 
grew. Tactics reigned supreme, and operational planning and strategy were reduced to the 
management of weapons, men, and resources. 19 
In the attempt to exercise increasingly tighter control over all aspects of Germanys 
wartime economy and society, Ludendorff and his close circle at OIIL forced through three 
successive measures that not only failed to achieve their stated intent, but actually caused 
greater chaos, inefficiency, and losses at the time when Germany could afford them least. 
The measures also established and extended Ludendorffs "Silent Dictatorship" over the 
German nation. 
Almost as soon as Hindenburg and Ludendorff arrived at OIIL, one of their first steps 
was an attempt to bring Germany's already chaotic war production under control. Introduced 
on 31 August 1916, the Hindenburg Program expanded munitions production by calling for a 
100 percent increase in ammunition and trench mortars and a 300 percent increase in artillery 
and machine guns by the spring of 1917. The program also required substantial increases in 
aircraft and antiaircraft artillery; the culling of the labor force for military service; and tighter 
controls over production and raw materials. The Prussian War Ministry previously had 
blocked similar programs that OHL's Colonel Max Bauer's attempted to push through. 20 
Enthusiastically supported by heavy industry, the Hindenburg Program amounted to a 
virtual end to civil government in Germany. Industry's only complaint was that it did not 
have the necessary manpower needed to carry out the program. I lindcnburg responded by 
offering to release large numbers of skilled workers from the army. By the winter of 1916- 
1917, some 125,000 soldiers had been released from the front lines. The result was a decline 
in the average strength of a front line infantry battalion from 750 to 713.21 
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In the end, the Hindenburg Program only caused more chaos in the German war 
industry. The major flaw in the program was the inability of OHL or any other organization 
to exercise the necessary controls. The decision to direct all available resources to 
conventional artillery and machine gun production closed off the development potentials of 
the tank and anti-tank weapons. The program did nothing to rationalize weapons production. 
In 1914 German factories were producing 14 different models of artillery. By April 1917 they 
were producing 77 models; and by January 1918,100 different models. 22 
On 1 November 1916 the control of all raw materials, labor, and munitions was 
brought under the General War Office (Allgemeines Kriegsamt), headed by General Wilhelm 
Groener. The chief of the technical staff was Dr. Kurt Sorge, the director of the Krupp- 
Gruson Works and chairman of the German Society of Engineers. The War Office was 
established essentially to manage the Hindenburg Program. Although Ludendorff wanted the 
War Office to report directly to OHL, he lost that battle and it came under the Ministry of 
War. But at Ludendorffs insistence, the Minister of War was replaced by General Hermann 
von Stein, who was under Ludendorffs thumb. 23 The War Office proved to be little more 
than another layer on top of Germany's already chaotic bureaucratic structure. It was a 
Prussian institution and it had no real authority over the non-Prussian war ministries. Bavaria, 
Saxony, and Württemberg all set up their own independent War Offices and sent 
representatives to the Prussian War Office. 24 
As the war progressed, Ludendorff became increasingly obsessed with the problem of 
the "cohesion of the people, " and in harnessing all Germany's physical and psychological 
resources to the war effort. In December 1916 Ludendorff introduced the draft of the 
Auxiliary Service Law (Hilfsdienstgesetz) to the government and insisted on its prompt 
passage. Drafted by Groener, the law made every German male between the ages of 17 and 
60 liable for some form of involuntary wartime service. 25 Groener did convince Ludendorff 
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to drop his initial demands for compulsory female labor, but by June 1918 Ludendorff was 
again renewing those demands. 26 In October 1917 Ludendorff pushed his control over 
civilian labor a notch higher by notifying Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann }Iolhveg that it 
was essential to begin restricting the freedom of movement of civilian workers. The 
mechanism to enforce the new restrictions would be the 1851 Law of Siege 7 
These measures all failed to produce their intended results, and even Ludendorff came 
to recognize the Auxiliary Service Law's negative effects: "... not merely insufficient but 
positively harmful in operation. " 28 The number of soldiers freed for duty at the front by the 
Auxiliary Service Law never equaled the number of soldiers released from the front required 
by the Hindenburg Program. 29 
Ludendorffs entire life to that point had been focused on military matters to the 
exclusion of almost all else. He had the German military officer's traditional total disdain for 
politics, either internal or external. It can be little wonder, then, that he displayed a stunning 
ineptitude from late 1916 on whenever he meddled in internal or external political affairs. 
[Ludendorffs effect on Germany's external political affairs is discussed in the next section on 
German war aims. His effect on German internal politics is discussed in the following section 
under the sub-section on military-political conflict. ) Almost everything he touched in the 
political, economic, or technical arenas turned to ashes. 
THE SHIFTING GERMAN WAR AIMS 
A coherent strategy is impossible without a clearly defined end state, yet the German 
government entered World War I without specific aims. After the initial German military 
victories in the east, expansionist elements in Germany began pushing for wide-ranging war 
aims. For most of the war, however, the government purposely left the question of war aims 
vague, hiding behind the fiction of a defensive war that no one really believed. At first, 
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Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg actually believed that clearly defined war aims would restrict 
Germany's freedom of action. Later, he came to believe that ambiguous war aims would 
facilitate a negotiated peace. This lack of clearly defined war aims flowed from Germany's 
deeper and most critical domestic problem, the need for internal governmental and social 
reform. 30 
The question of war aims in the east was not a significant issue until well into the war. 
After Germany had made major advances in the east, annexation became the key element of 
an expansionist program. The internal fight over war aims in the west was a far bigger 
problem that eventually destroyed any sense of unity between the various social classes and 
political parties. As much as anything, the internal strife and disunity that resulted from four 
years of arguing about war aims led to the weakening and the final fall of Imperial Germany. 
Even nations like Britain and the United States that were not immediately affected by war on 
the Continent, came to consider Germany's western war aims as a direct threat to their own 
political and economic interests. Any hope of a negotiated peace between Germany and any 
of her enemies in the west was impossible so long as the annexationists continued to push 
their agenda. 31 
By the middle of 1917, the direction of foreign policy had slipped completely away 
from the political leadership and into the inexperienced hands of Ludendorff and OHL. After 
Ludendorff assumed power, German war aims remained outwardly ambiguous, but there was 
little doubt about his expansionist outlook. Ludendorff firmly believed that the average 
German soldier would keep fighting only for expansive war aims. He also believed that 
control of the Belgian coast was vital to Germany's strategic survival. But Belgian 
independence was as important a war aim for Britain as regaining Alsace and Lorraine was 
for France. 32 
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By the winter of 1917 German politics were completely polarized. The parties of the 
left and labor supported a "Schiedemann Peace, " without annexations or reparations. The 
parties of the right, OHL, and the monarchy demanded a "Hindenburg Peace, " with vast 
annexations and large indemnities. In the east, Ludendorff rejected any moderate settlement, 
demanding a peace that would dismember Russia and annex its border states. He believed 
this would better position Germany for a future war in the east; provide settlement and 
expansion areas for Germans; and provide a buffer against the Slavic hordes. 33 
The basic position of OHL was stated in an estimate of the situation published on 30 
September 1917.34 Written by Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) Georg Wetzell, the head of 
OHL's Operations Section, the position paper focused not so much on the present war, but on 
Germany's need to position itself for a future war. "When one surveys this political situation 
in its larger aspects, it develops that, from a military viewpoint, we cannot come out of this 
peace strong enough by any means. " Wetzell clearly saw Britain as the major threat of the 
future. "If England does not emerge from the war as the victor, then we have the first basis 
for a decisive future war between Germany and England. " Although he was off by some 75 
years, Wetzell predicted the construction of a Channel tunnel--perhaps two-linking Britain to 
the Continent. Seen primarily as a means to move military forces, Wetzell estimated that a 
four-track tunnel was capable of moving 160 trains, or one corps, in a 24-hour period. 
In order to respond to any military threat to its west, Wetzell wrote, "The German 
Army must be in a position to concentrate on the line Ostend--Metz--Strasbourg, with the 
center of gravity behind the right wing. (Upper Alsace should be defended by fortifying the 
Voges. )" Thus, "Our future military needs would not be satisfied if Belgium should remain a 
free state in any form, and we should perchance be restricted to the line of the Meuse. " Which 
led to the conclusion; "It is absolutely necessary that we force through the military 
requirement that we be able to use Belgium as a concentration area. " 
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Wetzell is one of the more controversial figures of the last half of the war, and 
opinions on him were and are deeply divided. For a long time Ludendorff placed great faith 
in Wetzell, but Kuhl had a low opinion of his skills as a military planner. 35 Nonetheless, 
Wetzell's 30 September assessment was the basis for Ludendorffs war aims in the west, at 
least up until the failure of Operation BLÜCHER in May 1918. After that point, Ludendorff 
seemed to indicate to OHL's liaison officer at the German Foreign Office, Colonel Hans von 
Haeften, that he was willing to compromise on Belgium. 36 (For a further discussion of the 
"Political Offensive" see the section on the Decision to Attack. ) But because of Ludendorffs 
obsession with holding on to all of Germany's military gains, he never seriously considered 
using Belgium or Alsace and Lorraine as bargaining chips in return for a free hand in the 
east. 7 
OVERALL GERMAN STRATEGIC POSTURE IN WORLD WAR I: 
Germany entered World War I burdened by many serious strategic handicaps. Some 
of these handicaps were beyond Germany's control, the result of geography, demographics, 
economics, and technology in the first decades of the 20th century. Many of Germany's 
handicaps, however, were self-inflicted. Both categories of handicaps became exacerbated as 
the course of the war progressed. 
Germany's Geopolitical Handicap 
Many historians argue that by any application of the principles of economics, 
international politics, and military history, Germany never stood a chance of winning World 
War I. Liddell Hart, on the other hand, believed that with Germany's strong position in 
central Europe, there was little France, Britain, and Italy by themselves could have done to 
impose a military defeat. Even the British naval blockade, he argued, would have been of 
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only limited effectiveness without American involvement in the war. 38 Nonetheless, 
Germany stood against a large portion of the world, only supported by three weak allies, 
Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria. While Germany's population outnumbered that of 
France 67 million to 40 million, the combined Allied population totaled 378 million. 39 
With limited access to the sea, Germany was fighting a war on two fronts-or even 
three, counting Italy, the Balkans, and the Middle East. Because of Germany's and Britain's 
relative positions to the sea, Britain could impose a naval blockade on Germany without 
causing undue harm to neutrals. Germany could not do the same. France and Britain could 
carry on trade with the United States, Germany could not. Correlli Barnett argued that 
geography was the determining factor in which side America eventually would fight. "Pro- 
Allied sentiment alone would not have brought her in. " 40 
Verdun and Strategic Blunder in the West 
Up until the fall of Falkenhayn and the appointment of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, . 
German military policy was defensive and limited in nature. In an effort to break the 
stalemate in the west, Falkenhayn made a radical departure from traditional German military 
practice and attempted to draw the French into a massive battle of attrition at Verdun. The 
key but false assumption behind Falkenhayn's strategy was that the Allies were at the 
breaking point and could be forced to the bargaining table. 4 1 When the Germans attacked on 
21 February 1916 they temporarily wrested the strategic initiative from the Allies on the 
Western Front. But that strategic initiative shifted back to the Allies after the British attacked 
on the Somme on 1 July 1916. During July and August the Germans committed 42 additional 
divisions to the Somme sector, forcing Falkenhayn on 11 July to suspend the Verdun 
attacks 42 
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At the level of execution, German operational planning and tactics at Verdun were 
geared toward all-out offensive and had great difficulty in shifting to one-sided attrition. Thus 
the operational plan and tactics did not support the strategic goal. Falkenhayn did not send 
machines against men, rather he sent men against a fortified zone, drawing his own side into 
a battle of attrition as well. Thus, the Verdun operation suffered from a complete disconnect 
between strategy, operational design, and tactics. 43 In the end, the Verdun operation hurt the 
Germans almost as badly as it did the Allies, which was not a good result for the side least 
capable of sustaining a war of attrition. 
Limited Warfare Strategy in the East 
Falkenhayn's concept of limited war prevented the Germans from crushing the 
Russians in large-scale offensive operations in 1915-16.44 Conducting operations in 1915 in 
the east with only limited resources, Hindenburg and Ludendorff overran most of Poland and 
inflicted more than one million casualties on the Russians. Falkenhayn, meanwhile, poured 
massive resources that year into trying to break the Allied front in Flanders. 
While they were in command at Oberost, Hindenburg and Ludendorff chaffed at the 
bit and continually pushed OHL for the resources to conduct decisive operations in the east, 
where they argued the war could be won. Once they moved west themselves, however, their 
focus and orientation shifted accordingly. Although the Germans remained on the strategic 
and operational defensive in the west throughout 1917, it was clear by that time that they now 
believed the final decision could only be achieved in the west. There was a possibility of a 
peace settlement with Russia in late 1916, but any negotiations would have balanced on the 
occupied territory of Poland. Ludendorff refused to give up any war gains, especially what he 
saw as potential sources of resources. It was a major strategic blunder. Peace with Russia as 
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early as 1917 would have allowed the Germans to concentrate all their forces in the west. 45 It 
also would have relieved Germany of most of its burden of shoring up Austria-Hungary. 
The operations in the east eventually defeated the Russian forces in the field by the 
autumn of 1917. Russia, however, stubbornly refused to come to terms for several more 
months. Germany, meanwhile, waged a form of social war against Russia that produced 
results--but only in the short term. The famous "sealed train" that carried Lenin and his 
associates from Switzerland to Petrograd in April 1917 did contribute significantly to taking 
Russia out of the war. But then after the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia, Germany was 
faced with a revolutionary government that opposed all that OIIL stood for. It also brought 
the specter of Communist revolution closer to Germany than anyone could have predicted. 46 
The Naval Situation and Unrestricted Submarine Warfare 
The German Navy and its High Seas Fleet are one of the great "what ifs" of World 
War I. Unfortunately for the German Navy, World War I started eight years too early. 
Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz's master plan to challenge the Royal Navy was programmed out 
through 1922 47 Even if the building program had been completed, the High Seas Fleet 
would have had great difficulty challenging the Royal Navy globally. The majority of the 
German Navy's ships were designed for a decisive engagement in the North Sea, and thus did 
not have the range to sortie beyond the Dover Straits. Lacking the ability to refuel at sea, 
they would have had to anchor somewhere near Scotland, Norway, or the Faeroes to have the 
fuel aboard for combat or to escape when operating west of Great Britain, much less in the 
North Atlantic. 
The design of the German ships was driven by the assumption that in time of war the 
British would impose a traditional close blockade. Instead, the British opted for a far 
blockade using patrolling cruisers. Geography favored the British. By closing the sea 
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r. 1, 
entrances in the Channel, the North Sea, and the narrow straits north of the British Isles, 
Germany could be isolated effectively. 48 The naval blockade in turn meant that despite 
her strong central position, Germany could not remain on the defensive indefinitely. Without 
some sort of military decision, the naval blockade increasingly dominated the military 
situation. As Liddell Hart put it; "The all-pervading factor of the blockade intruded into every 
consideration of the military situation., , 49 
Prior to the end of the 19th century, Prussia/Germany had never been known as a sea 
power and had little naval tradition. But when Wilhelm II succeeded to the throne in 1888, he 
was determined to secure Germany's place in the sun. In the 1890s Germany began an 
aggressive program of naval expansion clearly intended to challenge the supremacy of 
Britain. The resulting Anglo-German Naval Arms Race was one of the principal causes of 
World War I. As late as the 1880s, Germany and Britain had been on fairly good terms. But 
as Otto von Bismarck had predicted, a German naval buildup quickly pushed Britain into an 
alliance with France. 
The German naval buildup consumed vast amounts of national resources. The 
German Navy's budget grew from 20 percent of the Army's in 1898, to 53 percent in 1911. 
But once World War I started and the Germans realized the High Seas Fleet was incapable of 
attacking directly the blockading forces, they also were unwilling to risk a direct 
confrontation with the Grand Fleet. Thus, the German Navy spent most of World War I as a 
mere "fleet-in-being. " 50 This, in turn, tied up vast resources that could have been put to 
better use in other sectors of the war effort, especially steel and manpower. Germany 
continued to build battleships and other large fleet units right to the end of the war, when it 
should have been apparent after Jutland that other than U-boats, no new naval construction 
was needed or justified. The last battleship (Württemberg) was launched in June 1917; the 
last battle-cruiser (Graf Spee) was launched in September 1917; and the last light cruiser 
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(Frauenlob) was launched in October 1918. On 1 October 1918,42 days before the end of the 
war, the German Navy initiated the Scheer Program that was supposed to be a naval 
equivalent to the Hindenburg Program. 5! 
As early as 1912 Winston Churchill accurately called the German Navy, the "Luxury 
Fleet. " How many tanks could have built instead of a battle cruiser, or even a light cruiser? 
That is a question that would not make much sense today, because of the vastly different 
manufacturing technologies involved in shipbuilding and armored combat vehicle production. 
In 1917 and 1918, however, the manufacturing technologies for the two types of weapon 
systems were not all that different. Even in World War II the construction of a Tirpitz-class 
battleship required 8,000 tons of armor plate, enough to equip a Panzer division. Perhaps the 
most useless of the High Seas Fleets' units were its 21 pre-Dreadnought battleships. Their 
combined crews alone (728 officers and 13,205 men) could have filled an additional army 
division. (Germany finished the war with 19 Dreadnoughts. ) 52 
The requirements of coastal defense alone did not justify the size of the High Seas 
Fleet. In 1914 the German Navy had 80,000 officers and men, enough to man six to seven 
army divisions. 53 As the war progressed the German Navy had almost as many men tied up 
in coastal defenses as it did in the fleet. Germany maintained heavy fortifications along its 
North Sea coast, and from 1915 it heavily fortified the Belgian coast, garrisoned by three 
divisions of naval infantry. No British force or amphibious operation in those areas would 
have accomplished much or could have been sustained given German mines, long-range 
artillery, and submarines. 54 In 1917 the British did plan and almost launched a division- 
sized amphibious landing on the Belgian coast between Nieuport and Ostende in support of 
the battle of Third Ypres. The landings were cancelled, however, when the ground force 
failed to take its objective at Roulers. SS After the war, when he compared the landing plan to 
the German defenses found on that part of the coast, Rear Admiral Roger Keyes wrote: "The 
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attack, if it was ever delivered, would be a great disaster, and the unfortunate division which 
was to carry it out would undoubtedly be annihilated. " 56 
For more than 80 years historians have debated about what the High Seas Fleet could 
have contributed to the German war effort, other than maintaining itself as a fleet-in-being. 
While a thorough analysis of the options is far beyond the scope of this study, a couple of 
intriguing possibilities should be noted. An amphibious operation against the Baltic Islands in 
1915 or 1916 (as opposed to late 1917) might have put enough pressure on St. Petersburg to 
have forestalled the Brusilov Offensive. Another possibility might have been increasing U- 
boat operations in the Mediterranean. The Germans and Austrians conducted unrestricted 
submarine warfare there throughout the war, with no noticeable effect on American public 
opinion. Increasing shipping losses in the Mediterranean would have hurt Britain as much as 
the same level of losses in the Atlantic, and also would have increased the pressure on Italy. 
As the war on the Continent developed, Britain's "contemptible little army" became 
the backbone of the Allies' fighting power. Yet Britain itself remained largely invulnerable to 
direct attack. German military leaders increasingly came to see indirect attack through 
unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic as the solution to that problem. With an 
apparent strategic stalemate both on land and at sea after Jutland, the submarine campaign 
also seemed the only way of averting defeat by slow starvation. 57 Bethmann Hollweg 
opposed the submarine campaign because he was sure it would bring America into the war. 
Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, Chief of the Admiralty Staff and one of the main 
proponents of the campaign, informed OHL in October 1916 that the campaign would 
decisively defeat Britain within six months, well before America could influence the war on 
land. 
During the debate the German Navy argued (quite incorrectly) that America did not 
have sufficient shipping of its own to transport its forces, and would have to rely on British 
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shipping, which was already stretched to the limit. Ludendorff believed that it would take 
America at least a year to train and deploy even five or six divisions, and he generally 
dismissed the combat capabilities of American units. 58 Betraying his characteristic political 
and strategic ineptitude, Ludendorff later wrote that he regretted that the internal debate over 
the submarine campaign had become a political issue, because he considered it "a purely 
military matter. " 59 
The campaign started on 1 February 1917. The U-boats sank 436,000 tons of shipping 
in February; 603,000 tons in March; and 841,000 tons in April. 60 On 6 April America 
declared war. President Wilson skillfully used the incredible German mishandling of the 
Zimmermann Telegram to overcome the traditional isolationism of many Americans. In May 
the British initiated convoy procedures, and the sinkings started falling. By the summer they 
were down to 350,000 tons per month. By November 1917 the United States had 100,000 
troops in France. Despite claims of Holtzendorff that the United States could at best have 
only 300,000 troops in Europe by the end of 1918, the U. S. actually had 1.98 million on the 
continent by the end of the war. The U-boats had not managed to sink a single American 
troop ship. 61 
The submarine campaign was a total failure. As early as 20 June 1917 Wetzell 
concluded in a staff study that the U-boats would not seriously restrict the arrival of 
American troops. 62 Rather than winning the war for Germany, the U-boat campaign turned 
into another sinkhole for precious resources. First priority on the supply of raw materials had 
gone to submarine construction, but by 1918 U-boat loss rates had risen to 7.4 percent. 63 
Average U-boat life expectancy was only six patrols. During the war the Germans built 344 
U-boats, but by mid-1917 150 had been lost. 64 
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Military-Political Conflict within the German Leadership 
Germany's weak political and rigid social institutions were arguably its greatest 
handicap in World War I--certainly the one that made the development of a coherent strategy 
virtually impossible. As opposed to past wars, this time Germany did not have a Frederick the 
Great or an Otto von Bismarck. Instead, she had only Wilhelm II and a weak and vacillating 
string of chancellors: Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg; Georg Michaelis; Georg Graf von 
Hertling; and Prince Max von Baden. On the Allied side they were opposed by men like 
David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau, and Woodrow Wilson. Nor on the military side 
did Germany have another Helmut von Moltke the Elder. 
With arrival of Hindenburg and Ludendorff at OHL on 20 August 1916, Ludendorff 
immediately began pushing for a ruthless mobilization of all German resources that 
eventually led to the Silent Dictatorship. Supported by Hindenburg, Ludendorff increasingly 
meddled in political affairs. Curiously enough, Ludendorff rejected the idea of an outright 
military dictatorship, despite having the chancellorship almost thrust upon him. 65 
Nonetheless, by the last months of the war Ludendorff wielded close to absolute power. Yet 
in his post-war memoirs he complained; "Unfortunately, the government did not state clearly 
and emphatically in public that it, and not General Ludendorff, was governing. " 66 
The question of unrestricted submarine warfare became one of the first fault lines that 
split the civilian and military leadership. Although Bethmann Hollweg finally acquiesced, his 
relationship with the military went steadily downhill. He further infuriated Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff when he eventually convinced the Kaiser to reform Prussia's three-class voting 
system. In June 1917 Ludendorff forbade German commanders even to talk to Bethmann 
Hollweg during the Chancellor's visit to the front. 7 The last straw was the Chancellor's 
inability to derail the Peace Resolution being debated by the Reichstag. Ludendorff countered 
by ordering patriotic instruction (Vaterländischer Unterricht) for all troops. He and 
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Hindenburg then forced Bethmann Hollweg to resign by threatening the Kaiser with their 
own resignations. 
Bethmann Hollweg resigned on 13 July 1917. The next day, the colorless Michaelis 
was appointed Chancellor with the support of OHL, but over the objections the majority 
parties in the Reichstag. Nonetheless, the Reichstag passed the Peace Resolution on 19 July, 
and Michaelis quickly lost the support of the military. He was forced out of office on 31 
October and replaced with the aging Herding. Although Hertling remained in office for 
almost one year, he spent most of his efforts trying to placate OHL, which further weakened 
any effectiveness he might have had in the Reichstag. On 8 January 1918 Wilson announced 
his Fourteen Points, eight of which echoed war aims of the Entente. Few, if any, German 
statesmen and soldiers even bothered to read the Fourteen Points, although Herding criticized, 
the peace proposal in the Reichstag. 68 
OHL continued to exercise its heavy hand in political affairs right until the end of the 
war. After the failure of Operations BLOCHER and GNEISENAU in May and June 1918, 
Foreign Minister Richard von Kühlmann made a major foreign policy speech in the 
Reichstag, stating that the war could no longer be won by purely military means and calling 
for a negotiated peace. Hindenburg and Ludendorff react violently, demanding his 
replacement. Kehlmann resigned and was replaced by Rear Admiral Paul von Hintze, a 
retired naval officer turned diplomat. Much to OHL's chagrin, however, Hintze continued to 
follow the moderate policies of his predecessor. 69 
GERMANY'S STRATEGIC SITUATION IN 1918: 
In a sense, 1918 was like 1914 all over again for the Germans. Instead of facing two 
sets of enemies separated by space (France/Britain and Russia), they were now facing two 
sets of enemies separated by time (France/Britain and America). And although Germany and 
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France/Britain were almost burned out by more than three years of war, America was coming 
in fresh, albeit inexperienced. Yet even Ludendorff could see that despite any military 
shortcomings American soldiers and units might have, they sooner or later would arrive in 
numbers so massive that the strategic scales would have to tip. Time was not on Germany's 
side. 
The Naval Situation 
Despite a successful amphibious operation against the Russian-controlled Baltic 
islands of Moon, Ösel, and Dagö in October 1917 (Operation ALBION), there was little that 
the High Seas Fleet could contribute to the war effort by 1918. Sailors on some of the High 
Seas Fleet's capital ships mutinied in August 1917. They would do so again in late October 
1918, triggering the final chain of events in Germany's collapse. The High Seas Fleet by 1918 
had only limited capability to interdict the British Army's Channel ports. British convoys 
crossed the Channel in two to four hours and had airship and aircraft support. Convoys were 
heavily escorted and protected behind a triple layer minefield. 
After 1916 submarines, mines, coastal artillery, and naval aviation were the German 
Navy's only effective weapons in the West. Had these assets been directed against the BEF's 
lines of communications (LOCs) in the Channel in coordination with a focused attack ground 
attack against the BEF's rail network, the British might well have been forced to withdraw 
from the Continent. The German submarine threat against their sea LOCs was a constant 
concern to the British, and one of the objectives behind the bloody battle of Passchendaele 
was to clear the Channel coast of the U-boat bases. 70 
German mines in the Channel could have been delivered by air or by submarine. The 
Navy's Freidreichshafen bomber was capable of carrying and dropping 750-kilogram naval 
mines. One such mine, in fact, sank a Russian destroyer during the Baltic Islands operation. 
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Submarines were the other way to lay mines, with the UC-class boats specifically designed as 
minelayers. Most of the UC-boats carried 18 mines. The U-class boats were fleet submarines 
that fired torpedoes; but in 1918 the Germans launched ten of the Project 45 fleet U-boats that 
could lay 42 mines through their torpedo tubes and carry an additional 32 mines in deck 
containers. 
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By the start of 1918, the Germans had 42 operational fleet U-boats; 66 operational 
coastal U-boats (UB-class); and 33 operational UC-class minelayers. During 1918 they built 
an additional 25 U-class (including the Project 45 boats); 47 UB-class; and 16 UC-class. The 
British, of course, had the Channel heavily mined, which increased the hazards of any U-boat 
operations. Mines caused 27 percent of the total German U-boat losses. Of the total of 53 UC 
type U-boats the Germans lost during the war, 19 were lost to mines. 72 The Germans, 
nonetheless, had a capability to lay mines in the Channel and at least disrupt that leg of the 
BEF's LOCs. On 14 February 1918, the German Navy did launch one major and largely 
successful surface raid against British defenses between Dover and Calais. The Heinecke 
Torpedo Boat Flotilla sunk 28 British picket ships and other vessels, including an older 
cruiser. That raid, however, was never followed up. Nor had it been coordinated with OHL, 
rather it had been launched at the request of the Naval Corps in Flanders. 73 Even after the 
failure of Operation MICHAEL in March 1918, General Ferdinand Foch still thought that 
increased submarine operations in the Channel posed a serious threat to cutting off the 
BEF. 4 
Finally, German naval artillery could have been turned against the BEF's channel 
ports. The three so-called Paris Guns (Wilhelmgeschütze) were actually manned by naval 
crews. With a maximum range of 127 kilometers, they had the reach to hit the BEF's three 
primary northern Channel ports (Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk) and even Dover, if the guns 
had been positioned in the Fourth Army sector. But between 16 and 30 March 1918, during 
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Operation MICHAEL, they did not fire in support of the attacking Seventeenth, Second, or 
Eighteenth Armies. Rather, the guns were positioned in the Seventh Army sector, delivering 
pointless terrorizing fire against Paris. 75 At least two German coastal batteries in Flanders 
were capable of hitting Dunkirk and could have fired in support of ground forces during 
Operation GEORGETTE. But Batterie Deutschland (four 3 80mm guns) never fired against 
land targets, and Batterie Pommern (one 380mm gun) delivered only occasional fire against 
Dunkirk and the major British base at Poperinghe. A third battery, Batterie Tirpitz (four 
280mm guns), had the range to hit targets in the northern quarter of the Ypres Salient, but it 
too never fired in support of ground operations. 76 
The Air Situation 
Germany lagged behind the Allies in aircraft production throughout the war. 
Recognizing the significance of the shortfall, Ludendorff on 23 June 1917 requested an 
increase in production rates to 2,000 aircraft and 2,500 engines per month. 77 This was the 
so-called America Program (Amerikaprogramm) that was supposed to establish 40 new 
fighter squadrons and 17 new air force regiments in a matter of months. 78 By the start of 
Operation MICHAEL Germany still was outnumbered 3,670 to 4,500 aircraft of all types. 79 
Nonetheless, the Germans used their air assets with efficiency and effectiveness. Through at 
least the end of May 1918 they managed to achieve air parity and even local air superiority 
over the battlefield wherever they needed it. 80 The comparative air loss statistics claimed in 
the German official history for March through September 1918, however, do not correlate 
with Allied statistics: 81 
141 
Table 4.1 
1918 Western Front Claimed Aircraft Losses 
German Allied 
March 159 451 
April 136 283 
May 198 425 
June 155 506 
July 131 528 
August 174 658 
September 116 650 
Germany started a strategic bombing campaign early in the war using airships. The 
Zeppelins carried out 20 raids against Britain in 1915, and 22 raids in 1916. But like the 
shelling of Paris by the Wilhelmgeschütze, these raids produced little more than nuisance and 
terror effects. Hindenburg and Ludendorff drastically cut back the airship raids against 
Britain (seven in 1917 and four in 1918) and switched to both day and night raids with heavy 
bombers. The Gotha G. IV had a payload of 500 kilograms. About 230 Gothas were built 
between January 1917 and May 1918. The giant Zeppelin-Staaken R. VI (of which only about 
18 entered service) had a 2,000-kilogram payload and an endurance of 8 to 10 hours. 82 
The strategic bombing campaign started 25 May 1917, which the Germans thought 
would prove strategically decisive in conjunction with the submarine campaign. The main 
instrument of the strategic bombing campaign was Kagohl 3, operating directly under the 
control of OHL. (See Chapter 3). Like the airship raids, however, periodic terror was the 
primary effect produced by the strategic bombing campaign. London was the main objective, 
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and there was some effort to target the national-level command and control centers 
(Parliament, War Office, Admiralty, etc. ), but the mass and the level of accuracy were just 
not sufficient to achieve significant effect. OHL suspended the strategic bombing campaign 
in May 1918.83 
After the raids against London were suspended, German bombers finally in May, 
June, and July 1918 were directed against British and French rail yards and shipping in the 
English Channel. 84 By then, however, it was too little too late. Whatever damage these 
raids did to the British LOCs was done in isolation. The major British rail nodes on the 
Continent remained under interdiction fire through the end of July, but were never again 
threatened seriously after the failure of Operation GEORGETTE at the end of April. 
Weapons, Ammunition, and Materiel 
As with aircraft, the Allies at the start of 1918 had more artillery than the Germans. 
Yet as with aircraft, the Germans used their artillery far more effectively, especially under the 
brilliant direction of Colonel Georg Bruchmüller. 85 Despite the general failure and chaos of 
the Hindenburg Program, the German Army was not chronically short of guns, small arms, 
machine guns, trench mortars, ammunition, or field engineering materials at the start of 1918. 
In March 1918 OHL had an ammunition reserve of 2,840 railroad trains. By October that 
reserve still stood at 1,632 trains. The field gun production rate was originally set at 3,000 per 
month, and later lowered to 750. Yet in March 1918 German industry produced 2,327 
artillery pieces. The monthly production rates for rifles and machine guns stood at 75,000 and 
6,000 respectively. 86 
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Transportation 
The world had never seen such a period of massive and continuous military 
consumption as World War I. Logistics rapidly grew to take on a level of significance that 
came to determine what was possible and not possible on the battlefield, particularly at the 
operational level. As the war progressed, all nations expanded exponentially the 
production/acquisition component of their logistical systems. The distribution component did 
not grow as fast, or in as many different directions, because it was tied directly to the existing 
transportation infrastructure, which could be expanded only incrementally. 
Ports were important to all nations at the level of their national economies, hence the 
significance of the British blockade against Germany and the threat imposed by the German 
submarine campaign. As a Continental power, however, Germany did not have to rely on 
seaports to move military units and war materiel. (Germany did make extensive use of inland 
waterways. ) Initially, France too was not very dependent on ports for military movement and 
re-supply, except for the shifting of some colonial units. Ports became far more important to : 
France after America entered the war. 
As an island nation, Britain was absolutely dependent on ports to project and supply, , 
its armies. As noted above, the BEF moved across the Channel in 1914 with absolutely no 
attempt by the German Navy to interfere. By February 1917, some 800,000 tons of supplies 
for the BEF arrived every month in France through six Channel ports. 87 North of the 
Somme, Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne received almost half the BEF's supplies. South of the 
Somme, Rouen, Le Harve, and Dieppe received the other half. 88 They were critical choke 
points in the British logistics system that should have been, but never were until too late, 
decisive points in German operational thinking. 
Railways (also discussed in Chapter 2) were one of the most important means of 
strategic and operational movement during World War I. The Germans made extensive use of 
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railroads. Prior to 1914 the Railroad Department was the largest section of the Great General 
Staff, and the entire execution of the Schlieffen Plan (in all its variations) depended heavily 
on rapid and precise rail movements. In August 1914 the Germans had 26,300 troops 
assigned to either constructing or operating rail lines. By June 1917 that number had grown to 
201,300, and OHL's chief of the Field Rail Service estimated he would need an additional 
80,000 to support future operations. 89 
Both France and Germany started the war with a dense, high capacity, and 
interconnecting rail network. Furthermore, the Germans were fortunate in that the rail grid 
was about the same behind the front lines of the areas of France and Belgium they occupied. 
The German system had great depth. Judging from the rate at which the Germans shifted their 
divisions around in 1917 and 1918, they had no serious shortage of rail motive power and 
rolling stock. It took 60 trains to move a single division by rail. One train averaged 49 cars, or 
2,940 cars per division. 90 Between 15 February and 20 March 1918, the German military 
rail system operated day and night to run 10,400 trains moving men and supplies-an 
average of 306 trains per day. 91 
In October 1917 the German Army made 73 divisional moves. For the purpose of this 
analysis, divisional moves from one field army to a directly adjacent field army are not 
considered, since such shifts could have been accomplished by marching, or by redefining 
army boundaries. The capacity and robustness of their rail system gave the Germans a great 
deal of flexibility in shifting combat forces around, but that flexibility also had a down side. 
The movements took time, and while the divisions were moving they were out of the line. It 
took four hours to load, and somewhat less than that to unload a single train. Even though the 
Germans had very large and efficient marshalling yards that allowed the loading or unloading 
of many trains simultaneously, it took at least a day to load and a day to unload a division 
under the best of conditions. Once the division detrained, it still had to march to its new 
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sector in the front lines, which on average took two days. Once at the front line, it took a 
division another three days to occupy its new positions. The pass time for a single division 
was four days for an intra-theater move, and six to eight days for an inter-theater move. 92 
General Fritz von Lossberg estimated that a typical divisional move by rail took eight to ten 
days. 93 
Using a very conservative estimate of an average of six days out of action per division 
per move by rail, the following table shows the number of divisional moves per month during 
the last year of the war; the number of divisional days and divisional months out of combat; 
and the percentage of total non-available combat power for that month (based on 250 
divisions, until July 1918). 94 Note the non-availability percentages for the critical months of 
March (MICHAEL) and April (GEORGETTE). 
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Table 4.2 
German Divisional Movements by Rail 
Month 
November 1917 
December 1917 
January 1918 
February 1918 
March 1918 
April 1918 
May 1918 
June 1918 
July 1918 
August 1918 
September 1918 
October 1918 
Divisional 
Moves 
21 
32 
14 
24 
67 
98 
62 
46 
65 
104 
130 
105 
Divisional Divisional 
Days Months 
126 4.2 
192 6.4 
84 2.8 
144 
402 
588 
372 
276 
390 
624 
780 
630 
4.8 
13.4 
19.6 
12.4 
9.2 
13.0 
20.8 
26.0 
21.0 
Percentage of 
Unavailable 
Combat Power 
1.7% 
2.6% 
1.1% 
1.9% 
5.4% 
7.8% 
5.0% 
3.7% 
5.2% 
8.6% 
11.3% 
9.4% 
The BEF was far less fortunate with the rail network in its sector. The British position 
in Flanders had no depth at all. North of the Somme, the British front lines averaged only 
about 90 kilometers from the coast. Rail was the BEF's primary means of moving supplies 
and troops from the ports. The rail network was adequate at best, with most of the lines 
running east-west. By 1916, the British had to operate 250 trains per day to keep the supplies 
moving along an overstrained rail system. 
95 The entire British transportation system was on 
the verge of collapse until Sir Eric Geddes was brought in to reorganize it at the end of 
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1916.96 In April 1918, during the last phases of Operation MICHAEL and during Operation 
GEORGETTE, the British ran 725 ammunition trains to their front. "7 
There were two key choke points in the British rail grid. Almost everything that came 
in through the three northern ports had to go through Hazebrouck. Almost everything that 
came in through the three southern ports had to go through Amiens. Furthermore, 80 percent 
of the north-south traffic went through or skirted Amiens. In early 1918 the north-south 
traffic averaged 140 trains per day, including 45 coal trains from the Bethune coalfields for 
French munitions factories in the south. "Strategic movements, " i. e. shifting reserves and 
other large forces, could add an additional 24 to 72 trains per day, resulting in a surge 
requirement of 212 per day. Haig's Q-Staff estimated that if the Allies lost Amiens, all 
possible bypasses could only handle 90 trains per day. If Abancourt, 40 kilometers southwest 
of Amiens fell as well, the only remaining north-south link would be the Dieppe-Eu- 
Abbeville Line, with a capacity of only eight trains per day. 98 [Map I] 
During Operation MICHAEL the British were very worried about losing Amiens. On 
27 March the town came under German artillery fire. The day before. Haig's Quartermaster- 
General, Major-General Travers Clarke, convened a meeting to consider the possible courses 
of action if the Germans succeeded in separating the British and the French, thereby cutting 
the BEF off from its southern LOCs. On 31 March the Q-Staff issued Scheme X. That 
quickly evolved into Scheme Y, which had options for evacuating (a) Calais and Dunkirk in 
the north, or (b) Abbeville, Albancourt and Dieppe in the south. By April, the Q-Staff issued 
Scheme Z, a plan for abandoning the entire area north of the Somme. The evacuation plan 
would require 28 days to execute, with 85 percent of the existing supplies north of the 
Somme being destroyed in place. 99 British contingency planning for losing key segments of 
their rail network continued through mid-July because Amiens and I lazebrouck both 
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remained subject to German interdicting fire. As we shall see later, that fire appears to have 
never risen much above the harassment level. 
In mid-January 1918, General Sir Henry Wilson, the British representative to the 
Allied Supreme War Council at Versailles, had used his staff to wargame a 100-division 
German attack at the British-French juncture, driving toward Amiens. 10° Rejecting the 
results of Wilson's wargame, Haig continued to deploy the main weight of his forces behind 
his center and northern wing. 101 Nonetheless, the British did understand just how fragile 
their transportation network was, and once Operation MICHAEL started, they were quicker 
than the Germans to recognize the critical vulnerability at Amiens. So was Marshal Ferdinand 
Foch, who wrote in his memoirs; "From the outset all were unanimous in recognizing that 
Amiens had to be saved at all costs, and that the fate of the war depended on it. " 102 After he 
took command of the Fifth (redesignated as the Fourth) Army), General Sir Henry Rawlinson 
wrote to Wilson; "There can be no question but that the Amiens area is the only one in which 
the enemy can hope to gain such a success as to force the Allies to discuss terms of peace. " 103 
The Germans seem to have never really understood that until it was too late--if they ever 
really saw it at all. 
While the Germans did not have to worry about vulnerable ports or rail centers, the 
weak link in their transportation system was from the forward railheads to their own front 
lines, and then beyond. The Germans had about only about 30,000 trucks to the Allies' 
100,000.104 The Germans also were critically short of fuel and rubber, and were heavily 
dependent on Romania for petroleum. German trucks had to run on iron tires, which tore up 
the roads, creating further mobility problems. 105 On the other hand, the Allies' numerical 
advantage in trucks was offset somewhat by the lack of good roads, especially in the BEF 
sector. Had the capacity of the British rail been seriously degraded, truck transportation could 
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not have provided much relief. It took 150 trucks to replace one train, and as one British staff 
officer noted, "... good roads for lorry work were few and far between. " 106 
Although the Germans had dismounted almost all of their cavalry units early in the 
war (except for some units in the east), horses still remained the primary means of motive 
power in the forward areas. Unfortunately for the Germans, the horse replacement situation 
was bleak at the start of 1918. In December 1917 the German Army was some 43,000 horses 
short of its required level of 690,000. An additional 15,000 replacement horses were required, 
each month just to keep even with the losses. The horses the Germans did have were 
underfed and below standard because of low stocks of forage. In March 1918 the Germans 
transferred some 14,500 horses from the Eastern Front, rendering 13 divisions there 
immobile. Even so, only the attack divisions for the MICHAEL offensive were brought up to 
their authorized horse levels. 107 
The shortage of trucks, the heavy dependence on horses, and even the shortage and 
low standards of horses all combined to restrict German battlefield mobility. That in turn 
limited the depth to which any German attack could be pushed and sustained. 
German Manpower 
Schlieffen's Plan of 1905 required 94 divisions to execute. Germany at the time had 
scarcely 60. Schlieffen's solution to this problem was to include mobilized reserve units in , 
the first-line order of battle. This was a risky approach that meant Germany would have no 
general reserve. Moltke also recognized all the other problems that would come with the 
early commitment of reservists. (The U. S. Army has been wrestling with the same problems 
since adopting a similar manpower strategy following Vietnam. ) By the time the war started, 
German and Austria-Hungary were able to field 136 divisions, against 182 divisions of the 
three Entente powers. 108 
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From a total population of 67 million, Germany mobilized 11 million men and 
suffered 7.2 million casualties (dead, wounded, missing, and prisoners. ) The total figures for 
the Central Powers were 22.8 million mobilized and 15.2 million casualties. The Allied and 
Associated Powers, with a combined population of 378 million (not including the French and 
British colonies) mobilized 42.2 million, and suffered 21.8 million casualties. 109 Thus, each 
mobilized Central Powers soldier on average inflicted one casualty on the Allies, while it 
took almost three Allied soldiers to inflict a casualty on the Central Powers. Nonetheless, 
Germany manpower situation already was becoming critical by the summer of 1917. 
On 17 December 1917 OHL estimated the monthly replacement requirements at 
150,000, of which returning convalescents only contributed 60,000 per month. ' 10 As of I 
January 1918 there were 2,154,387 German men directly in the war industry, 1,097,108 of 
whom could be classified as fit for field service. 111 Unfortunately, most of that group could 
not be touched unless the German Government was willing to extend compulsory war work 
service to women. That was one measure even Ludendorff was never able to force through. 
Complicating the replacement problem, the Germans were starting to suffer from high 
numbers of deserters, mostly from the infantry. 112 Returning POWs from Russia "... were 
contaminated politically and opposed to serving on the Western Front. " The last possible 
manpower draw, 637,000 men born 1899-1900, was probably insufficient to continue the 
war, and they would not be ready to enter service until the autumn of 1918.113 
High officer casualties, especially among the best officers, also hurt the Germans. 
Ludendorff actually wanted to draw officer replacements from the most capable NCOs, 
without regard to social background. The selection of officers, however, was one of the sole 
remaining prerogatives of the Military Cabinet, which insisted on maintaining pre-war social 
standards. The only solution was the creation of many temporary officers 
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(Offizierstellvertreter), who would have to revert to the ranks at the end of the war. 114 By 
mid-March 1918 German Army strength was distributed as follows: 115 
Table 4.3 
German Stren2th March 1918 
Officers Enlisted Horses 
West 136,618 3,438,288 710,827 
East 40,095 1,004,955 281,770 
Actual trench strength in the west was 1,232,000. The Germans still had more than 1 million 
troops (410,000 combat troops) garrisoning the east to enforce Ludendorffs expansionist 
goals. A large percentage of those troops, however, were over the age of 40, and some 85,000 
were from Alsace or Lorraine--considered politically unreliable for service in the west. 
Between 1 November 1917 and 21 March 1918, the Germans transferred 48 divisions 
from the Eastern Front to the Western Front (and two from the Western Front to the Eastern 
Front), and eight divisions from Italy to the West. From 22 March to the end of May eleven 
more divisions transferred from East to West, but three more went back to the East. 116 On 
the eve of Operation MICHAEL the 243 German divisions were deployed as follows: 117 
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Table 4.4 
Deployment of German Divisions on 21 March 1918 
West 191 Divisions 
East and Southeast 47 Divisions 
Balkans 2 Divisions 
Zone of the Interior 3 Divisions 
In the West the Germans had more divisions than the Allies, but the numerical 
strength of those units was lower. As the war ground its way through 1918, the trench 
strength of their front line units progressively declined. In April 1918 average infantry 
battalion strength was 766; by June it was down to 718; and by September it was down to 
570. The Germans finally were forced to eliminate the fourth company in the battalion to 
maintain company strength. 118 
Not all German divisions were equal, of course. As noted in Chapter 3, the Germans 
distinguished between their attack divisions and trench divisions. Allied intelligence order of 
battle sections also closely monitored the capabilities and state of readiness of all the German 
divisions. The Intelligence Division of the American Expeditionary Force put the German 
divisions into four classes, with Classl being the most capable, and Class 4 being the least. 
For the most part, those divisions the AEF rated as Class I in 1918 were the attack divisions. 
Class 2 consisted of some attack divisions and the better trench divisions, with the remainder 
of the trench divisions in Class 3. The divisions the AEF rated as Class 4 were the Landwehr 
divisions, for the most part. By March 1918 there were only two Class 3 divisions on the 
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Eastern Front; all the rest were Class 4.119 As an AEF intelligence report reproduced in the 
American official history noted: 
On March 21, Germany had 45 divisions on the western front rated 
as first class battle divisions. The plan, more or less closely followed, 
has been to make large use of such divisions for offensive operations. 
When the objective of a given operation is reasonably well attained 
these divisions are withdrawn, rested, reconstituted, and prepared 
for further use. 120 
The previously discussed analysis of divisional moves also showed clearly that the 
higher-class divisions made more moves between January and October 1918, and they were 
committed to action more often. Most of the Class I divisions were in at least two of the five 
major offensives, some were in three, and many were earmarked for Operation HAGEN. The 
average number of moves per division was the same for the Class 2 and Class 3 divisions; 
higher for the Class I divisions; and lower for the Class 4 divisions. These differences are 
statistically significant at the 99 percent level of confidence. 121 
Table 4.5 
1918 Divisional Movements by Class 
Total Average 
Number of Number of Moves per Standard 
Divisions Moves Division Deviation 
Class 1 45 208 4.6 1.813 
Class 2 61 212 3.5 1.812 
Class 3 72 250 3.5 1.928 
Class 4 43 70 1.6 1.732 
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Austro-Hungarian Troops 
With the reduction of the threat in the East, the issue of Austro-Hungarian troops on 
the Western Front naturally came up. Austria had struggled to stay in the war from 1915 on, 
and Germany diverted considerable resources into propping-up her ally. Negotiations for 
Austrian troops started between the two high commands in October 1917. During a 
conference on 3 November 1917, General Arthur Arz von Straussenberg, the Austro- 
Hungarian chief of staff, learned of the general German offensive plans for 1918. He stated in 
principle that Austro-Hungarian troops would be available for the offensive. 
On 15 December 1917, OHL sent a note to the Austrian High Command explaining 
the labor manpower problems Germany was facing because of the exchange of Russian 
POWs. Deferring the question of combat forces, the Germans asked for Austro-Hungarian 
labor forces. Concerned for their prestige and very sensitive to the fact that the Germans did 
not rate their troops very highly, the Austrians refused to commit labor forces only. On 29 
December Arz von Straussenberg finally agreed to commit Austro-Hungarian combat troops. 
Negotiations stalled, however, because the Austrians wanted to deploy their troops as an 
integral unit on the Western Front, to which the Germans objected. 
On 15 March Hindenburg sent a message to Arz von Straussenberg noting that British 
and French units were being withdrawn from Italy, and requesting therefore a renewed 
Austrian offensive in Italy to relieve pressure on the West. The attack, however, did not start 
until mid-June and it was a complete failure. It was not coordinated in any way with 
operations in the West. On 16 June Ludendorff sent the Austrians a message noting the 
failure of the offensive, and saying that he thought another attack in Italy was not worth the 
effort. He thus requested the transfer of five of the six Austrian divisions in Italy to the 
Western Front. 
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During a conference in Vienna on 26-27 June the Austrians finally agreed to send six 
divisions, with first two arriving at start of July. Nonetheless, Arz von Straussenberg almost 
immediately sent a message to Hindenburg stating that the Austrians intended to attack again 
in Italy in September. In July the Austrian Ist and 35th Divisions finally left for the Western 
Front, and in early September the Austrians committed two more divisions. Writing after the 
war, General Hermann von Kuhl laconically noted: "It is evident that OHL, for cogent 
reasons, initially did not attach very much importance to the participation of Austro- 
Hungarian divisions in the fighting on the Western Front. " 122 
Allied Manpower 
At the end of 1917 the British and French had 3,700,000 troops on the Western Front. 
The 175 Allied divisions had a trench strength of 1,480,000. Twelve Belgian divisions held 
the extreme north of the Allied line. Then came 57 British and two Portuguese divisions, 
organized into four armies. The 99 French divisions were organized into three army groups, 
North, Center, and East. In the French sector were also four huge American divisions. With 
28,000 troops, each was about twice the size of a European division. 123 The Allies at that 
point still did not have a unified command structure. Main kept 60 of his 99 divisions in the 
main line; 15 covering the Vosges sector in the south; and 20 in reserve behind the main 
French sector. He also earmarked four divisions to support the British in the north, if 
necessary. Haig held only eight divisions in general reserve, and he refused to provide any for 
a central Allied Reserve. 124 Pershing infuriated the French by insisting on keeping the 
American divisions under his own command, rather than allowing them to be broken up and 
fed piecemeal into the line as reinforcements. 125 
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Arrival of the Americans 
When America entered the war in April 1917, the U. S. Army consisted of 
approximately 130,000 regular soldiers and some 70,000 National Guardsmen. In a period of 
19 months, America raised an army of more than four million, and managed to send about 
half that number across the Atlantic. In May 1917, however, the Americans had only 1,308 
troops in Europe. That month OHL estimated that based on the British experience, the U. S. 
Army would need at least ten months to organize, equip, and train any of its major units. 
And, in fact, although there were seven American divisions in France by March 1918, only 
one was ready for combat. But then the numbers started to increase almost exponentially. 126 
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Table 4.6 
American Cumulative Strength 
Month Total American Troops 
May 1917 1,308 
June 1917 16,220 
December 1917 183,896 
January 1918 224,655 
February 1918 245,378 
March 1918 329,005 
April 1918 434,081 
May 1918 667,119 
June 1918 897,293 
July 1918 1,210,708 
August 1918 1,478,190 
September 1918 1,783,955 
October 1918 1,986,618 
November 1918 2,057,675 
The large jump in May 1918 (233,038) was accomplished in part by leaving I 
equipment behind and linking the troops up with excess stocks already in France. The large 
increase in the arrival rate of the Americans from May on caught OHL by surprise. 127 From 
March to July the Americans put 956,000 troops into Europe--in the same period that the 
Germans lost 973,000.128 By the time the French launched their counteroffensive on 18 July 
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they had nine American divisions. By the end of the war, 43 American divisions were in 
France, and 28 of those were either in or ready for combat. 
In their assessment of the Americans, the Germans committed one of the deadliest 
sins of warfare-underestimating the enemy. Ludendorff initially dismissed the Americans 
out of hand. As late as December 1917 an OHL intelligence summary noted: "The officer 
corps is not trained for the exigencies of major warfare. For this reason alone it will be 
impossible for a time to employ American units of any size under their own command in 
difficult situations. " 129 Even the usually astute General Han von Seeckt underestimated the 
influence of American entry into the war. He thought it would prolong it, but not decide it. 130 
In his two-volume history of the war, Kuhl gave the following assessment of the American 
soldier: "The American soldier excelled in bravery, although he was lacking practice. Rested, 
well-nourished and with his nervous energy still intact, he met the German forces who were 
exhausted from unprecedented exertions of four years of fighting. " 131 
The Home Front 
By 1917 the war was costing Germany 3 billion marks per month, and the cumulative 
cost had reached 111 billion marks by March 1918.132 Thanks to the British blockade the 
food situation in Germany was grim. The winter of 1916-17 was called the "Turnip Winter, " 
and that spring Germany was short 2 million tons of breadstuffs. 133 German infant mortality 
in 1917 was up 49.3 percent over what it had been in 1913. 
Germany depended heavily on its occupied zones for food supplies, which justified 
somewhat Ludendorffs continued commitment of forces in the east. In 1918 German civilian 
adults had a diet of only 1,000 calories per day. Early that year the food supply system 
collapsed completely. Industrial firms had to compete with municipalities for food for their 
workers, and both were forced to resort to the black market. 134 
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The food shortage also affected the German soldiers, whose daily caloric intake had 
fallen from 3,100 in August 1914 to 2,500 by early 1918.135 On 15 June 1918, army 
commanders were informed that until the next harvest, there would be no more deliveries 
from Germany of corn or potato fodder for the horses, and only limited potatoes for the 
troops. 136 
After three-and-a-half years of war German national morale was low. The war 
hysteria of 1914-16 was gone, and the left wing and pacifist fervor that had swept France in 
1917 was now sweeping Germany. In 1917 there were over 500 strikes involving more than 
one million war workers. 137 On 28-30 January 1918,400,000 workers went on strike in 
Berlin. Additional strikes quickly followed in Bremen, Hamburg, Leipzig, and Essen. The 
strikers demand immediate peace with no annexations and no indemnities; an improvement in 
the food supply; the end of military control of the factories; and the release of political 
prisoners. 
On 30 January Ludendorff sent a message to the Chancellor demanding the arrest of 
the strike leaders. With army support, the police closed down labor newspapers. Some 50,000 
munitions workers were recalled to active duty and sent to the front, but that only served to 
infect the front lines with more revolutionary agitators. 13' Nonetheless, the army effectively 
broke the strikes. After that, the period from March to July 1918 was one of relative calm in 
Germany, as the people waited with renewed hope, but ultimately in vain, for the promised 
military victory of Ludendorffs Offensives. 139 
The Situation in the East 
On 15 December 1917 Germany and Russia agreed on an armistice, but it turned out 
only to be a cease-fire. Negotiations with Russia broke down over the terms of the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk--terms mostly dictated by Ludendorff. Meanwhile, Germany on 9 February 
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signed a separate peace treaty with the newly independent Ukraine. But anarchy broke out 
almost immediately, and by 16 February most major Ukrainian towns and rail centers were in 
the hands of the Bolsheviks. On 18 February 1918, OHL broke off negotiations with the 
Russians and ordered the 20 weak divisions of Army Group Eichhorn to regain control of the 
Ukraine. The Germans reached Kiev on 1 March, Odessa on 12 March, and Kharkov by 
April. On 7 March the Ukrainian government re-established itself in Kiev. That government 
was overthrown on 24 April, but its replacement recognized the economic agreement with 
Germany and promptly asked for German troops to help get the harvest in. 140 Only by 
abandoning the Ukraine would it have been possible to free up significant numbers of troops 
for Operation MICHAEL. Yet, Germany absolutely had to retain its control over the Ukraine, 
which was a vital source of critically needed grain, meat, and horses. 141 
On 3 March Lenin finally agreed to the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 
including the recognition of Ukrainian independence. Brest-Litovsk, of course, was every bit 
as draconian as the Treaty of Versailles would turn out to be. Russia lost 89 percent of its 
coalmines; 50 percent of its industry; 73 percent of its iron production; 33 percent of its rail 
lines; and 32 percent of its population. 142 The Bolshevik government remained very hostile to 
Germany, and stepped up its efforts to export the communist revolution to the land of Karl 
Marx's birth. 
The Russians agreed to terms only 18 days before the Germans launched Operation 
MICHAEL in the west. In the early months of 1918, when he should have been focusing all 
his attention on MICHAEL, Ludendorff was obsessed with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 
sketching the future borders of the map of Europe. 143 
The Germans also continued to maintain forces in Romania, an essential source of 
petroleum as well as food. The 7 May Treaty of Bucharest gave Germany and Austria- 
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Hungary an 80 percent monopoly over the Romanian oil fields, and allowed Germany to keep 
four divisions and Austro-Hungary to keep two divisions in Wallachia. 
Finland took advantage of the war to push for independence from Russia, proclaiming 
its independence in December 1917. Under pressure from Germany, Russia recognized that 
independence on 6 January 1918. By the end of the month, however, remaining Russian 
troops seized control of the government and proclaimed a communist regime. In March the 
Germans sent the weak Baltic Division into Finland to cooperate with Mannerheim's forces. 
By the end of April, Red Guards had been suppressed and Finland was liberated. 144 
THE DECISION TO ATTACK: 145 
By late 1917 Hindenburg and Ludendorff had come to the conclusion that the war 
would be lost or won on the Western Front. 146 This was the very proposition of Falkenhayn's 
they had argued against from 1914 through 1916. But even during the preparations for the ., -., 
defensive battles of 1917, OHL began to realize that they had miscalculated Germany's 
military situation. 147 The senior German military leadership in the west was divided on the 
issue. The two principle army group commanders, Crown Princes Wilhelm and Rupprecht, 
were convinced that Germany could no longer win a military victory. They wanted to make 
peace before the offensive, even if it meant giving up Belgium. 148 In his post-war memoirs, 
however, Wilhelm expressed a somewhat different attitude than he expressed at the time to 
his chief of staff, General Friederich von der Schulenburg. 149 
If the war could not be ended otherwise than by a military decision, 
and the statesmen could find no diplomatic method of leading the 
parties to the negotiating table, there was no other choice but to take 
the offensive. 15 
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Rupprecht's chief of staff, Kuhl; the chief of staff of the Fourth Army, Lossberg; and 
Ludendorff s replacement as chief of staff on the Eastern Front, General Max Hoffmann, 
were arguably the best field chiefs of staff of the war. All three saw no alternative. Lossberg 
wrote to Ludendorff at the time; "The war can be decided in our favor only through an 
offensive. " 151 After the war Kuhl wrote; "The enemy's numerical superiority, enhanced by 
the prospective arrival of American contingents, rendered the defensive hopeless in the long 
run. " "There was no other choice" 152 In his personal war diary, however, Kuhl in November 
1917 expressed a slightly different point of view, noting that neither a major offensive nor a 
protracted defense held any prospect for success. Instead, Germany should conduct a strategic 
withdrawal from Flanders, followed by a series of powerful counterattacks. 153 In Hoffman's 
post-war memoirs he wrote; "From the point of view of a military critic, nothing can be said 
against the decision to attack. " 154 
Ludendorff continued to reject any peace through negotiation. While OHL continued 
to debate whether or not to attack, and if so where, none of Germany's political leaders had a 
voice in the decision! 55 On 19 September 1917 Ludendorff told the army group and army 
chiefs of staff that a major attack in the west was out of the question., 56 On 30 September 
Wetzell issued his strategic estimate of the situation that focused on the next war. (Discussed 
above. ) On 23 October Wetzell produced another estimate of the situation in which he 
argued that the only viable strategy was "to deliver an annihilating blow to the British before 
American aid can become effective. " Wetzell estimated that the offensive would require 30 
divisions, which could be freed up in two ways: firstly by shortening Army Group Crown 
Prince Wilhem's front by withdrawing to the Gudrun Line, which would free up 15 divisions; 
and secondly by withdrawing 15 more divisions from the east. ' 5' Ludendorff approved the 
concept within 24 hours. 
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On 25 October Rupprecht sent Ludendorff an estimate of the situation that argued 
against a major offensive and recommended only limited counterattacks, possibly in the 
Armentieres area. 158 On 9 November Wetzell produced a revised staff study. He still 
continued to argue for a major offensive: 
Only a large-scale offensive will, in my belief, offer a guarantee 
of influencing decisively the whole situation in the west. It must 
have a far-reaching strategic objective that will produce a great 
effect, not only material but also moral. 
But then Wetzell reversed himself from his 23 October staff study. He now considered a 
direct attack against the British as too hard, and argued instead for an attack against the 
French by cutting off the Verdun salient. 
Beyond all doubt our toughest and most stubborn, but at the same 
time our clumsiest opponent is the Englishman, and next spring, in 
my opinion, the most dangerous one will again be the Frenchman, 
tested in war, more skillful, and reinforced by the Americans. 159 
Ludendorff decided the Germans had to attack, he just wasn't sure where, how, or 
when. His key advisors were even more divided on those questions than on the primary 
question of whether or not to attack. On 11 November he met at Rupprecht's headquarters in' 
Mons with Wetzell, Bauer, Kuhl, and Schulenberg. They did not reach a decision. Ludendorff 
then ordered the development of an entire set of courses of action, and he issued his basic 
planning guidance. The decision on where, how, and when would be made later. 
Given the strategic box the Germans had put themselves in, was the decision to shift 
to the strategic offensive the correct one? There really were only two other options--the 
strategic defensive and negotiation. Noting that the Allies never did make the kinds of 
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breakthroughs the Germans made in 1918, Correlli Barnett argued that the defensive policy 
would have been no more disastrous in the long run, and not as risky. 160 Perhaps, but one of 
the most critical elements of a successful defense is time, and that was the one resource the 
Germans were the shortest of. On 22 December 1917, General Henri Main, commander in 
chief of the French Army, issued a directive that made the Allied strategy quite clear: 
The Entente Powers will reach numerical superiority only when 
sufficient American troops can enter the line. Until that time it will 
be necessary for us, unless we wish to use up our forces irretrievably, 
to assume a waiting attitude, with the express purpose of taking up the 
offensive as soon as we are able to do so; for only the offensive will 
bring us final victory. 161 
By the end of 1917 negotiation was probably the best way out. The Germans actually 
did attempt a "Political Offensive, " but Ludendorffs intransigence on Belgium doomed that 
course of action to failure every step of the way. On 11 February 1918 Germany's political 
leaders sent Ludendorff a memorandum pointing out the increasing unrest at home and the 
economic weakness of the Central Powers, and urging as rapid a peace as possible. They also 
urged strongly that the coming military offensive should be preceded by a political offensive. 
A month earlier, on 14 January, OHL's liaison to the Foreign Office, Colonel Hans von 
Haeften, had given Ludendorff an elaborate proposal for just such a political offensive. 162 
Ludendorff actually forwarded Heaften's memorandum to the Chancellor, after first removing 
the key element--the demand for a clear statement on Belgium. 163 
On 9 March 1918, Haeften briefed Ludendorff on the results of his talks at The Hague 
with President Wilson's delegate, Jacob Noeggerath. The Americans refused to budge on 
Belgium, but throughout March and April, during Operations MICHAEL and GEORGETTE, 
Ludendorff continued to insist on German domination over Belgium. 164 On 3 June, after the 
failure of Operation BLOCHER, Haeften gave Ludendorff a second proposal that pushed the 
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idea of Germany as the world's champion against eastern Bolshevism. 165 But that plan too 
sidestepped the issue of Belgium. Writing after the war, Hoffman noted: 
On the very day on which OHL gave the order to cease the attack on 
Amiens, it was their duty to notify the government that the time had 
arrived to proceed to peace negotiations, and that there was no longer 
any prospect of finishing the war with a decisive victory on the 
Western Front. 166 
The offensive was the only real option Ludendorff and OHL allowed for Germany. 
But as Wetzell stressed in his 9 November estimate, "it must have a far-reaching strategic 
objective. " As we shall see, it did not. Driven by the German fixation on the 
Vernichtungsschlacht, Ludendorff continued to believe until the end that a decision could 
only be achieved by directly attacking the enemy's strength. It apparently never occurred to 
him to take an indirect approach by attacking a key vulnerability, like the BEF's logistics 
system. Thus, the most serious question facing the planners was whether after affecting a 
successful breakthrough the field force would be sufficiently mobile to exploit it 167 Given 
Germany's shortage of horses, inadequate forage, shortage of trucks, scarcity of fuel, scarcity 
of rubber for tires, and lack of tanks, the answer was No. 
Most of the key German military leaders went into the 1918 Offensives believing they 
had no other viable course of action, yet somehow understanding that the whole thing was a 
gamble, one huge roll of the dice. Writing in his post-war memoirs, Crown Prince Wilhelm 
noted: 
Even if we could confidently anticipate a great tactical success, 
our operational success remained uncertain. We could only 
conjecture on how far it could be developed into something that 
would decide the campaign. 168 
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And in his memoirs, Hindenburg wrote: 
Even with the advantage of numbers on our side, it was not a 
simple matter to decide on an offensive in the west. It was always 
doubtful whether we should win a great victory. 169 
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From a military standpoint, it didn't make 
much difference whether we directed our first 
offensive against the French or the British. 
1 
Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg 
Chapter V 
THE OPERATIONAL DECISION 
(11 November 1917 to 21 January 1918) 
THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS 
Once OHL made the decision to attack, they then had to decide where, when, and 
how. The decision against whom, was a function of the decision where. The process of 
making the decisions on where and when played out over a period of ten weeks. It involved 
three major conferences and a large number of estimates and memorandums circulating 
among OHL and the army and army group headquarters. During that period, a number of 
course of action analyses also were initiated to address the specifics of how the offensive 
would be carried out. That process continued up through mid-March. 
The Mons Conference 2 
As noted in the previous chapter, Ludendorff met at Mons 11 November 1917 with 
Kuhl, Schulenburg, Wetzell, and Bauer. Typical of the German Army at that time, it was a 
meeting strictly with chiefs of staff and key General Staff officers. No commanders were 
present, but all presumably were briefed later by their respective staff chiefs. 
Kuhl argued strongly for an attack in the north, in the direction of Bailleul- 
Hazebrouck, with the left flank anchored on the La Bassee Canal. The objective of the attack 
173 
would be to cut the British in half by echeloning on the left wing. The key drawback would 
be having to wait until April for the ground in the Lys valley to dry sufficiently. Ludendorff 
generally favored the northern option, but he insisted on attacking no later than the end of 
February. 3 [Map 2] 
Schulenburg advocated an attack against the French center on both sides of Verdun- 
from the region in and to the east of the Argonne Forest, and from St. Mihiel westward. 
Schulenburg argued that while Britain could probably survive a military disaster, France 
would be broken by one. 4 That option, however, counted heavily on the assumption of 
French psychological collapse. Schulenburg was supported by Wetzell and his 9 November 
staff study (see Chapter 4), but Ludendorff countered that there was no major incentive for 
the British to send reinforcements to the French at Verdun. That meant the Germans still 
would have to fight the British later in Flanders. He also believed that the relative inactivity 
in that sector had allowed the French Army to partially reconstitute its strength. 
Ludendorff then asked if Rupprecht's Army Group could attack farther to its south, 
near Arras or St. Quentin. Ludendorff noted: 
It would seem that an attack near St. Quentin offers promising 
prospects. After reaching the line of the Somme between Peronne 
and Ham it might be possible, by resting the left flank on the 
Somme, to advance the attack still farther in a northwestern 
direction, and thus eventually roll up the British front. For the 
success of this operation it would be especially necessary to 
render useless the various rail centers by means of long range 
artillery and bombing squadrons. That would create difficulties 
for the timely arrival of the enemy's strategic reserves. 5 
This appears to be one of the few times that Ludendorff paid any attention to the 
BEF's transportation system. In this case, however, he was focusing narrowly on the 
movement of reserves, rather than more broadly on the BEF's entire lines of 
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communications 6 The overall plan was plan similar to one advanced by Seeckt in 1915, and 
almost a mirror image of Haig's overall plan on the Somme in 1916.7 Kuhl objected to the 
plan, pointing out its two major drawbacks. The Germans would have to attack over the 
terrain that had been devastated by the 1916 Somme battles, and by their own Operation 
ALBERICH withdrawal to the Siegfried line in 1917. Also, the left wing of such an attack 
would by necessity come into contact with the French and draw in their reserves that much 
faster. 
Despite Ludendorffs strong leanings, no final decision was reached at the Mons 
Conference. He ordered further staff studies and the course of action development of five 
principal operational options: ST. GEORG centered on Hazebrouck; MARS centered on 
Arras; ST. MICHAEL centered on St. Quentin; CASTOR north of Verdun; and POLLUX 
east of Verdun. Ludendorff concluded the conference by issuing the principles that would be 
the basis for future staff planning: 8 
1. The Situation in Russia and Italy will probably enable us in 
the new year to strike a blow on the Western Front. The relative 
proportion of strength of the belligerents will be approximately 
equal. For an offensive it will be possible to make available 
approximately 35 divisions and 1,000 pieces of heavy artillery. 
These resources will be adequate for one offensive only. A 
second, large diversionary attack will not be possible. 
[Emphasis added. ] 
2. Our general situation requires an attack as early as possible, 
at the end of February or start of March, before the arriving 
American forces tip the scales. 
3. The British must be knocked out of the war. 
In analyzing the previous Allied offensives, German planners had concluded that they 
had failed because of a lack of adequate diversionary attacks. Yet, Ludendorff decided that 
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the Germans lack sufficient forces to mount major diversionary attacks. Rupprecht too later 
noted that he thought that Ludendorff was vastly underestimating the toughness of the 
British. 9 As Correlli Barnett pointed out, it was the Schlieffen Plan all over again--a gamble 
under acute time pressure, making use of a temporary superiority that was not really 
overwhelming. 10 
The very next day, Crown Prince Wilhelm's Army Group fired off the first of a long 
string of staff studies, strongly advocating the Verdun option. Schulenburg argued that 
Britain would not end the war because of a partial defeat of its Army. Only the complete 
collapse of the French would cause the British to make peace. The St. Quentin option would 
surely draw in both French and British reserves, and surprise in the St. Quentin area would be 
almost impossible to achieve. Only the destruction of the French forces around Verdun, he 
concluded, would eliminate any possibility of an Allied offensive. 1 
On 16 November Wilhelm's Army Group issued planning guidance to its subordinate 
armies. 12 Already assuming that OHL was leaning toward one of the options in Rupprecht's 
Army Group sector, Wilhelm's Army Group told the Seventh, First, and Third Armies that 
they could not count on reinforcements in the case of an Allied counterattack. The army 
group also issued specific instructions for yielding ground. Three days later the army group 
requested permission from OHL to initiate the withdrawal to the Gudrun Position starting 15 
December. 13 Sometime in November, Lossberg also sent a detailed course of action 
analysis to Ludendorff addressing three key questions: 14 
Timing of the Offensive: Lossberg thought there was a very low probability that the 
Allies would attack the Germans first. They most likely would wait for a German attack, or 
wait until the arrival of the Americans gave them an overwhelming superiority. The 
Americans would take time, but as soon as the German offensive was launched, they would 
accelerate their preparations. If the offensive was not operationally and decisively successful 
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at the end of the operation, the Germans would be forced to transition to the operational 
defensive facing an enemy superior in numbers and strength. The later in the year the 
Germans would be forced to do this, the better, because the autumn and following winter 
weather would work to their advantage in the defense. Thus, Lossberg concluded the 
offensive should not start until mid-May. That also would allow the ground to dry out 
thoroughly, especially in the Lys valley, and it would provide more time to move more 
divisions from the east. Even if those were low quality units, they could be used to release 
higher quality divisions from other positions in the line. 
Method of Attack: Their good rail net and especially their superiority in motor 
vehicles gave the Allies the ability to reinforce threatened sectors faster than the Germans 
could during the Allied offensives. Thus, the enemy first had to be forced to commit and tie 
down his reserves through a series of about four limited diversionary attacks. The 
diversionary attacks should average 15 kilometers in width and 7 to 10 kilometers in depth-- 
to the Allies' first line of artillery. Each attack would be conducted by five attack divisions 
with three in reserve. Each attack should be able to destroy three enemy trench divisions and 
tie down five more committed to reinforce that sector, plus another five in reserve. Twenty 
German attack divisions, then, should be able to destroy 12 Allied trench divisions, and tie 
down another 40. 
Location of the Offensive: Lossberg stressed that the objective of the offensive should 
be a tactical and operational breakthrough (taktischen und operativen Durchbruchs) and a 
subsequent roll-up of the enemy front adjacent to the offensive sector. He was vague, 
however, on the precise location, only noting, "The choice of the location of the offensive 
must allow for an obvious operational success (operativen Erfolg). " After Ludendorff made 
his final decision for a single great strike, Lossberg proposed a two-phase offensive: first 
phase, attack north of Lens, in order to take the well-fortified defensive zone of Arras from 
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the rear; and second phase, continue to Amiens. Lossberg specifically recommended against a 
frontal attack against Arras (MARS). He also recommended strongly against an attack across 
the old Somme battlefield, because of the condition of the shell-cratered ground would make 
follow-on support and sustainment all but impossible. 
Crown Prince Rupprecht's Army Group followed up with its own very detailed staff 
study on 20 November. 15 The study was based on fact that Russia was still at war with 
Germany. Disagreeing with Lossberg, Kuhl argued that the attack should be made as early as 
possible, considering the arrival of the Americans. The Germans also had to assume the 
British would continue their offensive in Flanders. Kuhl then went on to examine the three 
options in Rupprecht's Army Group sector, ignoring the Verdun option completely. 
ST GEORG: Kuhl still primarily advocated the attack in the region of Armentieres, 
against the flank and rear of the large British force in the Ypres salient. The main attacking 
forces would be General Friederich Sixt von Arnim's Sixth Army, supported by General 
Ferdinand von Quast's Fourth Army. Kuhl also noted the two weak Portuguese divisions in 
the attack sector as an exploitable vulnerability. He laid out two alternative courses of action 
for GEORG; the first as a decisive attack, and the second as a diversionary attack to relieve 
pressure elsewhere. 
Bailleul-Hazebrouck was the main direction of advance for GEORG as a decisive 
attack. The British forces packed tightly into their northern flank would have great difficulty 
maneuvering. They would have the sea on their left flank as well as their rear. The objective 
would be to take the British in the flank and rear, cut off their retreat, and defeat the main 
body. The attack also would protect the German U-boat bases in Flanders. Kuhl argued that 
the ground conditions in Lys valley would actually work to the attacker's advantage by giving 
the defenders a false sense of security. The left flank of the German attack would push the 
British across the La Bassee Canal and anchor on that feature. The canal also would provide a 
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defensive line against French reinforcements moving up from the south--although strong 
reserves had to be held to counter such a thrust. Kuhl cautioned that the Germans must avoid 
committing heavy forces to a set-piece fight for the high ground around Mount Kemmel. 
GEORG as a decisive attack would require 40 divisions and 400 to 500 heavy batteries 
GEORG as a diversion to relieve pressure elsewhere also would attack across the Lys 
and Lawe in the direction of Bailleul-Hazebrouck, but to far less depth. The attacking force 
would consist of 20 to 25 divisions, a force naturally too small to engage the British main 
force. Such an attack, Kuhl warned, should be launched as early as possible. Waiting for the 
British to launch their own offensive first would be too late. 
MARS: Kuhl devoted only a few paragraphs of discussion to the options in the 
northern end of the sector of General Georg von der Marwitz's Second Army. He thought 
MARS would be far too difficult because the Allies held Vimy Ridge and other key high 
ground with large concentrations of artillery, especially Monchy le Preux, just east of Arras. 
[Map 2] Kuhl estimated that an attack between the La Bassee Canal and the Scarpe would 
require 19 divisions in the first line, 19 divisions in the second line, 12 divisions in reserve, 
and 600 heavy batteries. He also noted the possibility of an attack on both sides of the Scarpe, 
but he did not provide a force estimate. 
MICHAEL: Although the British defenses in the MICHAEL sector were far less well 
prepared, Kuhl argued that the area devastated by Operation ALBERICH was too much of an 
obstacle for the attacker. The Second Army, which as of November 1917 held most of the 
proposed MICHAEL sector, was so far away from the main British force in Flanders that the 
operational objective of the attack could not be that force. The objective of MICHAEL, then, 
would have to be "to break through the enemy front and in warfare of movement against the 
enemy reserves to achieve the most decisive result possible. "--whatever that was. Kuhl never 
spelled it out. 
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Kuhl thought the turn and pivot maneuver to accomplish the roll-up after the 
breakthrough was far too complex. The Second Army's front ran from north%%est to southeast, 
and the basic direction of the exploitation phase ran to the north%%est. A 90-degree turn of an 
attacking force in motion is one of the most difficult of all battlefield maneuvers. Kuhl also 
argued that MICHAEL would require far more forces than GEORG--55 divisions and 600 
heavy batteries. Because of MICHAEL's position closer to the French, it would be harder to 
block the movement of their reserves. He didn't believe that Ludendorffs plan to disrupt the 
movement of the enemy reserves by attacking the transportation system would be effective. 
To support that argument, he noted that the effectiveness of the air units in any such attacks 
would be heavily dependent on weather. He also noted that during their own attacks of the 
previous year the British had not seriously interdicted the German rail lines. Kuhl's argument, 
however, overlooked the overall fragility of the BEF's rail network, and the fact that the 
German rail network had no significant chokepoints the equivalent of Amiens or Hazebrouck. 
[Map 1] Kuhl concluded his assessment: 
After examining all the operations that can possibly be staged 
within the zone of this group of armies, I have come to the 
conclusion that the decisive offensive ST. GEORG constitutes 
the most advantageous operation we can undertake in 1918. 
The important thing is not to commit our main forces against 
the enemy too soon, but rather to let the situation develop. 
[Emphasis added. ] 
Despite the objection, raised during the conference in Mons on 
II November, that the offensive cannot be launched soon enough. 
I should like nevertheless to propose the ST. GF. ORG operation again. 
During the coming spring an exceptionally favorable operational 
situation [operative Lage]will develop for us. 
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Our naval offensive--the U-boat campaign--will force the Briton to 
continue his offensive in Flanders. To this end, he will be obliged to 
mass his main force in Flanders at the extreme northern wing of the 
entire hostile front, with the sea at his flank and rear. Along the south 
of the British front there are wide stretches of lightly held positions, 
consisting mainly of earthworks above ground, which will permit a 
rapid breakthrough in a direction that will be most effective 
operationally. [operativer Richtung] 16 
The key weakness in Kuhl's assessment was the lack of a well-defined objective or 
end state, clearly lacking in the second paragraph of his conclusions. Kuhl also was wrong 
about the effectiveness of the U-boat campaign, and he was wrong about a resumption of the 
offensive in Flanders by the BEF. Haig wanted to continue the offensive, but the BEF was 
far too short of manpower to do it. The replacements were available, however, they just were 
not in France. 17 War Office returns for 1 January 1918 showed 38,225 officers and 607,403 
men in Britain, fit for duty. Just 150,000 would have brought Haig's divisions up to full 
strength. 18 This was something that German intelligence apparently missed completely. 
Kuhl, therefore, may have correctly assessed his enemy's intent, but not his capability. 
On 7 December Rupprecht's Second Army submitted a plan for the MICHAEL option 
based on a breakthrough on a broad front by attacking on both banks of the Somme. The 
main effort would be farther to the south, in the direction of Ham. That had been the southern 
limit of Ludendorffs initial proposal. The plan continued with a push as far as possible 
toward Amiens, with the left wing based on the Oise as a barrier to the anticipated French 
counterattacks. [Map 2] 
Wetzell produced another staff study on 12 December, arguably his most important. 19 
He noted that France in 1918, with a rested army and reinforced by the Americans, would 
have freedom of maneuver. The Germans estimated that as of that time on the Western Front, 
106 British and French divisions opposed 118 1/2 German divisions in the line, with 62 
Allied and 42 German divisions in reserve. By end of February the Germans would have 70 
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divisions in reserve. Moreover, after the British 20 November attack at Cambrai and the 
German counter attack, the British forces were more evenly distributed. The French forces 
were strongest on their left wing, opposite General Hans von Boehn's Seventh Army. 
Wetzell still considered the offensive at Verdun as the most decisive option. That 
attack would require some 30 divisions. (Modem readers find it almost impossible to 
understand how the Germans could have seriously considered attacking at Verdun again, but 
then, Haig would have attacked in Flanders again if he could have. ) Wetzell also admitted 
the GEORG option, which would require 40 divisions, had its advantages. But GEORG was 
not likely to achieve decisive results by itself. Wetzell expressed doubts about attempting a 
breakthrough on a large scale. He pointed out that the difficulties in achieving a breakthrough 
in the west were so immense that it was impossible to achieve the goal by attacking in one 
place only. He also doubted that even tactical surprise was possible to achieve. 
Wetzell did not believe that an attack in the St. Quentin area could produce decisive 
results by itself either. The Allied rail network in that sector gave them the capability to 
reinforce from both the north and the south. "Therefore, we will succeed in gaining truly 
decisive results only by a skillful combination of multiple attacks having a highly reciprocal 
effects. " [Emphasis added. ] This statement was one of the clearest examples of German 
operational cognition in 1918. If Ludendorff, then, was determined to attack at St. Quentin, 
Wetzell proposed a two-phase operation against the British, "... using the railways for the 
rapid transfer of [German] troops. " 
The first phase would be a two-pronged attack in the St. Quentin sector by the Second 
and Eighteenth Armies to draw in the large British reserves from Flanders. (Although not yet 
in the German line, General Oskar von Hutier's Eighteenth Army was scheduled to be 
inserted between the Second and Seventh Armies within a week. ) That attack would require 
22 divisions. 
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a. With 12 divisions from a line of departure on both sides of 
Bullecourt in the direction of Bapaume, for the purpose of 
reaching the Bapaume-Cambrai railroad, the principal supply 
line of the British Cambrai front. 
b. With ten divisions between the Somme and the Oise, as well 
as from the direction of La Fere, in order to gain possession 
of the Crozat Canal. [Map 2] 
c. This double attack will merge two days later into the main attack 
with 20 divisions from St. Quentin and the region north of it in 
the direction of Peronne, for the purpose of closing the gap 
between the attacks a. and b. and reducing the Cambrai Salient. 
As to the purpose and objective of the combined attack, Wetzell wrote: 
The two attacks on the wings, a. and b., are to fix the British and 
French local reserves located in front of our Second and Eighteenth 
Armies, and thus establish favorable conditions for the rapid and 
deep thrust of the later main attack from St. Quentin and the area 
north of it. 
The second phase of the offensive would follow about two weeks later, conducted by 30 
divisions. Wetzell estimated that eight to ten divisions should be able to be released from the 
Second Army after the St. Quentin phase, and an additional four to six divisions could be 
shifted from German Crown Prince's Army Group. Most of the artillery and trench mortars 
used in the first phase would have to be used in the second as well. The Fourth Army would 
attack north of Armentieres in the direction of Kemmel-Bailleul; and the Sixth Army would 
attack south of Armentieres in the direction of Estaires. "Principal direction for both attacks: 
Hazebrouck. " The objective of the second phase: 
To penetrate the British front in Flanders--now stripped of its 
reserves--by means of an attack in the direction of Hazebrouck 
(the GEORG offensive proposed by Rupprecht's Group of 
Armies); to strike [the British front] in the flank and rear, 
shattering the entire British line, rolling it up from the north. 
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Wetzell's plan had a great deal of merit, and just possibly might have worked if 
executed as he envisioned it. He did recognize the importance of the rail lines, but he was 
only thinking at tactical depth in this case--cutting the Bapaume-Cambrai line into the 
Cambrai Salient (which the British called the Flesquieres Salient), instead of cutting the rail 
network at operational depth at Amiens. Hazebrouck was the objective of the second phase, 
but there is no mention in his assessment of the importance of the rail center there. 
Ludendorff did not adopt Wetzell's plan, because he was already fixed in his mind to a 
single great attack--a Schlieffenesque Battle of Annihilation-rather that a sequenced 
operation with cumulative effects. Nonetheless, Wetzell's plan almost certainly influenced 
Ludendorff s decision to continue contingency preparations for an attack in Flanders should 
the attack at St. Quentin fail. As we shall see, the major operational errors Ludendorff 
committed during the planning and especially during the execution of Operation MICHAEL 
made it impossible for the Germans to attack in Flanders later with any hope of achieving 
decisive effect. As the British official history put it: 
Fortunately for us, Lieut. -Colonel Wetzell's proposals were 
not accepted, although, in the end, after the first offensive 
had come to a standstill, Ludendorff, bearing them in mind, 
did order the second act-too late. 20 
On 15 December Rupprecht's Army Group submitted a new assessment to OHL based 
on the change in the strategic situation following the termination of hostilities with Russia? ' 
With the loss of Russia Kuhl now agreed with Lossberg and thought the Allies would sit on 
the defensive until at least summer. That meant the British would not mass in Flanders for 
their own offensive, but rather better deploy their defenses. That also would make an attack 
against them much harder. The prospects, Kuhl conceded, now looked better for success 
farther south, in the Sixth and Second Army sectors. Kuhl again emphasized that the previous 
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Allied offensives had failed because of lack of supporting attacks to tie down the German 
reserves, and he seconded Lossberg's earlier recommendation for diversionary attacks against 
the French around Verdun, and against the British around either Ypres, or better, Cambrai. 
The diversionary attacks should start the first of March, followed by major demonstrations 
(troop movements, etc. ) in the areas of Verdun and Cambrai. 
The main attack should start in mid-April. Its objective would be to penetrate to 
Dunkirk, threaten Calais, and then roll the British up to the south. 
In this manner we shall not only administer to the Briton a 
severe blow, but also hit him hard by the capture of the Channel 
coast near Dunkirk and by threatening Calais. If this operation 
succeeds, it will be possible to roll up the British front toward 
the south. Our left wing for the breakthrough will have to be 
strong from the start, and moreover, must be echeloned in 
depth to a considerable extent. 
In all other respects, the ST. GEORG offensive will have to be 
conducted as far as practicable according to the principles laid 
down in the memorandum of 20 November. Neither on the front 
of the Second Army nor on that of the Sixth will it be possible to 
stage an operation with so favorable an objective as that near 
Armentieres. 
This was a course of action that clearly focused on the importance of the British 
logistics system, rather than focusing solely on attacking the British main force. The key 
question is, did the Germans have the forces and the mobility to penetrate all the way to the 
Channel in a single operation? The answer is, probably not. Kuhl also stressed the necessity 
of starting the offensive with a short, violent, surprise artillery preparation, of the type 
artillery expert Georg Bruchmüller was then advocating. By this point Kuhl had become one 
of Bruchmüller's principal supporters on the Western Front. ZZ 
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On 19 December ONL ordered the insertion of llutier's Eighteenth Army into the line 
from St. Quentin to the Oise River, effective 1200 hours, 27 December. The same order also 
assigned Bruchmüller and his Arko 86 staff to the Eighteenth Army. 23 
On 21 December Rupprecht's Army Group issued another MICHAEL course of 
action analysis. 24 They now argued that the Cambrai battle had altered the situation for an 
attack by the Second Army in the spring of 1918. With the British having strongly reinforced 
the area, the MICHAEL option would be even more difficult. GEORG, therefore, should be 
the option selected for the offensive. Kuhl recommended, however, that the Second and 
Eighteenth Armies should still continue to make all the preparations to conduct MICHEAL. 
Those preparations alone would serve as an effective deception measure to cover for 
GEORG. 
And, if GEORG failed, MICHAEL could still be launched as a follow-up. In that 
case, the Second Army should attack in the general direction of Bapaume. An attack group of 
six to eight divisions would be used to cut off the Cambrai salient. The Second Army would 
then roll the British up to the northwest, basing its left flank on the Somme west of Peronne. 
The Eighteenth Army would cover the flank of the Second Army by attacking in sector 
between Peronne and the Crozat Canal. 
On 25 December Wetzell issued another operational assessment. 2S lie continued to 
push for an attack against the French. lie cited the estimated British strength at 67 divisions 
along 180 kilometers of front, with 20 divisions in reserve. That resulted in one British 
division in line per 2.9 kilometers and one division in reserve per 5.0 kilometers. French 
strength was estimated at 105 divisions on a front of 510 kilometers, with 35 divisions and 
three American divisions in reserve. That resulted in one French division in line per 5.0 
kilometers, and one division in reserve per 14 kilometers. With their much broader front, it 
also would be more difficult for the French to mass their reserves at a threatened point. 
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Wetzell also noted that eight French reserve divisions recently had moved behind the 
British north of the Oise. He stressed that an ill-advised attack on the British could destroy 
any possibility of a future attack on the French, and thereby condemn Germany to losing the 
war. "[The British] we can defeat but not destroy. If we defeat the Frenchman, it will mean 
destruction for him: first of all, the fall of the government, and probably the end of the war. " 
Oddly enough, this was the last assessment Wetzell issued until 19 April, well after Operation 
MICHAEL had died, and Operation GEORGETTE was in its final death throes. 
On 25 December Rupprecht's Army Group also issued planning guidance for 
simultaneous preparations of MICHAEL and GEORG. 26 Once the decision has been made 
for one option, the continuation of the preparations for the other would be a necessary 
deception measure. The importance of deception was stressed throughout the document. They 
also noted that the requirement to prepare both offensives simultaneously would require the 
establishment of an additional field army headquarters to take over part of the Second Army's 
sector, despite the fact that the Eighteenth Army had just been inserted into the line. The 
initial marshalling of the assault forces had to start well outside the attack sector, then the 
forces would be moved into the sector at the last possible moment. The total build-up of the 
assault forces, including all the support and sustainment units, could not be completed until ` 
four to five days after the start of the offensive. The instructions also included initial planning 
guidance for rapidly regrouping from GEORG to MICHAEL, or vice-versa. 
The Krueznach Conference 27 
Ludendorff held his second major planning conference with the army group chiefs of 
staff at Krueznach on 27 December 1917. Again, no final decision was made, but Ludendorff 
said that the balance of forces in the west would be in Germany's favor by the end of 
February, making it possible to attack in March. At the conclusion of the conference OHL 
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issued a directive to the army groups to plan and start preparing a compete array of operations 
spanning almost the entire German front. The completed plans would be due on 10 March 
1918.28 
Rupprecht's Army Group was directed to plan GEORG II in the Ypres sector; 
GEORG I in the Armentieres sector; MARS in the Arras sector; MICHAEL I in the direction 
of Bullecourt--Bapaume; MICHAEL II north of St. Quentin toward Peronne; and MICHAEL 
III south of St. Quentin toward Le Fere. [Map 2] Both Rupprecht and Kuhl had serious 
misgivings about GEORG II from Mt. Kemmel toward Bailleul, because of the heavily 
cratered ground in the Ypres sector. Both also considered MARS virtually impossible. 29 
Crown Prince's Wilhelm's Army Group was directed to plan ACHILLES, an attack by 
the First Army west of Reims; and HECTOR, an attack by the Third Army in the Argonne. 
Wilhelm's and Gallwitz's Army Groups were directed to plan jointly CASTOR, west of 
Verdun; and POLLOX, south of Verdun. Alberecht's Army Group was directed to plan 
STRASSBURG in the direction of the Breusch Valley; and BELFORT, a defensive operation 
in the south. 
On 30 December 1917 OHL sent Crown Prince Wilhelm's Army Group a message 
asking if the Seventh Army would be able to participate in MICHAEL. 30 On 1 January 1918 
Ludendorff admitted to Kuhl in a phone conversation that the attack would be against the 
British. 31 That same day OHL issued its new tactical doctrine, The Attack in Position 
Warfare. [Discussed in Chapter 3. ] On 3 January 1918 Rupprecht's Army Group issued 
further planning guidance to its field armies. 32 
The Fourth Army was directed to develop the GEORG II option, the attack against 
Ypres salient. The estimated forces required were two to six divisions. The Sixth Army was 
directed to develop two alternate options. The first was the GEORG I attack against 
Armentieres, breaking through in the direction of Hazebrouck, with further objectives Calais 
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and Dunkirk. The estimated forces required were 30 to 40 divisions. The second was MARS, 
an attack from Loretto Heights--Arras to Vimy, then rolling up the British front from either 
the north or the south. The estimated forces required were 30 to 40 divisions. 
The Second Army was directed to develop two simultaneous options. The first was 
MICHAEL I, an attack from the Cambrai front in the direction of Bullecourt-Bapaume. The 
second was MICHAEL II, an attack from the left wing of the army in the direction of 
Pdronne and then north. The objective of both attacks was to cut off the forces in the Cambrai 
salient, then continue the attack northwesterly to roll up the British front. The estimated 
forces required were 20 to 25 divisions. 
The Eighteenth Army was directed to develop MICHAEL III, an attack on both sides 
of St. Quentin to throw the enemy back over the Crozat Canal in the Peronne-Ham sector; 
then cover the flank of MICHAEL II. The estimated forces required were 20 divisions. The 
supporting attack was being planned for almost as many forces as the main attack. 
On 8 January Ludendorff again cautioned Kuhl not to become too committed to 
GEORG. 33 On 9 January 1918 Rupprecht's Army Group sent a message to the Fourth Army 
telling them that although GEORG II would be the supporting attack, they should be prepared 
to shift it to the main attack if the situation changed. 34 In such a case, its objective would 
be to cut off the British in the Ypres Salient and break through toward Cassel. The following 
day the army group issued a new assessment, stressing that preparations for both options 
should continue simultaneously, with the decision made as late as possible. 35 Despite the 
fact that Ludendorff had long since ruled out strong diversionary attacks, Rupprecht's staff 
again recommended that whichever course of action was accepted, the other should become a 
diversionary attack. They also cautioned that in order to preserve the element of surprise, the 
offensive must start no later that the sixth day of the build-up within the attack zone. GEORG 
I was still recommended as the best course of action, with GEORG II as the supporting 
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attack. They cautioned, however, that GEORG II could assume much greater significance if 
the British shifted their forces. 
By late January, German intelligence was starting to get indicators that the British 
would extend their southern wing, taking over the sector of the French line that would be 
attacked by MICHAEL III. Haig, in fact, had agreed with Petain on 17 December to extend 
the British southern wing to the Oise by the end of January. 36 
The Aresens Conference 
As a preliminary to the Aresens Conference, Ludendorff, accompanied by Kuhl and 
Schulenburg, made a tour of the front, visiting army group and army headquarters. 37 On 18 
January they held a conference on GEORG II at the Fourth Army headquarters. On 19 
January, they met on GEORG I and MARS at the Sixth Army headquarters. 38 Ludendorff 
continually stressed the importance of moving artillery forward to support the attack. "The 
whole matter depends on the advance of the artillery, and that depends on terrain. " And, "If 
we can't do it, then the offensive will be brought to a halt. " One staff officer proposed using 
Yellow Cross (persistent) gas rounds in the creeping barrage, but that suggestion was voted 
down overwhelmingly. Considering MARS, Ludendorff pointed out that the whole terrain 
south of the Scarpe was controlled from Monchy, which therefore had to be taken. All the 
participants agreed that the MARS attack got more difficult the farther it advanced, and that a 
quick and deep breakthrough was not possible. 
On 20 January they met with the Second Army and Eighteenth Army staffs at 
Marquette and Bussigny. 39 Ludendorff noted that the formula for the German attacks would 
be to handle the reserves economically and advance the artillery forcefully. The participants 
discussed the use of Blue and Green Cross (non-persistent) gas in the creeping barrage. 
Ludendorff noted that if the German troops hesitated to go through their own gas the attack 
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would stall. There also was a lot of discussion about horse replacements and a proposal to 
rate divisional combat readiness based on their horse strength. All the meetings leading up to 
the Aresens Conference focused almost exclusively at the tactical level. According to the 
meetings' minutes, Kuhl raised the only real operational issue when he started a discussion on 
whether the MICHAEL attacks should be conducted simultaneously or sequentially. 
Ludendorff announced his final decision at the Aresens Conference on 21 January 
1918 40 Setting the tone for the entire meeting, Ludendorff made his famous. "We talk too 
much about operations and too little about tactics, " comment. 41 Summarizing the various 
options, Ludendorff ruled out GEORG as too dependent on the weather. A late spring in the 
area might delay the start of the attack until May, which was far too late for Ludendorff. He 
also said he thought it necessary to take Mount Kemmel and the southern Bethune hills, 
which added to the difficulty of the operation. In his memoirs after the war Ludendorff wrote, 
"Strategically the northern attack had the advantage of a great but limited objective. It might 
enable us to shorten our front if we succeeded in capturing Calais and Boulogne. i42 It was 
odd that Ludendorff thought that capturing Calais and Boulogne would only produce the 
limited effect of allowing the Germans to shorten their lines, rather than the much wider- 
ranging effect of possibly collapsing the BEF's logistics system. 
MARS was too difficult all the way around. MICHAEL, then, on both sides of St. 
Quentin was the decision. "Here the attack would strike the enemy's weakest point, the 
ground offered no difficulties, and it was feasible for all seasons. i43 Ludendorff, however, 
decided to extend MICHAEL's northern wing to the Scarpe. Supporting attacks by the 
Seventh Army were ruled out for the time being, because while such attacks might tie down 
the local reserves, they also would pull in that much faster the Allied strategic reserves. 
Ludendorff planned to have 85 to 90 divisions in reserve in the west by the end of 
March. He saw the problems with the MICHAEL option, but he also saw the advantages of 
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splitting the British and the French. "The center attack seemed to lack any definite limit. This 
could be remedied by directing the main effort [Ludendorff used the term Schwerpunkt] 
between Arras and Peronne, toward the coast. If the blow succeeded the strategic result 
[strategischer Erfolg] might indeed be enormous as we should separate the bulk of the 
English army from the French and crowd it up with its back to the sea. " 44 Rupprecht, Kuhl, 
Wilhelm, and Schulenburg all pushed Ludendorff to set specific ground objectives for the 
attack 45 Ludendorff countered, "In Russia we always merely set an intermediate objective, 
and then discovered where to go next. " 46 
Ludendorff also announced that General Otto von Below's Seventeenth Army 
(formerly the Fourteenth Army from Italy) would be inserted into the line between the 
Second and Sixth Armies, effective 1 February. At the same time, the Eighteenth Army was 
to be detached from Rupprecht's Army Group and assigned to the German Crown Prince's 
Army Group. 47 Rupprecht naturally objected to this obvious violation of the unity of 
command, and Lossberg opposed it strongly as well. 48 
The Eighteenth Army's mission was to provide flank security for the attacks of the 
Second and Seventeenth Armies. The Eighteenth Army would advance to the line of the 
Somme between Peronne and Ham, and to the Crozat Canal. The initial Eighteenth Army 
plan was to attack south of the Somme on the first day of the operation, and to start the attack 
north of the Somme the next day. 49 During the meeting Hutier's newly appointed artillery 
chief, Bruchmüller, argued against that on the basis that the enemy would too easily 
anticipate the northern attack. That would allow them to attack preemptively the densely 
packed masses of artillery and ammunition in position to support the northern attack. 
The Second and Seventeenth Armies would make the main attack. Ludendorff told 
Rupprecht's Army Group to continue making preparations for GEORG, but the Germans 
would attack in Flanders only of MICHAEL failed 50 But failed to do what? That was the 
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question that apparently was never answered. OHL issued the operations orders for 
MICHAEL on 24 January, 8 February, and 10 March. (Discussed in detail in the following 
chapter. ) 
ANALYSIS: WAS THE BEF THE RIGHT OBJECTIVE? 
On the day of the Aresens Conference Rupprecht noted in his diary that he did not 
expect the German offensive in the west to succeed. He actually thought the attack should be 
launched in Italy, to take the Italians out of the war and to force the British and French to 
divert resources. 51 Hindenburg apparently was ambivalent, and Wetzell, Schulenburg, and 
Crown Prince Wilhelm insisted that the French had to be attacked first. But most of 
Ludendorff s key advisors, including Kuhl and Lossberg, agreed that Britain had to be taken 
out first. In terms of sheer force numbers on the Continent, Britain was the weakest member 
of the coalition, and in March 1918 that coalition suffered from a lack of a central command 
authority, or even a central reserve. 52 
As Brigadier-General James Edmonds put it in the British Official History, "Two 
main objectives seemed at [British] GHQ to present themselves to the enemy, either Paris or 
the Channel ports. " 53 An attack against Paris might not necessarily result in the decisive 
defeat of the French armies. They could still withdraw behind the Loire and later support 
Haig when the Germans turned on the British. Paris was some 80 miles from the front lines, 
and during any thrust toward the French capital the Germans would have to reinforce their 
right flank heavily to protect their own lines of communications against British counter 
attacks. 
On the other hand, "An attack towards the Channel ports would, if successful, be 
disastrous for the British armies. " The Channel ports were only 50 miles from the German 
lines, and only about 40 miles from effective heavy gunfire. The right flank of the German 
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attack would be anchored on the sea, and the left flank would be screened by a series of 
strong river lines. The British had no depth in Flanders, which closed off the option of an 
elastic defense. Besides, the British had been trained for the offense, and all their recent 
experience was in offense. Also, there was much resistance in BEF to adopting defense-in- 
depth tactics. As one anonymous regular NCO is widely quoted as saying at the time, "It 
don't suit us. The British Army fights in line and won't do any good in these bird cages. " sa 
Nonetheless, the British were far stronger and less vulnerable on their northern wing 
than on their southern, even if it would be easier for the French reserves to reach the British 
southern wing. The British themselves made several decisions that made things easier for the 
Germans. The first was the decision to keep the BEF short of replacements and its divisions 
under-strength, specifically to prevent Haig from resuming the offensive in Flanders. 
Although the assumption for many years has been that this was a deliberate policy of British 
Prime Minister David Lloyd George, historian Timothy Travers has shown evidence that 
suggests Chief of the Imperial General Staff General Sir William Robertson was behind that 
decision. ss 
Regardless of who was behind the decision, it compounded the effects of the second 
decision made by the British War Cabinet in January 1918, ordering the BEF to take over an 
additional sector of the French front. The provision for compensating reinforcements was not 
part of that decision, which meant that the British line had to be weakened somewhere. The 
issue of British manpower also ties to the question of an adequate reserve. If Haig had the 
forces to contribute, an effective Allied central reserve might have been available in March 
1918. Edmonds later said that if the BEF had had a robust enough reserve force, the 
MICHAEL offensive could have been defeated by a counterattack. 
56 
As the result of the extension of the British line to just south of the Oise, General Sir 
Hubert Gough's Fifth Army found itself in new, very poorly developed positions. That forced 
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the troops to spend a lot of time on labor details at the expense of training. By 21 March the 
Fifth Army's Battle Zone had no dugouts and was incomplete between St. Quentin and the 
Oise. 57 The Rear Zone consisted of a single trench line marked out on a map. The Fifth 
Army also consisted of only New Army and second-line territorial divisions. It had no 
regular, first-line territorial, or Empire divisions. 
58 And finally, of all the BEF's armies, the 
Fifth had the most thinly held line: 
Table 5.1 
BEF March 1918 Frontal Densities 59 
Average Divisional Fronts 
Second 1.92 miles 
First 2.36 miles 
Third 2.00 miles 
Fifth 3.23 miles 
The generally accepted explanation for Haig's decision to keep the Fifth Army weak 
is the assumption that Gough had the depth to fall back into, and there was nothing critical in 
his rear--except Amiens, which was at a greater depth than most World War I commanders 
would have believed to be vulnerable. 
60 And, based on a7 March agreement between Haig 
and Petain, the French were to put a reserve of six divisions immediately behind Gough on 
Haig's request. Travers, however, argues convincingly that this is a post facto rationalization 
to cover the fact that Haig and GHQ were slow to recognize the threat at the southern end of 
their line, and that for several days into the battle they believed the main danger was on the 
northern end of the MICHAEL attack. 
61 The irony here is that certainly was the original 
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German intent. The "open space" explanation also ignores the critical danger of a Franco- 
British rupture. 
Gough, of course, was only too well aware of the vulnerability of his position, and as 
the date of the German attack drew closer, he was increasingly convinced that the main blow 
would fall on the Fifth Army. On 4 and 9 February GHQ gave Gough specific instructions 
that in the event of a major attack, he was to stand and fight if he could, and then conduct a 
fighting withdrawal, but no farther back that the line of the Somme. He also was to maintain 
the connection with Third Army at all costs. 62 
By striking at the British at their juncture with the French, the Germans would be 
following the Napoleonic formula for defeating a coalition: Attack the weakest member at its 
weakest point, and then defeat the other members in detail. With the German troops trained 
for infiltration tactics, the shattered ground of the Somme area, with its maze of trenches, 
ditches, craters, and cellars, actually worked to the advantage of the attacking infantry--but 
not of course to the advantage of the following artillery and logistical support. The critical 
flaw in the German plan was that it was still conceived as a force-on-force operation--a 
Vernichtungsschlacht--rather than a wedge between the coalition partners and a focused 
attack on the very vulnerable logistics system of the numerically weaker but more resilient 
partner. 
Ironically, Hindenburg in his post-war memoirs clearly identified the logistics ,. 
vulnerability that Ludendorff never seemed to recognize: 
Had we reached the Channel coast, we would have touched 
Great Britain's very life-cord. By so doing, we not only would 
have been in the most favorable position for interfering with 
her communications, but we would also have been able thence, 
by means of our heaviest calibers, to bombard a portion of Great 
Britain's southern coast. 63 
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We indeed hope that it may succeed, but it 
is impossible for us to guarantee. If we were 
stronger, if matters were different, but with 
the available forces it will be very difficult. 1 
Bavarian Crown Prince Rupprecht 
We can now deploy our entire strength in the 
West. To be sure, that is our last card. 2 
Colonel Alberecht von Thaer 
Chapter VI 
OPERATIONS MICHAEL and MARS 
(21 March to 5 April 1918) 
PLANS 
Even before Ludendorff made his decision on 21 January, the Eighteenth Army Chief 
of Staff, General Traugott von Sauberzweig, sent Wetzell a memo on 16 January proposing 
that the Germans exploit the recent southern extension of the British line by heavily 
weighting the left wing of the Eighteenth Army attack. 3 Sauberzweig estimated that the 
Eighteenth Army would have a fairly easy time of it and could reach the line of the Somme 
and Crozat Canal in two to three days. This line would not be crossed. Once reached, all 
reserves would be oriented to the northwest toward Pdronne to support the Second Army. As 
the mission analysis memo noted; "The more forces the enemy introduces east of the Somme 
and the Crozat Canal, the more decisive will be his defeat if our breakthrough is successful 
and we continue to advance. " 4 [Map 2] Three days later Rupprecht's Army Group sent a 
rather testy response to the Eighteenth Army noting; "The attack of the Eighteenth Army does 
not have a purpose of its own, rather in the scheme of the total MICHAEL operations its 
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mission is to cover the flank of the Second Army. " And, "The main effort of the MICHAEL 
operations is on the left flank of MICHAEL II. " 5 Already fault lines in the MICHAEL plan 
were forming along the army group boundaries. 
On 24 January, OHL issued the order assigning the boundaries, 6 and another order 
laying out the basic planning guidance. The MICHAEL offensive had to be ready to go about 
20 March, with the Seventeenth Army conducting MICHAEL 1; the Second Army 
conducting MICHAEL II; and the Eighteenth Army conducting MICHAEL III. A 
supplemental order further stated; "The MICHAEL offensive is to rupture the enemy front 
with the line La Fere--Ham--Peronne as its objective; thereafter, the offensive is to be 
advanced, in conjunction with the Operation MARS left wing, beyond the line Peronne-- 
Arras" 7 MARS would only be launched south of the Scarpe (MARS-SÜD), a few days after 
the start of MICHAEL, after the artillery was regrouped and shifted. The attack north of the 
Scarpe, (MARS-NORD) was cancelled because of insufficient forces. Even by this stage 
there was no clear purpose to the operation, aside from the goal of achieving some sort of 
vague tactical success in the first phase of the operations to provide a guide for the second 
phase. 
Preparations were to continue for Operations GEORG I (Armentieres) and GEORG II 
(Ypres), but without hindering the preparations for MICHAEL. The GEORG operations had 
to be ready to go by the beginning of April, but only 30 divisions were now available for 
GEORG I. OHL put Operations HECTOR and ACHILLES east of Reims on hold, but did not 
cancel them. Operations CASTOR and POLLUX on both sides of Verdun were cancelled. 
Planning was to continue for Operations STRASSBURG and BELFORT on the southern end 
of the German line. OHL also added two new operations for planning purposes: ROLAND an 
attack by the Third Army farther to the east in the Champagne area; and ERZENGEL 
(ARCHANGEL), an attack by the Seventh Army to support the Eighteenth Army by striking 
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south of the Oise to take the high ground east of the Oise-Aisne Canal. 
8 The Seventh Army 
initially planned ERZENGEL for 11 divisions controlled by four corps. 
9 
Although Ludendorff decided on the MICHAEL option on 21 January, that decision 
was tightly held for security purposes and not widely disseminated. Thus, the working staffs 
at the different echelons continued to plan and develop the various courses of action as 
modified by OHL's 24 January order. Two days later Rupprecht's Army Group ordered its 
armies to plan and start preparing the GEORG, MARS, and MICHAEL options. If GEORG 
did not become a main attack it would become a supporting attack for MICHAEL, called 
KLEIN-GEORG (SMALL-GEORG). 1° 
The Second Army, meanwhile, was developing its plan for MICHAEL II. The 
planning guidance sent to the subordinate corps stated; "The purpose of Attack MICHAEL II 
is to cut off, in conjunction with the attack operations of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Armies, the British forces stationed in the Cambrai Salient, and to continue the advance 
westward via Peronne and north thereof. " 
11 The Second Army's planners estimated their 
force requirements at 18 attack and eight trench divisions; 198 light and 186 heavy artillery 
batteries; and 21 observation, 18 attack, and nine fighter squadrons, and two bomber wings. 
12 
In the end, they got more artillery than their original estimate, but fewer divisions and air 
units. 
OHL held another planning conference at Mons on 3 February. Ludendorff once 
again emphasized the primacy of tactics by stating, "It is the impression of OHL that the 
preparation phase for the attacks places too much emphasis on surprise and too little on 
tactical effect. " 13 Ludendorff reiterated that MICHAEL was the main attack, supported on 
the flanks by ERZENGEL and MARS. If these attacks failed, then either ROLAND or 
GEORG would be launched as soon as the supporting heavy artillery could be shifted. 14 
Now, however, there would be only 20 divisions available for KLEIN-GEORG I, and 12 to 
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15 divisions for KLEIN-GEORG II, which were downgraded from diversionary attacks to 
feints. KLEIN-GEORG II was further divided into a series of smaller operations, including 
FLANDERN III against the Belgians at Dixmuide, WALDFEST (FOREST FESTIVAL) 
north of Ypres from the Houthulst Forest, and HASENJAGD (RABBIT HUNT) between 
Hollebeke and Warneton. 15 The key point, however, was that available heavy artillery and 
not divisions was the pacing factor. 
After the meeting Rupprecht expressed some relief that Wetzell's original plan of 
alternating hammer blows finally seemed to have achieved limited acceptance at OHL. 16 
Kuhl, on the other hand, thought that if Ludendorff continued to listen to Wetzell, the 
German Army would wind up delivering a series of pointless attacks all up and down the 
Western Front. 17 
During the 3 February meeting Below also pressed to extend his Seventeenth Army's 
attack as far north as the Scarpe. Ludendorff, however, held firm that Seventeenth Army 
would attack only from Croisilles, some 12 kilometers south of Arras. After the artillery was 
regrouped, the MARS attack would go in. It was important to keep the weight of the main 
effort at the junction of Second and Seventeenth Armies. Ludendorff wanted to keep three 
OHL reserve divisions at Denain, some 35 kilometers to the rear. From there they could be 
committed to reinforce either the Seventeenth or the Second Army. iS Thus, at the same time 
Rupprecht's Army Group was saying the main effort was on the left of MICHAEL II, OHL 
was saying the main effort was on the right of MICHAEL II. 
The same day he chaired the Mons Conference, Ludendorff also held a conference at 
Maubeuge on artillery technical and tactical matters. Despite some lively discussion, no final 
decision was reached on the question of firing without registration. 19 
OHL finally transmitted the formal decision for MICHAEL in an operations order 
issued on 8 February. 20 The order contained mostly tactical planning guidance resulting 
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from the 3 February Mons Conference. That same day Schulenburg sent a memo to OHL 
stating that the main effort of the Eighteenth Army's attack should be in the north 
2' Two days 
later OHL issued an order designating Flanders as only a diversionary sector, owing to a lack 
of forces. 22 All the German efforts and resources were lining up behind the MICHAEL 
offensive. Yet, in a meeting with the Kaiser and Chancellor at Homburg on 13 February, 
Ludendorff made a comment that betrayed his own belief in the German ability to conclude 
the war with a single masterstroke. "We must not believe that this offensive will be like those 
in Galicia or Italy. It will be an immense struggle that will begin at one point, continue at 
another, and take a long time. " 23 It was a rather uncharacteristic comment from the man who 
could not stand the word "operations. " 
On 14 February Rupprecht's Army Group sent the Seventeenth Army a message 
indicating that the main effort of MICHAEL I should be more on the pivot of the right wing 
against Arras, rather than on the left wing in cutting off the Cambrai Salient and linking up 
with MICHAEL 11.24 Two days later OHL overruled the army group planners in a message 
re-emphasizing the relationship of MICHAEL and MARS. According to OHL, the main 
effort of the Seventeenth Army attack had to be on the left wing initially, in the direction of 
Bapaume and to the west. OHL also stated "The execution of the MARS attack depends 
solely on the complete success of the MICHAEL (I-III) attacks. Therefore, the decision [to 
launch MARS] cannot be left to the Seventeenth Army. The decision will remain with 
OHL. " 25 
Ludendorff met again with the chiefs of staff at Charleville on 24 February. The entire 
meeting was devoted almost entirely to artillery issues. Bruchmüller was present and he 
defended the efficacy of the Pulkowski Method. (See Chapter III. ) Bruchmilller and 
Ludendorff also spent much time arguing about whether the creeping barrage should make 
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100- or 200-meter shifts. Ludendorff decided that ammunition would have transportation 
priority over rations once the German forces started moving forward. 26 
Apparently not all the planners were convinced that MICHAEL would be a complete 
success. On 26 February Rupprecht's headquarters issued preliminary planning guidance for 
the regrouping of forces from MICHAEL-MARS to GEORG. Throughout the document the 
operation was still called GEORG, rather than KLEIN-GEORG. The order contained the 
remarkable statement: "It must be assumed that the MICHAEL operations will be halted 
because of operational considerations. " This could occur when the Germans reached the line 
Croisilles--St. Leger--Bapaume--Coumbles--Clery--Somme. Extensive use of land marches 
would be necessary to ease the load on rail traffic and to execute the regrouping as rapidly as 
possible. Units from the Seventeenth Army were to march to the Sixth Army area, and units 
from the Second Army would move by train to the Fourth Army area. 7 
Rupprecht's Army Group issued specific targeting instructions against rail 
installations for air and SCHWEFLA units. The priority targets were the rail centers at 
Bethune, St. Pol, Doullens, Amiens, Longueau, Montdidier, and Compiegne and the lines 
connecting those points. Bomber Wing 3 (based in the Fourth Army area) was assigned to 
attack Bethune and St. Pol, augmented by the fire of SCHWEFLA batteries in the Sixth 
Army area. Bomber Wing 5 (based in the Seventeenth Army area) was assigned Doullens; 
and Bomber Wing 7 (in the Second Army area) was assigned to attack Amiens and 
Chaulnes28 The Germans did recognize the necessity to interdict the Allied lines of 
communications; but the primary purpose of these attacks was to prevent the Allies from 
moving their reserves, rather than strangling the Allied logistical system. OHL estimated that 
during the first eight days of the operation the Allies could not move up more than 40 
divisions in reserve, while the Germans could move up at least 50.29 
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About three weeks before the start of the attack, more indications surfaced that the 
staff of the Eighteenth Army had somewhat different ideas about Operation MICHAEL. 
Major Klewitz, an OHL liaison officer, reported on 28 February that the Eighteenth Army 
sent a request to Crown Prince Wilhelm's Army Group for one division from the Seventh 
Army to be placed in position to support if the situation arose where the Eighteenth was 
ordered to advance beyond the Crozat Canal to the Oise. 
On 3 March, Ludendorff responded in a telegram: "Agreed. It is most desirable for the 
rapid and favorable course of the MICHAEL attack that the left wing of the Eighteenth Army 
should press forward well beyond the canal. For this purpose, as many divisions as possible 
of the Seventh Army should be brought forward via La Fere. " Although he was agreeing to 
the preparations to exploit the contingency, he did not agree to extend the Eighteenth Army's 
initial objectives beyond the Crozat Canal. That question, he said, would be would be settled 
at a conference with the chiefs of staff on Mons on 7 March. 30 
Wilhelm's Army Group responded on 6 March that any push toward Le Fdre would do 
little good if MICHAEL III remained a limited objective attack. If the Eighteenth Army were 
allowed to attack beyond the Somme, it might produce great results. It was necessary, then, to 
secure the bridgeheads west of the Crozat Canal at Tergnier and Jussy as soon as possible to 
facilitate any counterattack against French reserves moving up. 31 
Several days earlier the Eighteenth Army sent Wilhelm's Army Group a message 
explaining its initial lineup of forces. Noting that the main effort of MICHAEL III was in the 
north, the message stated; "The commitment of forces in the first line at the start seems 
contradictory--five divisions for the north attack, six divisions for the south attack. " The 
Eighteenth Army justified this because the starting width of the northern attack was narrower 
that in the south. A sixth division would be committed in the north after that front broadened 
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as it advanced. Despite this rationale, it appeared to be a rather odd way to weight the main 
attack. 
32 
Ludendorff had made it very clear from the outset that a large-scale operation would 
only be possible if the Cambrai Salient were cut off "on the first day. " 33 Rupprecht's Army 
Group, therefore, forced the Second Army to modify its plans for its main effort. The Second 
Army had wanted to put its main effort sufficiently far from the Cambrai Salient to avoid the 
British reserves stationed close by. Rupprecht's Army Group pointed out that this would not 
support the left wing of the Seventeenth Army that was supposed to push to Etray, and then 
link up with the right wing of Second Army in the vicinity of Equancourt no later than the 
first day. Thus, the right wing of the Second Army attack (XIII Corps) would have to be 
strengthened considerably. But then the same order also betrayed the deeply rooted suspicion 
that the Eighteenth Army might be fighting its own separate campaign: 
It had been expected that the Eighteenth Army, after capturing Holon 
Woods, would jump into action across Omignon Creek [the inter-army 
boundary] in order to facilitate the advance of the left of the Second 
Army. However, according to the intentions of the Eighteenth Army 
as made known here, one can no longer count on that. Should the current 
intentions of the Eighteenth Army remain in effect, the Second Army 
will have to help itself, and turn over to the LI Corps [the left flank corps] 
the forces that are absolutely necessary. 34 
So in the same order the Second Army was told to strengthen both flanks at the same 
time. The next day Second Army received more pressure to strengthen its left wing. "OHL 
has decided that the left wing of the Second Army... is to attack without regard to any advance 
on the part of its neighboring units. " 35 It seemed that even OHL recognized that the 
Eighteenth Army might go off on its own tangent. 
Rupprecht's Army Group also issued specific guidance for the synchronization of 
MICHAEL I and II. 
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The prime objective of MICHAEL I and II is the cutting off of the 
British forces in the Cambrai Salient and the achievement of a major 
tactical victory thereby. For this purpose, it is necessary that the 
Seventeenth and Second Armies, with strong interior wings and 
without regard to losses, advance in one bound as far as possible 
on Ytres and Equancourt respectively. 36 
The interior wings of the two armies were not supposed to pivot too early. In order to 
facilitate the attack, the two divisions on the extreme right of the Second Army would 
conduct a frontal holding attack to pin down the British forces in the salient. After cutting off 
the salient, the German forces were to continue to move in a westward direction, but with no 
specific objectives designated. [Map 2] 
In reference to the further course of operations, only the following 
can be stated regarding the general plan. Besides, everything is 
dependent on circumstances. In general, the Seventeenth Army will 
have to continue the attack in a northwesterly direction, enveloping 
the adjacent front; and the Second Army in a westerly direction, its 
left wing protected by the Somme. 37 
Ludendorff met the army and army group chiefs of staff on 7 March at Mons. It was 
the last time he saw them before the start of the offensive. Ludendorff agreed to the 
Eighteenth Army's proposal to take the bridgeheads over the Crozat Canal, but he rejected all 
suggestions to expand the Eighteenth Army's attack until the tactical situation developed. 
Ludendorff also expressed the hope that subsequent operations in the Fourth and Sixth Army 
sectors would be possible if MICHAEL made good progress in the north. He further thought 
that if the attacks went well, there would be little to fear from an Allied attack on some other 
sector of the German front. 38 Rupprecht, however, wrote in his dairy that even if the main 
mass of their reserves were drawn into the MICHAEL attack, the Allies still could attack 
other sectors with massed tanks, without an extensive artillery preparation, much as they had 
done at Cambrai. 39 
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On 9 March the Second Army issued an order assigning missions to its supporting air 
units. The fighter squadrons had the mission of preventing enemy aerial observation and 
protecting friendly aerial observation. The first priority for the attack squadrons was the 
Allies' artillery. After the German infantry passed the line of the enemy artillery the priority 
of targets became; Allied reinforcements moving up, Allied artillery and tanks moving up, 
and any moving Allied motor vehicles. On the night of the first day, the bomber units were to 
bring the rail centers at Amiens and Longueau under constant attack. They also were to attack 
individual trains moving between Amiens and Albert, and Amiens and Chaulnes. Their 
follow-on mission would be attacks against the Peronne rail installations. 40 
OHL issued the main operations order for MICHAEL on 10 March. Its complete text 
bears repeating here: [Map 2] 
His majesty commands: 
1. The MICHAEL attack will take place on 21 March. Units will 
break into the enemy's first positions 0940 hours. 
2. The Group of Armies of Crown Prince Rupprecht will, as their initial 
important tactical objective, reduce the Cambrai Salient now held by 
the British, and thereafter advance to the north of Omignon Creek to 
the line Croisilles--Bapaume--Peronne and the confluence of Omignon 
Creek and the Somme. In the event that the attack of the right wing 
makes favorable progress, the Seventeenth Army will advance it beyond 
Croisilles. The group of armies has the further mission to push forward 
in the direction of the line Arras--Albert; to hold with its left wing on the 
Somme at Peronne; and by shifting its main effort to the right wing, to 
force the British back across the front of the Sixth Army, thus releasing 
for the advance additional forces hitherto engaged in positional warfare. 
To this end, all divisions now in the rear of the Fourth and Sixth Armies 
will be committed should the contingency arise. 
3. The Group of Armies of the German Crown Prince will first of all gain 
the line of the Somme and the Crozat Canal to the south of Omignon 
Creek. In the event of the Eighteenth Army making rapid progress, it will 
capture the passages across the Somme and the Canal. In addition, the 
Eighteenth Army will be prepared to extend its right wing to Peronne. 
The Group of Armies will reinforce the left wing of the Eighteenth Army 
with divisions from the Seventh, First, and Third Armies. 
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4. The 2nd Guard Division, 26th Württemberg Division, and 12th 
Division remain in OHL reserve. 
5. Based on the progress of operations, a decision will be made later on 
the MARS and ERZENGEL attacks. Preparations for those attacks must 
continue without interruption. 
6. The armies not participating in the attack will follow the instructions 
in order Ia 6925 dated 4 March. Crown Prince Rupprecht's Army Group 
will secure the right flank of MARS-MICHAEL against British counterattack. 
The Seventh, First, and Third Armies of the German Crown Prince's Army 
Group will fall back in the face of major French attacks, except in the sector 
for ERZENGEL. In the sectors of Gallwitz's and Duke Albrecht's Army 
Groups, there is no immediate decision on the response in case of a major 
French attack. Divisions from those army groups may be shifted to support 
the main battle. 41 
The basic operational concept was a departure from Ludendorffs original concept, 
broadening the attack rather than focusing it. The main objective, however, was still the 
defeat of British forces north of the Somme. The scheme of maneuver was not a frontal attack 
but rather a penetration followed by an attempt to cut across the British rear with the 
Seventeenth Army, using the Second Army and Eighteenth Army in supporting efforts to 
hold the French in the south, and then reinforcing the breakthrough on the right. 
The Seventeenth Army had the most difficult mission. The reduction of the Cambrai 
Salient required it first to advance to the southwest on Bapaume. After that, it had to turn 
northwest to reach the line Arras--Albert. The Seventeenth Army's maneuver would be 
restricted on its right by Arras and the high ground around Monchy. Like Below, Kuhl 
wanted to extend the Seventeenth Army's attack to cover Arras and the Scarpe from the start, 
which would have greatly facilitated the rolling up the British line later. Kuhl asked OHL to 
reinforce the Seventeenth Army at the expense of the Eighteenth, but OHL refused. 42 
In its initial attack, then, the Seventeenth Army had to divert resources to cover itself 
from Allied reaction from Arras until the heavy artillery could be shifted to support the 
launching of MARS. This in itself would be an extremely difficult task. The artillery would 
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have to move laterally across the lines of communications for MICHAEL I. The artillery 
grouped for MICHAEL had the advantage of being able to move into position under 
conditions of relative security. The artillery re-positioned for MARS would have to enter a 
battle under way, moving into position without the benefit of surprise. 
The Second Army mission was somewhat easier. Initially it had to attack to the west. 
As soon as the Seventeenth and Second Armies reach the line of Croisilles--Bapaume-- 
Peronne, the Second Army would continue its advance toward Albert, anchoring its left flank 
on the Somme. From that point its mission would be to support the Seventeenth Army in 
rolling up the British. 
The Eighteenth Army had the easiest mission. After reaching the Somme, it would 
extend its right wing as far north as Peronne. The operations order contained no follow-on 
mission for the Eighteenth Army after it reached the line of the Somme and the Crozat Canal. 
The sole purpose of its attack was to capture the river crossings and the canal. 
On 11 March, ten days before the start of the attack, the Second Army reported 
evidence of increased British artillery strength opposite its sector. 3 As a result of the Second 
Army's reports, Ludendorff started to consider the possibility of a much slower advance by 
Second Army, and also the possible necessity for a deep inward swing by the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Armies. 44 The next day Rupprecht's Army Group sent OHL another memo 
on MICHAEL and MARS. Noting that the heavy artillery from MICHAEL would be 
available for transfer to MARS on the evening of 21 March, Rupprecht's headquarters 
stressed that MARS should be launched as early as 22 March. "A MARS offensive executed 
only some days later will be more difficult and more bloody than an immediate roll-up of the 
front after the first great breakthrough. " It also recommended that the reserve divisions for 
MARS, including those under direct OHL control, should be positioned as close as possible 
to facilitate their immediate commitment. 
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If the OHL divisions are still at Bouchain on the afternoon of the 21st, 
then they will not be able to arrive before the evening of the 23rd, and 
cannot attack before the morning of the 24th. Therefore, they must 
be in the area south of Douai on the morning of the 21st if they are 
to be available when needed. The earliest they could attack then would 
be the 22nd. 45 
These OHL divisions were the ones referred to in Paragraph 4 of the main operations 
order. Rupprecht's headquarters also reminded OHL that: "The Seventeenth Army cannot 
provide from its MICHAEL forces such a strong reserve for the right wing that it would still 
be able to continue the attack in the direction of Arras under its own power. " Because of the 
requirements of the deception plan (cited in Paragraph 6), more divisions could not be 
withdrawn from the Fourth and Sixth Armies until at least 21 March. 
On 12 March OHL also issued an order reconfirming 21 March as D-Day (Y-tag) for 
the attack. 46 Crown Prince Wilhelm's Army Group issued its operations order on 14 
March. 7 Strong reserves were to be brought up close to the rear of the right wing of the 
Eighteenth Army. Their mission was to attack in the flank and rear [northwest] any enemy 
forces opposing the Second Army. After the attack succeeded, the Eighteenth Army had to be 
prepared to extend its right flank as far as Pdronne. The Seventh Army had the mission to 
secure the left flank of the German attack with Operation ERZENGEL. Bomber units 
assigned to the Eighteenth Army were ordered to attack Allied headquarters and airfields. 
From the evening of the 21st the priority target was the rail net between Ham, Amiens, Creil, 
Verberie, Compiegne, and Noyon. 
The following day, only six days before the start of the operation, Hutier submitted a 
proposal to Wilhelm's Army Group calling for a significant expansion of the Eighteenth 
Army's mission far beyond the line of the Crozat Canal. Its key passages included: 
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1. If the enemy is driven back over the Somme and the Crozat Canal 
by the Eighteenth Army, he will try to hold that line to secure the 
commitment of his reserves against the Second and Seventeenth 
Armies via Roye--Amiens. Therefore, this sector must be seized 
quickly. Any loss of time on our part will enable the enemy to 
strengthen his defenses. 
2. Having crossed the Somme and the Crozat Canal, it will be the 
mission of the Eighteenth Army to draw in its direction the French 
reserves intended to reinforce the British, to defeat these 
reinforcements, and interrupt the communications between the 
British and the French. 
It must be assumed that the French will bring up move reinforcements 
over the railroad lines Roye--Chaulnes and Montdidier--Amiens, in 
order to commit to action below Peronne against the flank of the Second 
Army and in front of the Eighteenth Army. 
Even in the event of a major offensive against their own front, the 
French will still provide local support to the British. In order to secure 
their own flank, they will probably push additional forces forward via 
Chauny--Noyon, and over the Compiegne--Noyon railway. 
The troop movements will begin as soon as our combat activities on 
the inactive fronts are recognized as feints. They will probably occur 
on the second day of the offensive at the latest. 
The mission of the Eighteenth Army requires, therefore, fast and decisive 
action, not only during the forcing of the line of the Somme and Crozat, 
but during further advances as well. The earlier the Eighteenth Army 
reaches the line Chaulnes--Roye, the better will be the chances of meeting 
the French while they are in the process of concentration, the more favorable 
will be the prospects for mobile warfare. 48 
On 18 March, Wilhelm's Army Group forwarded Hutier's proposal to OHL with the 
following endorsement: 
The more the French reaction is directed toward Rupprecht's Group 
of Armies, the more effective will the proposed operation to strike the 
French. The enemy will soon become aware of its ominous significance 
and of the menace to his capital. We must therefore expect him to react 
very forcefully. It is for this reason that we should undertake this 
operation with strong forces. 49 
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OHL made no changes to the orders it already issued, noting that the possibility of the 
Eighteenth Army advancing across the Somme had already been established with the order to 
seize the crossings. Nonetheless, the plan of attack for the Eighteenth Army already had 
grown far more ambitious than Ludendorff had envisioned originally. From a supporting 
attack controlled by the same army group that was making the main attack, MICHAEL III 
had grown into a distinct attack of its own, with no fixed objectives, controlled by a separate 
army group, with a potential to engage the French on open ground. 
On 16 March Rupprecht's Army Group issued its operations order for the attack. The 
mission of the Second and Seventeenth Armies was to roll-up the British north of the Somme, 
with the Eighteenth Army providing support as the situation permitted. The initial objective 
of MICHAEL I and II was to "cut the British off in the Cambrai Salient and achieve a major 
tactical success, " reaching the line Croisilles--Bapaume--Peronne-mouth of the Omignon. 
The follow-on mission for the Seventeenth and Second Armies was to "push forward to the 
Arras--Albert line, disrupting the British Army, including those forces opposite the Sixth 
Army. " To accomplish this, the Seventeenth Army had to shift its attack to a general 
northwesterly direction, while the Second Army continued attacking to the west, anchored on 
the Somme. Miraumont, five miles west of Bapaume, was established as the coordinating 
point for the inner flanks of the two armies. so 
The operations order also noted that the MARS attack could only be launched after 
the Second and Seventeenth Armies achieved "a great tactical success. " OHL would make the 
final decision on launching MARS, but those attack forces had to be positioned so they could 
exploit immediately by rolling up the British front north of Fontaine lez Croisilles. The whole 
purpose of MARS was to facilitate the pivot of the Seventeenth Army. The Sixth Army, in 
the sector north of the La Bassee Canal, had to be prepared to pursue the enemy and prevent 
the escape of his forces "in case he has to retreat from the pressure of MICHAEL. " 
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The Eighteenth Army had the mission of reaching the Somme and the Crozat Canal, 
and then, on order, extending its right flank to Peronne. If the Second Army met heavy 
resistance, the Eighteenth Army was supposed to attack via Beuvois-Tertry (northwestward) 
toward Peronne. That attack, in conjunction with the left wing of the Seventeenth Army, was 
supposed to cut off the enemy forces in front of the Second Army. This, of course, would 
shift the direction of the Seventeenth Army's attack southward instead of northwestward, 
making the later pivot even more difficult. 
On 16 March the Second Army issued its operations order to the XXXIX Reserve 
Corps, which was on the extreme right flank of Second Army, facing the front of the Cambrai 
Salient. Its mission was to conduct a frontal holding attack, while the Second Army's XIII 
Corps and the XI Corps of Seventeenth Army went around the salient and pinched it off from 
the rear. The XXXIX Reserve Corps was assigned only two divisions for that mission. After 
the first day's objectives had been achieved, the XXXIX Reserve Corps was supposed to 
withdraw from the line, and its artillery would revert to Army reserve. 51 
On 18 March Ludendorff and Hindenburg, along with an augmented Operations 
Division, establish an OHL forward command post at Avesnes. The next day, OHL finally 
bowed to the continuous pressure from Rupprecht's Army Group and the Seventeenth Army 
and agreed to move the three OHL reserve divisions in the Douai area behind the Seventeenth 
Army's right flank by the evening of 21 March. 52 Their commitment however, depended 
entirely on the success of MICHAEL. 
On 20 March OHL issued the launch order for the next day, informing the subordinate 
commands that the Kaiser himself had come to the front to assume personal command 53 
That same day Ludendorff, in a telephone conversation with Kuhl, talked about his concept 
for the exploitation and follow-on objectives in the event that MICHAEL was a major 
success. The Eighteenth Army would move toward the line Bray--Noyon; the Second Army 
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on Doullens--Amiens; and the Seventeenth Army in the direction of St. Pol. The result would 
be a divergent attack. Ludendorff stressed that such a divergent operation would only feasible 
if the Allies were defeated along the entire front. Even then, it would depend on whether the 
necessary forces were available at that point. 54 This, of course, would represent a significant 
change in the original operational concept. And as we shall see, it is almost exactly what 
Ludendorff tried to do, but without first achieving his stated conditions for success. 
PREPARATIONS 
The German build-up and preparations for MICHAEL were a masterpiece of staff 
work. For the most part they were representative of the preparations for all of the 1918 
Offensives. At this point, therefore, we can consider the MICHAEL preparations in some 
detail, and then consider only the significant differences for the subsequent operations. 
Although much of what is considered in this section traditionally constitutes the "boring bits" 
of military history, they nonetheless are the fundamental building blocks of the operational 
level of war. 
Main Preparations 
Even before the final decision was made, Rupprecht's Army Group on 25 December 
issued general preparation guidelines establishing two main preparation phases; a general 
phase lasting approximately six to eight weeks, and a close phase lasting four weeks. The 
plan established the requirements for extension of road-networks and narrow-gage field rail 
networks; extension of communications nets for the various headquarters, the artillery, and 
aviation; establishment of routes of approach, march tables, assembly areas, and divisional 
zones of action; establishment of command posts and observation posts; establishment 
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forward airfields and the pre-positioning of required tentage; and establishment of artillery 
and trench mortar firing positions and the pre-positioning the ammunition. 55 
During the final phase, units would be moved up and emplaced in the following order 
of priority: First, corps headquarters; artillery headquarters; and communications units; 
Second, divisional staff advanced parties; artillery staffs; engineer staffs; ammunition trains; 
and motorized trains; Third, artillery units; air defense units; labor and road construction 
companies; aviation companies; and balloon detachments; and Fourth, divisional combat 
units; horse depots; bridge trains; subsistence trains; medical units and field hospitals. 56 
Security, Surprise, and Deception 
At this point, strategic surprise was impossible to achieve, but the Germans went to 
extreme measures to achieve operational surprise. Their basic approach is best summarized in 
the words of a security order issued by the Second Army on 22 January: 
Not a single man in the army must have any doubt in his mind that 
the fight has already begun, the fight for secrecy and for concealment 
of our preparations. Every one must realize that he himself stands in 
the midst of this battle and that he must employ the weapons of 
caution and reticence in order to win out. 5 
German troops and even subordinate-level commanders were kept ignorant of the actual plan 
for as long as possible. As previously noted, OHL made the attack option decision on 21 
January, but the armies were not notified until the operations order of 8 February. To insure 
the strict adherence to security procedures, OHL established a network of special security 
liaison officers with broad enforcement powers. These officers were augmented with motor 
transport, aerial observers, balloon observers, and photoreconnaissance resources. During the 
preparation and build-up the security restrictions mandated that no orders or information were 
to be disseminated to the trenches; no movement was to be made during daylight; all 
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detraining must take place as far to the rear as possible; special controls were established on 
all incoming and outgoing personal mail; telephone discipline was strictly enforced; all new 
positions required overhead concealment; route discipline was to be enforced to avoid cross- 
country vehicle tracks observable from the air; and increased air activity was to be avoided in 
the planned attack sector. 58 
German intelligence reported on 5 February that the prevailing assumption among the 
French was that the German attack would come in the direction of Nancy, while the British 
were convinced the attack would occur on their front. 59 On 18 February OHL issued its main 
deception plan, designed to convince the French they would be the objective of the main 
attack, either by the First and Third Armies in the Champagne area, or by the Fifth Army 
north of Verdun. 60 OHL also issued a supplemental deception plan designed to make it look 
like OHL itself was relocating to the vicinity of Strasbourg on or about 1 April. 61 
On 28 February Rupprecht's Army Group issued the orders for its own deception 
operations under the codename GEORGEPLAN. Based on the GEORG and KLIEN-GEORG 
operations, GEORGEPLAN was designed to convince the British that if the blow fell on their 
front, it would fall in the Flanders sector. The deception activity also had the advantage of 
laying the groundwork for a subsequent KLEIN-GEORG operation, should it be necessary. 
The Fourth Army was allocated three divisions to carry out the plan, the Sixth Army got four 
divisions. An equal level of activity was supposed to be maintained along the army group 
front until about 5 March. After that point the GEORGEPLAN preparations were to become 
more obvious than the MICHAEL preparations. 62 
A follow-on OHL deception order required the First and Third Armies of Crown 
Prince Wilhelm's Army Group to launch diversionary attacks against the French in the 
Champagne sector starting 19 March and continuing through 24 March. Starting the morning 
of 21 March, feint artillery preparations would be fired in the GEORG and ERZENGEL 
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sectors simultaneously with the MICHAEL artillery preparations. 
63 For the most part, the 
troops and the subordinate leaders carrying out the deceptive measures were kept in the dark 
themselves and actually believed that they would be making the main attack. This added to 
the realism of the deception measures that were so effective that two days into MICHAEL, 
the French still believed it was a diversion for the main attack in Champagne. 
Artillery Preparations 
As discussed in the chapter on the tactical realities of the Great War, the fire planning 
for the 1918 offensives was influenced greatly by Colonel Georg Bruchmüller. After the 
battle of Riga Bruchmüller transferred to the Western Front along with the rest of Hutier's 
staff to take over the Eighteenth Army. In early November 1917, Bruchmüller, his chief 
assistant, Major Wilhelm Marx, and other key tactical leaders from the Eastern Front met at 
Le Cateau for a debriefing session conducted by OHL. It was a frustrating meeting for 
Bruchmüller. For the most part the Western Front staff officers dismissed the experiences of 
their Eastern Front colleagues. One OHL staff officer made the statement; "We just don't 
have enough experience with offensive operations in trench warfare. We should be looking at 
the Russo-Japanese War. " Bruchmüller later wrote in exasperation, "And that in spite of 
Toboly and Galicia, in spite of Riga and Jacobstadt! " 64 
A small circle of Western Front General Staff officers did take the experiences of the 
imports from the East seriously. This group included Kuhl, Wetzell, Bauer, Geyer, and 
Ludendorff himself, who certainly was not one to write off the experiences in the East. In 
early December 1917 Bruchmüller met with Kuhl at Rupprecht's headquarters Mons. Kuhl 
was acutely aware of the tactical disadvantages of artillery registration, and he wanted to hear 
more about Bruchmüller's abbreviated registration techniques in the East. Later that month 
Bruchmüller and Marx met with Captain Erich Pulkowski at Maubeuge. Pulkowski had been 
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working under OHL orders on his new fire direction technique since the spring of 1917, but 
he was having a hard time getting anyone at OHL to take it seriously. The system was seen as 
useful only in static defensive situations. Bruchmüller quickly saw it as the answer to the 
dilemma of registration versus surprise during the attack. But the precision registration was a 
procedural icon on the Western Front, a mindset reinforced by the long period spent in a 
defensive posture. Even the new Attack in Position Warfare manual of 1 January 1918 
required all firing units to register, even the infantry accompanying batteries. The new 
doctrine was quite clear on the importance of accuracy versus operational security: "Even if 
the registration alerts the enemy to an impending attack, that still is not as bad as an invalid 
registration. " 65 
Bruchmüller argued that precise registrations were impossible because of the 
changing effects of the weather. That left two options. All registrations could be fired 
immediately preceding an attack--but that amounted to handing the enemy a copy of the 
operations plan. The other option was to spread the registrations out for days and even weeks 
prior to the attack, and then continually update the correction factors for the changes in the 
weather. This required the guns to be in final position well before the attack, making them all 
that more vulnerable to detection. Bruchmüller reasoned that the Pulkowski Method could 
produce the same results with less effort and far less chance of compromising security. 
Bruchmüller nonetheless had a hard time getting his ideas accepted. Early in January 
Bruchmüller, Marx, and Pulkowski met with Kuhl and won his support. On 10 January 1918 
Prince Rupprecht's Army Group sent a request to OHL to be allowed to use the Pulkowski 
Method in combat operations. OHL refused. Meanwhile, Pulkowski had written a memo to 
Geyer on 7 January urging adoption of the system. Geyer supported the system and wrote a 
memo to Bruchmüller noting, "the procedure is theoretically unquestionable and more 
secure. i66 Geyer forwarded the memo and Pulkowski's letter to Bauer who first briefed 
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Ludendorff, and then arranged an extensive test firing at Maubeuge for 2 and 3 February and 
later at the Artillery Test Board Range at Jueterbog. Bruchmüller was present at the 
Maubeuge test firings, but the results were mixed. As a result, the War Ministry in Berlin 
decided squarely against the Pulkowski Method. That was not the end of the issue, however. 
The operations staff at OHL evaluated other Bruchmüller concepts that were resisted 
strongly by many officers on the Western Front. They opposed his task group organization, 
with its shifting of the counter-battery mission to the corps artillery as being a violation of the 
principle of unity of command. There was little understanding of the reinforced counter- 
battery phase in the preparation. Bruchmüller's concept of positioning all guns as far forward 
as possible also ran against Western Front practice, where two years of almost continuous 
defensive operations had laid stress on positioning artillery in depth. There also was a great 
resistance to the synchronized use of non-persistent gas in close support of attacking infantry 
troops, despite the results obtained at Riga. Finally, there was widespread resistance to using 
medium and heavy calibers in the creeping barrage, although this too had proved successful 
in the East. 
OHL issued the basic order on artillery preparations on 25 January. 67 The following 
day key members of the operations staff and the army artillery chiefs of Rupprecht's Army 
Group met to discuss the new tactics and techniques. Bruchmüller also attended the meeting, 
representing the Eighteenth Army. The result was an eight-page memorandum issued on 29 
January that covered 20 key points, including the call for the elimination of registrations, 
artillery organization for combat, and the optimum length of preparations. Not all the 
participants were in agreement and the memorandum included various dissenting opinions. 
The artillery chiefs of the Sixth and Seventeenth Armies recorded dissenting opinions on 
several key points, including the elimination of the registration and placing the counter- 
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battery groups under corps control. For the most part, however, the meeting was an 
affirmation of the methods Bruchmüller had already proved in the East. 8 
Following the 24 February Charleville meeting, OHL on 28 February issued a new set 
of artillery instructions formally adopting many of the techniques proposed in the 29 January 
memorandum. Despite the urgings of Kuhl and Rupprecht and the support of Geyer and 
Bauer, the Pulkowski Method was not adopted; but OHL did allow the use of the abbreviated 
registration procedures. Specifically, OHL required the verification of the guns' angle of lay 
in all cases, and also registration for range in cases where there were doubts about the 
accuracy of firing position locations or gun calibration. 69 It was a partial victory for 
Bruchmüller, but the 28 February instructions were not at all popular and they were opposed 
by many artillery and General Staff officers right up to the start of MICHAEL. But OHL, 
strongly backed by Ludendorff, stuck to the new concepts. 70 According to Wetzell, it was 
Bruchmüller who almost single-handedly pushed the German Army into making these radical 
changes in fire support doctrine. 71 
Bruchmtlller had seven weeks to work out and implement the plans of the Eighteenth 
Army's artillery support. There was no overall artillery coordination among the three armies, 
but all were to follow the general guidelines of the 28 February memo, including the counter- 
battery organization and the abbreviated registrations. The duration of the preparations for the 
Eighteenth and Second Armies was set down by OHL. Rupprecht's Army Group was allowed 
to establish the preparation length for the Seventeenth Army. 72 
The new artillery concepts still met with stiff resistance. The Seventeenth Army in 
particular wanted to go its own way. On 3 March Ludendorff had to order the Seventeenth 
Army in writing to modify their artillery plan in accordance with the new principles. He even 
suggested very strongly that the Seventeenth Army adopt the specific procedures of the 
Eighteenth Army. 73 But many German artillery officers just could not bring themselves to 
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abandon the precision registration, with its sacred 50-meter bracket. Just prior to the start of 
the attack one of the armies sent the following message to Rupprecht's headquarters; "The 
army urgently requests permission to conduct a precision registration prior to the attack. " 
Kuhl, a firm supporter of the Pulkowski Method and Bruchmüller's techniques, replied; "If a 
registration is necessary the army group will not attack". 74 
The artillery preparations required painstaking and systematic organization of the 
battlefield. Well prior to an attacking corps moving into a sector of the line held by a trench 
division, the commander and staff of the trench division's artillery initiated the planning. The 
trench division artillery commander personally managed the counter-battery planning and he 
eventually assumed command of the corps' AKA group when it was formed. The divisional 
artillery command post of the trench division became the command post of the corps' AKA 
group. Other senior artillery officers of the trench division initiated the preparations for the 
direct support batteries, and eventually became commanders or primary staff officers of the 
IKA groups and sub-groups that supported the attack divisions of the corps. The commander 
of the trench division's heavy artillery battalion usually became the commander of the 
attacking corps' FEKA group. The idea was that these officers from the trench divisions were 
already in position and were most familiar with the situation and the terrain of the forward 
area. 
The preparation activities included the reconnaissance of firing positions, observation 
posts, supply routes, approach routes, and ammunition facilities. Each corps required an 
artillery ammunition depot, and each attack division needed a forward ammunition dump and 
a rear ammunition supply point. In the Eighteenth Army sector alone 2,978,436 rounds of 
artillery ammunition, including 479,286 gas rounds, were placed in position prior to the 
opening of the attack. 75 
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Once the positions were reconnoitered, the artillery staffs of the trench divisions 
started the initial preparations. Preliminary survey work was done, including establishing 
orienting lines at the firing positions. Telephone lines were installed as far down as sub- 
group command posts. When the attacking corps' firing units later moved into position they 
completed the internal communications circuits. As the preparations proceeded, the advanced 
parties and support troops of the attacking corps' artillery moved up and assumed the tasks in 
progress. The topographic section of the corps' survey battalion produced firing charts on a 
common grid. The flash and sound ranging sections located active enemy batteries and 
started the counter-battery target lists. 76 
The guns themselves moved into position using infiltration techniques. In most cases 
the majority of the batteries moved up into their firing positions only hours before opening 
fire. Those positions were prepared well in advance of the occupation, camouflaged, stocked 
with ammunition, and hooked into the telephone nets. Battery commanders and fire direction 
personnel moved into the positions well ahead of the guns to prepare the firing charts. Since a 
huge number of guns that close to the front was sure to draw the enemy's attention sooner or 
later, the insertion of the batteries was carried out in three groups: 77 
Class I: Positions with cover and concealment available: these batteries occupied their 
positions immediately upon arriving in the attack sector. Very few batteries 
ever fell into this class. 
Class II: Hiding places (barns, haystacks, ruins, etc. ) available in the general vicinity 
of the firing positions: these batteries infiltrated into the hiding places during 
the nights preceding the attack. The night of the start of the preparation the 
guns were moved by hand into their firing positions. Most batteries fell into 
this category. 
223 
Class III: No concealment available anywhere near the positions: these guns were 
brought up from the rear and moved into position on the night of the attack. 
Horses were used exclusively for motive power. 
Air Preparations 
The air buildup started in early March and was complete by 20 March. On 7 March 
there were 82 squadrons in the sectors of the three attacking armies. By 21 March there were 
125. Air units were assembled far behind the front, beyond the range of enemy 
reconnaissance. It was not possible to construct all the required hangers beforehand, but tents 
were pre-positioned at reconnoitered positions for use as expedient hangers. Units were 
moved up piecemeal and the aircraft were hidden in barns and under horse tents. New balloon 
units were brought up under cover but not inflated until just before the start of the artillery 
preparation fire. The only authorized balloon assents in the attack sectors were based on what 
had already been in position before the build-up started. The new squadrons were not allowed 
into the air until the day of the attack. The attack squadrons conducted training in formation 
attacks far behind the front. By 48 hours before the start of the attack all ground support 
units were at their forward airfields making the final preparations. By 24 hours before the 
attack, all the aircraft had flown in by infiltration, and the flight crews were receiving their 
mission briefings. 78 
Supply and Transportation 
The German Army in the 20th century generally gets low marks from historians in the 
area of logistics, and supply failures are considered to be among the major causes of the 
collapse of the 1918 offensives. Ludendorff himself contributed to that belief in the message 
he sent out terminating MICHAEL on 5 April: "The supply situation does not allow the 
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continuation of the attack.... " 79 Not all of Ludendorffs contemporaries necessarily agreed 
with him on that point. In the several versions of his own monograph on the offensives, Kuhl 
described a relatively well planned and executed, albeit strained, supply and support system. 
Early in 1930, the former General Staff Officer Ib of the Seventeenth Army, Colonel Fritz 
Jochim, deposited in the Reichsarchiv a remarkably detailed rough manuscript explaining the 
Seventeenth Army's logistics planning and execution for MICHAEL. Near the end of his 
manuscript Colonel Jochim specifically said that in his opinion, MICHAEL failed because of 
operational, rather than supply system failures. 80 
In preparation for offense the Germans shifted from a pull to a push supply system. 
During the buildup the daily supply requirement was 25,000 tons, or 60 standard trains 81 
The Eighteenth Army alone required 650 troop trains and 500 supply trains for its buildup. 82 
The planners recognized clearly that transportation and forward movement would be the 
critical factors in sustaining the momentum of the advance. In terms of total tonnage, one of 
the most critical supply items was gravel for road construction, which was shipped as far 
forward as possible by canal. Each attacking corps was assigned an engineer battalion with a 
road building company. 83 One of the Second Army's orders stated: "All forward movement 
must proceed without interruption. The infantry of the first and second lines will clear the 
roads for vehicular traffic, primarily for ammunition and supply vehicles and for artillery. 
The infantry will march alongside the roads. " All wagons of the field trains above the 
authorized number were to be left behind. 84 
In the Second and Seventeenth Army sectors the advance would have to proceed 
through the old Somme battlefields, with ground chewed up from years of shelling. 
Forward transportation through the crater fields was the immediate problem. Conducting 
experiments in a crater field in its rear area at the end of February, the Seventeenth Army 
concluded that rolled mats of duckboard with earth packed into the craters beneath was the 
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best solution. Aerial photography was used to determine the shortest paths across the crater 
fields in each corps sector. Movements through the crater fields proceeded in the following 
priority: 15`, Ammunition columns of the infantry regiments; 2nd, Accompanying artillery 
with double ammunition carriages; P, Elements of the field and heavy artillery of the first- 
line divisions; 4th, Field and heavy artillery of the second-line divisions; 5th, Combat, 
ammunition, medical, and baggage columns of the first-line divisions; 6a', Corps-level trench 
mortars and heavy artillery; 7`h, Combat, ammunition, medical, and baggage columns of the 
second-line divisions; 8t', Army-level artillery units; 9th, Field and heavy artillery of the 
third-line divisions; 10th, Combat, ammunition, medical, and baggage columns of the third- 
line divisions. 85 
Once through the crater area, the Germans planned to capture and use the Allies' 
front-line narrow gage rail network, and then eventually sectors of the main rail network. 
Thus, great quantities of rail construction material had to be positioned in readiness, along 
with 60 railroad construction companies supported by 48 labor companies. Each attacking 
corps had a narrow-gage rail network in its own forward areas. The Second Army identified 
the critical Allied rail lines in their forward area that would have to be put back in service as 
soon as possible. The planners estimated that it would take 14 days to restore the Cambrai-- 
Roisel--Peronne and Epehy--Fins--Maricourt lines to service. Until then, the Second Army's 
main rail supply line would be Cambrai--Bussigny--Bohain line, which ran parallel to the 
front, from ten to 25 kilometers behind it. 86 
The Germans also made careful plans to recover and exploit lost, damaged, and 
captured material. They organized collection companies for just that task. 87 The Second 
Army issued an order titled, "Exploitation of Newly Conquered Area, " which outlined 
specific instructions for the collection, organization, and control of captured Allied supplies 
and equipment. One ironically prophetic sentence anticipated the problem the Germans had 
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after they captured major supply depots in Albert. "The victoriously advancing troop units 
will nevertheless look upon the captured supplies as their own property and look after their 
own needs as far as possible. " 88 
One of the most interesting sections in Colonel Jochim's manuscript concerns the use 
of tracked re-supply vehicles by the Seventeenth Army. What few were available were used 
to transport ammunition through the worst of the crater areas. According to Jochim, they 
proved valuable, even though they broke down quite often. 89 This is a point to which we will 
return when we discuss the allocation of the few available tanks in the German order of 
battle. 
Training, Organization, and Equipment 
90 
The Germans faced an enormous challenge in totally converting three armies from 
defensive to offensive configuration and posture in a very short period of time. In each army 
a special corps headquarters was established to coordinate training. The 56 attack divisions 
had to be brought up to full strength for men, horses, and transportation equipment, most 
often at the expense of the trench divisions. Starting in late December 1917 the attack 
divisions and the OHL-level field and heavy artillery units were all withdrawn from the front 
and billeted far to the rear, where they received four weeks of rest, rehabilitation, and 
training. In the Eighteenth Army Major Marx and Captain Pulkowski trained over 6,000 
officers in the new fire direction techniques--including the Pulkowski Method. All the new 
batteries assigned to reinforce the Eighteenth Army were sent immediately to a gunnery 
range in the rear to re-calibrate. 91 
For the infantry units, a myriad of details had to be worked out and coordinated, 
including, but not limited to: assignment and transportation of light trench mortars and light 
machine guns; assignment of accompanying artillery; assignment of grenadiers (a critical 
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specialty); ammunition basic loads; infantry ammunition wagons; hand grenades and flares; 
reduction of the infantryman's basic pack; composition of combat trains and field trains; draft 
animals for the train vehicles; and boards, bridging sections, and other material for crossing 
shell holes and obstacles. The artillery units had their own special technical requirements, . 
which included ammunition vehicles and organization of ammunition trains; organization of 
field trains; draft animals for supply vehicles; assignment of flash and sound ranging 
detachments; and assignment of accompanying engineer detachments to help the artillery 
move forward. 
Finally, the attack divisions had to be augmented with specialist units that turned each 
of them into a combined arms organization that closely approximated what we now think of 
as a modern divisional organization: engineer companies, telephone and radio detachments, 
medical collecting companies, ammunition trains, subsistence trains, and road repair and 
labor companies. 
Reconnaissance and Intellizence 
Between 10 and 20 March the weather was good for both operational and tactical 
aerial reconnaissance (operative und taktische Fliegeraundärung). According to the 
intelligence estimate of 17 March, there was an increased Allied trenching activity in front of 
the sectors of the three attacking armies, especially in the second and third positions. There 
were, however, no abnormal increases in rail cars and locomotives at the major rail centers of 
Albert, Amiens, Beauvais, Compiegne, or Noyon; in motor traffic along key roads; or in 
numbers of aircraft or airfields. Deep reconnaissance indicated that the Allied reserves and 
counterattack divisions had not been assembled in depth behind the main attack sector. The 
assessment, therefore, was that although the Allies had reinforced their defenses at the local 
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level, their reserves were not in position, nor could be for at least three days, to interfere with 
the German attack. 92 
Allied Actions 
It was not exactly hard for Allied intelligence to figure out that a major German attack 
would come in 1918. But with no unified Allied command, both Haig and Petain made their 
own preparations based on their own priorities. Haig, most concerned with covering the 
Channel ports, kept 30 percent of his divisions in reserve, with eight in general reserve. 
Main, who was more concerned with protecting Paris and the heart of France, kept 39 of his 
99 divisions in reserve: 19 between the Argonne and the Vosges; 18 behind French center in 
Champagne; four west of Soissons behind the British Fifth Army; and two behind the 
Belgians in Flanders. 93 
Haig was late in realizing that 1918 would probably open with a German attack rather 
than a continuation of his own Flanders campaign. He had requested 605,000 replacements in 
1918, but was promised only 100,000. Haig therefore had to reduce his divisions from 12 
battalions to nine in February 1918, as the Germans and French had done earlier. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the mass of the British reserves was center-left, oriented on 
Arras. After the war, the British official history and Haig himself wrote that Haig positioned 
his reserves as they were in order to cover the Channel ports. Another reason was because 
there was far more depth and room for maneuver behind the Fifth and Third Armies on the 
southern end of the line, than behind the First and Second Armies in the north. Thus, Haig 
figured he would have more time to react as the Fifth and Third Armies gave ground. But this 
entire rationale came under serious challenge by Tim Travers in his 1987 book. (See Chapter 
V). 
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The British defenses were poorly prepared and organized, compared to those of the 
Germans in 1917. In late 1917, the British had started studying defensive methods for the 
first time since 1914. On 14 December 1917, BEF GHQ issued its first set of instructions on 
defense layout and tactics 94 The instructions copied the German defense methods, but only 
in form, not in spirit. The British still relied heavily on the notions of static defense. In the 
German defensive system, two-thirds of the force was kept far to the rear, available for, 
counterattack and maneuver. In the British system of early 1918, some least two-thirds of the 
total strength was within range of the initial German artillery preparation. 95 The situation in 
the Fifth Army area was made worse by forced southward extension of its line to just below 
the Oise, where it took over former French positions that were in terrible shape. 
The British also were somewhat slow in understanding the new German attack tactics; 
although the September 1917 attack at Riga had drawn wide attention, and the Germans had 
used their infiltration tactics to great effect during the counterattack at Cambrai. In a certain 
sense, the Cambrai counterattack was a dress rehearsal for MICHAEL. In early January 1918, 
General Jan Smuts issued a warning that the Germans could be expected to use similar tactics 
in an attack on a much larger scale. That warning, however, was largely ignored in the BEF 96 
In December 1917, Pdtain and Haig tentatively agreed to provide mutual support in 
the event of a German attack. Main agreed to put the French Third Army (f ive infantry 
divisions and a cavalry corps) at Clermont for action in the British zone either between the 
Oise and the Somme, or north of the Somme. 97 In January and February, meanwhile, the 
Allied Supreme War Council continued to wrangle over the question of establishing a general 
Allied reserve, where it would be positioned, and who would command it and have the 
authority to commit it. At that point the newly arriving American Expeditionary Force (AF) 
was the only general reserve. 
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On 1 February Gough sent GHQ an assessment accurately predicting that the main 
German attack would come between the Scarpe and the Oise, and pointing out the inadequate 
state of the Fifth Army defenses. 98 Three days later GHQ sent the Fifth Army a memo titled 
"Principles of Defence, " in which Gough was instructed to fight east of the Somme if 
possible, but he was authorized to fall back to the line of the Somme if absolutely 
necessary. 99 On 9 February GHQ also told the Fifth Army that it should join with the Third 
Army in defending the Peronne Bridgehead. loo 
On 2 March the BEF intelligence estimate noted: "There is strong indication that the 
enemy intends to attack on the Third and Fifth Army fronts, with the objective of cutting the 
Cambrai salient and drawing in our reserves. " 101 That same day Haig wrote in his diary, "I 
was only afraid that the enemy would find our front so very strong that he will hesitate to 
commit his Army to the attack with the almost certainty of losing very heavily. " 102 On 10 
March the BEF weekly intelligence summary estimated that none of the German attacks 
would be south of St. Epehy, roughly the boundary between Third and Fifth Armies. A week 
later BEF Intelligence now estimated that the German attacks would reach as far south as St. 
Quentin. GHQ still didn't know where the main attack was coming, and still regarded an 
attack in the north against the Channel ports as the most dangerous enemy course of action. 103 
On 20 March a British XVIII Corps trench raid captured German prisoners who 
pinpointed 21 March as start of the attack. Gough tried to have the two GHQ reserve 
divisions nearest to him (the 20th and 50th Divisions) moved up closer to his line. Haig's 
chief of staff rejected the request, and when the attack fell Gough's closest support was 
almost 25 miles from the front. 104 
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German Order of Battle 
Various sources give slightly different figures for the German starting order of battle 
on the morning of 21 March. For this analysis we will use the information cited in the 
German official history, which matches the surviving records. Although the Seventeenth 
Army had the highest starting density of first line divisions for the width of its attack sector, 
that density would diminish drastically as soon as the MARS attack south of the Scarpe 
added another 10 kilometers to the sector width. Although the Germans had an overall force 
superiority of 2.6-to-1 in divisions, it is difficult to see from the table below any significant 
weighting of the main attack. 
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Table 6.1 
German Divisions on 21 March 1918 105 
First Second Third 
Line Line Line 
Seventeenth 7 Attack 5 Attack 5 Attack 
Army 4 Trench 1 Trench 
Second 6 Attack 
Army 3 Trench 
Eighteenth 8 Attack 
Army 5 Trench 
Total Sector 
Divisions Width 
17 Attack 20 km 
4 Trench 
4 Attack 2 Attack 12 Attack 40 km 
I Trench 3 Trench #7 Trench 
8 Attack 5 Attack § 21 Attack 42 km 
1 Trench 6 Trench 
21 Attack 17 Attack 12 Attack 50 Attack 103 km 
12 Trench 3 Trench 3 Trench 17 Trench 
*3 OHL Reserve Divisions Earmarked for MARS 
#I OHL Reserve Division 
§1 OHL Reserve Division 
In addition to its divisions committed to MICHAEL I, the Seventeenth Army had two 
trench divisions in the first line and one attack division in the second line south of the Scarpe 
earmarked for MARS-SÜD; and another two trench divisions in the first line and one attack 
division in the second line north of the Scarpe in the MARS-NORD sector. Three of the five 
attack divisions in the third line belonged to the OHL reserve, presumably for commitment to 
MARS. The other two attack divisions formed the army reserve. 
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Not actually counted in the MICHAEL order of battle, the Second Army had two 
trench divisions on its extreme right flank, facing the front of the Cambrai Salient. Their 
mission was to conduct a holding attack to pin down the British forces in the salient. There 
was only one OHL reserve division behind the Second Army, and that was a trench division. 
The second Army itself had the largest army reserve, with one attack and one trench division 
in the second line, and two attack and two trench divisions in the third line. The 67 attacking 
divisions were controlled by 13 corps headquarters. 
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Table 6.2 
German Corps on 21 March 1918 106 
(North to South) 
Corps Commander Attacking on 21 March 
Seventeenth Army Below 
I Bavarian Reserve Fassbender No 
III Bavarian Stein No 
IX Reserve Dieffenbach No 
XVIII Albrecht Yes 
VI Reserve Borne Yes 
XIV Reserve Lindequist Yes 
XI Kühne Yes 
Second Army Marwitz 
XXXIX Reserve Staabs Holding 
XIII Wafter Yes 
XXIII Reserve Kathen Yes 
XIV Gontard Yes 
LI Hofacher Yes 
Eighteenth Army Hutier 
III Lüttwitz Yes 
IX Oetinger Yes 
XVII Webern Yes 
IV Reserve Conta Yes 
Group Gayl Gayl Yes 
All the divisions in the Eighteenth Army sector were committed directly to 
MICHAEL. OHL had one attack division in reserve behind the Eighteenth, and the army- 
level reserve consisted of four attack divisions. The Eighteenth Army then, had the largest 
number of attack divisions in army reserve. 
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Table 6.3 
Reserve Divisions on 21 March 1918 107 
Army OHL 
Reserve Reserve 
Seventeenth 3 Attack 3 Attack 
Army 
Second 3 Attack 1 Trench 
Army 3 Trench 
Eighteenth 4 Attack I Attack 
Army 
The weighting of the main attack was even less clear for artillery. Although the 
Eighteenth Army was making a supporting attack, it had more field guns and significantly 
more heavy guns than the other two armies. The three armies combined had 48 percent of the 
German Army's artillery pieces, and 40 percent of its trench mortars. Overall, the Germans 
had a tube superiority ratio of 2.5-to-1. Prior to the attack Allied Intelligence under-estimated 
German artillery strength at approximately 4,000 guns. 108 Immediately following the attack, 
the ferocity of the artillery fire led British Intelligence to over-estimate the number of 
German guns that had fired on them at 8,067.109 
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Table 6.4 
Guns and Trench Mortars on 21 March 1918 110 
Field Heavy Super Total Trench 
Guns Guns Heavy Guns Guns Mortars 
Seventeenth 1,408 801 25 2,234 1,197 
Army 
Second 1,034 704 13 1,751 1,080 
Army 
Eighteenth 1,568 1,028 27 2,623 1,257 
Army 
4,010 2,533 65 6,608 3,534 
The artillery commanders (General von der Artillerie) in each army were responsible 
for the detailed fire planning, including the number of guns required. Bruchmüller's 
assignment to the Eighteenth Army's may partially explain the weighting of guns in that 
army's favor. He clearly was a far more innovative fire planner than his two colleagues at 
Second and Seventeenth Armies. On the other hand, the Eighteenth Army also received a 
larger allocation of the heavy artillery batteries controlled directly by OHL. 
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Table 6.5 
OHL Heavy Artillery Batteries on 20 March 1918 
Army OHL Batteries 
Fourth 99 
Sixth 80 
Seventeenth 228 
Second 199 
Eighteenth 251 
Seventh 57 
First 52 
Third 66 
OHL Reserve 118 
Other Army Groups 149 
1,399 
Although the Germans were outnumbered in aircraft 3-to-1 overall, they managed to 
mass 1,070 planes against 579 British aircraft in the MICHAEL attack sectors. The Second 
Army received slightly more attack squadrons than the other two armies, and the Eighteenth 
Army got two bomber wings as opposed to one each for the Second and Seventeenth. This 
made some sense given the mission of those units to interdict the French reinforcements 
moving up from the south over the rail lines. 
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Table 6.6 
German Squadrons on 21 March 112 
Observation Attack Fighter Bomber Total 
Seventeenth 17 7 13 3 40 
Army 
Second 16 11 10 3 41 
Army 
Eighteenth 16 9 12 6 44 
Army 
49 27 35 12 125 
The final curious point about the German order of battle is the assignment of the few 
tanks the Germans had. All nine of the German tanks were assigned to two corps of the 
Eighteenth Army, both in Hutier's center. The four German-built A7V tanks were assigned to 
XVII Corps, and five captured Mk IV tanks were assigned to IX Corps. ' 13 The question is, 
why did the army making the supporting attack get the tanks? One argument might be that the 
more open and even ground in the area south of the Somme was better suited for armored 
vehicles. That argument might make sense today, or even with World War 11-era tanks, but 
not for the tanks of World War I with their limited, speed, range, and mechanical reliability. 
Recall also Colonel Jochim's comments about the effectiveness of the tracked supply vehicles 
in helping to get through the crater fields of the Seventeenth Army's attack sector. In the end, 
nine tanks most likely would not have helped the Seventeenth Army significantly, but this 
represents another example of the German failure to weight the main attack. 
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British Order of Battle 
The British held 126 miles of front with 57 infantry and five cavalry divisions, either 
in front lines or in army-level reserve. A cavalry division was about the size of an infantry 
brigade. This amounted to an average of one division per 2.2 miles. Eight divisions were in 
general reserve, with two of those behind the Fifth Army. The thinly spread Fifth Army had 
five divisions facing the German Second Army, and seven divisions facing the Eighteenth 
Army. Nineteen of the 21 divisions in the Fifth and Third Army front lines had been involved 
in the Passchendaele battles. 
Table 6.7 
British Order of Battle in the MICHAEL Sector 21 March 1918 114 
Infantry Cavalry 
Divisions Divisions 
Army Heavy Total Sector 
Reserve Guns Guns Width 
Third 14 0 
Army 
Fifth 12 3 
Army 
EXECUTION 
4 Inf 461 1,120 45 km 
1 Inf 515 1,566 68 km 
1 Cav 
20 March 
On the morning of 20 March, Hindenburg and Ludendorff and the key members of 
the OHL staff met to decide whether or not to launch the offensive on the following day. The 
German artillery preparation relied heavily on gas for its effect, which in turn was heavily 
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dependent on wind direction and weather conditions. The previous day had been rainy and 
windy, not the best conditions for gas. At 1100 hours Ludendorff got a meteorological report 
indicating that the weather the following day would not be perfect, but adequate for the 
attack. At noon Ludendorff made the decision to attack the next day, and OHL sent out the 
launch order. By 2100 hours that night, a heavy fog had settled in on top of the British Third 
and Fifth Army positions. 115 
21 March 
By 0200 hours on the morning of the attack the thick fog along the front had reduced 
visibility to just a few yards. At 0330 hours British artillery began sporadic interdiction fire 
against the German trenches and road junctions. The German artillery opened fire at 0440 
hours. The preparation fire lasted for five hours. The Eighteenth Army preparation had seven 
main phases. Three sub-phases built into Phases 5 and 6 each put brief periods of heavy fire 
on the ground between the defender's trenches. Bruchmüller did this in case the British 
infantry tried to use the German technique of crawling out of the trenches and taking cover in 
nearby shell holes. Despite the obligatory abbreviated registrations for IKA units in Phases 2, 
3, and 4, the Eighteenth Army apparently did not fire abbreviated registrations for the other 
firing units. In 1922 Bruchmüller hinted in a book that he had used the Pulkowski Method for 
these units without the OHL's knowledge or permission. In a 1935 letter to Wetzell he 
admitted as much. 116 
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Table 6.8 
Eighteenth Army Artillery Preparation 21 March 1918 117 
Start 
Phase Time Duration Mission 
. 04: 40 120 Mins Time-on-Target with HE followed by counter-battery 
and fire against C3 targets with gas and HE at a 4: 1 
ratio. Trench mortars (MW) slacken fire after first 20 
minutes. 
la. 05: 30 10 Mins Surprise shift by all MWs and guns (except 
SCHWEFLA) onto infantry lines, with no counter- _ 
battery fire. HE against the 1st defensive positions. 
Buntkreuz against the 2nd defensive positions. 
2.06: 40 10 Mins IKAc batteries shift onto their targets in the 2nd 
defensive positions to verify firing data. All other 
batteries continue firing on Phase 1 targets. 
3.06: 50 10 Mins Same as Phase 2, with IKAb batteries verifying data on 
targets in the rear of the first defensive position. 
4.07: 00 10 Mins Same as Phase 2 and 3, with IKAb batteries verifying, 
data on targets in the intermediate defensive position. 
5.07: 10 70 Mins AKA, FEKA, and SCHWEFLA continue firing on their 
assigned targets. All IKA units shift onto enemy 
trenches. IKAa verifies data on front of first defensive 
positions. 
5a. 07: 40 15 Mins IKAa subgroups (howitzers) sweep ground between the 
trench lines in the first defensive position. 
5b. 07: 40 10 Mins IKAb subgroups (howitzers) shell defensive strong 
points. 
5c. 07: 40 10 Mins IKAc subgroups (field guns) shell ground between 1st 
and 2nd defensive positions with Buntkreua. 
6.08: 20 75 Mins Repeat of Phase 5 (including sub-phases) with slight 
variations in targets. 
7.09: 35 5 Mins All artillery and trench mortars deliver saturation fire on 
enemy's front-most positions. 
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The MICHAEL preparation was the greatest artillery bombardment in history to that 
time. The sound of the firing could be heard as far away as London. The Germans fired 3.2 
million rounds on the first day of the battle. Approximately one third of that total was gas; 
with the Yellow Cross inflicting almost 12,000 Allied casualties, and the Buntkreuz 
accounting for 3,000 more. 118 Lieutenant Herbert Sulzbach, a German artillery officer, 
described in his diary the action at the battery level on 21 March: 
4 AM. Very, very slowly the night starts to disappear. We are 
standing at our guns, gas masks around our necks, and the minutes 
creep toward 4: 40. Finally, it's time, and with one crash from 
thousands and thousands--even tens of thousands of gun tubes 
and trench mortars, the preparation starts. It sounds as if the world 
were coming to an end. During the first hour we only shoot at the 
enemy's artillery, alternating HE with Blue and Green Cross. The 
ly worse, especially since we are in a town noise gets increasin'19 
between buildings. 
At 09: 40 hours the creeping barrage started to move forward followed closely by the 
German infantry. The heavy fog until late that morning favored the attackers and tended to 
prolong the effects of the German gas. Bruchmüller did note that the poor visibility had an 
adverse impact on the effectiveness of the creeping barrage. The accompanying artillery 
units followed closely behind the infantry and by the afternoon of the first day they were 
exchanging direct fire rounds with the guns of the Royal Artillery. 
By 1400 hours the Germans were up to the Fifth Army's battle zone and preparing to 
attack it. About that same time Rupprecht's Army Group ordered the Seventeenth Army to 
start planning to move forces to both sides of the Scarpe, including two divisions from the 
Sixth Army. 120 By end of day, the Fifth Army's III Corps and 36th Division of XVIII Corps 
were fighting in the rear of their battle areas. 121 Despite the seemingly stunning results, the 
senior German commanders were somewhat disappointed. The results were far from even, 
with the Eighteenth Army making the greatest advances, and the Seventeenth Army the least. 
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The Germans had hoped to over-run all the British artillery positions on the first day, but 
even the Eighteenth Army had captured only 80 guns. Rupprecht concluded at the time that 
the British Fifth Army had been caught in the act of a voluntary withdrawal to the Crozat 
Canal. 122 Crown Prince Wilhelm, on the other hand, thought, "the way was opened for 
exploitation of the breakthrough. " 123 His chief of staff, Schulenburg, believed that the 
offensive would achieve substantial results, but in the end Germany's position would be 
worse than ever. 124 
At the end of the first day the Seventeenth Army was stuck in front of the British 
battle zone, having advanced only four to five kilometers. It was still some seven kilometers 
short of its objectives for the day, the British artillery line, and had already committed 16 of 
the 18 divisions under its control. 125 The Second Army's right had not progressed well either, 
but its left wing had made better progress. The Second had committed 14 of its divisions by 
end of the day. 126 Both the Second and Seventeenth Armies had taken heavy casualties. The 
Eighteenth Army had broken into the British battle zone all along its front. It had committed 
only two of its second echelon divisions, and now had 14 in the front line with 12 
following. 127 
Ludendorff later wrote that the main problem with the Seventeenth Army's was that 
its creeping barrage had outrun the advancing infantry. 128 Ernst Jünger, whose 111th 
Infantry Division was near the far right flank of the Seventeenth Army attack, gave a 
somewhat different account: 
A little before the edge of the village [Vraucourt], we were brought 
to a stop by our own artillery, which had the stupidity to go on shooting 
at the same spot until the next day... As I learned later, the artillery had 
orders to go on shooting at their longest range. This incomprehensible 
order took the finest fruits of victory from our grasp. 129 
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Astride the boundary between the Seventeenth and Second Army the British forces in 
the Cambrai Salient still held out, but that was not necessarily an advantage for the British. 
Third Army commander General Sir Julian Byng had ordered his V Corps holding the salient 
to withdraw only 4,000 yards to an intermediate defensive line. 130 But GHQ had clearly 
ordered that the Flesquieres Salient (as the British called it) only be held as a "false front. " As 
a result, the Third Army had 21 battalions packed into ten miles of front facing MICHAEL I 
in the Flesquieres Salient, as compared to I1 battalions on a similar length of the Fifth Army 
front. 131 In theory, this made a very strong defensive sector. In fact, it provided the German 
artillery with a densely packed zone of targets. 
Despite Ludendorffs pronouncement of 6 March, the Cambrai Salient had not been 
cut of on the first day. The basic operational concept already was slipping. 132 Ludendorff 
now had a choice between opportunism and consistency of purpose. 133 He could reinforce 
his right wing in order to push through his original intent, or he could shift reserves to exploit 
Hutier's success on the left. Reinforcing success and not reinforcing failure is generally a 
sound practice at the tactical level. At the operational level such shifts are not that easy to 
make, and they usually have greater consequences in terms of second and third order effects. 
Ludendorff decided for opportunism. On the evening of 21 March, OHL committed 
no fresh forces to the Seventeenth or Second Armies, but ordered six new divisions to start 
moving to the Eighteenth Army, even though the Eighteenth had the best reserve posture. 
One division came from the First Army, two from the Third Army, and one from the Fifth 
Army, all of which were to the left of the Eighteenth Army. 134 OHL did not, on the other 
hand, start shifting northward the heavy artillery that would be needed to support an 
immediate launching of MARS, as Rupprecht's Army Group had considered so essential. 135 
About 2150 hours Ludendorff also ordered "strong forces" of the Seventh Army to 
move to the Oise in preparation to support the left flank of Eighteenth Army. 136 At 2300 
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hours Wilhelm's Army Group ordered the Eighteenth Army to continue attacking throughout 
the night. 137 The left wing of the army was to seize the crossings over the Crozat Canal, but 
prepare to defend east of the canal. The Seventh Army was ordered to neutralize the Allied 
artillery south of the Oise. Despite the order to attack throughout the night, the Fifth Army 
was able to fall back relatively unmolested. 138 
Around 1100 hours Haig received first official report of the attack. He ordered three 
divisions from the First and Second Armies to the Fifth and Third Army sectors. By the end 
of the day GHQ had ordered five divisions from the north to assist the south, but the first four 
went to the Third Army. 139 Haig also requested three French divisions from Petain, who even 
before receiving the request for assistance ordered five divisions from the French Third Army 
to be ready to move by 1200 hours on 22 March. They were concentrated in the Noyon area, 
12 to 15 miles behind the right flank of Fifth Army. Because of transport lag time, they 
would not be able to influence the action before the 27th. '4° French intelligence, meanwhile, 
had concluded that the German main objective was Amiens. 141 
22 March 
There was heavy morning fog again on 22 March. On the first day, the fog had not 
hampered the German artillery too much, because the British positions had all been located 
accurately before the start of the attack. On second day, after the Germans had moved 
forward, they had to rely more on observed fires, which the fog severely hampered. The fog 
also restricted the German air operations, but it did provide concealment for the attacking 
infantry. 
That morning British sappers blew the three rail bridges over the Crozat Canal. [Map 
3] One, however, remained standing and passable for infantry. At 1045 hours Gough issued 
an order to his corps to, "fight rear-guard actions back to the forward line of the rear zone, 
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and, if necessary, to the rear line of the rear zone. " 
142 Around noon, British XVIII Corps 
initiated a withdrawal to the line of the Somme. That in turn exposed the left flank of the 
southernmost III Corps, and facilitated the German rupture of the British line. 
143 Wilhelm's 
Army Group issued the orders at 1345 hours to cross Crozat Canal but advance no farther 
than the bridgeheads. The first Eighteenth Army troops crossed the canal shortly thereafter. 
By the end of the 22nd the Eighteenth Army was on the Somme and Crozat Canal. 144 The 
Fifth Army had lost its entire battle zone, and remnants of its XVIII, XIX, and III Corps were 
reeling back. las 
In the north, the Seventeenth Army was ordered to continue attacking on its left wing 
in coordination with the Second Army to eliminate the Cambrai Salient. The Seventeenth 
Army's right wing was stuck south of Arras. The Second Army also was stalled on its right 
wing, but its left wing was moving with the Eighteenth Army. Both the Seventeenth and 
Second Armies were ordered to take the objectives that had been assigned to them for 21 
March. By the end of the 22nd most of the Second Army had broken into the British third 
positions, but the Cambrai Salient still held, despite the concentric German attack. 146 The 
British V Corps, however, had received orders to fall back from the salient that night. 147 
OHL originally intended that the Eighteenth Army would shift its main effort to 
supporting the Second Army on reaching the Crozat Canal in the south and the British third 
position in the north. But now, Wilhelm's Army Group started arguing that the Eighteenth 
could best support the Second by pushing forward. At 2140 hours the Eighteenth Army 
received the orders to continue its advance. 148 
At 1845 hours Ludendorff spoke to Kuhl by telephone. He ordered the Seventeenth 
Army to expand the success of the Second Army by attacking toward Bapaume--in other 
words, to drive more south than west as in the original plan. OHL also ordered preparations 
for attacks on both sides of the Scarpe, despite Kuhl's and Rupprecht's views of the difficulty 
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of MARS-NORD, and the fact that the northern attack had been cancelled as far back as 24 
January because of insufficient forces. 149 
At 1900 hours Rupprecht's Army Group issued the orders. The inner wings of the 
Second and Seventeenth Armies were to avoid pivoting too early, with the lead elements of 
the inner attack wings aiming for Ytres (Seventeenth) and Equancourt (Second). The 
Seventeenth also was ordered to be prepared to execute MARS, now on both sides of the 
Scarpe. 150 Rupprecht's Army Group also ordered the Sixth Army to start planning and 
preparing an operation to be called WALKÜRENRITT (RIDE OF THE VALKYRIES), an 
attack north of MARS-NORD, against the Loretto Ridge. This would extend the attack as far 
north as Lens. OHL, however, had retained for another day the artillery needed for MARS in 
both the Second and Seventeenth Army sectors. 151 
At 2000 hours Gough notified Haig that the Germans had broken through the Fifth 
Army's reserve line. Haig approved the fall back to the Somme, contingent on holding the 
Peronne bridgehead. At 2330 hours GHQ ordered the Third Army to maintain contact with 
the left of Fifth Army. 152 By this point Petain had seven divisions from the French Third 
Army preparing to move up to the line of the Somme and Crozat Canal. That night Haig also 
wrote to his wife that he still expected the main German attack to come in the north toward 
Arras. 53 ' 
23 March 
On 23 March, the left wing of the Second Army reached the Somme between Peronne 
and St. Christ. The right wing of the Second Army and the left wing of the Seventeenth Army 
lagged behind, east of Bapaume. Overall, the Germans had achieved a breach almost 40 miles 
wide in the Allied line, but fatigue was starting to take its toll. That morning Marwita 
complained to Kuhl about the lack of bridging trains in the Second Army sector, stressing 
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that his initial orders had not required him to cross the Somme. 154 German deep 
reconnaissance from Dunkirk to Calais via Aire to Amiens and to Montdidier showed little 
significant Allied traffic on the main lines. On the 23rd the Wilhelmgeschütze in the Seventh 
Army sector opened fire on Paris for the first time. 155 
At 0045 hours the British V Corps in the Cambrai Salient was ordered to fall back 
farther still. It was their third withdrawal order in less than 12 hours. But V Corps had stayed 
in the salient too long. When it finally was forced out, it had to withdraw to the northwest, 
away from the Fifth Army's VII Corps on their southern flank. This exacerbated the gap that 
was opening up between the two armies. 156 At 0930 hours OHL issued new orders: 
The Seventeenth Army will attack vigorously in the direction of 
Arras--St. Pol, left wing moving on Miraumont. The Second Army 
will advance in the direction of the line Miraumont--Lihons. The 
Eighteenth Army echeloned in depth will march on the line Chaulnes- 
-Noyon, at the same time sending forward strong forces via Ham. 
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The war diary of Rupprecht's Army Group noted with alarm that the attacks were 
starting to diverge. Rupprecht himself thought the new OHL orders would work, "only if the 
enemy remains in full retreat, " to which all indicators seemed to point. Rupprecht believed 
that the British were in the process of withdrawing to their old pre-July 1916 Somme 
positions, where they then would wait for the French counterattack against the German flank. 
In such a situation, the British should be given no rest. Rupprecht thought that the weight of 
the attack should be concentrated behind the Second Army putting pressure on the British 
withdrawal, while the southern wing of the Eighteenth Army should consolidate its positions 
in preparation for the French attack. At some future point the Second Army could proceed 
along the line of the Somme. 
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At 1300 hours the Seventeenth Army was ordered to complete breaking through the 
British third position, take Bapaume with its left wing, and then begin to wheel northwest 
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toward St. Pol. The advance to the northwest would take the strong British positions at Vimy 
from the rear. Preparations for MARS-SÜD were to continue without additional forces. 159 
That afternoon Ludendorff held a conference in Avesnes with Kuhl, and 
Schulenberg. Stating that, "a considerable part of the British force has been defeated, " 
Ludendorff considered their remaining strength to be about 50 divisions. He also thought it 
no longer probable that the French would be in a position to launch a relief offensive. With 
only about 40 divisions at their disposal, the French would be forced to concentrate south of 
the MICHAEL sector. Based on that wildly optimistic estimate of the situation, Ludendorff 
continued: 
The objective of the operation now is to separate the British from 
the French by means of a rapid advance on both sides of the Somme. 
The Seventeenth and Sixth Armies, to be joined later by the Fourth 
Army, will attack the British to the north of the Somme and drive 
them into the sea. They will, therefore, attack again and again in new 
places (MARS, WALKÜRENRITT) in order to force back the entire 
British front. The Seventeenth Army will make its main effort in the 
direction of St. Pol and with its left wing will push forward by way 
of Doullens toward Abbeville. To the south of the Somme, the 
operation will take the form of an attack against the French, which will 
be accomplished by occupying the line Amiens--Montdidier--Noyon, 
and by means of a further advance thence in a southwestern direction. 
To this end, the Second Army will advance on both sides of the Somme 
by making its main effort toward Amiens, and keeping close touch with 
the Eighteenth Army. If this operation succeeds, the left wing of the 
Eighteenth Army will have the mission of attacking southward across 
the Oise between Noyon and Chauny, and combine with the Seventh 
Army to throw the French over the Aisne. 160 
At this point, the conditions for exploitation described by Ludendorff in his 20 March 
phone conversation with Kuhl did not exist. Rupprecht, however, still thought the British 
should be given no respite. He also thought-and he believed Ludendorff agreed with him-- 
that the British would fall back to the lines they held before the battle of the Somme. 161 
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Rupprecht's Army Group issued the new orders. The Seventeenth Army was ordered 
to push hard in the direction of Arras--St. Pol. The Second Army was to advance against the 
line Miraumont--Lihons, with its left flank (LI Corps) seizing the Somme crossings between 
Peronne and St. Christ. The Eighteenth Army also would use the crossings near St. Christ. 
The Seventeenth and Sixth Armies were ordered to prepare to launch MARS and 
WALKÜRENRITT; the Fourth and Sixth Armies were ordered to halt all preparations for 
KLEIN-GEORG. The Eighteenth Army, echeloned to the left, was to advance in the direction 
of Chaulnes--Noyon, and with strong forces toward Ham. 162 
This was a complete departure from the original operational plan. Previously, the 
attacks of the Second and Seventeenth Armies against the British constituted the main effort. 
Now the objective was to separate the British from the French and to attack both 
simultaneously. This required a significant shift to the left. No longer on the north side of the 
Somme only, the Second Army's mission was now to advance straight ahead in the direction 
of Amiens on both sides of the Somme, to separate the British and the French. The 
Seventeenth Army's mission was now to attack the British in a northwest direction, with a 
deep objective line of St. Pol--Abbeville. The Eighteenth Army mission was no longer to 
screen the Second Army on the line of the Somme between Peronne and St. Christ. Its 
mission now was to cross the Somme and the Crozat Canal between St. Christ and La Fere, 
then attack the approaching French in a southwestern direction along the line Chaulnes-- 
Noyon. 
Thus the Germans launched off on diverging attacks: northwest, west, and southwest. 
The original operational concept of massing forces in one sector for a decision while adopting 
the defensive and economy of force measures in all other sectors was dead. Instead of the 
original concept of a main effort against the British carried by the Seventeenth and Second 
Armies; instead of the thrust along the Somme that Rupprecht's Army Group recommended; 
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instead of the free reign for the Eighteenth Army that Wilhelm's Army Group wanted, 
Ludendorff decided to do all three. His forces now had three different missions: separate the 
French and British; defeat the British; and defeat the French reserves. It is also important to 
note here that although Amiens was now designated as a direction of advance for the Second 
Army, the vital rail center was still not an operational objective. 
The Seventh Army was ordered to send three more divisions (it already had sent 
three) to the Eighteenth Army. 163 Ludendorff was dissipating his reserves, assuring that he 
would not have them in position to exploit any break that did occur. The indicators to that 
point, however, did not come close to supporting Ludendorffs grandiose scheme. The total 
artillery bag for the first three days had been about only 400 guns, which should have been 
captured by the first day. This was hardly indicative of an army retreating in full rout. By the 
end of the third day, the Germans had committed 59 divisions to the attack. 
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About 2300 hours Wilhelm's Army Group ordered the Eighteenth Army to cross the 
Somme, advance in a southwesterly direction between Noyon and Chauny, and then proceed 
south over the Oise. It was supposed to keep strong reserves behind its left wing, and in 
coordination with the Seventh Army, throw the French forces back across the Aisne. To 
accomplish this new mission, the Eighteenth Army was given three fresh divisions. 165 
Late that afternoon Main and Haig met at Dury. Haig asked for a large concentration, 
of 20 French divisions in the vicinity of Amiens. Saying that he still expected a major 
German attack in the Champagne sector, P&ain agreed to take over the British line as far as ..; 
Pdronne. He then ordered another six French divisions to prepare to move forward. With the 
gap between the Fifth and Third Armies growing wider by the hour, Haig was faced with the 
decision of sacrificing the Fifth Army to hold the rest of the BEF together. About 1700 hours 
GHQ ordered: "Fifth Army will hold the line of the Somme River at all costs. There will be 
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no withdrawal from this line... The Third and Fifth Armies must keep in closest touch... and 
must mutually assist each other in maintaining Peronne as a pivot. " 166 
24 March 
Rupprecht's Army Group tied the Seventeenth Army's intended wheel to the 
northwest to the Second Army's right wing objective of Miraumont, some 10 kilometers 
away. The Eighteenth Army no longer had to extend north to cover the Second Army, rather 
the Second now had to extend south to cover the Eighteenth. Thus, the Second Army's front 
was diverging from its initial operational boundaries. The Second and Seventeenth Armies 
did gain some ground that day, but the Second Army was still seven miles short of its daily 
objectives. The two armies finally established contact that evening at Beaulencourt. 167 
At 1330 hours Rupprecht's Army Group reported to OHL that it anticipated capturing 
Bapaume that day, and would drive past to the west. The divisions on the left of the 
Seventeenth Army that would be squeezed out by the convergence of the front would pass 
into the second echelon. The Seventeenth Army would then advance to facilitate the crossing 
of the Ancre by the Second Army. The deep objective for the Seventeenth Army was St. Pol, 
to the northwest. 168 
At 1630 hours OHL changed the direction of the Seventeenth Army attack, ordering it 
to push hard to the west, toward Doullens. 169 The success of that attack might make the 
MARS attack unnecessary. Nonetheless, OHL was now planning a grandiose series of 
operations based on the mistaken assessment that the British had been broken completely. 
The new attacks included: MARS-SÜD on 27 March, to drive the British back from Arras 
and push beyond; MARS-NORD on 28 March, to roll up the British on Vimy Ridge from the 
southeast; WALKÜRENRITT on 29 March, to support MARS-NORD; and KLEIN-GEORG 
in about eight days if all the British reserves were drained south. The operational objectives 
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(Operationsziel) were Boulogne for the Sixth Army; Doullens--Abbeville for the Seventeenth 
Army; and Albert--Amiens for the Second Army. 10 
In the south, the Eighteenth Army pushed across the Somme toward its objectives for 
the day, the line Rosieres--Roye--Noyon. Chaulnes was to be captured on 24 March, and 
Royon on 25 March. The British III and XVIII Corps disintegrated in front of the Eighteenth 
as it moved forward. By the end of day, however, most of Hutier's units had advanced only 
four kilometers instead of the assigned twelve. The Eighteenth Army was starting to slow 
from fatigue and supply strain, even though it had been reinforced with a total of eight 
divisions in the first three days of the operation. 171 The Wilhelmgeschütze also fired 34 
rounds into Paris on 24 March. 172 
Despite reports of French forces pouring toward Noyon on the southern extreme of 
the German advance, Ludendorff wanted the reinforced left wing of the Eighteenth Army to 
seize the heights above Noyon that day and then prepare to push across the Oise. The Seventh 
Army, meanwhile, was ordered to be ready to attack with Operation ERZENGEL across the 
Ailette. OHL also ordered heavy air attacks on the Compiegne rail center. 173 
Ludendorff was now adding additional objectives north and south to an already 
diverging operation. On the Allied side Haig still faced the decision of whether to abandon 
the Fifth Army and pull the Third Army back to the north, or to try to hold the line between 
the two armies. At a QMG conference on the 24th, the decision was made to prepare 
contingency plans to abandon the Fifth Army. 174 The British Third Army, meanwhile, 
continued to withdraw its right flank in an attempt to maintain contact with the Fifth Army. 
All day long on 24 March French infantry units had been thrown into the battle as 
soon as they de-trained. Often they were committed without communications equipment or 
supporting weapons. French Grand Quartier General (GQG) realized that the only way to 
restore the situation between the Somme and the Oise was to establish a prepared defensive 
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position and then let the Germans come to it. GQG ordered the French First Army to move to 
the Montdidier area and be prepared either to intervene on the British right or to support the 
French Third Army. The British Fifth Army, which Haig put under French orders later in the 
day, was to withdraw to the line of the Avre between Montdidier and Amiens. The Germans 
were still 30 kilometers from the Avre at that point, but the French First Army could not be in 
position before the 26th. 175 
At 0900 hours Main issued a new order to the French armies identifying his primary 
and secondary objectives in the battle: First, keep the French armies together and not allow 
the Reserve Army Group to be cut off; and Second, maintain, if possible, the link with the 
British forces. 176 Main still feared a major German attack in Champagne and he was 
worried about a possible threat to Paris. Thus, the maintenance of the unity of the French 
Army became Main's primary mission. He would continue to support the British only so 
long as he could hold together his own forces. 
Haig and Main met again at BEF headquarters about 2300 hours. Petain informed 
Haig that if German progress continued along the line toward Paris, he would be forced to 
withdraw French reserves to cover the capital. 177 As dismayed as he was by that news, Haig 
did agree to place the Fifth Army and the line south of the Somme under the command of 
General Marie Fayolle's Army Group Reserve. With twelve infantry and five cavalry 
divisions and twelve regiments of heavy artillery, Fayolle was now responsible for the battle 
between the Somme and the Oise. 178 Haig, nonetheless, immediately reported what he 
considered to be Petain's unreliability to London and he requested Sir Henry Wilson, the new 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to come to France and help arrange the establishment of 
a unified supreme command to take central control of the battle. 
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25 March 
On the morning of 25 March, Ludendorff and Kuhl met at Avesnes to discuss both 
MARS attacks, WALKORENRITT, and KLIEN-GEORG I. All three of the attacks in the 
Arras sector were directed toward Houdain. WALKÜRENRITT was the most difficult and,, 
would need the most preparation. OHL could supply only three or four fresh divisions for 
KLEIN-GEORG I, but if the Arras attacks were successful, KLEIN-GEORG might not be 
needed. If that attack were launched, the deep objective for the Sixth Army would be 
Boulogne. Doullens--Abbeville remained the main axis of advance for Seventeenth Army, 
but elements of the Seventeenth would probably have to support the advance of the Sixth . 
Army on Boulogne. The Second Army remained oriented on Amiens. Ludendorff was now 
following almost the same general plan advocated earlier by Kuhl, except that while the 
Second, Seventeenth, and Sixth Armies were now going to attack the British, the Eighteenth 
and Seventh Armies were attacking the French. 179 
The Eighteenth Army, meanwhile, was still not at line Noyon-Chaulnes [Map 3], .; 
although it had to insert a new corps headquarters (XXV Reserve Corps) into the line to 
control all the extra divisions it was receiving. 180 Wilhelm's Army Group ordered the 
Seventh Army to prepare to advance its right wing trench divisions to the Ailette in order to 
plug the gap on the Eighteenth Army's left. 181 Wilhelm also recommended to OHL that the 
left wing of the Eighteenth should not go beyond Noyon-Roye, and that the main weight 
should be shifted to the right wing to support the Second Army in taking the line from Caix to 
the Avre valley. 182 Wilhelm later wrote in his memoirs, "My chief of staff and I were of the 
opinion, and remained so during the next few days, that our principal mission was to split the 
French and the English completely by continuing to drive west. And then, but not until then, 
we would press to the southwest and south. " 183 
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By that evening the Eighteenth Army had succeeded in separating the British Fifth 
and French Third Armies and was beginning to envelop the French flank northeast of Roye. 
The two French cavalry divisions assigned to cover this flank were not yet in position. 184 
Writing in his postwar memoirs, Ludendorff stated: 
Strategically we had not achieved what the events of the 23`d, 24`h, 
and 25th had encouraged us to hope for. That we had also failed 
to take Amiens, which would have rendered communications 
between the enemy's forces astride the Somme exceedingly 
difficult, was especially disappointing. Long-range shelling of 
the railway installations of Amiens was not a good equivalent. 185 
This is another post facto justification. In the German plans and orders up through the 25`h, 
Amiens had only been identified as a direction of advance, but never as a key objective of the 
operation. 
On the Allied side, French forces were starting to move up from the south. By the 
morning of the 25t', the French Third Army, under General Georges Humbert, was moving 
into position with a strength of seven divisions behind the British XVIII and III Corps. The 
French First Army, under General Marie Debeny, also was moving toward the area with six 
divisions. 186 Later in the day the British Third Army was ordered to withdraw to the line 
Noyon--Montdidier. 187 
Haig ordered the British Third Army to withdraw to the Ancre, telling its commander 
Byng that all further withdrawals must be to the northwest, and that he should no longer rely 
on the French or the British Fifth Army. The mission of the Third Army was now to protect 
the southern flank of the BEF. 188 The British Q-Staff also prepared to fall back to the north, 
and started to develop Scheme X and then Scheme Y to increase the supply flow through the 
northern ports, while shutting down the southern line of communications. (See Chapter IV) 
The QMG also decided to let the French take over the logistics operations up to the line of the 
Somme and absorb the logistics structure of the Fifth Army. 189 
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Later in the day Haig met Foch's chief of staff, Colonel Maxime Weygand, at 
Abbeville. Haig repeated his request for the immediate concentration, "astride the Somme, ,, 
west of Amiens, of at least 20 French divisions for the purpose of acting against the flank of 
the German attack on the British Army. " The French took this to mean that the British had 
decided to defend west of Amiens, and intended to fight falling back slowly to cover the 
Channel ports. As Foch saw the situation: 
... two distinct battles were being fought by the Allies: a British battle for the ports, and a French battle for Paris. They were 
carried on separately and farther and farther away from one 
another. The Allied commanders thus tended to emphasize 
the separation of their armies, the primary objective of the 
German operations. 190 
26 March 
On the morning of the 26th Kuhl issued telephone orders to the Seventeenth and . 
Second Armies to continue to drive hard to the west toward Doullens--Amiens, keeping their 
inner wings linked. 191 As mobile warfare conditions set in, the British communications 
system, hard-wired in place for trench warfare, began to break down. Even the usually 
realistic Rupprecht now began to believe the Germans would succeed in splitting the British 
in two and driving them back to the bridgehead position of their ports. 192 Hope ran high f 
among the Germans that the British would not make a stand on the Ancre, even though it was 
the last natural line of defense before the sea. 193 
About 0820 hours the Eighteenth Army captured Roye and Noyon, outflanking 
elements of the French Third Army moving up. [Map 3] The Eighteenth Army formed a 
defensive front along the Oise from Chauny to Noyon, and Wilhelm's Army Group ordered it, ; 
to advance its right wing, in coordination with the Second Army, past Chaulnes to take the 
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old French trenches of 1916. The center and left of the Eighteenth Army were to capture the 
old German trenches running to the southwest of Roye and Noyon. 194 
By 1700 hours that afternoon the Second Army finally took Albert. Proceeding 
through the town, some German officers lost control of their troops as they stopped to loot 
the unbelievable wealth they found in the British ration and supply depots. 195 Nonetheless, 
the fall of Albert cut the double-tracked Amiens--Albert--Arras line and severely restricted 
Allied lateral rail communications to Arras. Lateral rail transport was now limited to the 
double-tracked line Amiens--Doullens--St. Pol, with single-track lines running into Arras. 
The loss of that line, however, did not cut too badly into the Allied capacity to shift reserves 
from north to south. 
About 1930 hours, a frustrated Ludendorff called Rupprecht and said he was 
considering relieving Below's chief of staff, Konrad Krafft von Dellmensingen. 196 Always 
looking for tactical reasons for success or failure, Ludendorff believed the main reason for 
the Seventeenth Army's failure was, "apparently because it had fought in too dense 
formation. " 197 Kuhl, on the other hand, agreed with Ludendorff that it was time for Krafft 
von Dellmensingen to go. 198 
By that evening the right flank of the British Fifth Army was being forced back 
toward Nesle and Amiens, instead of toward Roye and Montdidier. That movement 
eventually would create a 12-mile gap between the British and French. 199 The left wing of 
Seventeenth Army had passed Miraumont and was approaching Hebuterne, while the Second 
Army was trying to negotiate the "trackless crater-fields of the Somme. " 
In the south, the right wing of the British Army seemed to have been crushed. 
Nonetheless, German intelligence reported heavy troop concentrations moving north into 
Compiegne and beyond it toward Noyon, combined with heavy road traffic moving east and 
southeast from Amiens. Elements of six French divisions arrived by the 26t', and the French 
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First Army was starting to form in front of Amiens. Ten British and eight French divisions 
were now in front of the Eighteenth Army, and two more French divisions were moving up. 
The French Sixth Army under General Denis Duchene was forming a defensive front south of 
Noyon with five French divisions and the remnants of two divisions from the British III 
Corps. 200 
At 2200 hours OHL issued new orders 201 The Seventeenth Army retained its mission 
to advance in the direction of the line Doullens--St. Pol, keeping its left wing above the 
Nievre River, and moving its right wing toward St. Pol, using Arras as a pivot. The 
Seventeenth's attack would be extended on the right by MARS-SÜD and -NORD. Instead of 
being launched a day apart as originally planned, both MARS attacks now would be launched 
on the same day. The following day the Sixth Army would launch WALKÜRENRITT, 
extending the attack as far north as Lens, with the completely unrealistic deep objective of. 
Boulogne. But the Seventeenth's main effort was now on its left wing, which calls into 
question the whole reason for the northern group of three attacks. 
The Second Army was to make its main effort south of the Somme, its left wing 
advancing toward the Avre in a southwesterly direction, with Moreuil as left boundary. Its 
right wing was to cross the lower Somme at Airaines, and its center was to capture Amiens 
(".... nimmtAmiens... "). The follow-on objective for the left wing would be Breteuil. Thus, the 
Second Army was being required to execute a complex two-phase maneuver. It was supposed 
to keep its right wing north of the Somme and its left wing south of the Somme until past of 
Amiens, and then swing southwest. Combined with the Eighteenth Army, the maneuver 
would be a massive swing away from the Somme, to face the French. 
The Eighteenth Army was to make its main effort southwestward to the Avre to seize 
the crossings, but not cross the river without specific orders from OHL. The Eighteenth's 
deep objective was Compiegne, with a strongly echeloned left wing. Despite the fact that 
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Amiens was now designated for the first time as an actual objective, the new orders focused 
more on executing the southwest swing than on taking Amiens. The right wing of the 
Eighteenth Army in this maneuver would pass 18 miles south of Amiens, leaving it entirely 
to the Second Army. 
On the extreme left wing of the German attack the Seventh Army was to advance 
toward the junction of the Oise and the Aisne. The overall concept now was that the Seventh, 
Eighteenth, and the Second Armies would form a barrier facing southwest against the French, 
while the Seventeenth and Sixth Armies would deal with the British, and the Fourth with the 
Belgians. Nowhere did the new orders consider covering the 20-kilometer gap that would 
open up between the Second and Seventeenth Armies from Airaines to Doullens. 
The war diary of Rupprecht's Army Group noted, "Everything depends on the 
breakthrough in the direction Doullens--Amiens. " 202 But as Kuhl later wrote, the new 
scheme of maneuver was "... a renewed widening of the already widely stretched frame of 
operations... " And, "The offensive power of the armies soon proved insufficient for all these 
tasks. " 203 Some French writers have suggested that Ludendorff intended to drive on Paris, 
but as Edmonds correctly pointed out, nothing in the German orders suggests this. 204 In his 
own memoirs Ludendorff wrote: 
The original idea of the battle had to be modified and the main 
weight of the attack vigorously aimed in this direction [Amiens]. 
I still hoped we should get through to open warfare and followed 
this perspective in my instructions to the armies. But the 
Seventeenth Army was not moving; the Second and the Eighteenth 
were still gaining ground. I continued my efforts toward reinforcing 
the left wing of the Second Army and to direct it and the Eighteenth 
on Amiens. 205 
The situation, however, was nowhere nearly as clear in the orders he issued on the 
evening of the 26'x'. Rather than narrowing the scope of the attack and focusing the main 
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effort along the Somme toward Amiens, as he implies in his memoirs, Ludendorff continued 
to try to grab for everything at once. The German official history called the orders of the 26th 
a "logical amplification" [folgerichtige Erweiterung] of the orders of the 23`d. 206 But the 
three-pronged attack of the 23`d had now become a two-pronged advance against the British 
and French simultaneously. 
At 2240 hours Rupprecht's Army Group issued the orders to the Second and 
Seventeenth Armies to complete the breakthrough toward Amiens and Doullens. 207 The 
Seventeenth Army's main effort was on its left wing, which was supposed to push forward 
"as far as possible" in coordination with the right wing of the Second Army. The Seventeenth 
Army's right wing was supposed to take Mercatel. But after six days of fighting, that 
objective was still less than a mile behind the rear of the original British battle zone, which , 
indicates the lack of progress in the north. 
By this stage in the battle the tyranny of logistics was starting to impose itself on the 
Germans. The German infantry was outdistancing its own artillery, while the artillery was 
outrunning its ammunition trains. The Eighteenth Army already was 56 kilometers away 
from its forward railheads. [Map 3] On 25 March the III Corps had been forced to cut its 
artillery ammunition supply rate in half. 208 And while the German supply and transport 
systems were being stretched thinner and thinner, the British at the same time were falling 
back on their own logistics base. Many of the German attack divisions were burned out. By 
the end of 26 March, eight of the 37 divisions in the front line were back in action for a 
second time. The Eighteenth Army had committed 30 divisions to the fight, and OHL was 
getting ready to send it four more. 209 
On 26 March the Allied conference at Doullens became one of the pivotal events of 
the last year of the war. After years of bickering about it, the Allies finally establish a unified 
command. At that point, however, it was only for the conduct of the immediate battle. Foch 
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was given the authority to coordinate and synchronize the Allied response. Foch was not yet 
designated actual commander in chief of the Allied armies. That would come later, on 14 
May. Foch later wrote, "From the outset all were in unanimous agreement in recognizing that 
Amiens had to be saved at all costs and that the fate of the war depended on it. I made some 
strong remarks in this sense. " 210 Ironically, Foch saw clearly what Ludendorff did not. Foch 
wasted no time. As he later wrote: 
Before the close of this same day, the 26"', I had thus 
explained my intentions to all the commanders whose troops 
were in action. In the evening, moreover, General P6tain 
cancelled his instruction of March 20' and ordered General 
Fayolle to cover Amiens and to maintain contact with Field 
Marshal Haig's forces. In addition, he directed that ten 
divisions and four regiments of artillery be withdrawn from 
other groups of armies and moved towards the reserve group. 21 1 
27 March 
The Eighteenth Army's orders for the day called for crossing the Avre from La 
Neuville, past Montdidier, and southeast to Lassigny. Around 0745 hours Ludendorff called 
to supplement his previous orders. The Eighteenth Army's follow-on advance to Compiegne, 
he cautioned, probably would not take place until 30 March. He also reemphasized the 
importance of the right wing completing the southwest pivot and reaching the line 
Montdidier--Lassigny to hold the French. Montdidier absolutely had to be taken by the 27`h 
and the blocking positions established, but the Eighteenth Army was not to cross the 
objective line even if there was an opportunity for exploitation. [Map 3] Sauberzweig 
recommended that the Eighteenth be allowed to press forward, but Ludendorff refused. Then 
Ludendorff made a most uncharacteristic comment for the man who could not stand the word 
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"operations. " He said that it was no longer the time for battles, but for operations ("... nicht 
mehr gekämpft, sondern operiert werden. "). 212 
The Eighteenth Army attack jumped off at 1000 hours. Progress was slow initially. 
Between Rosieres and Noyon Hutier had 11 divisions in his front line; three divisions along 
his southern flank on the Oise; 12 divisions in his second line; and six in his third line, 
including three in OHL reserve. 213 In support of the attack, the bomber units in the 
Eighteenth Army sector dropped 11,000 kilograms on bombs on the rail center at Soissons214 
By noon the Eighteenth Army's right wing was making good progress and closing in 
on Montdidier. Newly arriving French units put up poor resistance against the Germans in 
that sector. The gap started to widen between the British Fifth and the French Third Armies, 
and a gap of more than five miles developed between the French Third and First Armies. Still 
operating under Main's original orders, the French poured all their resources into plugging 
the gap between their two armies. 
In the German center the Second Army made very little progress in face of stiff 
British resistance. The right wing of the Second tried to cross the Ancre in force and to 
expand the bridgeheads at Albert and Aveluy. The Ancre, however, proved to be a death trap. 
That tributary of the Somme was shallow and only 20 to 30 feet wide, but it was bounded by 
marshes and flood planes two to three hundred meters wide. The crossings were limited and 
plainly visible. The British artillery on the west bank sat on high ground from where it had 
good observation and clear fields of fire. 
The Second Army's left wing, south of the Somme, was too weak to advance the 
attack on Amiens. Even though Ludendorff had designated it as the main effort, Marwitz had 
only three front-line and three second-line divisions on that axis. As Crown Prince Wilhelm 
later wrote, "the left wing for this very preferable undertaking was not strong enough. " 215 
From 25 to 27 March the front of the Second Army had fanned out from 25 to almost 40 
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kilometers. 216 Although the Second didn't capture Amiens, it did get close enough to put 
the rail center under fire with 150mm guns. 217 
The Seventeenth Army made only minor progress. In two days of fighting it had 
advanced only one and one-half kilometers. 218 In the middle of the day the Seventeenth 
Army attack halted temporarily to wait for MARS. At 1355 hours Rupprecht's Army Group 
issued the final orders to the Seventeenth, Sixth, and Fourth Armies for MARS and 
WALKÜRENRITT. 219 Between 1400 and 1500 hours, Rupprecht requested that OHL 
commit three of its reserve divisions to support the right wing of the Seventeenth Army. 
OHL refused, and when Rupprecht learned that OHL had already diverted those three 
divisions to the sector south of the Somme, he commented, "Now we have lost the war. " 220 
Rupprecht's chief of staff, however, was starting to feel more optimistic. Late that night 
Kuhl sent a message to OHL, "We're pulling through. " ("Ich habe den Eindruck, dass wir 
durchkommen. ") 221 
Although the Germans certainly gained more ground south of the Somme on the 27`h, 
they committed roughly equal forces in both sectors on that day: 36 divisions in the north, 
with 15 in the front line; and 28 divisions in the south, with 16 in front line. 222 The 
Eighteenth Army started entering Montdidier about 1930 hours, cutting one major rail line 
over which the French reserves were moving. The French, meanwhile, were in the process of 
closing the gap between their Third and First Armies, but the gap between the British and the 
French remained. 223 
Later that evening Wetzell had a phone conversation with the chief of staff of 
Wilhelm's Army Group. Schulenberg said: "Ludendorff does not place great importance on 
Schoeler's attack. After the capture of Montdidier it will be necessary to position strong 
reserves on the right wing. " 224 
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Schoeler was the commander of VIII Corps, another corps headquarters recently 
inserted on the extreme left flank of Eighteenth Army to control the ever growing number of 
divisions 225 Wetzell told Schulenberg: 
After capturing Montdidier, march straight along the Avre 
valley to Amiens. Take advantage of the success at Montdidier, 
advance toward Amiens, then come around. Wait for further 
orders reference the attack in the southeast. Again, Eighteenth 
Army to advance with its right wing; Second Army to advance 
with its left wing in order to exploit the advantage gained at 
Montdidier. 226 [Map 3] 
28 March 
Shortly after midnight the commander of the French First Army reported to Foch that 
he could do no more with the British. 227 The Eighteenth Army had accomplished the 
splitting the French and the British. The road to Amiens was open from the south, and the 
main rail line from Paris to Calais along which the French reserves were moving was only 12 
miles away. Hutier had at least five divisions (including four assault divisions) available for'' 
commitment. Two were in the second and third lines of the XXV Reserve Corps, and three 
were in the second and third lines of the IX Corps. But eleven hours later Wilhelm's Army 
Group reported to OHL, "The Eighteenth Army is not in a position to advance to Amiens. " 228 
Rupprecht and many other Germans considered 27-28 March the turning point of the 
offensive. 29 Wetzell too clearly saw that MICHAEL was dead. Seventeen years after the 
war, Wetzell, by then a retired lieutenant general, wrote; "... the failure of OHL to recognize 
and exploit fully the gap in the French front at Montdidier was one of the principal causes of 
the failure of the great offensive. " 230 Wetzell recommended to Ludendorff that MICHAEL 
be broken off and the forces shifted north for a strong GEORG attack, not merely the reduced 
KLEIN-GEORG. Rupprecht, on the other hand, though that the low levels of ammunition 
would preclude launching even a modified version of GEORG for at least ten days. 
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Ludendorff refused, hoping that the MARS and WALKlORNRITT attacks would re-energize 
MICHAEL. 231 
OHL issued new orders. 232 The Seventeenth Army and right and center of the 
Second Army were to stand fast and be prepared to exploit the success of MARS. The left 
wing of the Second Army and the right wing of the Eighteenth Army were to continue the 
drive toward Amiens. Ludendorff also approved an Eighteenth Army recommendation for its 
right flank corps to shift to the northwest and drive toward Moreuil. This is the first 
indication of Ludendorff focusing seriously on Amiens. But even still, it was a half-hearted 
effort. The main thrust of the Eighteenth Army continued to pivot toward the south. 233 By 
this point in the battle, the Eighteenth Army had been reinforced with a total of ten divisions, 
and one more was enroute. 234 The British, meanwhile, had already cleared their ordnance 
depot at Amiens, and were developing plans to blow up the ammunition dumps on their 
southern line of communications. 235 
At 0300 hours 1,250 guns started firing the artillery preparation for both MARS 
attacks, and the infantry jumped off at 0730 hours. The Seventeenth Army attacked with only 
nine divisions, one corps north of the Scarpe, and two south of the river. Only five of the 
divisions were attack divisions. Even the German official history noted that the attacks were 
executed shoulder to shoulder, with no hint of the infiltration tactics that had been so 
successful in the early stages of MICHAEL. 236 The Germans encountered well-prepared 
British defenses. North of the Scarpe MARS made no progress at all; south of the Scarpe it 
made only slight progress. 
Even in the early stages of MARS, Ludendorff at 0815 hours told the Second Army 
that their main effort was south of the Somme. At 0905 hours the Second Army's chief of 
staff told Kuhl of the difficulty of moving ammunition columns forward. He estimated that 
half his losses had come from enemy aircraft. By 1400 hours OHL was reporting to Second 
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Army that MARS was a failure. 237 By 1700 hours both MARS attacks were at a standstill 
with heavy losses. Rupprecht's Army Group, nonetheless, was convinced that victory 
between Albert and Arras was still possible, and requested additional divisions to resume the 
attack. OHL refused. 238 Wilhelm's Army Group, meanwhile, was stressing to OHL the 
importance of capturing the rail center at Amiens. 239 
At 1855 hours OHL ordered the Second Army to drive hard on Amiens from south of 
the Somme. Amiens was now the principal objective of the Second Army, but its main axis of 
advance also was now toward the southwest. The Second Army's left wing was to push 
forward to reach beyond the Avre by 30 March . 
240 To accomplish these missions the Second 
Army would be reinforced by two divisions from the Seventeenth Army. 241 In his memoirs 
Ludendorff later claimed; "I continued my efforts to strengthen the left wing of the Second 
Army and to direct it with the Eighteenth Army on Amiens. " 242 
OHL issued new orders for the other armies at 2345 hours. 243 MARS and 
WALKÜRENRITT were cancelled. The Seventeenth Army was now given the mission of 
containing the British with local attacks and supporting the Second Army with its right wing. 
Operation GEORG or even KLEIN-GEORG were no longer possible because of the 
resources squandered in MICHAEL. An even more reduced version, renamed GEORGETTE 
1, was ordered for the right wing of the Sixth Army in eight to ten days, depending on the 
weather. The Fourth Army was to follow with the supporting attack GEORGETTE II by its 
left wing, and with operation FLANDERN III, an attack on the Belgians across the Loo 
Canal. Rupprecht's Army Group immediately issued the orders for the regrouping for 
GEORGETTE. 244 
The Eighteenth Army, meanwhile, would receive four more divisions, but it was not 
supposed to cross the Avre without specific orders. Essentially, the Eighteenth was supposed 
to mark time for two days while the Second Army completed its pivot to the southwest and 
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took Amiens. 245 After taking Amiens, everything seemed to center on a vague hope of some 
great success by the Eighteenth Army. At OHL Ludendorff said: "In the next few days it 
must be done by the Eighteenth Army. " 246 
29 March 
Late on 28 March General John J. Pershing made the few ready American divisions in 
France available to Foch. By 29 March strong French reserves were beginning to mass in the 
vicinity of Beauvais. 247 The force consisted of the French Fifth and Tenth Armies, with six 
infantry and three cavalry divisions in the first echelon. 
At 0600 hours Wilhelm's Army Group sent a message to OHL recommending that if 
the attacks of 30 March did not draw in heavy French forces, then the interior flanks of the 
Seventh and Eighteenth Armies should launch a strong enveloping attack on the enemy to 
their front, with a possibility of extending the objective to the east. Ludendorff approved the 
recommendation. 248 
Later that morning in a phone conversation with Kuhl, Ludendorff ordered the 
Seventeenth Army to go over to the defensive. 249 The left wing of the Seventeenth Army 
could only attack as necessary to help the Second Army move forward. The Germans at that 
point held Bapaume, Albert, Peronne, Nesle, Hamm, Chauny, Noyon, Roye, and Montdidier. 
They also were approaching the outskirts of Villers-Bretonneux and were able to shell 
sections of Amiens, only ten miles away. That meant that almost all the British Fifth and 
Third Army's forward railheads had been over-run. British GHQ decided to reduce tonnage 
at the southern ports of Le Harve and Rouen by 60 percent and to increase Calais by the same 
figure. 250 
That afternoon Ludendorff issued further orders by phone. 251 The attack beyond the 
line Chauny--Noyon--Montdidier was to be continued with the left wing of the Second Army, 
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the Eighteenth Army, and the right wing of the Seventh Army. The rest of the Second Army 
and the Seventeenth Army would later join in the attack north of the Somme, to support the 
drive on Amiens. OHL also ordered strong reserves pushed up behind the Eighteenth and 
Second Armies. Rupprecht's Army Group responded by ordering three more divisions from 
the Seventeenth to the Second. 252 
OHL's orders at 1800 hours made another change. 253 Despite the heavy actions of the 
inner wings of the Second and Eighteenth Armies, the attack now had to be pushed as far as 
the Noye, five miles west of Moreuil. The left wing of the Second Army had the objective of 
the Amiens--St. Fuscien--Ailly road, and the right wing of the Eighteenth Army had La 
Faloise as an objective. In order to deny the French the time to make an orderly deployment, 
Ludendorff cancelled his orders of the previous day requiring the Eighteenth Army to stand 
firm until the Second Army had completed its pivot to the southwest and had reached 
Amiens. In the British official history, however, Edmonds seems not to have understood the 
significance of Amiens when he wrote; "So now Ludendorffs grandiose schemes for the 
capture of the British Armies were dwindling down to the scale of a local operation to seize a 
railway centre, Amiens. " 254 That rail center should have been the operational objective from 
the start. 
At 2235 hours OHL again stressed to the Second Army that its left wing must 
advance the next day. 255 Two corps of Seventh Army, meanwhile, started preparations to 
launch Operation ERZENGEL on 2 April. 256 The Eighteenth Army by this point had grown 
so large and unwieldy that the VIII Corps on extreme left flank of the Eighteenth Army was, 
transferred to the Seventh Army. 257 
On the Allied side, five more fresh divisions had reached the French First Army, 
which already had relieved the entire British XVIII Corps. 258 That allowed Haig to 
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reconstitute his reserves and reorganize the Fifth Army (now redesignated as the Fourth 
Army) without pulling it out of the line. 
30 March 
The German attacks resumed on 30 March, but they generally stalled all along the 
line. The Second Army took the Avre crossing at Moreuil, but the French continued to pour 
in reserves. By that morning the German Second and Eighteenth Armies had a total of 41 
divisions (22 in the front line), and four more moving up. The British Fourth and French First 
and Third Armies had 33 infantry and six cavalry divisions (20 in the front line), and five 
moving up. 259 The attack clearly had reached culmination by this point. By 1800 hours the 
Germans broke off all their attacks. An after action analysis of the day's attacks conducted by 
Wilhelm's Army Group two months later concluded: 
OHL was of the opinion that the attack should only be executed 
from the north, whereas the Army Group wanted to launch it 
from the north and south. The Army Group thought that the entire 
enemy artillery could have been wiped out in this way. This 
attack would have required a longer preparation period, but 
probably could have been launched within a short period of time. 260 
At 1845 hours OHL sent Rupprecht's Army Group a warning order that 
GEORGETTE would be executed. OHL also issued the orders to start shifting the artillery 
northward. 261 At 2200 hours Ludendorff ordered the Second Army to continue attacking the 
next day along its whole front, even if its left wing did not make any headway. Second Army 
protested that it could not do that without adequate preparation and additional resources. 
Ludendorff backed down, and the attack was postponed 262 Wilhelm later wrote in his 
memoirs; "My chief [of staff] and I saw in the general attack from the first only an attempt to 
bring the faltering operation once more into motion. , 263 
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31 March 
Ludendorff had two basic options at this point. He could break off MICHAEL 
immediately and prepare to launch another major attack somewhere else. The best possibility 
would be an expanded version of GEORGETTE, which in its current form had been designed 
as either a diversion or a supporting attack. The second option was to resume the MICHAEL 
attacks after giving the troops a few days rest and fresh reinforcements. Ludendorff chose the 
latter, but at that point he had no other realistically attainable objective but Amiens. 264 
That morning OHL ordered all units to transition temporarily to the defensive. 265 
Then at midday OHL issued new orders for continuing operations. The Eighteenth Army was 
ordered to reorganize to repel any French attacks, but its right wing had to be prepared to 
attack west of Moreuil to reach the line Thory--Ailly. That attack would be supported by the 
Second Army, with the inner wings of the two armies reinforced by six divisions. The Second 
Army also was ordered to continue its drive on Amiens, but transferring the main weight of 
that attack south of the Somme, where the terrain favored offensive operations. The renewed 
attacks were scheduled for 4 April. Meanwhile, the Seventh Army's ERZENGEL attack was 
rescheduled tentatively for 8 April. 266 
At the end of the day on 31 March OHL assessed the situation in the south. "The 
English Army at the moment has no operational capability. The French can mount a 20 to 30 
division attack against the southern wing of the Eighteenth Army. " 267 
1 April 
Ludendorff met in St. Quentin with the chiefs of staff of both army groups and the 
Second and Eighteenth Armies. Kuhl recommended, "The main objective is the British. 
Therefore, the Second and Seventeenth Armies should attack north of the Somme. " 
Ludendorff responded that the main objective was to split the British and the French, then the 
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next objective could be the defeat of the British. This would be done with the GEORGETTE 
attack by the Sixth Army, supported by the Seventh Army's ERZENGEL attack in the 
south 268 
After the meeting OHL issued the new orders. Offensive operations would resume on 
4 April south of the Somme toward Amiens, with the left wing of Second Army and the right 
wing of the Eighteenth Army. One day later, the attack would resume north of the Somme 
with the right wing of the Second Army and the left wing of the Seventeenth Army, with 
pressure in the direction toward Amiens. On 5 April the Seventh Army also would attack the 
salient near Amigny as a preliminary operation for ERZENGEL. The Sixth Army would 
follow-up with the GEORGETTE attack on 7 or 8 April. 269 
2-3 April 
The Germans conducted only local attacks on 2 and 3 April, concentrating on the 
preparations for the resumption of operations on 4 April. At 1150 hours on 2 April Kuhl 
confirmed to the chief of staff of the Second Army that Ludendorff wanted the main effort on 
the army's left wing, but now north of the Somme. This was a contradiction of the orders 
issued on 31 March and 1 April. 270 About 1900 hours on 3 April the Second Army's chief of 
staff complained to Kuhl about the shortage of ammunition on his left wing. 271 
The Allies, meanwhile, had almost completed sealing off in depth Hutier's penetration 
in the south. Fayolle's Army Group now had 27 infantry and five cavalry divisions, with 
1,344 guns and some 700 aircraft. (The Germans at this point had 822 aircraft, the result of 
reinforcements added to the squadrons supporting MICHAEL. ) By 3 April the French had 
extended their line an additional three miles, with two French divisions relieving two of the 
British Fourth Army's divisions. To the north, the British Third Army had 15 divisions in its 
first line, facing 31 of Rupprecht's divisions. 72 
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4 April 
German artillery started a 75-minute preparation at 0515 hours. The infantryjumped 
off at 0630 hours in persistent rain. Fourteen divisions were committed to the attack, but only 
four were fresh. The attack was intended to reach the line Chirmont--Blangy Tronville, and if 
possible cross the Noye and establish a bridgehead north of Ailly. That modest objective line 
did not include Amiens itself, but it would put the Germans within 12,000 meters of the 
critical rail center. The more ground the Germans gained, the more effective their shelling 
would be against the main rail station and the rail bridge over the Somme west of Amiens. 73 
As the day's fighting dragged on, the Eighteenth Army reported that it could 
not push the Allies across the Noye. The Eighteenth did make a slight improvement in its 
Avre bridgehead, but its artillery on the far bank was difficult to keep supplied with 
ammunition. Just south of the Somme the Second Army reached the outskirts of Villers- 
Bretonneux, which sat on a key piece of high ground overlooking Amiens, only ten 
kilometers away. At 1700 hours, a desperate counterattack by one Australian and one British 
battalion halted the 9th Bavarian Reserve Division only 400 meters short of the town. Within 
an hour the Germans had been driven back 2,000 meters. 274 [Map 3] 
Wilhelm's Army Group recommended not continuing the attacks on 5 April because 
of the increasingly strong Allied counterattacks. Nonetheless, OHL ordered the resumption of 
the attacks for the next day. 215 Kuhl, on the other hand, wrote in his diary that Germany's ,,. 
last chance to strike a decisive blow against the British had just passed. The shortages of 
reserves, ammunition, and especially horses would make it impossible to launch another 
offensive on such a large scale. 276 
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5 April 
The Second Army and the left wing of the Seventeenth Army attacked north of the 
Somme, but now the objective was more to prevent the Allies from shifting forces north 
against GEORGETTE. The attack started at 0900 hours, but by noon it was clear that it had 
failed. In the south, the Eighteenth Army was too exhausted to make any headway, and in 
fact, had to fend-off counterattacks from five French divisions along the line from Cantigny 
to Castel. 77 
By the end of the day, all of the army and army group chiefs of staff were 
recommending the termination of MICHAEL. At 1925 hours OHL sent out Ludendorffs 
message: "The supply situation does not allow the continuation of the attack by the Second 
and Eighteenth Armies. The attack is henceforth temporarily discontinued..., " except, "... 
where an improvement of the local situation demands it. " 
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6 April 
The day after the termination of MICHAEL, the Seventh Army launched Operation 
ERZENGEL with six divisions. The operation originally had been intended as a diversion in 
support of MICHAEL. But after the Eighteenth Army had pushed farther south than 
originally planned, ERZENGEL became an operation to reduce the salient between the inner 
wings of the Seventh and Eighteenth Armies. The attack centered on Coucy le Chateau, and 
its primary objective was the high ground east of the Oise-Aisne Canal. 
The artillery preparation started at 0425 hours, and the infantry attacked at 0530 
hours. The Germans made good progress, but heavy rains hampered their advance on the 
night of the 6t'. The arrack ended when the Seventh Army reached the Ailette on 9 April. The 
Germans had shortened their line by some seven kilometers, at a cost of 1,900 casualties. By 
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that date, 22 French infantry divisions and six cavalry divisions opposed the Germans 
between the Oise and the Somme. 279 
ASSESSMENT 
The Results 
In sixteen days of fighting Operation MICHAEL had penetrated the Allied positions 
to a depth of 60 kilometers, capturing 1,200 square miles of territory. [Map 3] The Germans 
also captured 90,000 Allied prisoners (75,000 British), 1,300 guns, and temporarily opened a 
wide gap between the British and the French. The British Fifth Army had been almost totally 
destroyed, and the BEF was on the verge of falling back on its channel ports. The casualties 
on both sides were high. But while the Germans suffered slightly fewer casualties, they were 
losses that could not be replaced for the rest of the war. The arriving Americans more than 
made up the Allied losses. 280 
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Table 6.9 
Casualties from Operation MICHAEL 281 
German 
Seventeenth Army 81,200 
Second Army 73,800 
Eighteenth Army 84,800 
Total 239,800 
Allied 
British 177,739 
French 77,000 
Total 254,739 
On the tactical level the results of MICHAEL appeared spectacular. They were far 
beyond anything that had been achieved in World War I so far. On the first day of the attack 
alone, the Germans had taken almost exactly as much territory as the British and French had 
needed 140 days to wrest from the Germans in 1916. Even so, on the first day of the attack 
the maximum advance was still four kilometers short of the assigned depth for that day. On 
22 March the shortfall was seven kilometers. On 23 March, the shortfall was four kilometers, 
even though the Germans made their largest single-day advance that day. After French forces 
had arrived in the south significant force by 28 March, the daily depths of the German 
advances declined sharply. 
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Table 6.10 
MICHAEL Daily Advances 282 
Date Maximum Advance 
21 March 5 kms 
22 March 5 
23 March 16 
24 March 6 
25 March 10 
26 March 8 
27 March 6 
28 March 4 
29 March 1 
30 March 3 
Of course, the impressive tactical results accomplished nothing operationally, much 
less strategically. By the time it was over, the Germans had committed 90 divisions, had 
consumed tons of precious supplies and ammunition, and had little to show for it. 
Nonetheless, Ludendorff would write in his memoirs: 
It was a brilliant feat of arms and will always stand as such 
in the history of the world. What the English and the French 
had not succeeded in, we had accomplished, and in the fourth 
year of the war. 283 
It may have been a brilliant feat of arms, but it was one that failed to pass the "so 
what? test. " Why did MICHAEL fail? Could it have succeeded? No general purposely goes 
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into a battle intending to loose it, and my own 38 years of military service--most of it in the 
operations and intelligence areas--make me extremely reluctant to try to second guess those 
who had to make the decisions, at the time, on the ground. On the other hand, this operation 
and the entire group of Ludendorff Offensives taken together offer too many key points for a 
critical analysis of the modem concepts of the operational art. Therefore, the following 
assessment is conducted with that objective in mind. 
Over-Emphasis on the Tactical Level 
One of the most common criticisms of MICHAEL is Ludendorffs obsession with the 
tactical level of warfare, at the expense of the operational and strategic levels. And to a large 
degree Ludendorff was a product of the institution he grew up in. As noted in previous 
chapters, the Germany Army and its General Staff had a tendency to ignore the strategic level 
of war, and their understanding of the operational level was deeply flawed, more resembling 
tactics on a very large scale. In one of the most widely quoted and criticized passages of his 
memoirs Ludendorff wrote: "It was necessary to place tactical considerations above pure 
strategy. The latter was not feasible without tactical success. A strategy that disregards it, is 
condemned to failure from the start. " 284 
Yet, there were solid tactical reasons to support the basic concept of MICHAEL, 
factors that could have been turned to operational advantage. MICHAEL was not as 
dependent on weather and terrain conditions to the extent GEORG was. And the terrain south 
of the Somme favored the attacker. Below the river the ground was mostly flat all the way to 
Amiens, and the only significant water obstacles were the Crozat Canal and the Canal du 
Nord. North of the Somme the terrain was more difficult, especially in the sector bounded by 
Arras--Peronne--Amiens--Frevent. There the terrain elevation differences ran up to 150 
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meters, with water obstacles running through the valleys, most significantly the Canal du 
Nord, Omignon, Scarpe, and Ancre. 
If tactical considerations reigned supreme, as Ludendorff so steadfastly maintained, 
then it is hard to understand why the main weight of the operation was not south of the 
Somme from the start, in the area where the terrain was most favorable and where the Allies 
were the weakest. 
Failure to Weight the Main Attack 
The original intent was for the main effort to be north of the Somme. But on 21 
March, the Seventeenth Army (minus the three corps allocated to Operation MARS) and the 
Second Army (minus XIV and LI Corps) started with 32 divisions north of the Somme. The 
Eighteenth Army and the XIV and LI Corps of Second Army started with 35 divisions south 
of the Somme. (This analysis is based on the line of the Somme as extended east from 
Peronne. ) 285 The Seventeenth Army planners originally had estimated that they needed 
between 32 and 47 divisions for both MICHAEL I and MARS. They got 25.286 Even Kuhl 
noted, "All in all, it is safe to say that the Seventeenth Army was relatively weak for the task 
that had been assigned to it. " 287 
Meanwhile, the Eighteenth Army, facing the weakest enemy, had more guns and 
more reserves. It had had twice as many guns per mile of front, and 50 percent more men 
than the Seventeenth Army. Writing immediately after the war, General Otto Fehr criticized .., 
Ludendorffs initial positioning of the reserve divisions as tending to support the concept of a 
main effort by the Eighteenth Army. 288 But the actual disposition of the reserves on 21 
March (see Order of Battle table above) does not really support Fehr's contention. If anything, 
it is difficult to see where the main effort was from the positions of the reserves on 21 March. 
What is clear is that as MICHAEL progressed, the commitment of reserves to the Eighteenth 
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Army shifted the weight and direction of the main effort of the operation. The following table 
shows the allocation of reserve divisions from OHL to the three armies for the periods 21-31 
March, 1-5 April, and the combined totals for the entire operation. 
Table 6.11 
Divisional Reinforcements from OHL 289 
Seventeenth Second Eighteenth 
21-31 March 
Gain +4 +8 +12 
Loss -5 -1 -2 
Net -1 +7 +10 
1-5 April 
Gain 0 +2 +7 
Loss -1 -1 0 
Net -1 +1 +7 
21 March-5 April 
Net -2 +8 +17 
The next table shows the total number of divisions committed to the Eighteenth Army 
and the two right wing corps of Seventh Army at various points in the battle. When 
comparing the above and below tables, it is important to note that as OHL fed divisions to 
Wilhelm's Army Group some were held in OHL reserve, while others were released to the 
operational control of the army group or the armies. 
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Table 6.12 
Divisions Committed in Crown Prince Wilhelm's Army Group 290 
Date Time OHL Reserve Total Divisions 
Divisions 
21 March 0940 1 27 
22 March 0130 1 28 
23 March 2330 3 29 
24 March Morning 2 30 
24 March 2020 3 30 
25 March Evening 4 29 
26 March 2010 5 33 
28 March 0850 3 34 
28 March 2210 2 35 
**29 March 2345 4 42 
30 March Morning 4 42 
30 March 2225 5 42 
31 March 2300 9 46 
3 April 1050 4 48 
4 April 0715 3 51 
5 April 1135 3 51 
* Includes Seventh Army's VIII Corps and VIII Reserve Corps 
** VIII Corps reassigned from Eighteenth Army to Seventh Army. 
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. 
A, 
Some historians have argued that the attack should have extended to the Scarpe right 
from the start. The Seventeenth Army was bound to fail without it. The standard argument is 
that the Germans had sufficient divisions to extend the attack, but not sufficient artillery. But 
an analysis of the disposition of the OHL heavy artillery batteries (see Order of Battle table, 
above) shows that the three attacking armies had only 598 out of the available 1,399 heavy 
batteries, or just 43 percent. If MICHAEL was really intended to win the war, the Germans 
should have been able to accept greater risks along other sectors of the Western Front, 
especially in the south, where "other army groups" had 149 of the heavy batteries. This is an 
echo of Moltke's unwillingness to accept risk in secondary sectors in order to weight 
overwhelmingly the main effort that in the end doomed his final variation of the Schlieffen 
Plan in 1914. 
The following table shows the dispositions on 16,23, and 30 March of the 
SWCHEFLA batteries, the German Army's heaviest shooters. Note that on 23 March the 
three MICHAEL armies had a total of 20 SCHWEFLA batteries, but by 30 March they had 
only ten. By that date, many of those batteries already had been shifted north in preparation 
for GEORGETTE. This shortage of the heaviest artillery certainly reduced the power of any 
MICHAEL attacks launched after 30 March. 
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Table 6.13 
SCHWEFLA Batteries 291 
Army 16 March 23 March 30 March 
Fourth 6 6 15 
Sixth 7 6 10 
Seventeenth 12 12 7 
Second 8 8 0 
Eighteenth 10 10 3 
Seventh 7 7 13 
First 1 1 2 
Third 0 0 1 
Fifth 4 4 2 
Unity of Command 
Many historians have correctly pointed to the lack of unity of command as one of 
MICHAEL's most serious flaws. 292 The fact that the command disjuncture occurred at the 
operational level, the army group level, made it that much more serious. Ludendorffs 
justification for this command arrangement was his requirement to influence and control the 
battle personally. "That would have been difficult, if only one group of armies had been in 
charge of the conduct of the operations. Any interference whatever by OHL would then have 
practically amounted to meddling on the part of a higher headquarters. " 293 
In his memoirs Ludendorff issued a strong disclaimer that the decision was influenced 
by dynastic or political considerations. Judah Wallach, however, noted that by the start of 
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1918 Ludendorff was seriously considering forcing the Kaiser to abdicate in favor of his son, 
and it was therefore important for his candidate for the throne to get his share of the 
anticipated glory. 294 Rupprecht at the time noted: "For political reasons, especially after the 
fiasco at Verdun, it is desirable to give the German Crown Prince a chance to repair the 
damage. " 295 
Ludendorffs method of command and control was exactly the opposite of Moltke's in 
1914, but it was no more successful. The result was the unsynchronized army group 
operations orders of 14 and 16 March, with their two very different concepts of the mission 
of the Eighteenth Army. Wilhelm's Army Group and the Eighteenth Army clearly were trying 
to go their own way, and in the end they did. 
Artille 
One of the German Army's greatest advantages going into the battle was the 
innovative new artillery tactics based on neutralization, surprise, centralized planning, and 
decentralized execution. But the fragmentation at the army group level of command did much 
to dilute that advantage, which if uniformly applied, could have contributed greatly to the 
operational results. When the Eighteenth Army was transferred to Wilhelm's Army Group, 
Bruchmüller went with it. Bruchmtlller, of course, had the most experience with the new 
techniques. And although Kuhl was one of Bruchmüller's most ardent supporters, that 
apparently was not enough for the new techniques to be applied correctly and uniformly 
within Rupprecht's Army Group. 
The artillery chiefs of the Second and Seventeenth Armies were not at all enthusiastic 
about having to follow the lead of the upstart from the Eastern Front. This was particularly 
true in the case of the Seventeenth Army, whose artillery chief, Lieutenant General Richard 
von Berendt, had been the German artillery chief at Caporetto, and had something of a 
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reputation himself as a pioneer in artillery tactics. Berendt's had been one of the two major 
voices of dissent at the 26 January Artillery Planning Conference. It is quite possible there 
was even some longer standing animosity between Berendt and Bruchmüller, who were once 
lieutenants together in the 3rd Foot Artillery Regiment. As a lieutenant general, Berendt did 
not appreciate having to take suggestions from a mere lieutenant colonel. This resentment 
came through very clearly in Berendt's post-war writings. 296 
Thus there was a good deal of personal friction among the three army artillery chiefs. 
The Eighteenth Army's artillery followed the new concepts to the letter; the Seventeenth 
Army's artillery did not. A Seventeenth Army order issued on 3 February specifically 
required firing units to register. 297 Another order issued on 24 February spelled out the fire 
sequence for the preparation, which was to start with one hour of reinforced counter-battery 
fire. Then, all Seventeenth Army artillery, with the exception of the counter battery units, was 
to cease firing for one half-hour. 298 After Ludendorffs message of 3 March, the Seventeenth 
Army issued revised fire plans on 6 March. That order was supposed to supercede the 24 
February order, but it was little different from the original plan. It did drop the requirement 
for a precision registration, but it still included the half-hour break in the firing. 299 Finally, 
an order issued on 16 March noted that at 0640 hours on the morning of the attack there 
would be sufficient light and a "registration can be done. " 300 By waffling on the whole issue 
of registrations, the final decision was left to the subordinate corps. In the event, many 
Seventeenth Army units did actually fire a precision registration, thereby compromising the 
surprise of the attack in the north. If that was not enough, the senseless half-hour pause in the 
preparation fire certainly telegraphed the attack to the British. 301 
There were other significant differences between the two army groups in artillery 
planning and execution. As previously noted in the discussion on order of battle, the 
Eighteenth Army started the battle with considerably more artillery assets than its supporting 
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mission would have seemed to require. And on the first day of the attack Lieutenant Ernst 
Jünger bitterly complained about being held up by a standing barrage of German artillery fire 
that had reached its maximum range and then just continued to fire blindly. In the Eighteenth 
Army under Bruchmüller, once the guns firing in the creeping barrage reached their 
maximum range, they ceased firing. Then, those guns that could be supplied forward with 
ammunition were. aggressively pushed up. Finally, only the Eighteenth Army used the 
complete Bruchmüller system of task-tailored artillery groupings. All of the Second and 
Seventeenth Army artillery orders for MICHAEL mention only SCHWEFLA groups, but not 
IKA, AKA, or FEKA groups and sub-groups. 
On 1 April 1918, Rupprecht's Army Group issued an analysis of the new artillery 
procedures that concluded: "The procedure gains complete surprise and had proved itself on 
21 March. " 302 In his post-war writings Kuhl continued to be a staunch supporter of 
Bruchmüller and his methods. Yet Kuhl never leveled any direct criticism at Berendt, and 
even defended his performance 303 Ludendorff, on the other hand, was a little more direct in 
his post-war memoirs when he wrote of the Seventeenth Army's results; "... the vitalizing 
energy that emanated from Colonel Bruchmüller was lacking. " 304 Even more significantly, 
Ludendorff put Bruchmtlller in complete charge of the artillery for the remaining four 1918 
offensives and for the planning for HAGEN. 
Condition of the German Army in 1918 
Some historians have argued that MICHAEL never chance, under any circumstances, 
because the German Army at the start of 1918 had been burned out by more than three years 
of a grinding war of attrition. The troop morale, levels of training and leadership, and the 
resources were no longer there. Even Kuhl admitted, "The Army that stood ready to attack in 
March of 1918 was no longer the body of troops of 1914. " 305 
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On closer examination, however, this argument does not pass muster. The effects of 
the last three years were evenly distributed on all sides. The Allies were worn down too, and, 
the national morale of the French was close to collapse. And while the Allies had the 
potential to be reinvigorated by thousands of fresh American troops, that potential in March 
1918 was still several more months from full realization. The fact remains that after 
MICHAEL the Germans managed to muster the will and the resources to launch four more 
major offensives, and they were planning and actively preparing yet another one when the 
Allies finally counterattacked on 18 July. The Allies managed to contain Operations 
GNIESSENAU and MARNESCHUTZ"REIMS fairly effectively, but during Operations 
GEORGETTE and BLOCHER there was a real fear that the Germans could still win 
militarily. What would the results have been if the combined power of those five offensives 
had been focused in one properly designed sequence of operations? 
The deficiencies in the German war economy and the German Army's logistics system 
are another element often used to bolster the "burn out" argument. And as noted above, many 
writers including Kuhl, Ludendorff, and the German official history have claimed that 
MICHAEL reached culmination because of supply failures. But while the German supply 
system was strained to its limits, and shortages of various classes of supplies plagued local 
commanders throughout the course of the battle, much the same can be said for many large- 
scale battles in the 20th century. The evidence is just not there for a complete breakdown in 
the German logistics system. As Colonel Jochim, the General Staff Officer lb of the 
Seventeenth Army, argued so forcefully in his manuscript; "The March offensive did not fail 
because the supplies did not come, as was said after the war sometimes. " 306 
Operation MICHAEL reached culmination, but it did not culminate solely because of 
supply failures or because of any other single reason. It reached culmination because of a 
combination of factors, including supply problems, troop fatigue, length of lines of 
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communications, lack of battlefield mobility, and most importantly, poor operational design 
and a series of bad decisions made during the execution of the operation. 
Operational Objective 
Arguably the single greatest flaw in Operation MICHAEL was the lack of a clearly 
defined objective. Writing immediately after the war General Otto von Moser noted: 
We find that Ludendorffs plan of attack and first attack order 
for 1918, as opposed to the operations of 1914 and 1915 in the 
East, lacked not only the great, bold, clear, and simple outline, 
but also the idea intelligible to everybody that will kindle 
enthusiasm of both subordinate leaders and troops. 307 
And on 5 April, the date Operation MICHAEL was halted, Rupprecht wrote in his diary in 
frustration: 
It is obvious that one cannot discern a proper purpose in all 
OHL's directives. They always mention certain landmarks 
which should be reached, and one gets the impression that 
OHL lives from hand to mouth, without acknowledging a 
fixed purpose. 308 
The initial MICHAEL plan did not call for a breakthrough of the British front on a 
large scale as far as the sea for the purpose of rolling up and destroying the enemy. Merely, it 
called for a breakthrough as far as the Somme and a drive on a wide front to the line of 
Bapaume--Peronne--Ham, with some vague form of exploitation to follow. The only clearly 
defined objective at the start was the first day's objective was to eliminate the Cambrai 
salient. As Ludendorff later wrote; "The crown of success was to be found in that operation in 
which we were able to develop our entire superiority of strength. To strive for that was our 
ultimate aim. " 309 Whatever that meant to Ludendorff, it was hardly a crystal clear concept 
for a war-winning operation. But as Kuhl also later wrote; "There is no doubt whatever that 
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OHL intended to bring about a decision in the World War by means of this offensive, and not 
by a series of local attacks designed to wear out the enemy. " 310 
For all the reasons already discussed, Amiens should have been the operational 
objective of MICHAEL right from the start. The failure to designate operational objectives in 
the beginning led the Germans to commit follow-on forces along the line of least resistance, 
which led away from the decisive point. Amiens finally did become a stated objective, but 
not until 26 March. That objective was clearly stated in all the post-operation analyses, but it 
was not clearly stated in the orders before 26 March. The German official history later 
imposed an ex-post facto operational objective. "Despite the superhuman efforts of men and 
horses, the operational objective [operative Ziel] of splitting the French and the British and 
then fighting each separately was not achieved. " 311 
Ironically, some of the Allied leaders, most particularly Foch and Wilson, recognized 
the significance of Amiens long before Ludendorff did. On 18 April, the new commander of 
the British Fourth Army, Sir Henry Rawlinson, wrote to Wilson; "There can be no question 
that the Amiens area is the only one in which the enemy can hope to gain such a success as to 
force the Allies to discuss terms of peace. " 312 Writing in his memoirs after the war 
Hindenburg said: 
The decision was therefore to be sought more and more in 
the direction of Amiens.... We ought to have shouted in the ear 
of every single man: 'Press on to Amiens. Put in your last ounce. 
Perhaps Amiens means decisive victory. Capture Villers- 
Bretonneux whatever happens, so that from its height we can 
command it with masses of our heavy artillery. 313 
Things might have gone better for the Germans if Hindenburg had told that to Ludendorff 
well before 21 March. 
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The Germans ended up only seven miles from Amiens. The BEF's major forward 
marshaling and switching yards remained under artillery and air interdiction until the 
summer, and most rail traffic had to be routed through the much lower capacity station at 
Beauvais. 314 But the Germans apparently never fully exploited that advantage. On 7 April 
the Second Army sent OHL a telegram requesting the assignment of a 280mm SCHWEFLA 
battery specifically to shell the rail facilities around Amiens. 315 The following day OHL 
responded with a telegram signed by Ludendorff, curtly denying the request. 
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Decision 21 March 
By the end of the first day of Operation MICHAEL, less than sixteen hours after the 
German Infantry had jumped off, the basic operational concept already was starting to come 
apart. The Cambrai Salient had not been eliminated, and the inner wings of the Second and 
Seventeenth Armies were still separated. But rather than sticking to the original plan, 
Ludendorff followed the tactical principle of reinforcing success rather than failure. He 
committed six additional divisions to the Eighteenth Army, while committing none to the 
Second or Seventeenth. Nor did he order the shifting of the artillery north to support MARS. 
But he did order the Seventh Army to start moving forces into position, shifting even more 
weight to the south. Operationally, this all but killed the original MICHAEL plan, even 
though over the next several days Ludendorff attempted to waffle back to it. 
Decision 23 March 
Ludendorffs decisions on 23 March are completely glossed-over in his memoirs. In 
ordering diverging attacks, northwest, west, southwest, he abandoned the original operational 
concept and enlarged the scope of the operation, without having yet separated the British and 
French. On 23 March the Cambrai Salient still had not been taken, the British artillery was 
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still mostly intact, and French forces in the south were starting to arrive in some numbers. Yet 
Ludendorff expanded the scope of the battle to three divergent main attacks, against two 
enemy forces, and involving a semi-circular front of 90 miles. Ludendorff, in effect, started 
the exploitation phase of a battle not yet won. The three diverging attacks remind one of a 
larger scale version of the U. S. 28th Infantry Division's disastrous attack in the Hürtgen 
Forest in November 1944. 
In his post-war assessment of the operation, Kuhl maintained that Ludendorff should 
have stuck to the original operational plan by putting the left wing on the defensive along the 
Somme, and then shifting forces from the Eighteenth to the Second Army. This would have 
improved the Second Army's advance, and possibly might have carried along the Seventeenth 
Army as well. 317 Correlli Barnett, on the other hand, wrote that Ludendorff should have 
recognized the pattern of German success in the south as early as 22 March, and channeled 
all his forces into a single thrust to split the British and the French. 318 
Decision 26 March 
By 26 March the three-pronged attack had given way to a two-pronged attack against 
the British and the French. But in deciding to launch the two MARS attacks and 
WALKÜRENRITT in the north two days hence, Ludendorff seemed to be trying to return to 
the original operational concept he abandoned late on 21 March. Those additional attacks in 
the north only further dissipated the main effort, and expended resources for no gain. 
Operationally they made no sense at all. MARS originally was supposed to facilitate the pivot 
of the Seventeenth Army. But the Seventeenth Army's direction of advance already had been 
changed from northwest to west, and its main effort was now supposed to be on its left wing. 
So just what was MARS supposed to accomplish? MARS was launched without forces 
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sufficient for even a chance of its success. But what if the Germans had committed that nine- 
division and 1,250-gun force against Amiens? 
In the south, the Eighteenth Army was given no direct role in the capture of Amiens, 
other than pivoting to block off the French--a movement away from Amiens itself. But 
directly in front of Amiens was a solid defensive position of wire systems and concrete 
bunkers. Built by the French in 1915, the Amiens Line ran eight miles from Demuin on the 
Luce River to Sailly le Sec on the Somme 319 The Eighteenth Army was supposed to pass just 
to the south of the Amiens defenses, and could have made a flanking attack against the 
British positions. Instead, the Second Army was given the mission of making a frontal attack, 
something that was supposed to be anathema to German tactical doctrine. 
Decision 28 March 
After the failure of MARS, Ludendorff all but shut down operations in the north and 
shifted back to the middle, but with his forces too dispersed to have any real effect. Just hours 
earlier, the path to Amiens had been wide open from the south, but by late on 28 March 
French forces under Fayolle were starting to shore up the British defenses. At a Fourth Army 
POW camp in late May, a British officer told Crown Prince Rupprecht: "It would have been 
easy for the Germans to take Amiens on 29 March, if they had just pushed their attack 
farther. What did we have facing them? We were completely at the mercy of the Germans; 
but they stopped half way. God knows why. " 320 
By not committing the Eighteenth Army to the drive for Amiens, Ludendorff had 
condemned the Second Army to a hopeless frontal attack across almost impossible terrain. 
Writing in the British official history, Edmonds speculated that the Germans did not exploit 
the success against the French at Montdidier because doing so would have lengthened the 
flanks of the salient already created, making them even more vulnerable. Yet, taking Amiens 
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then would have severed the rail link between the Allies, "and left the British on 'an island' so 
that they could have been dealt with at leisure without weakening the tactical situation. " 321 
With the failure to take Amiens at that point, Operation MICHAEL had almost no , 
hope of achieving any worthwhile operational results. Ironically, this is the point at which 
Amiens finally became a clear objective for Ludendorff. It remains questionable, however, 
whether he really finally understood Amiens' significance, or if it was just the last spot on the 
map he thought he had some sort of chance of taking. 
Rupprecht thought it was a mistake to let up the pressure on the British at all. Several 
weeks later, as Operation GEORGETTE was dying, Rupprecht wrote to his father, the King 
of Bavaria: 
... OHL, 
in view of their own not inconsiderable losses, 
decided to give up the attacks on the British and turn 
with strong forces against the approaching French, 
instead of staying on the defensive against the latter. 
The English, in consequence, were presented with the 
opportunity of being able to fortify their front anew. 322 
Decision 30 March 
By 30 March it should have been clear to anyone that MICHAEL had reached 
culmination. In the case of culmination, the original plans had called for an immediate 
regrouping and shifting of forces, not wasting them in further costly and useless fighting. At 
this point the German Second and Eighteenth Armies had 41 divisions (22 in the front line), 
and four moving up. The British Fourth and French First and Third Armies had 33 infantry 
and six cavalry divisions (20 in the front line), and five moving up. 323 And as noted above, . 
by 30 March the three MICHAEL armies had only ten SCHWEFLA batteries among them. 
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If Operation GEORGETTE had even the most remote chance of success, Ludendorff 
severely hurt that chance by deciding not to break off MICHAEL on 30 March. The resources 
squandered in the fighting after 30 March just might have tipped the balance in the follow-on 
operation that in many ways was a closer-run thing than MICHAEL. To cite just the example 
of horses, one of the German Army's most critical scarce resources, more than one third of 
the almost 29,000 horses lost were lost after 31 March. 
Table 6.14 
Operation MICHAEL Horse Losses 324 
Army 21-31 March 1-10 April 
Seventeenth 7,000 2,079 
Second 5,987 3,201 
Eighteenth 5,314 5,177 
18,301 10,457 
Allied Reactions 
The competence and decisions of the enemy commanders is one thing a commander 
cannot control directly. The most he can hope to do is influence those decisions indirectly 
through a deception plan. Initially the German deception plan was successful, with the French 
believing the main German attack would come in Champagne and threaten Paris, and the 
British believing it would be toward their own Channel ports in the north. Thus, for the first 
six days of Operation MICHAEL, Petain and Haig both saw themselves fighting completely 
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different battles. The decisions of the two Allied commanders were doing almost as much to 
pull their two forces apart as the Germans were doing to drive them apart. 
All that changed as the result of the Doullens Conference late on 26 March. One 
commander, Foch, was put in charge of the battle. Even the British official history admitted, 
"The appointment of General Foch to co-ordinate and control the Allied efforts prevented the 
disaster of the separation of the two Armies. " 325 Nonetheless, the British did complain of 
communications problems that stemmed from Foch's inexperience at dealing with British 
commanders. Fortunately for the Allies, however, Foch saw the operational decisive point 
more clearly than either of his two primary subordinates, Haig and Main. He also saw that 
decisive point far more clearly than his key opponent, Ludendorff. 
Alternatives 
Was Operational MICHAEL the right attack, and could it have succeeded? Those two 
questions have been debated by historians and military analysts since almost immediately 
after Ludendorff broke off the attack. Some historians have argued that GEORG was the 
better of the two options, and that the same resources committed to GEORG would have 
produced greater results. A 60-kilometer penetration northwest of Armentieres would have 
reached the coast. The fallacy of that argument is that there is no way to assume that an attack 
in that sector with equal forces would have produced equal results on the ground. The terrain, 
the defenses, and the opposing forces were all much different. 
Perhaps the greatest weakness of both MICHAEL and GEORG is that each was 
designed as stand-alone decisive battle, rather than as a phase of a larger sequence of 
operations. And both were designed to attack directly and destroy the enemy's main force, 
rather than attacking an exploitable vulnerability, such as the BEF's very fragile and shallow 
logistics system. In other words, each was supposed to be a Vernichtungsschlacht. But if the 
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two operations had been designed as phases of a larger operation to attack the enemy's center 
of gravity (the BEF itself) indirectly, then the decisive points of MICHAEL and GEORG 
should have been the rail centers at Amiens and Hazebrouck respectively. The loss of either 
one would have hurt the British severely; the loss of both would have been fatal. Once those 
two objectives were secure, follow-on objectives would be Abancourt, St. Pol, and then the 
Channel ports. This, of course, would have been a variation on the "skillful combination of 
multiple attacks having a highly reciprocal effects" proposed by Wetzell on 12 December 
1917, but in this case targeted for the BEF's logistics jugular vein. 
If the operations had been designed as a sequenced set, MICHAEL was most likely 
the better one to start. An initial successful attack against Hazebrouck would have made it 
very clear that Amiens would be the next objective. At that point, the French would be sure to 
push massive reinforcements to the Somme sector. A successful first attack against Amiens, 
on the other hand, would partially seal off the north and isolate the British forces there. The 
control of the north-south rail lines would, temporarily at least, cut the movement of 
reinforcements to a trickle. Weather and terrain conditions at that time of year also favored an 
earlier attack in the south--although in the event, the late winter and early spring of 1918 
were far dryer than normal. 
Amiens became the final objective for MICHAEL almost as an after-thought. If 
Amiens had been the clear operational objective right from the start, the operation would 
have looked much different. For a focused drive on Amiens, MICHAEL would not 
necessarily have been as large an operation. The main attack should have been made by the 
Eighteenth Army, south of the Somme. The Allies were the weakest there, and the ground 
was some of the most favorable attack terrain on the Western Front. The attack would be 
supported in the south by the Seventh Army, with a mission of blocking the French forces 
moving up and deceiving the French into thinking that Paris was the objective. That 
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essentially was the Seventh Army's primary mission in Operation BLOCHER in May 1918. 
To the north, the Second Army would support the attack by splitting the boundary between , 
the British Third and Fifth Armies. The Cambrai Salient could be fixed with a frontal holding 
attack, and later taken from the rear. 
Once Amiens was taken, the Germans would have to hold it with sufficient force to, , 
prevent the French from retaking it, while at the same time, shifting sufficient artillery north 
as rapidly as possible to support the attack on Hazebrouck. Such a series of attacks would 
have been complex and difficult to orchestrate, but they would have been simpler than 
MICHAEL-MARS-GEORGETTE as those operations actually played out. A sequenced 
series of attacks specifically designed to take Amiens and Hazebrouck would have had a 
good to very good chance of succeeding. MICHAEL and GEORGETTE came very close to 
taking those respective objectives; and although GEORGETTE was designed to do that, 
MICHAEL was not. 
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One cannot help being struck by the 
contradiction which appears between 
Ludendorffs strong-willed character 
and the lack of perseverance in the 
directing idea which he had conceived. 1 
General Maxime Weygand 
Command and staff work are quite different 
arts, and capacity for both is rarely combined 
in one individual. 
Brigadier-General James Edmonds 
Chapter VII 
Operation GEORGETTE 
(9-29 April 1918) 
PLANS 
Operation MICHAEL failed, but Ludendorff had not quite given up on it. Initially he 
thought it would be possible to resume MICHAEL in two or three weeks. On the other hand, 
he believed the British forces were shaken and off balance, and he wanted to resume 
offensive operations as quickly as possible to take advantage of the situation. 3 Soon after the 
termination of MICHAEL, Crown Prince Wilhelm recommended a focused attack on 
Amiens; but those preparations could not be completed before 17 April. 4 Rupprecht and 
Ludendorff also discussed the possibility of attacks against the British at Albert, Arras, and 
south of the Somme; but those attacks could not be ready to go until 16 April. S That was not 
fast enough for Ludendorff, so he reached for the old GEORG attack plan, which along the 
way had evolved into KLEIN-GEORG, and then GEORGETTE. 
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Wetzell originally had recommended an attack in the vicinity of St. Quentin, followed 
as soon as possible by an attack in Flanders--but for a much different purpose than what 
eventually became the GEORGETTE attack. Wetzell envisioned the St. Quentin offensive 
being conducted only up to a fixed line, and for the sole purpose of pulling the British 
reserves down from Flanders. Kuhl also had recognized the necessity for such a diversion in 
his original proposal. As Kuhl and Wetzell saw it, the main attack would be directed toward 
Hazebrouck, with the objective of rolling up the British front from the north. [Map 4] But 
Ludendorff decided that the German Army did not have the necessary resources for a strong 
diversionary attack prior to the main attack, and OHL therefore rejected both Wetzell's and 
Kuhl's plans. 6 
On 20 November 1917 Crown Prince Rupprecht's headquarters issued its initial 
analytical study of the GEORG Operation: 
[GEORG's] objective must be to defeat the enemy. In the zone 
of the group of armies this objective would best seem to be 
attained by an attack near Armentieres--Estaires against the flank 
and rear of the mass of the British Army assumed to be in the 
Ypres salient and west thereof. Furthermore, this attack is the 
best operation for thwarting the enemy offensive in Flanders and 
for ensuring the permanent security of our U-boat base. 
Rupprecht's planners already had clearly identified the Portuguese sector as the 
weakest and therefore the best break-in point. Estaires--Flazebrouck was the "strategically 
most effective direction. " The Sixth Army would make the main attack with 20 to 25 
divisions, and the Fourth Army would conduct a supporting attack %ý ith 12 to 15 divisions. 
With the attack's right flank anchored on the La Bassee Canal, the most serious problem 
would be the high ground on the right: 
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Our primary endeavor must be to affect a wide envelopment on 
the left. In the case of an extension to the right, we must consider 
how the problem of the high ground near Kemmel will be handled... 
We must avoid committing heavy forces in a stiff fight for this 
high ground. 8 
In a course of action analysis dated 15 December 1917, Rupprecht's planners warned 
that the Germans could no longer assume that the British would continue their offensive in 
Flanders. They recommended a supporting diversionary attack, either against Ypres or 
Cambrai, to tie down the British reserves. The subsequent main attack would collapse the 
British in the north, take their northern ports, and then roll them up to the south. 9 Six days 
later Rupprecht's staff issued another course of action analysis that recommended Cambrai 
rather than Ypres as the best place for the diversionary attack. Ypres, they argued, was too 
close to the main attack, which would give the British the advantage of operating on interior 
lines. The British might simply evacuate the Ypres salient and then the British reserves could 
then be shifted against GEORG, which would reduce the attack's flank and rear effectiveness. 
But if Ypres did become the place of the diversionary attack, that attack should precede 
GEORG rather than follow it. 10 
On 3 January 1918 Rupprecht's Army Group issued the detailed planning guidance for 
its subordinate armies. The Sixth Army, now with 30 to 40 divisions, would conduct the 
GEORG I main attack, creating a breakthrough in the direction of Hazebrouck, with the ports 
of Calais and Dunkirk as deep objectives. The Fourth Army would launch GEORG II, a 
supporting attack against the Ypres Salient with an additional 12 to 15 divisions. II 
The final version of the original GEORG plan called for a frontal attack to fix the 
British First Army, followed by converging attacks against the British Second Army, with the 
objective of destroying it. If the Germans could secure the line of the Flanders Hills from 
Kemmel to Godewearsvedle, the British would be forced to evacuate the Ypres Salient. Most 
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of Rupprecht's planners saw this line of high ground in an otherwise flat plane as the key to 
the entire area. That line of high ground partially encircled Ypres, starting with the very low 
Passchendaele ridge just to the east-northeast of the town, continuing to the south-southwest 
through the Messines Ridge, and then hooking almost straight west through a line of 
relatively high peaks. Mount Kemmel (156 meters), some 8 kilometers almost dead south of 
Ypres, was at the eastern end of that line. Mount des Cats (158 meters) near Godewearsvedle, 
south-southwest of Ypres, was at the western end. Farther to the west and separated from the 
Cats-Kemmel ridge by a stretch of flat ground, Mount Cassel (158 meters) was the last piece 
of high ground before the coast. Dunkirk could be observed directly from atop Mount Cassel. 
That piece of high ground was a key objective of the original GEORG plan. 12 [Map 4] 
The original plan called for the Sixth Army to attack between the La Bassee Canal 
and Armentieres. Once it broke through, it would attack the British forces to the north in the 
flank and rear. The right wing of the Sixth Army would envelope Armentieres from the 
south. The center would take the high ground around Locre and Godewearsvedle. The left ,, 
wing would screen the flank, but also be prepared to advance against British forces in the 
south. In the second phase of the attack, the Sixth Army would form into three groups. The 
right and strongest group would move against Dunkirk and Gravelines; the left group would 
screen the left flank; and the center group would follow in reserve to Aire. The artillery 
requirement for GEORG I was estimated at 620 field batteries and 588 heavy batteries. 13 
The Fourth Army would attack Messines Ridge and Mount Kemmel to cut off the 
British in the Ypres Salient. GEORG II was divided into three subordinate attacks. 
HASENJAGD (RABBIT HUNT) would be the main effort to support GEORG I by driving 
northwest toward Poperinghe and taking Mount Kemmel. WALDFEST (FOREST 
FESTIVAL) would be an attack from the Houthulst Forest southwest against the northern 
flank of the Ypres salient, also converging on Poperinghe. FLANDERN III would be a 
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diversionary attack from Dixmuide south-southwest toward Reninghelst, breaking through 
the Belgian positions and driving for the left flank of the British Second Army. If 
FLANDERN III could not be launched simultaneously with HASENJAGD, then it would 
later be launched frontally against the Belgians to fix them. 
Ludendorff made the decision for the MICHAEL option at the 21 January Aresens 
Conference, but that decision was closely held for security purposes. At one of the meetings 
leading up to the Aresens Conference, Ludendorff made a point of noting that the GEORG II 
attack south of Ypres should advance in a northwest direction, bypassing the high ground 
around Mount Kemmel. 14 German planning would continue to waffle back and forth on the 
question of taking or bypassing the Flanders Hills. On 24 January OHL directed the Sixth and 
Fourth Armies to continue the GEORG I and II preparations, with a projected launch date in 
April. OHL cautioned, however, that it could allocate only 30 divisions for GEORG I. 15 At 
the Mons Planning Conference held on 3 February, the GEORG attacks were downgraded 
from diversionary attacks to feints, and renamed KLEIN-GEORG I and II. Now OHL would 
only be able to provide 20 divisions for KLEIN-GEORG I, and 12 to 15 divisions for 
KLEIN-GEORG II. 16 
Even though Kuhl continued to believe that GEORG was the best option, he had little 
enthusiasm for KLEIN-GEORG as a follow-up to MICHAEL. He argued that if large British 
reserves moved south from Flanders in response to MICHEAL, it would be very difficult to 
withdraw German forces from MICHAEL, especially artillery, and shift them back north for 
KLEIN-GEORG. Kuhl thought instead that the Germans should launch strong diversionary 
attacks in Flanders in support of MICHAEL. 17 On 10 February Ludendorff sent a somewhat 
rambling telegram to Rupprecht's headquarters outlining the purpose and scope of any attacks 
in the north: 
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In response to your message Ia 5459 (secret): OHL having 
decided on the MICHAEL offensive as the main operation, 
GEORG I and II will constitute merely the second phase, and 
on the contingency only that the MICHAEL offensive does 
not culminate in the expected great breakthrough, but instead 
comes to a standstill when encountering the British and French 
reserves that have moved up in response. 
From the general situation that results, it will be possible to 
execute the disposition of the units for the GEORG I and GEORG 
II offensives by regrouping the forces, especially the artillery that 
was used in the MICHAEL offensive. It will neither be possible 
nor necessary to execute the GEORG operations in the manner 
recommended by the Fourth and Sixth Armies and with the number 
of units required by them. We will not be able to make available 
the units these two armies have estimated for--not even the approximate 
numbers specified--nor, most importantly, will we be able to move 
them to the new front and commit them to action there in a short 
period of time. Thus it will be necessary to restrict materially or to 
abandon completely the operations on the left wing (the southern 
portion of GEORG I). The more than 20 divisions, excluding the 
trench divisions, cannot be made available in time for GEORG I; 
nor can the 12 to 15 divisions, not counting the trench divisions, 
be made available for GEORG II. It is, however, safe to assume 
that the GEORG operation considered as a second phase, will 
produce a decisive effect, inasmuch as we can count with absolute 
certainty on the British reserves being contained farther south by the 
MICHAEL offensive. It is most important, therefore, that GEORG I 
and HASENJAGD should advance on both sides of Armentieres 
toward Hazebrouck. Simultaneously, WALDFEST should cut off the 
Ypres salient from the northeast. 
Therefore, I ask you to continue the GEORG I preparations on this 
basis and forward the plans to OHL as soon as both armies have made 
their revisions. 18 
Rupprecht understood the message to mean that although MICHAEL would be the 
main attack, GEORG would follow if necessary. 19 On 12 February Rupprechts 
headquarters informed the Fourth and Sixth Armies of that, noting, "The Sixth Army will 
conduct the main attack in the direction of Hazebrouck in order to take the English north 
wing from the rear. " But now there was no mention of the Channel ports as deep objectives. 
The order also noted that the preparations for KLIEN-GEORG would constitute a major 
element of the deception plan for MICHAEL. 20 
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On 17 February Rupprecht's Army Group approved the basic plans for KLEIN- 
GEORG I, but told the Sixth Army not to plan on more than 20 divisions. 21 It also ordered 
the Fourth Army to prepare, in order of priority, HASENJAGD, FLANDERN III, and 
WALDFEST, planning for 12 to 15 divisions. 22 When the plans were submitted to OHL, 
Rupprecht's staff pointed out that HASENJAGD was probably the only part of KLEIN- 
GEORGE II that could be launched simultaneously with KLEIN-GEORGE I. OHL approved 
the plans, stressing that the HASENJAGD attack against the Messines Ridge should not be 
too narrow. The artillery requirement for KLEIN-GEORG I was now reduced to 130 field 
batteries and 192 heavy batteries. 23 
On 9 March Rupprecht's Army Group issued plans for the regrouping of forces from 
MICHAEL to KLIEN-GEORG I. The Seventeenth Army would provide the Sixth Army 
with six divisions and 131 artillery batteries, and the Second Army would provide five 
divisions and 127 batteries. OHL also would provide two divisions and 45 heavy artillery 
batteries. 24 
In the first days of Operation MICHAEL, when it appeared to be succeeding, OHL 
concluded that KLEIN-GEORG would not be needed. OHL figured it could accomplish the 
same objectives by extending MICHAEL farther to the north with MARS and 
WALKÜRENRITT. 25 On 23 March the Sixth and Fourth Armies were ordered to suspend all 
preparations for the attack. 26 The next day, however, KLEIN-GEORG was back on the 
table, with Wetzell telling Rupprecht that Ludendorff hoped to launch that offensive in about 
eight days. On 26 March Wetzell urged Ludendorff to cancel MARS and launch a 
reinvigorated Operation GEORG instead. Ludendorff rejected the recommendation. 27 That 
same day OHL ordered the Sixth Army to resume preparations for KLEIN-GEORG I and the 
Fourth Army to resume preparations for attacks against the Belgians. 28 With its resources 
reduced even more, the Sixth Army sent the plan for the operation now called GEORGETTE 
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Ito OHL. 29 The basic assumption was that the attack would be necessary only if the MARS 
and WALKÜRENRITT attacks failed to roll up the British from the south. 
The latest version of the plan called for the Sixth Army to make a ten-division attack 
with six fresh assault and four trench divisions. The main effort would be launched by four 
divisions against the Portuguese sector from Givenchy to Fromelles, driving northwest 
toward Hazebrouck. The immediate objective of that attack was to reach and cross the Lys on 
the first day, force the British back behind the river, and then facilitate the follow-on attack of 
the Fourth Army. 30 Two more divisions of the Sixth Army had the mission of securing the 
left flank along the Le Bassee Canal. Two divisions in the first echelon followed by two 
divisions in the second echelon would attack on the right flank to reach the Lys east of Sailly, 
and then prepare to exploit to the north. In addition to the ten initially attacking divisions, two 
divisions would follow behind the center as the army reserve. 
The Fourth Army, initially launching only HASENJAGD, would attack to the west, 
with its left flank on Frelinghien. The sector between Fromelles and Frelinghien, which 
included Armentieres, would be cut off and pinched out in conjunction with the right flank of 
the Sixth Army's attack. The success of the entire GEORGETTE operation depended on 
reaching the Lys between Estaires and Armentieres in 24 to 48 hours and crossing in multiple 
places before the British could organize and move up a resistance. [Map 4] 
Both MARS attacks failed utterly on 28 March, and WALKÜRENRITT, which had 
been scheduled for the following day, was cancelled. On 29 March OHL issued orders for the 
conduct of further operations, and Rupprecht's Army Group issued a warning order for 
GEORGETTE. 31 The Sixth Army was now promised seven divisions from the Seventeenth 
Army, for a total plus-up of 11 divisions that would give it a total of 17. The Fourth Army 
was ordered to expand the FLANDERN III attack into FLANDERN IV, extending it from 
Dixmuide to the coast, with an objective of capturing the coastal area south of Nieuport. 
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GEORGETTE and FLANDREN IV could not be executed simultaneously, however, because 
of insufficient forces. HASENJAGD would support GEORGETTE I initially, with 
WALDFEST and FLANDERN IV to follow based on the situation and the availability of 
forces. 
It was difficult at that point for the Germans to provide more forces for 
GEORGETTE, because MICHAEL had added 33 miles to the length of the German front. 
OHL issued the orders for shifting and reassigning the artillery and special troops, but not on 
anywhere near the scale of the original GEORG plan. The Seventeenth Army would now 
provide the Sixth Army with 56 heavy batteries, and OHL would provide 32 heavy 
batteries 32 
As it became more obvious that the Germans would not take Amiens, the importance 
of GEORGETTE grew for OHL. All the planners came to realize that it would actually 
constitute the second phase vaguely referenced in the MICHAEL operations order of 10 
March. On 30 March OHL set 4 April as the start date for GEORGETTE, but only "if 
weather conditions permit. " 33 Rupprecht's Army Group responded that the attacking 
divisions might not be available in time, causing a delay. Preparations, however, would still 
continue. 34 
On 1 April OHL ordered the resumption of Operation MICHAEL, supported in the 
north by Operation GEORGETTE on 8 April, and in the south by Operation ERZENGEL on 
5 April. 35 On 3 April Ludendorff, Kuhl, and the chiefs of staff of the Fourth and Sixth 
Armies met in Tournai to review the GEORGETTE planning. 6 During the meeting 
Ludendorff only talked about initial objectives for the attacking forces and did not mention 
follow-on objectives. 37 Immediately following that meeting, Rupprecht's Army Group issued 
the final orders for GEORGETTE. The orders noted that if GEORGETTE proved to be a 
major success, the remaining forces of the army group would be committed to exploit it. 38 
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The Sixth Army was to attack with its right wing along the vector Armentieres-- 
Steenwerck--Bailleul to take the heights north of Bailleul (Mount Kemmel-Mount des Cats 
ridge), and then be prepared to advance beyond Godewearsvedle to Cassel. The center was 
to attack along the line Clairmarais Forest-Thiennes to take the Lys crossings. The left wing 
was to attack over the Canal d'Aire to secure the heights west and south of Bethune and the 
crossings at Bethune and La Bassee. The main effort was toward Hazebrouck. Both wings 
had to be deeply echeloned, and "objectives for follow-on attack [would] depend on the 
situation. " 
The Fourth Army was to be ready to launch HASENJAGD in the direction of 
Messines--Wulverghem as soon as British front north of Armentieres began to waiver, but 
not until the right wing of the Sixth Army got across the Lys. The initial objective was 
Messines Ridge, then Mount Kemmel. HASENJAGD would then establish contact with right 
wing of GEORGETTE I in the vicinity of Neuve Eglise, then swing to the northwest. [Map 4] 
The Fourth Army also would be prepared to exploit on order with WALDFEST and 
FLANDERN IV. 
The Germans broke off the attack on Amiens on 4 April, and officially terminated 
Operation MICHAEL the next day. On 6 April GEORGETTE I was pushed back one day, to 
9 April. 39 At that point Rupprecht's Army Group estimated that there were six and 1/3 British 
and two Portuguese divisions in the line opposite the Sixth Army. 40 
On 7 April Kuhl held a planning conference at Tournai with the chiefs of staff of the 
Fourth and Sixth Armies. 1 Ludendorff now wanted the right wing of the Sixth Army and the 
left wing of the Fourth Army to attack simultaneously on 9 April, but Lossberg pointed out 
the available heavy artillery was insufficient to support both attacks. The decision finally 
was made for the Fourth Army to attack on 10 April. The objective was to envelope 
Armentieres from both flanks without having to attack it directly 42 The Fourth Army's 
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WALDFEST attack from the Houthulst Forest against the north of the Ypres Salient was split 
into two different options. One was a deliberate attack (planmässigen Angrifj) called 
TANNENBERG; the other was a pursuit attack (Verfolgungsangriff) called BLÜCHER, to be 
launched if the British started to evacuate the salient voluntarily. 43 
In a telephone conversation on 8 April, Ludendorff told Kuhl that if GEORGETTE 
was a success, the Germans must then be prepared to follow-up with immediate attacks in the 
vicinities of Arras, Albert, and south of the Somme. 
44 Rupprecht recorded in his diary that 
same day that the staff of the Second Army was irritated by Ludendorffs insistence on 
dictating such minor details as the times that rearward divisions would break camp. 45 As the 
period of intense combat of the 1918 offensives continued, Ludendorff increasingly interfered 
in lower level planning and execution details. Major Joachim von Stuelpnagel, a General 
Staff officer at the Seventeenth Army, also complained about being on the receiving end of 
many of Ludendorff s telephone calls about minutia. 46 
PREPARATIONS 
The preparations and build-up (Aufmarsch) for GEORGETTE were similar to those 
for MICHAEL, except on a smaller scale and on a far more compressed schedule. 47 OHL 
originally figured that following a successful MICHAEL breakthrough it would be possible 
to release some of the required artillery and trench mortar units, engineer units, labor forces, 
search light platoons, flame thrower companies, and visual signal platoons. It would not, 
however, be possible to transfer the bulk of the forces north until MICHAEL had been 
definitely terminated. Even after that point it would be necessary to leave most of the support 
columns with the MICHAEL armies until the local rail lines could be repaired and extended 
to the German advanced positions. 48 
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OHL also had to determine which units could be shifted via the already overloaded 
rail net and which would have to march. Most of the units from the Seventeenth Army were 
t 
nearer, so they would march. All marches would be conducted at night. The units from 
Second Army had the farthest to go, and they would go by rail whenever possible. The basic 
load for artillery ammunition was set at four days of fire, and the rations basic load at sixteen i 
days. The daily ammunition re-supply requirement was 14 to 15 trains just for the Sixth ., 
Army, and 30 to 35 trains for the whole of Rupprecht's Army Group. Even though 
r 
MICHAEL had halted, the consolidation and defensive operations in the Second and 
i 
Seventeenth Army sectors continued to consume unexpectedly high amounts of ammunition, 
and by 7 April Rupprecht's Army Group reported to OHL that the Sixth Army had received 
only half its total supply requirement. 49 
Ludendorff took no chances with the artillery preparations this time. The Sixth 
Army's artillery chief, General Huhn, had been one of the major dissenters at the 29 January 
artillery conference. At the end of March Huhn was sick. Possibly Kuhl asked for 
Bruchmüller first, but in the event Ludendorff decided to second Bruchmüller and his entire 
staff to the Sixth Army to make sure the firepower planning and execution were done right 
this time. Bruchmüller and his ARKO 86 staff were set up at a command post near Hamm 
east of St. Quentin when he got the phone message to report personally to Ludendorff at OHL 
50 to receive his orders for GEORGETTE. 
Bruchmüller was not enthusiastic about the task he had been handed. He had only 
nine days to pull it all together. When he reached the Sixth Army headquarters he found 
almost no artillery planning had been started. A quick tour of the forward positions showed 
utter confusion among the artillery units. Reinforcing batteries transferred in from other 
sectors for the attack were just sitting around in the rear areas, and no one seemed to know 
i 
318 
lk 
what to do with them. Once more Marx and Pulkowski mounted a massive training effort, 
despite encountering stiff-necked skepticism. 51 
Allied Actions 
General Sir Henry Wilson saw clearly the most dangerous course of action to the 
British. In a telegram to Foch he wrote: 
In my opinion, the proper course for the enemy to pursue is as 
follows: place Amiens town and Amiens railway and junctions 
under his guns so as to deny all serious traffic, then mass an 
attack of 40 to 50 divisions against the British between Albert 
and the La Bassee Canal. If the enemy does this and at the same 
time is prepared to give up ground in front of a French attack, I 
am quite certain the British line will not be able to sustain such 
an attack without the direct assistance of French divisions, or 
unless the French take over much more of the British line to 
enable Field-Marshal Haig to have many more troops than he 
now has in reserve. 52 
Haig agreed with Wilson and told Foch so, but the French declined to take over any 
more of the British line. Small French reserves were west of Amiens, but Haig wanted them 
moved farther north, to the vicinity of St. Pol. Foch felt very strongly that the Allies should 
attack as soon as possible south of the Somme to drive the Germans back from the Paris- 
Amiens rail line and the Amiens rail center. His two primary objectives at this point were to 
strengthen the connection between the British and the French and to "cover Amiens. ". 53 
By 2 April British intelligence estimated that the Germans would continue the attack 
in the Arras sector. 54 The British front line there was only 50 miles from the coast. At the 
southern end of the sector Vimy Ridge lay only three miles from the front. Control of that 
ridge would allow the Germans to exploit to the south. On the north end of the Arras sector 
lay that portion of the Bethune coalfields not already in German possession or under their 
guns. Even Main agreed this was the most economically critical sector of the front. 
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At the Beauvais conference on 3 April, the Allies expanded Foch's mandate, giving 
him "strategic direction" of all Allied military operations, not just the response to MICHAEL. 
The commanders of the British, French, and American Armies in the field retained "full 
control of the tactical employment of their forces. " 55 The Belgian King, however, flatly 
refused to recognize Foch's authority over Belgian forces. 
By 5 April the Allied intelligence assessment noted the potential of a follow-on 
German offensive north of Arras. 56 Haig reorganized his reserves into two groups: one 
consisting of eight divisions (five fresh) between the Ancre and Doullens; and one of seven 
divisions (two fresh) northwest of Arras. Main also started shifting French forces north to 
Ailly sur Noye. Several days earlier, General Sir Henry Home, the commander of the British 
First Army, had decided that the two weak Portuguese divisions should be withdrawn from 
their sector of the line in the vicinity of Neuve Chapelle. By 5 April the Portuguese 1st 
Division had been withdrawn, and the British 50th Northumbrian Division was scheduled to 
relieve the Portuguese 2nd Division on 9 April. But after the Portuguese 15` Division pulled 
out, the Portuguese 2"d Division merely extended to cover the gap, thus making that sector 
even weaker when the Germans struck. 57 
On 6 April Haig's intelligence chief, Brigadier-General E. W. Cox, reported that the 
Germans intended to capture Vimy Ridge by turning it on both flanks from Arras and Lens. 58 
This, of course, would have meant a resumption of the MARS and WALKÜRENRITT 
operations. On 8 April Home reported to Haig that he had every indication he would be 
attacked the next day. The French, meanwhile, were planning in conjunction with the British 
Fourth Army to attack the German Eighteenth and Seventh Armies in the south, with a 
projected attack date of 12 April. Nonetheless, Foch on 7 April agreed to move four French 
59 infantry and three cavalry divisions west of Amiens. In the immediate days before 
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GEORGETTE, the Allies also launched a series of local attacks at Hangard, Trois Doms, and 
other locations. 
German Order of Battle 
Only four of the Sixth Army's five corps participated in the GEORGETTE I attack. 
South of the La Bassee Canal, one corps held the line down to the Second Army's northern 
boundary. Both the Sixth and the Fourth Armies had to attack with a high percentage of 
trench divisions, which with their very limited mobility, acted as a drag on the overall tempo 
of the attack. On the other hand, the Sixth Army was reinforced with six tank units, each with 
five tanks. Almost all were machines captured from the Allies. 60 The following two tables 
show the order of battle for the attacking divisions and corps of the Sixth and Fourth Armies 
on 9 and 10 April 1917. When the attack jumped off, there were also three more trench 
divisions enroute to the Sixth Army sector as OHL reserve. 
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Table 7.1 
German Divisions on 9 and 10 A pril 1918 61 
First Second Third Total Sector 
Line Line Line Divisions Width 
Fourth 1 Attack 2 Attack * 3 Attack 17 km 
Army 3 Trench 2 Trench # 5 Trench 
Sixth 5 Attack 3 Attack I Attack # 9 Attack 27 km 
Army 5 Trench 2 Trench 2 Trench § 9 Trench 
6 Attack 3 Attack 3 Attack 12 Attack 44 km 
8 Trench 2 Trench 4 Trench 14 Trench 
* OHL Reserve 
# Army Reserve 
§1 each OHL and Army Reserve 
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Table 7.2 
German Corps on 9 and 10 April 1918 62 
(North to South) 
Corps Commander Attacking on 9 or 10 April 
Fourth Army Sixt von Arnim 
Naval Corps Schroeder No 
Guard Corps BSchmann No 
XVIII Reserve Sieger 10 April 
X Reserve Eberhardt 10 April 
Sixth Army Quast 
II Bavarian Stetten 9 April 
XIX Carlowitz 9 April 
LV Bernhardi 9 April 
IV Kraewel 9 April 
XL Litzmann No 
The artillery order of battle for GEORGETTE shows the weighting of the main attack 
far more clearly than it did for MICHAEL. With a total of 1,686 German guns opposing 511 
British, the Sixth Army started the battle with a tube superiority ratio of 3.3: 1. 
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Table 7.3 
German Guns on 9 and 10 April 1918 63 
Field Heavy Super Total 
Guns Guns Heavy Guns Guns 
Fourth 307 253 * 11 571 
Army 
Sixth 892 765 29 1,686 
Army 
1,199 971 40 2,210 
* Includes 47 heavy guns transferred from Sixth Army on the night of 9 April. 
The weighting of the main effort is far less clear in the air order of battle. The two 
attacking armies had only 57 percent of the aviation squadrons of all types and only 50 
percent of the bomber squadrons available to Rupprecht's Army Group. The Sixth Army, 
with four attacking corps, was supported by 43 squadrons; while the Fourth Army, attacking 
with only two corps had 33 squadrons. 
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Table 7.4 
German Squadrons on 10 Ap ril 1918 64 
Observation Attack Fighter Bomber Total 
Fourth 12 7 11 3 33 
Army 
Sixth 16 10 14 3 43 
Army 
GEORGETTE 
Total 28 17 25 6 76 
Seventeenth 15 460 25 
Army 
Second 16 486 33 
Army 
Army Group 
Total 59 25 39 12 134 
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British Order of Battle 
On the British side of the line, the First Army was spread especially thin, with each of 
the divisions having to cover a 6.7-kilometer sector on average. 
Table 7.5 
British Order of Battle in the GEORGETTE Sector 9-10 April 1918 65 
Infantry Cavalry Army Heavy Total Sector 
Divisions Divisions Reserve Guns Guns Width 
Second 501 Inf 
_ 
17km 
Army 
First 4*02 Inf 200 511 27km 
Army 
* Including one Portuguese Division 
French Order of Battle 66 
Between Switzerland and Le Fere on the Oise, the French on 9 April had: 46 divisions 
in the line; 12 divisions in reserve; three divisions in transit; and three American divisions. 
Between the Oise and the British the French had: eight divisions in the line; ten divisions in 
army and army group reserve; ten divisions (one American) in GQG reserve; six cavalry 
divisions in GQG reserve; and four divisions in transit toward the sector. 
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EXECUTION 
9 April 
As a lead-up to the GEORGETTE attack, the Germans on 7 and 8 April hit the British 
lines at Lens and Armentieres with heavy mustard gas barrages. On 9 April the Sixth Army 
launched its attack from Givenchy to Fromelles. The success of the operation depended on 
reaching the Lys between Estaires and Armentieres in 24 to 48 hours and making multiple 
crossings before the British could bring up reinforcements. On the right, the Bavarian II 
Corps had to reach the Lys east of Sailly. 67 
The German artillery opened fire at 0415 hours. At four-and-one half hours and with 
only four phases, the preparation was a streamlined version of the one Bruchmüller used at 
St. Quentin. Still not relying completely on the Pulkowski Method, the German guns firing 
against the British infantry positions verified their predicted registration data during the 2nd 
Phase of the preparation. The adjustment of the fire was accomplished by balloon observers 
wherever ground observers could not see the targets. The rate of advance of the creeping 
barrage was slower than at St. Quentin. The Sixth Army fired a total of 1.4 million artillery 
rounds that first day. 68 
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Table 7.6 
Sixth Army Artillery Preparation, 9 April 1918 69 
1S` Phase (120 minutes) 
" Fire strike with Buntkreuz against enemy batteries, trench mortars, 
headquarters, communications centers, and depots. 
" Trench mortars drop out after 20 minutes firing. 
0 50 minutes after the start, 10-minute saturation of the front infantry 
positions with no counter battery fire. 
" HE against the 1St line; Blue Cross against the 2 "d and 3 `d lines. 
2 °a Phase (30 minutes) 
" Registration verification against the infantry positions. 
" AKA continues counter battery with gas. 
3rd Phase (115 minutes) 
" IKA attacks only those 1St infantry positions the mortars cannot reach. 
"2 "d and 3`d positions attacked heavily, especially the break-in sector. 
9 AKA continues counter battery. 
" After 90 minutes, 10 minute fire strike against enemy artillery by IKA and 
AKA. 
4th Phase (5 minutes) 
" Saturation fire on the leading trenches of the 1St position. 
Creeping Barrage (Feuerwalze) 
" 1St jump 300-400 meters. 
0 200 meter subsequent jumps. 
" 30 minutes per kilometer. 
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At 0845 hours the German infantry surged forward, once again in heavy fog. The 
weak Portuguese division in the center disintegrated almost immediately, with the Germans 
capturing large numbers of the fleeing troops. By 1500 hours the Germans had reached the 
Lys at Bac St. Maur and soon reached it at Estaires. By that night their lead units reached the 
River Lawe at Petit Marais and Vielle Chapelle, a penetration depth of six miles. Once again 
the initial results looked spectacular; but as on 21 March, the Germans had failed to achieve 
all their first day objectives. On the extreme left wing of the attack, the Germans were held 
fast at Givinchy by stubborn resistance from the British 55th Division. 70 
One of the main difficulties was in getting the supporting artillery forward. Ironically, 
the tanks committed to GEORGETTE compounded that problem. With their notorious 
mechanical unreliability, more of the German tanks broke down under their own weight than 
were knocked out in combat. The soft, wet ground in the area of the Lys operation made the 
tanks, along with all other heavy equipment, road-bound. When the tanks started breaking 
down along the few and relatively narrow avenues of approach, they blocked the advance of 
the accompanying artillery. The stalled tanks had to be blown in place before the supporting 
guns could move up. That experience could not have done much to ameliorate Ludendorffs 
blind spot for the tank. 7' 
That night Rupprecht's Army Group ordered the Sixth Army to resume attacking at 
0600 hours the next morning and continue pushing over the Lys. The Fourth Army also was 
ordered to launch its HASENJAGD phase of GEORGETTE II on 10 April. Sixth Army was 
ordered to leave the artillery it could not move forward behind its extreme right wing, to 
support the Fourth Army's attack. 72 
Foch happened to be visiting Haig at GHQ in Montreuil that day. When the reports of 
the attack began to come through, Haig immediately pressed Foch for French reinforcement 
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divisions. Foch, however, refused, saying the attack was only a diversion and the real threat 
would come in the vicinity of Arras. 73 
10 April 
At 0245 hours on 10 April, 522 field guns and 215 heavy and very heavy guns started 
the Fourth Army's artillery preparation. Two-and-one-half hours later two corps moved 
forward with their left flank at Frelinghien. At 0600 hours the Sixth Army resumed its attack. 
Again, heavy fog worked to the overall advantage of the attackers. Shortly before noon the } 
Fourth Army's XVIII Reserve Corps captured Messines and continued moving against the 
lower slopes of the Wytschaete Ridge. A little after noon the fog cleared. Encouraged by the 
initial success, Ludendorff planned to give the Fourth Army control of two more divisions 
plus the elite, division-sized Alpine Corps. 
That afternoon an attack by a South African brigade retook Messines, only to loose it 
again quickly. Under pressure from both flanks, the British 34th Division started to evacuate 
Armentieres, withdrawing to the north bank of the Lys. About 1645 hours Ludendorff told 
Lossberg that the Armentieres-Bailleul road had to be taken by nightfall at all costs. An hour 
later the Sixth Army captured Steenwerck. By end of 10 April the Germans had captured 
11,000 prisoners and 146 guns. The Sixth Army had pretty much forced the line of the Lys, 
and in the south it crossed the Lawe and pushed as far as Lestrem. On the extreme left wing 
of the attack, however, the Germans were still held up by stubborn British resistance at 
Festubert and Givenchy. 74 
The Sixth Army issued orders for the Bavarian II Corps and XIX Corps to capture 
high ground at Bailleul, Meteren, and Strazeele the next day. The two corps also were to link- 
up with the Fourth Army in the vicinity of Nieppe and then pinch out Armentieres. The two 
southern corps were to continue efforts to capture the crossings over the La Bassee Canal and 
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eliminate the British at Festubert and Givenchy. The Fourth Army objective for the next day 
was to capture Wytschaete and push toward Wulverghem. The decision to move toward 
Kemmel or Dranoutre would be made only after Wulverghem was taken. 75 [Map 4] 
Rupprecht at that point wanted to execute the WALDFEST attack from the Houthulst 
Forest against the right flank of the Belgians, believing that only exhausted British divisions 
remained in the Ypres Salient. The Fourth Army initially insisted that it needed three more 
divisions plus additional artillery, but finally agreed it could attack with only one extra 
division. Rupprecht believed that even if the attack did not achieve significant results on its 
own, it would do a great deal to reduce the resistance in front of the Fourth Army's main 
attack. 76 
That morning in Paris Wilson warned Clemenceau about the serious threat to the 
Channel ports and the consequences of their loss. Although Foch at that point still thought the 
attack in Flanders was a diversion, he nonetheless issued orders for the French Tenth Army to 
move north slightly, and for the French Fifth Army to move up behind it. Haig sent Foch a 
request for the French to relieve a sector of the British front in the south, but Foch ordered 
Petain to move the French 133`d Division to Dunkirk by rail. In his memoirs Foch did note: 
"Our available railway lines had been reduced by the attack of March 21st, and the difficulty 
of moving troops was considerably increased. " 77 
11 April 
The Germans committed seven more divisions to GEORGETTE. The correlation of 
forces now stood at 31 German divisions against 13 Allied. But ten of those German 
divisions had fought in MICHAEL. The Sixth Army took Armentieres, and although the 
Germans claimed to have captured it, the British actually evacuated the town with few 
losses. 8 The Bavarian II Corps reached Steenwerck, but the IV Corps on the left wing still 
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made little progress against Festubert and Givenchy. As Ludendorff laconically noted in his 
memoirs; "On the left, at Givenchy and Festubert, we were held up. The result was not 
satisfactory. " The Fourth Army, meanwhile, closed in on Wytschaete and Wulverghem 
and established contact with Sixth Army near Le Romarin. 80 OHL pressured the Sixth 
Army to move more troops up to continue the attack. Sixth Army resisted on the grounds that 
more troops in the area of operations would only add to the confusion, given the poor state of 
communications and the ground. It was more important, it argued, to move up supporting 
artillery and ammunition. 81 
By evening the Germans were almost to the Nieppe Forest, some nine miles from 
their starting line on 9 April. They were close to splitting the British First and Second 
Armies. In the orders for next day the Sixth Army was given the objectives of taking the high 
ground near Bailleul, Meteren, and Strazeele ; the northern and western edges of the Nieppe 
Forest; the Aire-La Bassee Canal; and Mount Bernenchon before the Allies could reinforce. 82 
The Fourth Army's XVIII Reserve Corps on the right was ordered to consolidate its gains 
until the X Reserve Corps on the left could make more progress in the direction of Neuve 
Eglise. Rupprechts Army Group at that point still considered the priority of effort to be the 
attack toward Hazebrouck and then the far end of the Kemmel-Cats ridge at 
Godewearsvedle. 83 [Map 4] 
Haig sent Foch a message that day requesting a minimum of four French divisions to 
support the Second Army. Foch finally began to recognize the threat to Hazebrouck and the 
Hazebrouck-Lille rail line. He ordered the French Tenth Army to start moving toward the 
north to the line of Doullens-Vauchelles in response to the German attack. Meanwhile, 
Petain on his own initiative moved the French Fifth Army farther north, up closer behind the 
Tenth Army. 84 
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12 April 
By the fourth day of GEORGETTE the Germans were on the verge of capturing 
Hazebrouck. They were less than five miles from that vital rail center. But the Sixth Army 
had not yet taken all its assigned objectives from 11 April. It was ordered to take them on 12 
April. 85 About noon Ludendorff ordered a maximum effort drive on the approaches to 
Bailleul by the combined inner wings of the Fourth and Sixth Armies. 86 That, however, 
shifted the direction of the main effort more to the north, away from Hazebrouck. 
At 1315 hours the Fourth Army ordered the immediate capture of the high ground 
around Neuve Eglise, Wulverghem, and Wytschaete, then a push forward by the infantry to 
cover the concentration of the artillery to support the attack on Mount Kemmel. By that 
evening the Fourth Army was on the eastern edges of Wytschaete and Wulverghem. Its 
orders for the next day required it to attack with a strong left wing in the direction of Neuve 
Eglise. 87 Kuhl also told the Fourth Army that if the British started to withdraw from the 
Ypres Salient, then the BLÜCHER attack should be launched immediately. The exact method 
of attacking Mount Kemmel, however, would be based on the outcome of the operations of 
13 April. Ludendorff earlier had indicated that the attack should be executed from either the 
east or west, but not from the south. 
Kuhl, Schulenburg, and Ludendorff also met in Avesnes on 12 April to consider a 
new attack by the Second Army against Amiens, projected for 20 April. Ludendorff 
considered it important to get "as close to Amiens as possible. " At that meeting Kuhl also 
argued for a suspension of all operations south of the Somme. But Ludendorff also was 
considering an attack by the right wing of the Second Army, supported by the left wing of the 
Seventeenth Army--in other words, a renewed attack north of the Somme, which later would 
be designated NEU-MICHAEL. 88 Writing in his diary, Rupprecht noted that the Second 
Army attack south of the Somme should only be made if the attacks of the Sixth and Fourth 
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Armies succeeded. If those attacks did not succeed, then it would be better for the Second 
Army to do nothing and consolidate its forces to support NEU-MICHAEL. 
The most important thing of all is to exhaust the British completely, 
in order to bring about their final collapse. Major Wetzell, the 
Chief of the Operations Section, agrees with this view, while 
Ludendorff seems to prefer a series of smaller attacks. These will 
only result in smaller successes-- although with proportionately 
higher casualties--than large attacks. Moreover, in these smaller 
attacks the expenditure of ammunition is relatively greater than 
in larger attacks, owing to the necessity of protecting the flanks, 
and the regrouping of the artillery entails much work and fatigues 
the men and horses very much. Ludendorff is certainly a wonderful 
organizer, but not a great strategist. [... aber kein grosser Stratege. ] 89 
Haig issued his famous "Backs to the Wall" order of the day on 12 April: "Every 
position must be held to the last man. " 90 Effective on noon that day, Plumer's Second Army 
assumed control of the most of the battle as the boundary between Second Army and General 
Sir Henry Home's First Army shifted south from just north of Armentieres, to two miles north 
of the Lys at Merville. Foch, meanwhile, moved to establish a Franco-Belgian reserve 
groupment behind the British First Army, but under the command of Plumer. With French 
troops already starting to detrain at Dunkirk, Foch put the French II Cavalry Corps under 
Plumer to maintain liaison between the British First and Second Armies. 91 
Recognizing the threat to the high ground of the Flanders Hills, Foch also ordered the 
French 28th Division to move north to the British sector. He also asked the governor of 
Dunkirk to flood the ground from the Fumes-Dunkirk road to St. Omer to halt any German 
advance toward Dunkirk and Calais. Foch then issued his plan for the defensive battle, which 
called for establishing two converging lines: one in the south from Bdthune to St. Omer, 
facing the northeast; and one in the north from Mount Kemmel to Cassel, facing the south. 
Between these two solid converging lines Foch ordered the establishment of a series of 
successive lines facing east, to slow down and eventually stop the German advance. Those 
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lines included in order: Bailleul--Nieppe Forest; Meteren--Caestre--Hazebrouck--Aire; 
Cassel--Ebblinghem; and Cassel--Clairmarais Forest. 92 
13 April 
The German official history dourly noted, "The battle on 13 April was not fought 
under a lucky star. " 93 The Sixth Army's objectives for the day were Bailleul, Meteren, 
Strazeele, the Nieppe Forest, and the La Bassee Canal crossings between Guarbecque and 
Mount Bernenchon. 94 Four divisions attacked the Nieppe Forest toward Hazebrouck, but 
made little progress. The Sixth Army also failed to take Bailleul and continued to be held fast 
at Festubert and Givenchy. [Map 4] 
The Fourth Army attacked with only its X Reserve Corps to take the high ground 
between Neuve Eglise and Bailleul, while its XVIII Reserve Corps prepared to launch an 
envelopment against Wytschaete on 16 April. 95 Poor coordination on the inner flanks of the 
two corps resulted in elements of both corps firing on each other. Sixt von Arnim 
recommended launching the WALDFEST attack from the Houthulst Forest north of Ypres to 
relieve the pressure in the south. 96 
The lead elements of the French II Cavalry Corps arrived in Flanders on 13 April. 
Foch, meanwhile, had ordered the defense of Hazebrouck to be conducted "as near as 
possible to the eastern edge of the Nieppe Forest. " 97 The Australian I" Division arrived in 
front of Hazebrouck and joined with the 4th Guards Brigade to form a solid barrier in front of 
the vital rail center. Although the original objective of GEORGETTE was now effectively 
screened, the German main effort already had shifted to the Mount Kemmel--Mount des Cats 
ridge. 
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14 Aprill 
On the sixth day of the battle the overall results continued to grow increasingly 
disappointing for the Germans. All committed units were ordered to continue the advance 
while preparations were made to launch the attack from the Houthulst Forest. The main effort_ 
was now against the line of low hills that included Bailleul and Neuve Eglise, well away from 
Hazebrouck. The deep objectives were Godewearsvedle for the Sixth Army and Poperinghe 
for the Fourth Army. All the emphasis was now focused on the inner wings of the two 
armies. 
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The extreme left wing of the Sixth Army still made no progress against Festubert and 
Givenchy. The Sixth Army finally reported to OHL that its attack was stalling and the troops 
were exhausted. The Sixth Army chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel von Lenz, recommended 
that the attack be halted until sufficient artillery and trench mortars could be brought up. Both, 
Kuhl and Lossberg disagreed strongly, but Ludendorff accepted the recommendation. 99 As 
a result, new orders were issued directing the Sixth Army to resume the attack on 17 April, 
north of the Nieppe Forest against Meteren and Strazeele. On the extreme left flank, 
however, the IV Corps had to continue attacking to take Festubert and Givenchy. The 
Fourth Army too would continue attacking. 100 
At noon the Fourth Army's increased its frontage by assuming control of the three left 
flank divisions (117th, 32nd, and 10th Ersatz) of the Sixth Army. The units were assigned to the 
newly inserted Guards Reserve Corps. In the Sixth Army sector, the III Bavarian Corps 
replaced the II Bavarian Corps, which was considered to have failed. The IX Reserve Corps 
headquarters also was inserted between the LV and IV Corps. 101 The Sixth Army now had 
19 divisions under five corps headquarters committed to the battle. By the end of the day 
most German divisions were reporting officer losses exceeding 100 each. 102 
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By the end of 14 April the French 28`x' and 133`d Divisions and the II Cavalry Corps 
were operating under Plumer's control. At an Allied conference at Abbeville, Haig pressed 
Foch to send more French forces to the Hazebrouck-Cassel area. 103 Foch, however, flatly 
refused to provide relief for any of the divisions fighting on the Lys. As he later wrote in his 
memoirs: 
To relieve units while the battle was in progress would 
immobilize both the relieving troops and those relieved 
during the time required for the operation, and at the very 
moment when the Allied reserves were scarcely sufficient 
to man the whole front. 104 
The British, meanwhile, continued to worry about the threat to the Channel ports. The 
Admiralty was especially concerned about the possibility of losing Calais and Boulogne. 
Because the potential substitute ports of Dieppe, Le Harve, Rouen, and Cherbourg were 
farther away, there were out of range for smaller ships. Using larger ships would slow down 
the flow of supplies, and also would make it almost impossible to continue to maintain the 
blockade at Dover, the key element in the antisubmarine defense. 105 
15 April 
Rupprecht's Army Group issued the orders for the capture of Bailleul. Fourth Army 
was to encircle the town from the north and east, with follow-on objectives of St. Jans Cappel 
and Mount Noir. The Sixth Army was to attack from the south and west, with a follow-on 
objective of Berthen. 106 In the event, the Sixth Army postponed its attack, to allow for 
further preparations The Fourth Army did take Bailleul and its XVIII Reserve Corps captured 
Wulverghem. By end of day the Germans had pushed across the Bailleul-Wulverghem rail 
line. 107 The German main effort, however, was now clearly focused away from Hazebrouck, 
toward the high ground of the Flanders Hills. [Map 4] 
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,, Later that day OHL 
issued a wildly optimistic communique stating, "The break-in on_ 
both sides of Armentieres has lead to a new, great tactical success. " Significantly, the 
message used the term break-in (Einbruch) rather than break-through (Durchbruch). 108 OHL 
also issued a warning order to the Second and Eighteenth Armies to start preparing an attack 
with their inner wings on both sides of Moreuil and also against Montdidier--Noyon. 109 
In order to free up forces for the fight in the Lys valley, the British that day made the 
agonizing decision to pull back their line north of Ypres. In the process they gave up all the 
territory won at the cost of almost a quarter of a million casualties during the previous year's 
Passchendaele offensive. 110 German intelligence that day reported approximately two French 
divisions in vicinity of Doullens, 30 kilometers north of Amiens. 111 
16 April 
Sixth Army still stood fast, preparing to launch a renewed attack. But it did take 
advantage of the British evacuation of Bailleul to capture Meteren. The Fourth Army 
continued attacking with its three left flank corps between Bailleul and Wytschaete. 112 
Kuhl, meanwhile, was trying to convince Ludendorff to authorize the TANNENBERG 
deliberate attack, arguing that even 19 April would be too late for that option. 113 
The Guard Corps, positioned between the Ypres Canal and the Houthulst Forest, was 
still unaware by afternoon of the British partial pullback in the Ypres Salient. By late 
afternoon its two left divisions (the 58th and 236th) unexpectedly broke into the former 
British positions. Upon receiving that information, Lossberg decided to move up the 
BLÜCHER pursuit attack option from 20 April to 17 April. The Guard Corps would have 
four divisions in the first line, three in the second, and one in general reserve, and be 
supported by 180 batteries. 114 But now, the attackers would have to advance down two 
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miles of an exposed ridge face, hauling their artillery pieces over open ground and through 
mud. 
The first two French infantry divisions entered the battle on 16 April in support of the 
Second Army. At a meeting with Haig in Abbeville that day, Foch agreed to commit another 
infantry division and move up two more reserve divisions. The French now had twelve 
divisions behind the British. 115 
17 April 
The German Guard Corps launched the BLÜCHER attack at 0900 hours. The 
objective was to separate the Belgians and British. But the attack was launched piecemeal. Of 
the four first line divisions that were supposed to make the attack, two were already following 
the British and the Belgians. Two of the second echelon divisions had not completed 
detraining. The British partially neutralized the attack by swinging their line back even 
farther. At 0945 hours the Belgians launched a series of unexpectedly fierce 
counterattacks! 16 
At 1000 hours the left wing of the Fourth Army and right wing of the Sixth Army 
launched strong attacks. The Fourth Army's objective was to outflank Mount Kemmel by 
taking Mounts Noir and Rouge to the west. The Sixth Army attacked in the direction of 
Godewearsvedle. The objective of the combined Fourth and Sixth Army attacks was now to 
cut off the Ypres salient by enveloping it from the north and taking the high ground to the 
south. But the direction of those attacks led away from Hazebrouck. 1 '7 [Map 4] 
By evening it was clear that the German attacks had failed completely. North of Ypres 
the Belgians drove the attackers back almost to their starting positions. Early reports of 
German success, however, caused the Guards Corps to plan to commit reinforcements. Under 
the mistaken assumption that the Guards Corps lead elements had crossed the Steenebeeck, 
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the corps headquarters ordered the attack to be pressed against the Belgians. South of Ypres 
the commanders of the Fourth Army's X Reserve, Guards Reserve, and III Bavarian Corps all 
reported that they could not continue unless their exhausted troops in front line were relieved. 
The Sixth Army also halted its attacks in the Bailleul sector in the face of freshly arrived 
French reinforcements. On the Sixth Army's left wing, the IV Corps and IX Reserve Corps 
still made no progress against Festubert and Givenchy. 
Between 1930 hours and midnight Ludendorff, Kuhl, and Lossberg discussed the 
situation in a series of phone conversations. Lossberg reported that the situation was very 
bad, and that the Fourth Army's left wing was in a poor tactical position, at base of high 
ground held by the enemy. He recommended that all efforts to take Mounts Kemmel and Noir, 
by direct attack on a broad front be abandoned, and the attack of the Guard Corps be broken 
off. He also noted that the Fourth Army needed fresh divisions. Kuhl responded that it would 
be impossible to give the Fourth Army fresh divisions in the Bailleul area before 21 April 
because the Sixth Army also needed reinforcements. Kuhl also instructed the Guards Corps to 
start preparing a line of defense in case their attack the next day failed. Ludendorff said he 
would not make any decisions until he saw how the Guards Corps' attack went the next day. 
If the attack went well, he would commit two more divisions to the Fourth Army. If the 
attack did not go well, he would withdraw the three uncommitted reserve divisions presently 
behind the Guards Corps. 118 
Even though the German attack had every appearance of stalling, Foch noted that the 
British were still making contingency plans to destroy and evacuate the port of Dunkirk. 119 
German intelligence, meanwhile, reported that French forces were "beyond doubt on the 
battlefield of Armentieres. " 120 
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18 April 
As the attacks continued on the 18th, German morale continued to grind down. OHL 
general staff officer Alberecht von Thaer noted in his diary, "The moral influence on the 
troops has passed to the company commanders and the troop leaders. " 121 After conferring 
with Lossberg, Kuhl decided to halt the attack on both sides of Bailleul. On the extreme left, 
the Sixth Army again failed to take Festubert and Givenchy in the face of determined British 
counterattacks. On the extreme right, the Guards Corps' attack north of Ypres failed. That 
attack was suspended until 19 April. But after it later became clear that the Germans had not 
crossed the Steenebeeck and that the stream was held in force, the follow-on attack was 
postponed until 20 April. 122 
About 1945 hours, Ludendorff was conferring with Kuhl and Lossberg, still believing 
that the attack north of Ypres was going well. Ludendorff wanted the Guards Corps to 
continue attacking in the north, while the XVIII Reserve and X Reserve Corps attacked 
Mount Kemmel. Lossberg, however, was already recommending that GEORGETTE should 
be broken off and a new offensive should be launched on some other sector of the front. 123 
The Allies, meanwhile, continued to move more forces into Flanders. French units in 
Flanders were formed into "Army Detachment of the North. " 124 Together with the Tenth 
Army, the French now had nine infantry and three cavalry divisions north of the Somme. 
South of the GEORGETTE sector, the French attacked the German Second Army between 
Castel and Mailly, inflicting 2,000 casualties. 125 
19 April 
The attack clearly had reached culmination, although in the center the Sixth Army had 
pushed 17 miles, as far as the line Bailleul-Merville. Rupprecht's Army Group sent OHL a 
message saying that GEORGETTE has turned into a battle of attrition and requested 
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permission to halt the attack and pass to the defensive. 
126 Lossberg now insisted that the 
Fourth Army was no longer capable of conducting the TANNENBURG deliberate attack in 
the north. OHL cancelled the attack. 127 At 0800 hours the Fourth Army halted the Guards 
Corps' BLÜCHER attack. OHL immediately withdrew the three general reserve divisions 
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and sent them south to support later operations anticipated in the Mount Kemmel sector. 
That same day Wetzell issued his first operational assessment since the before the 
start of MICHAEL on 21 March. Noting the solidification of the British defenses in Flanders, 
supported by French and possibly American divisions, he concluded that all operations 
against the British should be suspended: "... there no longer exists the probability of a great 
success in that region. " He recommended instead, a new offensive to the south, in the sector 
of the German Seventh Army. 129 Ludendorff too was beginning to look elsewhere. Noting 
the relative weakness of the French forces opposite the German First, Third, and Fifth 
Armies, Ludendorff told Kuhl he wanted to launch an offensive in the Reims sector with the 
First and Third Armies. 130 
The Allies, meanwhile, put two French divisions into the line between Meteren and 
Wytschaete, with the French 28th Division assuming responsibility for Mount Kemmel. Five , 
bloodied British divisions were withdrawn from the line, and sent south to the quiet sector . 
along the Chemin des Dames. 131 
20 April 
OHL ordered the halt of the Sixth Army offensive. But before passing entirely to the 
defensive, OHL insisted on the capture of Festubert and Givenchy. 132 From that point on, 
the Sixth Army made some half-hearted efforts, but never did take the two British bastions. 
OHL also ordered a halt to the Fourth Army's attacks, but at the same time ordered a renewed 
push scheduled for 25 April to take Mount Kemmel. Thus, although the general attack was 
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halted, the flank attacks to take Festubert and Givenchy on the left and Mount Kemmel on the 
right would continue. 133 These, of course, were widely divergent and non-mutually 
supporting efforts. 
21-23 April 
Ludendorff held a conference at X Reserve Corps headquarters on 21 April to plan the 
resumption of the offensive against Mount Kemmel on 25 April. A preliminary attack 
tentatively scheduled for 23 April was cancelled. The final plan called for the left wing of the 
XVIII Reserve Corps to launch its attack 15 minutes before the X Reserve Corps jumped 
off. 134 Both corps would attack with a combined seven divisions in the first line, four in the 
second line, and one in general reserve. They would be supported by 290 guns, six bomber 
squadrons, 17 fighter squadrons, and 16 attack squadrons. The attack's deep objective was the 
Poperinghe-Vlamertinghe road, north of the high ground of Mount des Cats, Mount Rouge, 
Mount Noir, and Mount Kemmel--in other words, to the northwest, away from Hazebrouck. 
[Map 4] North of Ypres, the Guards Corps was to be prepared to re-launch their attack . 
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Rupprecht's Army Group also issued a warning order that if the attack on Mount Kemmel 
went well, the inner flank corps of the two armies should be ready to advance immediately. 136 
German intelligence at this point had confirmed the presence of the French 133rd, 
28th, and 34th Divisions in Flanders. It also estimated that 51 of the 59 British infantry 
divisions had been committed to action since 21 March, and 19 had gone into the line for a 
second time. 137 French intelligence, meanwhile, estimated that the Germans still had some 
60 divisions available for another attempt at splitting the French and the British. 138 
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24 April 
One day before the resumption of the attack against Mount Kemmel, the Second 
Army launched an attack in front of Amiens. The initial plan had been developed between 8 
and 11 April. The objective of the attack was Blangy Tronville, about half way between 
Amiens and Villers-Bretonneux, with three corps attacking the first day, followed by another 
corps on the second day. Because of the general weakness of the Second Army's divisions, 
the plan was scaled-back on 13 April to a three corps attack on Cachy, just to the west of 
Villers-Bretonneux. After a few days, another corps would also attack between the Ancre and 
the Somme. Ten divisions (including five attack divisions) were committed to the first line, 
and four divisions were in the second line. They were supported by 1,208 guns, 710 aircraft, 
and 13 tanks. The purpose of the operation was to make it possible to move up more forces 
and artillery to facilitate a follow-on attack on Amiens. 139 In his memoirs, Ludendorff 
merely noted that the attack was conducted by the Second Army "to improve its position. " 140 
The artillery preparation against Villers-Bretonneux started at 0445 hours. The 
infantry jumped off at 0715 hours, and by just before noon Villers-Bretonneux was almost 
completely in German hands. The attackers pushed to the woods beyond just beyond the 
town, but then started to bog down. Late that night at 2200 hours, the Allies conducted a 
strong counterattack with one British and two Australian brigades, driving the Germans 
almost back to their original line of departure. The Germans tried to take Villers-Bretonneux 
again the next day, but the defenders beat them back. In the end, the operation cost the 
Germans some 8,000 casualties with almost nothing to show for it. OHL finally halted the 
Second Army attack on 26 April. 141 
25 April 
The German artillery preparation against Mount Kemmel started at 0330 hours and 
included high concentrations of Yellow Cross and Buntkreuz. Most of the French batteries 
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were silenced or neutralized by 0830 hours. At 0645 hours the XVIII Reserve Corps on the 
left flank jumped off in thick fog, with visibility not more than 50 yards. Fifteen minutes 
later, as planned, the X Reserve Corps on the right flank jumped off. Three-and-a-half 
German divisions hit six regiments in the French line, and within an hour French troops were 
falling back toward the rear. The attackers reached the summit of Mount Kemmel by 0810 
hours. A few hours later, Lossberg called the commander of the Guard Corps northeast of 
Ypres to alert him to the apparent success and gave him a warning order to prepare to attack. 
At 1100 hours Lossberg issued the orders for XVIII Reserve and X Reserve Corps to 
initiate the exploitation phase. The intent had been to take the hill indirectly from the east, 
but the frontal holding attack was an unexpected success. With the loss of Mount Kemmel, a 
four-mile-wide gap opened up from Vierstraat to the point west of Mount Kemmel where the 
French 154th Division stood. The Allies had only three battalions in the gap. About noon 
the German main force swept over the summit and pushed down the north slope of Mount 
Kemmel, but then halted behind a defensive artillery barrage along the base of the hill at the 
Kemmelbeek. There the Germans waited until the artillery could be moved up to support the 
push on the final objectives. 
Late that afternoon a still optimistic Lossberg told the commander of the Guards 
Corps that the British almost certainly would be forced to withdraw from the entire Ypres 
salient. The Guards Corps chief of staff, however, noted that all the local patrols sent out by 
the corps had encountered stiff resistance. As evening set in, mounting indicators of an Allied 
counterattack prompted Lossberg to order the XVIII Reserve and X Reserve Corps to move 
up their second echelon divisions in preparation. The German advance finally halted at 
Vierstraat. Late that day the British 25th Division moved into the area with orders to retake 
Mount Kemmel. It didn't, but it did close the gap, and the Germans missed the opportunity to 
take Mount des Cats and the entire ridgeline from the rear. 
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After consulting with the chiefs of staff of the two attacking corps that evening, 
Lossberg ordered the resumption of the attack for 0800 hours the next morning, with the 
same divisions in the first and second lines. The new objective was the Reninghelst-- 
Vlamertinghe line. Vlamertinghe was almost directly to the west of Ypres. 142 
26 April 
Just as the Germans renewed their attack on 26 April, the first reports of strong Allied 
counterattacks started to reach Fourth Army headquarters. By 0900 hours the Germans were 
under heavy pressure in their center, and only the outer wings of the two corps attempted to 
advance. By mid-afternoon Lossberg decided that further attacks should be postponed until 
the following day, with the Fourth Army committing three fresh divisions from the army 
reserve. A little later Lossberg decided to postpone the resumption of the attack yet another 
day. Then about 1945 hours the chief of staff of the XVIII Reserve Corps recommended ;. 
postponing the attack until 29 April, to provide adequate time to move up ammunition and 
relieve the divisions in the line. Reluctantly, Lossberg agreed. 143 
The British, meanwhile, pulled back another three kilometers north of Ypres, freeing.,. 
up more reserves for the battle to the south. Foch ordered Main to send two regiments of 
field artillery and 12 heavy artillery groups to what was now called the Army Detachment of , 
the North. The following day Foch ordered three more French divisions shifted to 
Flanders. '44 
I 
27-28 April 
The orders for the resumption of the attack on 29 April established the objective line 
Ypres--Vlamertinghe--Reninghelst--Westoutre--Mount Rouge. The plan called for seven 
divisions to attack in the first line, with six divisions in the second line, and two in army 
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reserve. Lossberg asked for two fresh divisions from Rupprecht's Army Group. He was 
promised three, and two more if the Fourth Army succeeded. 145 
OHL was concerned about the potential for a major French attack in the south. 
German intelligence also estimated that there were now five French infantry divisions and 
one French cavalry division in Flanders, and more units from the French Tenth Army could 
be expected to move up. 
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29 April 
The Germans launched their final GEORGETTE effort on 29 April. The artillery 
preparation started at 0400 hours with the infantry jumping off at 0640 hours. The Allied 
artillery, which hardly responded during the preparation, opened with heavy fire as soon as 
the infantry advanced. Within little more than an hour reports of heavy Allied resistance 
started reaching Fourth Army headquarters. At noon Lossberg called Ludendorff to report 
the heavy Allied resistance and the organization of their artillery in great depth. Lossberg, 
however, intended to press the attack on the left after a concentrated artillery preparation. But 
the German attacks made no progress, and around 2135 hours Lossberg finally advised 
Ludendorff to suspend the attack. Kuhl and Ludendorff agreed at 2300 hours to halt the 
attack. 147 
30 April-1 May 
At the end of the operation the Fourth Army had 17 divisions facing 25 Allied 
divisions, and the Six Army had 26 divisions facing 10 Allied divisions. The French had 14 
infantry and three cavalry divisions in Flanders. OHL estimated that more than half of the 
available French reserves were between Amiens and the coast. After analyzing the situation, 
Lossberg concluded that the Fourth Army would need ten to twelve fresh divisions in order to 
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capture Poperinghe, Mount Noir, and Mount Rouge. 148 Operation GEORGETTE came to an 
official end on 1 May. 149 The Germans periodically made a half-hearted attempts throughout 
May to take Mount Rouge and Mount Noir, but with little success. 150 
ASSESSMENT 
The Results 
The German official history called Operation GEORGETTE "a skillful and effective 
operational chess move. " (operativer Schachzug) 151 But despite the seemingly impressive 
tactical results, it was another operational failure. GEORGETTE failed to accomplish either 
of what were supposed to be its primary objectives at the various stages of the operation. Its 
initial objective was the vital BEF rail center at Hazebrouck. The Germans got within six 
kilometers of Hazebrouck, but they never made it. Midway in the battle the objective shifted 
to the line of the Flanders Hills, which ended at the heights near Cassel and Godewearsvedle. 
The control of that ground would have forced the British out of the Ypres salient. And 
although the loss of Mount Kemmel did force the British to abandon a major sector of the 
salient, they managed to hold fast just in front of Ypres. To the south, GEORGETTE did put 
the Germans within artillery range of the Bethune coal basin, which did affect for a time the 
output of the munitions factories and the railways that depended on Bethune. 152 But even 
that produced no long-term operational or strategic effect. In the 40 days of fighting since the 
start of MICHAEL, the Germans sustained fewer casualties than they inflicted, but those 
were losses they could not recoup. Rupprecht, however, claimed that many of those 
casualties were lightly wounded that could be returned to duty in short order. 153 
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Table 7.7 
Casualties from Operations MICHAEL and GEORGETTE 154 
MICHAEL GEORGETTE Total 
German 239,800 86,000 325,800 
British 177,739 82,040 259,779 
French 77,000 30,000 107,000 
Preparation Time and Strength 
Without the seven weeks of elaborate preparations that MICHAEL had, 
GEORGETTE could not have been so well prepared. But Ludendorff felt that time was 
working against the Germans, as American forces continued to pour into Europe. Although 
some of the GEORGETTE preparations had already been accomplished as part of the 
GEORGEPLAN deception plan, the Germans really had only 12 days to carry out the 
preparations. They managed to accomplish a great deal in that short period, while at the same 
time maintaining an impressive level of operational security. 
The major effect of the compressed schedule was the number of forces the Germans 
could move into the attack sector. With 26 divisions committed across a 44-kilometer front, 
GEORGETTE was less than half as strong as MICHAEL. The following table shows the 
various planning strengths as the operation evolved from GEORG to KLEIN-GEORG to 
GEORGETTE. Even after the force was increased by nine divisions in the final 29 March 
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revision of the plan, the attackers still had only a superiority of about 2.2: 1 over the 
defenders. 
Table 7.8 
Divisions Allocated Under the Various GEORG Plans 
Operation Plan Date Sixth Army Fourth Army 
GEORG 20 Nov 20-25 12-15 
GEORG 3 Jan 30-40 12-15 
KLEIN-GEORG 3 Feb 20 12-15 
GEORGETTE 26 Mar 10 4** 
GEORGETTE 29 Mar 17 6 ** 
* Not including OHL reserve divisions 
** HASENJAGD only 
Mobility of the GEORGETTE Divisions 
The compressed preparation schedule also forced the Germans to use far too many 
trench divisions in GEORGETTE. Fourteen of the 26 divisions committed on 9 and 10 April 
were trench divisions, including eight of the 14 divisions in the first line, and four of the 
seven divisions in either army or OHL reserve. Each trench division was 500 to 600 horses 
short, with especially critical horse shortages in the field artillery units, and it had no draft 
horses for the ammunition wagons for the infantry units. 
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Another problem was the state of the attack divisions transferred from the Second 
Army. Most had been committed to MICHAEL, and then had to march to the Sixth Army 
zone over poor roads and bad terrain. They arrived in a very worn-out condition, most at no 
better than half their normal level of strength. 155 Thus, even if GEORGETTE had achieved a 
breakthrough of the British lines, the Germans most likely did not have the necessary number 
of divisions capable of exploiting to operational depth. 
Failure to Weight the Main Effort 
As in Operation MICHAEL, the weighting of the main effort in GEORGETTE was 
far less than clear. The attack of the LX Corps toward Hazebrouck was supposed to be the 
main effort, and with four attack divisions in its first and second lines, it was the strongest of 
the four attacking corps. But in addition to the drive northwest toward Hazebrouck, part of 
the corps' force was supposed to branch off south of the La Bassee Canal and drive due west 
to support the IV Corps on its left. The XIX Corps to the right, had the deepest assigned 
attack depth, yet it had only two trench divisions in its first line and one in its second line. 
On the far left flank of the attack, the IV Corps had two attack and one trench division in its 
first line, and one trench division in its second line for what was supposed to be a supporting 
mission. As Tables 7.2 and 7.3 above show, the artillery this time was heavily weighted in 
favor of the Sixth Army, but the air assets were not as heavily weighted. As Table 7.8 below 
shows, the six corps attacks diverged slightly, although not to the extent of the three army 
attacks in Operation MICHAEL. 
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Table 7.9 
Initial Cor ps Strengths and Vectors 156 
Divisional Attack 
Army Corps Weight* Direction Depth Vector Line 
Fourth XVIII Res. 2 Trench NW 4km Ypres 
Fourth X Res. I Attack WNW 11km Messines--Kemmel 
2 Trench (plus Armentieres from 
the north) 
Sixth II. Bav. 2 Attack NW 24km Steenwerck--Bailleul-- 
2 Trench Mount Cats (plus 
Armentieres from the 
south) 
Sixth XIX 3 Trench NW 29km Estaires--Steenvorde 
Sixth LX 4 Attack NW 24km Merville--Nieppe Forest- 
Hazebrouck (also, hook 
WSW to the La Bassee 
Canal south of the Nieppe 
Forest) 
Sixth IV 2 Attack W 15km Lawe--La Bassee Canal- 
2 Trench High Ground North of 
Bethune 
* Does not include army and OHL reserve divisions in the third line. 
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As during operation MICHAEL, OHL again fed reinforcements into the battle in 
driblets. In this case, however, the greatly compressed preparation period combined with the 
required transit times undoubtedly constrained what OHL could do. Up to the start of the 
battle, OHL moved ten divisions into the Sixth and Fourth Army sectors. During the 20 days 
of the battle itself, OHL moved in 17 more divisions. 
Table 7.10 
Division Reinforcements from OHL 157 
Fourth Army Sixth Army 
1-10 April 
Gain +5 +11 
Loss -4 -2 
Net +1 +9 
11-20 April 
Gain +12 +8 
Loss 0 -4 
Net +12 +4 
21-29 April 
1-29 April 
Gain +4 +1 
Loss 0 -3 
Net +4 -2 
Net +17 +10 
The army and OHL level reserves at the start and the end of the battle also show that 
the Germans had a very limited exploitation capability, especially at operational depth. 
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Table 7.11 
GEORGETTE Reserve Divisions 159 
9 April 29 April 
Army OHL Army OHL 
Fourth Army 2 Trench 2 Attack 5 Trench 3 Attack 
Sixth Army 1 Attack 1 Trench 4 Trench 2 Trench 
1 Trench 
Finally, there was the Second Army's 24 April attack at Villers-Bretonneux, one day 
before the Second Army's attack at Mount Kemmel. Although the attack on Mount Kemmel 
was supposed to be the main German effort on the Western Front, the Villers-Bretonneux 
attack was weighted more heavily. The Second Army attacked with 14 divisions (including 5 
attack divisions) in its first and second lines; the Fourth Army attacked with 11 divisions in 
its first and second lines. The Second Army was supported by 1,208 guns (including 465 
heavy); the Fourth Army was supported by only 290 guns (including 128 heavy). The Fourth 
Army, however, was far more heavily weighted with attack and fighter squadrons. 
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Table 7.12 
Army Group Rupprecht Air Order of Battle 24 April 1918 159 
Army Observation Attack Fighter 
Fourth 14 16 17 
Sixth 15 38 
Seventeenth 14 24 
Second 15 4 10 
Bomber Total Squadrons 
6 53 
3 27 
0 20 
6 31 
Operational Objective 
As in Operation MICHAEL, the very objective of the attack changed in the middle of 
the operation. In the initial plans Hazebrouck was identified clearly as the direction of the 
main effort. In the early planning for the GEORG operation, the Channel ports were the deep, 
follow-on objectives. GEORGETTE had no hope of reaching the Channel, but taking 
Hazebrouck and the western end of the Flanders Hills would put the Germans in a position to 
take the BEF from the rear. In their planning documents, the Germans clearly recognized the 
importance of the rail center; but as with Amiens that importance seemed to focus solely on 
Hazebrouck as a transfer point of forces, rather than as a logistical jugular vein. 
After the Germans were stopped short of the Nieppe Forest on 13 April, the main 
effort shifted first to Bailleul, and then to Mount Kemmel, at the eastern end of the line of 
Flanders Hills. They did finally take Mount Kemmel, but that brought them very little 
positional advantage at the operational level. As early as 20 November, Rupprecht's planners 
had warned of the dangers of getting bogged down in a protracted fight for Mount Kemmel, 
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recommending instead that the Flanders Hills be outflanked. Right up until the start of 
GEORGETTE, however, various German planners waffled back and forth on the problem of 
Kemmel and a direct attack on the eastern end of the line of hills. 
Thus in GEORGETTE, the Germans repeated the same mistake they had made in 
MICHAEL. When it became clear that they were not going to be able to achieve their 
original objective, they continued the attack in the hope of taking something to show for their 
efforts. 
Decision 12 April 
On 12 April the Germans were within five mile of Hazebrouck and on the verge of 
capturing the vital rail center. But Ludendorffs noontime order for a maximum effort against 
Bailleul by the inner wings of the two armies shifted the main effort away from Hazebrouck. 
That night the Sixth Army's orders for the next day assigned a spread of objectives, running 
from Bailleul on its right, through the Nieppe Forest in its center, to the La Bassee Canal 
crossings on its far left. Even with four divisions committed to the attack on the Nieppe 
Forest, the Sixth Army's combat and combat support power was spread too thinly across its 
27-kilometer front. By the end of 13 April, the British had managed to move enough forces in 
front of Hazebrouck to establish a solid defensive barrier. 
Decision 14 April 
With the assignment of Godewearsvedle as the deep objective of the Sixth Army, and 
Poperinghe as the deep objective of the Fourth, the original GEORGETTE scheme of 
maneuver was dead. The objective at that point was the entire length of the Flanders Hills 
line, but the focus quickly shifted to the inner wings of the two armies, which in turn shifted 
the objective to Mount Kemmel and the eastern end of the line. 
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Decision 19-20 April 
On 19 April the staff of Rupprecht's Army Group recognized that GEORGETTE had 
reached culmination and had turned into a battle of attrition. Rupprecht wanted to transition 
to the defensive all along the line. OHL agreed to suspending the operations of the Sixth 
Army, but still insisted that it take Festubert and Givenchy. There was no longer any purpose 
for that effort, however. OHL also ordered the Fourth Army to resume its attack against 
Mount Kemmel on 25 April, while at the same time ordering the Second Army's Villers- 
Bretonneux attack for 24 April. None of these widely separated and relatively weak attacks 
had much of a chance of accomplishing anything of any significance. At this point it appears 
that OHL was desperate to capture something, anything, that it could claim as a battlefield 
victory. But in so doing, it continued to expend its almost non-replenishable combat power 
for next to nothing in return. If the Germans had thrown all their power into one attack or the 
other, they might have accomplished something. 
Decision 25 April 
Despite the relatively low levels of fire support, the Fourth Army's attack on Mount 
Kemmel was tactical success initially. Lossberg ordered the exploitation just before noon, but 
the German forces that swept over the hill to its base on the far side halted and waited for 
their fire support to move up. With the loss of Mount Kemmel, a four mile-wide gap opened 
in the Allied lines and remained open for about eight hours, but the Germans lacked either the 
power or the will to exploit it. As Kuhl noted in his post-war analysis for the German 
government: "The storming of Kemmel was a great feat, but on the whole the objective set 
had not been attained. " 160 
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Allied Reactions 
One thing the Germans had not counted on was the stiff resistance put up by the 
British 55th Division at Festubert and Givenchy. In one of the most impressive defensive 
battles of the war, the 55th Division stubbornly held on and never gave way. This solid 
anchor on the left flank of the German attack diverted resources and combat power away 
from the main effort. 
Another factor working against the Germans was the Allied Supreme Commander, 
General Foch, who kept a cooler head and had a far better grasp of the overall operational and 
strategic situation than did his primary opponent, Ludendorff. Writing in the British official 
history, Edmonds noted: 
[Foch] kept his main reserves near the junction of the Allied 
Armies and sent up reinforcements in driblets, divisions singly 
or in pairs, replacing those engaged by moving others up from 
the rear. His action in refusing to do more was justified by results, 
and this limitation of assistance to the absolute minimum may 
well be claimed as proof of the highest military judgement in 
relation to the Allied cause as a whole: he kept his head and 
declined to send his none too plentiful reserves in response to 
every call from General Petain as well as from Sir Douglas Haig. 16' 
Alternatives 
Clearly GEORGETTE was far too weak to accomplish its intended objective. The 
only way it could have been made stronger was through more time to prepare and to move 
and build up forces. The best way to gain more preparation time for GEORGETTE would 
have been to terminate MICHAEL earlier. As reluctant as Kuhl was to criticize Ludendorff 
directly in any of his writings, he did note: 
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One may ask the question whether it would not have been better 
to have broken off the MICHAEL offensive sooner, about 31 March; 
also whether it would not have been preferable to have dispensed 
with the subsequent Amiens attack on 4 April and the attack of the 
Seventh Army at Coucy le Chateau on 6 April, designed to reduce 
the salient between the inner wings of the Seventh and Eighteenth 
Armies. In that case, it would have been possible to make the 
offensive near Armentieres considerably stronger, so that it would 
have approached in scope the GEORG offensive as originally planned. 
Let it be admitted that that was the proper thing to do. 162 
Given that MICHAEL was allowed to run far beyond its culmination point, the only 
other way to gain more time would have been to push the start date farther back into April. 
Ludendorff believed he did not have that time. But after GEORGETTE failed he still 
managed to launch Operations BLOCHER in May, GNEISENAU in June, 
MARNESCHÜTZ-REIMS in July, and he was planning HAGEN for August. Thus, if 
Ludendorff had given himself a few more weeks to build the Sixth and Fourth Armies back 
up to the levels approaching the original GEORG plan, the Germans would have had a far 
better chance of taking Hazebrouck. A delay of a few more weeks would have improved the 
ground conditions as well. 
Such an operational pause naturally would have carried certain risks. Since Flanders 
was the most likely next target, the Germans would have had to screen the preparations with 
a far more extensive deception plan, supporting by local diversionary attacks. But if the 
attack in Flanders succeeded in taking Hazebrouck, Ludendorff then could have turned his 
attention back toward Amiens. That too would have been an obvious follow-on objective, but 
the disruption to the British logistics system that would have been caused by the loss of 
Hazebrouck just might have given the Germans enough of a window of opportunity to shift 
forces south rapidly and push the few remaining kilometers to Amiens. This, or course, 
would have been the "skillful series of blows" originally proposed by Wetzell, and supported 
by Lossberg, Kuhl, and Rupprecht. 
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Finally, there remains the problem of the line of the Flanders Hills. Foch thought the 
control of this high ground was absolutely essential to any military success in Flanders. 
Commenting on the shift in objective during GEORGETTE, Foch wrote: "... by continuing 
the advance west without having first captured the line of the Flanders Hills, [the enemy] 
would be exposing his right flank to serious risk. He therefore decided to attack that line 
before pursuing his march on Hazebrouck and Dunkirk. " 163 And there is no question that the , 
control of that high ground would be absolutely essential in a force-on-force operation-- "to 
defeat the enemy" as the original 20 November estimate stated. But it would not necessarily 
be essential to control that high ground if the operational objective was not the main force, 
but rather a key vulnerability like the Hazebrouck rail junctions, or even deeper, the Channel 
ports. 
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In May 1918 it was our immediate business 
to try to separate the two allies in Flanders. 
England was easier to beat when France 
was far away. 1 
Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg 
Our previous objective could now be extended. 
New operational possibilities opened to us. All 
other considerations had to give way to the single 
idea of exploiting the extraordinary success of 
the first day. 2 
German Crown Prince Wilhelm 
Chapter VIII 
Operations BLÜCHER, GOERZ, and YORCK 
(27 May -5 June 1918) 
PLANS 
With the failure of MICHAEL and then GEORGETTE, the Germans were on the 
verge of running out of time and resources. But the basic strategic imperative of defeating the 
British had not changed. As Hindenburg noted in his memoirs: 
The attack against the British northern wing remained the focal 
point of our operations. I believed that the war would be decided 
if this attack was successful. If we reached the Channel coast, we 
could lay our hands directly on Britain's vital arteries. In so doing, 
we would not only be in the most favorable position conceivable 
for interrupting her maritime communications, but our heaviest 
artillery would be able to bring a segment of the south coast of 
Britain under fire. This technical marvel of science, which was 
even now sending shells into the French capital from the region 
of Laon, could be directed against Britain as well. 3 
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Ironically, Hindenburg only seems to have grasped the importance of attacking Britain's lines 
of communications in his post-war writings. The operations orders issued at the time say 
nothing about such an objective. His "technical marvel of science, " the Paris Guns positioned 
well in the sector of the Seventh Army, were already capable of hitting Britain's south coast if 
they had been positioned in Flanders. 
On 13 April, more than two weeks before GEORGETTE died out, Rupprecht's Army 
Group issued planning guidance to develop courses of action for follow-on operations. The 
first option, called NEU-MICHAEL, was to be an attack between the Somme and Arras in 
the direction of Doullens. The second option, called NEU-GEORG, was to be a renewed 
attack in Flanders. The two operations were later re-designated WILHELM and HAGEN, 
respectively. 4 
The main operational problem for the Germans at this point was that in responding to 
the German attacks, the French had weakened their other sectors to support the British. As a 
result, Ludendorff and most of the German planners were now in agreement that the Allies 
were too strong north of the Somme. A decisive victory in Flanders would not be possible 
until the bulk of the French reserves were withdrawn from the sector. That meant the 
Germans would have to attack the French with enough force to threaten a vital point. As 
Ludendorff put it; "I was in hopes that it would consume enough enemy forces so as to permit 
us to resume our attack in Flanders. " 5 
On 17 April Wilhelm's Army Group received a warning order to start preparing for an 
attack in the sector of General Hans von Boehn's Seventh Army. Ludendorff, however, did 
not want to make a final decision as long as there was some possibility that the Mount 
Kemmel phase of GEORGETTE might still lead to decisive results against the British. In its 
basic concept, the original objective of the new attack in the south was to be the line of the 
Aisne River, which required the capture of the Chemin des Dames ridge between the Ailette 
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and the Aisne. During the subsequent planning, however, the objective was extended to the 
next ridgeline, between the Aisne and the Vesle, and then to the Vesle itself. Just prior to the 
start of the attack, the objective was extended yet again to the high ground south of the Vesle. 
[Map 5] Simultaneously, the planned frontage of the attack first narrowed, and then widened. 
Initially it was supposed to run from Brimont (a little west of Reims) to Soissons. Wilhelm's 
Army Group actually wanted to widen the attack from Reims on the east, to Compiegne (23 
miles west of Soissons) on the west. But Ludendorff didn't think he could free up the 
necessary infantry and artillery without weakening critical sectors in Crown Prince 
Rupprecht's area of operations. 6 
On 19 April, with GEORGETTE still hanging in the balance, Wetzell issued his first 
operational assessment since 25 December 1917. Wetzell noted that Foch appeared to be 
pursuing two objectives: to hold fast in the British sector, and especially in front of the 
Bethune coal fields; and also to relieve the pressure on British forces to allow them to 
reconstitute. Foch was able to pursue both objectives only by foregoing launching a major 
offensive himself. Thus, if the Germans wanted to retain the initiative, Wetzell argued, they 
had to attack again. The key question was where? 
Wetzell went on to argue that another 50-division attack on the scale of MICHAEL 
was no longer possible, because of the increased front line that resulted from MICHAEL and 
GEORGETTE. But by pulling divisions from Army Groups Gallwitz and Albrecht, a 25- to 
30-division attack force could be assembled. Wetzell, therefore, recommended a penetration 
attack on the "southern front of the Seventh Army east of the Oise-Aisne canal and the 
refused right flank of the First Army. " As a preliminary and supporting effort, he also 
recommended an attack toward the southwest through Montdidier by the Eighteenth Army. 
The objective of that attack would be to eliminate the flanking effect of the Arve bridgehead. 
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The main purpose of the group of attacks would be to force the Allies to shift their reserves 
from Flanders. 
On 20 April, Crown Prince Wilhelm's Arm) Group issued a course of action analysis 
for what would become known as Operation BLÜCHER. The Seventh Army would conduct 
BLÜCHER I, attacking across the Chemin des Dames from Fort Malmaison to Berry au Bac, 
pushing to the Aisne. Simultaneously, General Fritz von Below's First Army on the left 
would conduct BLÜCHER II as far east as Brimont, and then prepare to exploit to the high 
ground between the Aisne and the Vesle in support of the Seventh Army. In the event that 
BLOCHER failed, the Third Army should start making preparations to resurrect the 
ROLAND plan for an attack east of Reims. g Eventually, the Seventh Army's attack sector 
was extended to the left and absorbed BLÜCHER Il. The First Army attack also shifted left 
to just west of Reims, and was re-designated GOERZ. Initiall}, that attack was planned as a 
single corps effort. The First Army's XV Corps was told to plan on the minimum levels of 
artillery and to make maximum use of trench mortars and gas launchers. The VII Reserve 
Corps would support the attack by shelling the city of Reims. " 
That same day (20 April) Ludendorff approved the basic concept proposed by Army 
Group German Crown Prince and gave the order to initiate planning and preparations. 10 
The terrain did not exactly favor the attackers. The Chemin des Dames was a 24-mile long 
"hog's back" ridge, running east-west. It rose steeply from the Ailette River along the north, 
and then fell sharply to the Aisne River to the south. The top of the ridge was 300 to 400 
meters wide and flat. The entire area between the Ailette and the Marne River consisted of a 
series of more or less parallel rivers with high ridgelines in between. South of the Aisne lay 
the Vesle, then the Ourcq, and finally the Marne. The French had taken the Chemin des 
Dames in 1917 and had held it lightly ever since. It was good defender's terrain, and the 
prevailing road network also ran east-west. Thus, the rivers, roads, and ridges almost all ran 
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perpendicular to the axis of the German advance. [Map 5] As a Seventh Army operations 
order noted; "Of course, the very few roads running east-west prove difficult for this 
attack. "" And even Hindenburg later wrote, "... the ground was extremely unfavorable for 
attack. " 12 
On 26 April the Seventh Army submitted its second version of the BLOCHER plan to 
OHL. It recommended extending the first-day objectives beyond the Aisne to the high ground 
between the Vesle and the Aisne. The Seventh Army estimated its force requirements at 17 
divisions controlled by four corps headquarters. Twelve of those divisions would have to 
come from OHL. Two days later the Seventh Army started to consider adding another corps 
headquarters on the right flank of the attack. 13 
Wetzell issued another operational assessment on 28 April. He started out by stating 
the generally accepted notion: "In order to be able to strike another great blow against the 
British, the principal mass of the French reserves on the British front must first be 
withdrawn. " This, he argued, could be accomplished by the Seventh Army's attack to the 
depth of the line Vauxaillon--Vailly--Aisne--the basic plan of the BLOCHER attack. But 
Wetzell also recommended extending the right wing of the attack as far west as Malmaison. 
This extension would later be designated Operation YORCK. Wetzell went on to argue that if 
the Seventh Army attack succeeded, it would set up the conditions for "a really decisive 
blow" against the French reserves. This would entail a major thrust by the Eighteenth Army 
five or six days after the Seventh Army attack. The Eighteenth Army would attack in the 
direction of Compiegne to the line Domfort--Mery--Marsuil--Thiescourt. This thrust would 
be supported by a further thrust of the Seventh Army in a westerly direction along both banks 
of the Aisne, through Soissons to create a giant pincer. Thus, contrary to his 19 April 
assessment, Wetzell was now advocating that the Eighteenth Army attack after the Seventh 
Army. This later attack came to be designated as Operation GNEISENAU and evolved into 
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the fourth of Ludendorffs five major offensives. Wetzell concluded that after the extended 
BLÜCHER attack, followed by GNEISENAU, "a great blow could be struck against the 
British a few weeks later in the Seventeenth or Fourth Army sectors. " 14 
At a meeting with the army group chiefs of staff on 29 and 30 April, Ludendorff made 
the final decision to proceed with the Chemin des Dames attack. The purpose of the operation 
was stated clearly as: "To disrupt the unity of the Allied front opposite Army Group Crown 
Prince Rupprecht, and create the possibility of renewing the offensive against the British. " 
The attack was scheduled tentatively for 20 May, with the follow-up attack against the British 
being launched in middle- June. is Ludendorff directed Wilhelm's Army Group to expand 
the Seventh Army attack to the west as far as Pinon, and to start developing the plans for the 
possible follow-on attack by the Eighteenth Army from Montdidier to Lassigny that Wetzell 
had recommended. 16 To support the buildup, Rupprecht's Army Group was required to shift 
substantial artillery and some reserve divisions to Wilhelm's Army Group. 
Wetzell issued another operational assessment on 2 May, now arguing: "Decisive 
results can only be achieved in the near future on the Montdidier-Reims front, and there we 
must strive for victory on a large scale. " The best course of action, Wetzell noted, would be 
for the Seventh, First, and Eighteenth Armies to launch one massive coordinated attack. But 
since the Germans had insufficient artillery, the same results would have to be achieved , 
through successive rather than simultaneous blows. Wetzell was convinced that even if the 
Seventh Army attack was not completely successful, the French would over-react and mass 
their reserves in front of the center and left wing of the Eighteenth Army, thereby presenting 
a lucrative target. In such a situation, a strong Eighteenth Army attack would give further 
impetus to a renewed attack by the Seventh Army. 17 
Ludendorff essentially accepted Wetzell's recommendation. Ludendorff too would 
have preferred to attack simultaneously across the whole sector from Reims to hlontdidier, 
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but the forces were just not available. Wilhelm's Army Group, nonetheless, did not want to 
conduct a split offensive. The Crown Prince's chief of staff, Schulenburg, pushed OHL 
several times for a single attack across the entire sector of the Seventh Army, and he 
recommended against the later attack of the Eighteenth Army. The wings of the Seventh 
Army attack had to be especially strong, he argued, with the right wing anchored along the 
Oise all the way to the Compiegne woods. Schulenburg also recommended a stronger effort 
by the First Army, extending that attack far enough to the east to take Reims and the high 
ground to the south. Schulenburg also floated the idea of a push toward Paris, but Ludendorff 
rejected all his recommendations citing insufficient forces, especially artillery. 18 
The same day that Wetzell issued the third of his recent string of operational 
assessments, Wilhelm's Army Group issued the operations order for BLÜCHER. With the 
army group staff still somewhat reluctant about the expanded operation, the order noted that 
the army group would not advance across the Aisne if the enemy succeeded in rapidly 
moving strong forces to the south of the river. On the other hand, if the right wing of 
BLÜCHER did prove successful, then the left wing of the Eighteenth Army (the XXXVIII 
Reserve Corps) would launch Operation YORCK as an enveloping attack between the Oise 
and the Aisne. 19 
The First Army's 5 May operations order for GOERZ expanded the scope of that 
attack. The First Army now had three missions. First, it was to push the enemy back over the 
Aisne-Marne Canal between Berry au Bac and Brimont; second, it was to take the high 
ground west of the canal as a line of departure for the next objective; and finally, it was to 
push the enemy across the Vesle between Prouilly and Reims in coordination with the 
Seventh Army. Confusingly, the exploitation phase in support of the Seventh Army was 
given the code name GNEISENAU. The First Army also strongly recommended the capture 
of Reims in the event that BLÜCHER reached the Vesle. 20 
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The following day the Seventh Army sent the army group headquarters a new attack 
plan for BLÜCHER. The objective for the first day had been extended to cross the Aisne and 
reach the Vesle. The Seventh Army emphasized that the attack had to cross the Aisne on the 
first day and continue pushing to the banks of the Vesle to deny the enemy the time to move 
reinforcements onto the high ground between the two rivers. "Higher headquarters must be 
prepared to halt the offensive if the line of the Vesle is not reached by the second day and if, 
the enemy deploys a superior force on the high ground between the two rivers. " On the 
afternoon of the first day of the attack the Seventh Army planned to shift about 60 field 
batteries and as many heavy batteries to the First Army sector; but a portion of the army's 
artillery also had to be shifted to the west to support the later YORCK attack. 21 OHL 
responded by designating 27 May as the start date for BLÜCHER. 22 
, 
`, . 
On 9 May the First Army sent a request to Wilhelm's Army Group for approval to 
launch the GOERZ attack 1 1/2 hours after daybreak, rather than simultaneously with 
BLÜCHER. 23 That same day OHL issued orders stating that BLOCHER and GOERZ must 
be launched simultaneously, but then later reversed itself and approved the First Army 
proposal. OHL also included the extremely cautious note; "Should the BLÜCHER attack 
encounter strong enemy resistance at or on the other side of the Aisne, the attack will be - 
halted. " 24 
On 16 May Ludendorff and the chiefs of staff met again at Avesnes. The objective of 
BLOCHER remained the Vesle, but the west wing of the attack had to exploit its success 
until the enemy collapsed along the lower Ailette and the Oise toward the west. Three days 
after the main attack the inner wings of the Eighteenth and Seventh Armies were supposed to 
launch the YORCK attack across the Oise and the lower Ailette. [Map 5] The GNEISENAU 
attack of the Eighteenth Army, scheduled to follow a few days later between Montdidier and 
Lassigny, was reduced to a heavy stroke west of the Oise in the direction of Compiegne. It 
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was not supposed to cross the general line Mery--Ressons--Matz, rather it was supposed to 
help the forces fighting in the Oise-Aisne angle move toward Compiegne. 25 
GOERZ would be a difficult attack at best. At the planned crossing point the Aisne- 
Marne Canal was 35 meters wide, and from there the attack would have to proceed uphill in 
wooded country. The initial plan called for the advance to be tied to the left wing of the 
Seventh Army. But on 17 May the First Army issued orders expanding GOERZ to include 
the capture of the high ground northeast of Cormicy. 26 
Ludendorff met with the chiefs of staff one last time at Marle on 21 May. As a result 
of that meeting, OHL extended the first day's objectives yet again, to across the Vesle and to 
the high ground to the south. 27 
PREPARATIONS 
On 1 May the Fourth and Sixth Armies in Flanders passed to the defensive and all 
army groups start issuing the orders to withdraw all "dispensable divisions", heavy and field 
artillery, engineers, trench mortars, communications units, and bridge units. The next day the 
28 Seventh Army issued generalized orders for preparations for a large-scale attack. 
Security, Surprise, and Deception 
The buildup for BLOCHER was another masterpiece of secrecy and operational 
security. As before, the Germans enforced stringent camouflage and concealment measures 
and light and noise discipline. One widely reported factor that supposedly helped mask the 
noise of the German night movements was the croaking of thousands of frogs in the Ailette 
and its surrounding marshy ground. 29 Special security officers down to the brigade level 
tested the security measures. Only the corps commanders and their chiefs of staff and 
operations officers knew of their activities. 30 During the build-up, the German trench 
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divisions in the front lines of the attack sector were told that expended divisions were being 
rested to their rear. 31 
On 4 May, OHL ordered the Fifth and Nineteenth Armies, and Army Detachment C 
to initiate deception measures. Simultaneously, the 30 attack divisions left opposite the 
British in Flanders lit extra fires, marched their troops about behind their own lines, and 
conducted air attacks against the British rear areas. The Germans also planned a number of 
diversionary attacks, including Operation TARNOPOL, conducted by the inner wings of the_ 
Second and Eighteenth Armies from 27 May through 2 June; and Operation 
JOHANNISFEUER, conducted by Rupprecht's Fourth Army during the same dates. 32 
Right up until just before the attack, GHQ and GQG had no idea where the Germans ,,,; ", 
would attack next. GHQ initially predicted the Germans would resume the offensive between 
Albert and Arras. By 7 May the German deception measures seemed to indicate an attack 
astride the Scarpe. By 15 May, conspicuous radio silence in that sector convinced the Allies 
the attack would be resumed in the area of the La Bassee Canal. By 18 and 19 May the 
thinking was back to the area between Albert and Arras. On 25 May, GQG thought the 
attack would come between the Oise and the sea. Finally, on 26 May Haig himself noted that 
an attack against the Chemin des Dames seemed likely. 33 The 26 May mid-day and evening 
reports of the German Crown Prince's Army Group noted that aerial reconnaissance showed 
that the three forward-most Allied trench lines opposite Seventh Army's VII Corps on the 
right and LXV Corps on the left were held normally. 34 
Ironically, the intelligence section of the American Expeditionary Force had 
accurately predicted the location of the next blow as early as 25 April. The assessment was 
based on German capabilities derived from order of battle and logistics realities. But the 
French and British rejected out of hand the assessment of the inexperienced Americans. 35 
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Artillery and Air Preparations 
As early as 20 April, the German Crown Prince's Army Group ordered Bruchmüller to 
report to the Seventh Army. The assigned artillery commander, Major General Meckel, was 
"placed at the disposal of other duties. " 36 Bruchmüller and his staff had five weeks to work 
up the plans and position the guns without the Allies noticing. The first batteries with 
concealed firing positions started occupying those positions on 14 May, the last by 23 May. 
Only 20 of the more than 1,100 batteries were Category III, those that had to make their 
approach marches on the night of the attack. Two-and-a-half day's ammunition basic load 
was positioned at the guns; one day's load on the battery wagons; one-and-a-half day's load at 
the divisional ammunition point; and one day's load in the corps dumps. Each attacking corps 
was allocated 4,000 kilometers of communications wire, most of it for the artillery. About 2/3 
of the trench mortars committed were used to substitute for the unavailable artillery in the 
First Army sector, where the attack zones were much more narrow than in the Seventh Army. 
The Germans also prepared forward airfields, but did not occupy them until the day of the 
37 attack. 
Supply and Transportation 
The Germans made all movements larger than company-sized at night only. Because 
of the series of river lines running perpendicular to the attack, BLOCHER had extensive, 
bridging requirements. One corps, for example, had 24 specially constructed foot bridges in 
each of its divisional sectors for crossing the Ailette and the surrounding marshy ground, plus 
-five additional heavy bridges for the entire corps sector. On 20 May the night approach 
marches of the attacking units began. By the night of 26 May all forces were in position. 38 
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Allied Actions 
On 23 April, in accordance with Foch's roulement plan to rest tired divisions in order, 
to build up the Allied general reserve, four British divisions under the headquarters of IX 
Corps were withdrawn from Flanders. They moved to the sector on the eastern end of the 
Chemin des Dames, and came under the command and control of the French Sixth Army. 39 e, 
Meanwhile, the rail lines from Paris south of Amiens and across the Somme were reinforced 
with two and three tracks, because the rail traffic was being interdicted by German long- 
range fire. Recognizing their key vulnerability apparently better than the Germans, the Allies 
used 35 rail construction companies and 20,000 workers to keep those lines open. 40 
On 17 May Haig ordered the British Fourth Army to war game the possibility of a 
German attack east from Villers-Bretonneux in conjunction with an attack against the French. 
Three days later Foch issued his General Directive No. 3, which ordered the preparations for 
two offensive operations. The priority operation was between the Oise and the Somme, to 
relieve the pressure on Amiens and on the Paris-Amiens rail line, and the rail lines to the 
north. The other attack would be in the Lys sector, to take back the German-held part of the 
Bethune coalfields. 41 
Along the seemingly quite Chemin des Dames sector, the commander of the French 
Sixth Army, General Denis Duchene, largely ignored Main's orders of 20 and 22 December 
1917 mandating the adoption of defense in depth techniques. Foch supported Duchene in his 
rigid forward defense approach. 42 On 19 April and again on 5 May Foch had issued 
directives that between the Oise and the sea, "no ground can be lost ... It is a matter of defense 
foot by foot. " 43 Even after the start of BLÜCHER, the foot-by-foot defense was again 
emphasized in a2 June memo from Foch to Main. The British IX Corps commander pleaded 
with Duchene in vain for a flexible defense in depth, at least in his own sector. Along with 
the other French commanders, Duchene scoffed at the American intelligence assessment and 
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only began to take it seriously when two German prisoners captured the day before the attack 
provided detailed information. 44 
German Order of Battle 
At start of MICHAEL, the Germans had 191 divisions on the Western Front. By mid- 
May, they had 207. The extra divisions were all late arrivals from the Eastern Front, but of 
low quality. For the combined BLÜCHER-GOERZ attack the Germans managed to mass 29 
attack divisions and ten trench divisions. Twenty-six of the attack divisions had participated 
in MICHAEL or MARS, but none had been in GEORGETTE. Eleven of the attack divisions 
were already in position at the start of the buildup, the remaining 19 had to be provided by 
OHL. 
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Table 8.1 
German Divisions on 27 May 1918 as 
First Second Third Total Sector 
Line Line Line Divisions Width 
YORCK " 3 0 2 OHL 6 25 km 
1 Army 
BLÜCHER" 17 5 5 OHL 29 43 km ... 
2 Army 
GEORZ 1 5 0 1 OHL 7 32 km .. { 
1 Army 
25 58 OHL 42 100 km 
4 Army 
* One corps each of Eighteenth and Seventh Armies 
# Five corps of Seventh Army 
§ Two corps of First Army 
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Table 8.2 
German Corps on 27 May 1918 46 
(West to East) 
Corps Commander Attack 
Eighteenth Army Hutier 
_ 
XXXVIII Reserve Hofmann YORCK II 
Seventh Army Boehn 
VII Francois YORCK I 
LIV Larisch BLÜCHER 
VIII Reserve Wichura BLOCHER 
XXV Reserve Winckler BLOCHER 
IV Reserve Conta BLOCHER 
LXV Schmettow BLOCHER 
First Army Below 
XV Ilse GOERZ 
VII Reserve Wellmann GOERZ 
Again the Germans weighted the attack heavily with artillery. Facing the 1,422 
French and British guns, the Germans massed 1,158 batteries for a total of 5,263 tubes, of 
which 1,631 were heavy or super heavy, including nine 240mm railway guns. The fire 
support assets also included 3,080 gas projector tubes and 1,233 trench mortars, of which 826 
were medium or heavy. In the main attack zone for BLÜCHER the gun density averaged 110 
tubes per kilometer. The resulting 3.7: 1 tube superiority ratio was the highest the Germans 
achieved during any of the battles on the Western Front between 1914 and 1918. Finally, all 
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three first line divisions of the LXV Corps received a detachment of tanks. All were captured 
vehicles. 47 
Table 8.3 
Guns Supporting BLÜCHER and GOERZ 48 
Super Total Trench 
Field Heavy Heavy Guns Mortars 
3,632 1,598 33 5,263 1,233 
For air support for BLÜCHER and GOERZ the Germans massed some 500 aircraft, 
organized into at least 54 squadrons. 
Table 8.4 
Squadrons Supporting BLÜCHER and GOERZ 49 
Observation Attack Fighter Bomber Total 
Seventh 24 8 10 ? 42+ 
Army 
First 60 6 0 12 
Army 
30 8 16 7 54+ 
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Allied Order of Battle 
At the beginning of May the French had 47 divisions north of the Oise, with 23 in the 
line and 24 in reserve. They had 55 divisions between the Oise and the Swiss border, with 43 
in the line and 12 in reserve. 50 Prior to BLOCHER, German intelligence estimated that of 
the 58 divisions the BEF had in France, 55 had been committed since MICHAEL; 29 had 
been committed twice; and six had been committed three times. 51 After the Mount Kemmel 
battle, the BEF had been forced to reduce ten of its divisions to cadre strength. But after April 
the British rushed 140,000 troops across the Channel, and by July all had ten been 
reconstituted. 
52 
On 26 May Duchene's French Sixth Army had only eleven divisions in the front line. "- 
Seven of those (four French and three British) were deployed along the Chemin des Dames 
ridge. Duchene also had five divisions in reserve behind the ridge, including two French and 
one British. They were supported by fourteen squadrons of aircraft. German intelligence 
estimated that only six of the French divisions were fully combat capable. 
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Table 8.5 
Allied Order of Battle in the BLÜCHER-GOER7rYORCK Sectors 
53 
Infantry Cavalry Reserve Heavy Total Sector 
Divisions Divisions Divisions Guns Guns Width 
Third 1 0 0 ? ? 15 km 
Army 
Sixth"' 11 0 5 Inf 600 1,400 75 kin 
Army 
Fourth § 3 0 1 Inf ? ? 10 km 
Army 2 Cav 
15 06 Inf 600+ 1,400+ 100 km 
2Cav 
* One corps of Third Army 
# Three corps (including British IX) of Sixth Army 
§ One corps of Fourth Army 
EXECUTION 
27 May 
At 0200 hours on 27 May 1918 the German artillery opened fire and caught the Allies 
almost completely by surprise. 54 This preparation was Bruchmüller's masterpiece. All firing 
was done using predicted fires for effect with the Pulkowski Method. Because there was no 
adjustment of rounds, and therefore no need to observe, all the firing was done during 
darkness. After MICHAEL and GEORGETTE the German Army in the west finally had 
come to accept Bruchmüller's fire support techniques. The fire lasted just two hours and 40 
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minutes, the shortest of any of Bruchmüller's preparations. The first phase opened with 10 
minutes of saturation fire. The reinforced counter-battery phase lasted 65 minutes. Then three 
phases against the infantry positions and the C3 targets lasted 20,20, and 45 minutes 
respectively, with the last ten minutes being the final concentration on the defenders' leading 
positions. 
Running concurrently with the preparation, the artillery of the units on the flanks of 
the main attack also laid down intensive fires to deceive the Allied commanders as to the 
precise sector of the main attack. The effect was accurate and devastating. The German 
gunners missed hardly a single forward position, communications trench, command post, or 
battery. The FEKA units had been sited to enfilade the Aisne river valley on the backside of 
the Chemin des Dames. The SCHWEFLA groups damaged the tracks behind the French 
ss railway guns. Unable to withdraw, 14 were captured by the advancing Germans. 
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Table 8.6 
Seventh Army Artillery Preparation, 27 May 1918 56 
Ist Phase (10 minutes) 
Fire strike against enemy batteries, infantry positions, command 
posts, and communication centers. 
" AKA guns fire Blue Cross. 
2nd Phase (65 minutes) 
" Reinforced counter-battery with all types of gas. 
" Three-to-one ratio against the enemy batteries. 
41 Trench mortars did not fire. 
3rd Phase (20 minutes) 
IKA fires against the crest of the Chemin des Dames and against 
the positions on the reverse slope using mixed Blue Cross and HE. 
" AKA continues counter battery with Blue Cross. 
" FEKA and SCHWEFLA engage deep targets. 
" Trench mortars fire on the front line. 
4th Phase (20 minutes) 
9 Same as Phase 3, with slight variations in the targets. 
5th Phase (45 minutes) 
" IKA joins the trench mortars in attacking the front lines and in the 
last 10 minutes fires only HE. 
" Trench mortars drop out in the last 10 minutes. 
" AKA, FEKA, and SCFHWEFLA continue as in Phases 3 and 4. 
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Creeping Barrage (Feuerwalze) 
" Double creeping barrage; first line with HE, second line with HE 
and Blue Cross. 
"4 to, 5 minutes per 100 meters. 
" High angle fire up the north face of the Chemin des Dames 
The counter-battery fire was particularly effective. French Colonel J. P. Muller later 
wrote; "Our batteries, at first taken under fire by one enemy battery each firing gas shells, 
found themselves ten minutes later when they were ready to reply, subjected to the fire of 
three batteries each. " 57 That was exactly the way Bruchmüller had planned it. The French 
artillery almost seemed to go out of its way to make it easy for the Germans. Most of the 
French guns were still in the same firing positions they had occupied since their own attack in 
that sector in October 1917. 
The carnage was even worse than it should have been' because of Duchene's refusal to 
yield an inch of French soil to the Boche. Duchene packed all of his troops into the most 
forward positions at an average density of one division for every eight kilometers. 58 They 
were easy targets for Bruchmüller's guns. The German artillery fired three million rounds on 
the first day of the battle. Fifty percent of that total was gas, their highest proportion of 
chemical rounds for any attack of the war. 59 
The German infantry assaulted at 0440 hours, 20 minutes before first light. Following 
behind a double creeping barrage, lead elements of the XXV Reserve Corps in the center 
reached the top of the ridge at 0535 hours. Five minutes later, the First Army on the left 
launched Operation GOERZ. At approximately 0900 hours lead elements of LXV Corps on 
Seventh Army's far left reached the Aisne near Gemicourt, and the Germans closed in 
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strength along the river's length within the next hour. The Germans moved so fast the French 
could not evacuate the large proportion of their own artillery that was in battery on the north 
side of the river. The Germans captured some 650 guns as they swept along. 60 By 1100 
hours the lead elements of IV Reserve Corps crossed both the Aisne and the Aisne-Marne 
canal at Oeuilly. Around 1800 hours elements of the First Army's XV Corps linked up with 
Seventh Army's LXV Corps on the left. Two hours later all three divisions of the IV Reserve 
Corps had reached the Vesle and elements crossed near Fismes. By 2200 hours elements of 
the XV Reserve Corps in the Seventh Army center crossed the Vesle at Courlandon. 61 
By the end of the first day the German infantry had advanced 22 kilometers, the 
y 
largest single day advance of any attack in World War 1.62 LIV Corps on the Seventh 
Army's right, however, had not reached its objective of the Aisne and the high ground south 
of Soissons. In a phone conversation at 2215 hours, Wetzell told the army group to continue 
the attack on the hills south of the Vesle on the 28th. A half an hour later OHL ordered the IV 
Reserve Corps to continue attacking throughout the night, to take the high ground south of 
the Vesle. The main effort was with the IV Reserve Corps, supported by the LXV and XXV 
Reserve Corps. The reserves were supposed to be concentrated behind those units. On the 
extreme left wing, the GEORZ attacking force had made it across the Aisne-Marne Canal, but 
then encountered stiff resistance from the British in front of Cormicy. 63 [Map 5] 
On the first day the Allies committed five reserve divisions (including one British) to 
the battle. Foch and Main conferred in the afternoon at Chantilly. Main immediately started 
moving forces toward the breakthrough area, including the Fifth Army with six infantry 
divisions and the I Cavalry Corps with three divisions. Three of the infantry divisions and 
two of the cavalry divisions were supposed to be committed to action by the 28th. 64 
Duchene ordered that the German attack had to be stopped at the Allies' second 
position on the 28th. Unfortunately, Duchene had helped the German advance by waiting too 
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long to order the destruction of the bridges over the Aisne between Vailly and Pontavert. 65 
He also threw his reserves into the battle piecemeal and too early, where they were consumed 
in the melee. And as noted, most of the French light and medium machine guns and field 
artillery had been as far forward as possible, and were swept over by the German infantry. As 
the War Diary of the Crown Prince's Army Group noted on the 27th; "It is remarkable that no 
hostile artillery appears in the district south of the Vesle and west of Fismes. " 66 
28 Mav 
On the 28th the Germans crossed the Vesle on a wide front. Most German units 
resumed operations at 0600 hours. By 1100 hours the Germans captured Fismes, and about 
1215 hours they captured Breuil, on the boundary between the British IX Corps and the 
French XI Corps. But although the attack was making good progress in the center, the units 
on the flanks were starting to slow down. 67 
At 0800 hours Ludendorff held a planning meeting at Seventh Army headquarters 
with the army and army group chiefs of staff. Ludendorff was facing another decision point. 
So far the objective of the entire operation had been for the German center to cross the Vesle 
and take the high ground to the south. They were already past that, and Ludendorff now had 
two basic options. He could follow the original plan by slowing the pace of the BLOCHER 
attack--which was starting to draw in the French reserves-- and then shift to the northern 
attack against the British. Or, he could continue to exploit the stunning and unexpected 
tactical success of BLUCHER--but to what operational objective? 
No definite orders came out of that meeting, but at 1300 hours OHL apparently opted 
for the second course with the issuance of an order that effectively extended the BLÜCHER's 
objectives. In so doing, OHL also committed three additional divisions to the German Crown 
Prince's Army Group. 68 
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The group of armies must reach the general line: high ground 
southwest of Soissons--Fere en Tardenois-high ground south of 
Caulonges--south front (line of forts) of Reims.... Whether it will 
be of any advantage to advance in the direction of the line 
Compiegne--Dormans--Epernay, is still too early to say. Such 
action will receive consideration, however, in case the attack 
progresses favorably. 69 
Late that afternoon the army group issued an order to the Seventh and Eighteenth 
Armies to continue preparations for YORCK and GNEISENAU. 70 The army group also sent 
a message to the Eighteenth Army noting that Allied reserves were starting to move from 
Flanders and stressing that all rail lines leading south from Amiens had to be interdicted. 71 
[Map 5] 
Following OHL's orders to reach the high ground southwest of Soissons, LIV Corps' 
5th Division crossed the Aisne east of Soissons about 2030 hours and sent four battalions into 
the town. A half hour later, however, a telephone message from the corps headquarters 
ordered the 5th Division to abandon Soissons and withdraw to the north of the Aisne. The 
basis for that order was supposed to be a large French force assembling south and southwest 
of the town. 72 Ludendorff later lamented the failure to exploit the situation at Soissons. 73 
The German official historian, Theo von Bose, later suggested that the real reason for the 
withdrawal was the fear that German troops would go out of control if they got ahold of the 
Allied supplies and rations in Soissons. 74 Late that evening OHL's orders stated: "Seventh 
Army must attack tomorrow at earliest possible hour. " 75 At that point the Germans had 
captured more than 20,000 prisoners, and 21 German divisions were facing 16 more or less 
stunned Allied divisions. 76 
Within 24 hours of the German breakthrough, P&tain had started moving sixteen 
divisions into position to block the road to Paris. He pulled four of those divisions from 
behind Amiens, without requesting approval from Foch. Most of those divisions were moved 
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by truck and thrown into the battle by regiments, usually without their artillery. 77 During 
the 28th the French committed an additional four divisions (three infantry and one cavalry) to 
the battle, with 11 infantry and 3 1/2 cavalry divisions enroute. 78 Early morning German 
intelligence reports identified elements of the French 13th Division from Alsace in the 
vicinity of Fismes. 79 About 1000 hours, GQG ordered Army Group North to hold the line of 
the Vesle, but that order had been overcome by events before it was ever issued. 80 GQG also 
ordered the insertion of the Fifth Army headquarters into the line between the Fourth and 
Sixth Armies, on the east side of the salient, with an effective date of 2 June. 81 
Foch did not panic over the BLÜCHER attack. He saw almost right away that it could 
not lead to any decisive operational results, attacking as it did into the Allied depth. He 
correctly concluded it was a feint designed to draw off the Allied reserves, preparatory to a 
main attack in a more decisive direction. He therefore saw no need to shift large elements of 
the strategic reserves from the Flanders or Somme sectors. 82 The French at that point still 
had ten divisions from the Oise north to the Channel. The Germans, however, had 41 
divisions in reserve behind Rupprecht's Army Group. 
29 May 
By the third day of BLÜCHER the German center was extending its advance in the 
direction of Dormans. The two wings of the attack still trailed far behind. At that point the 
Germans again started to feel the heavy hand of "the tyranny of logistics. " The only operable 
railway line into the salient ran east-west between Reims and Soissons. The former was still 
in French hands; the latter was effectively interdicted by French artillery. The only other 
major rail line into the sector was a single-track line that ran north-south from Soissons to 
German-held Laon. That line, however, was blocked at the tunnel at Vauxaillon--blown up by 
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the Germans during their 1917 withdrawal to the Sie gfriedstellung. German engineers 
estimated that it would take at least six weeks to reopen the tunnel. 83 
At 0045 hours OHL issued the warning order for the YORCK attack for the next 
day. 84 Several hours later, however, OHL postponed the start of YORCK until 31 May. 85 
Later that morning OHL ordered the continuation of the offensive in the direction of the line 
Compiegne--Dormans--Epernay. The main effort continued in a southwesterly direction, but 
the left wing was ordered to shift to the east toward Reims, to capture the heights south of the 
city. That attack failed. 86 Ludendorff also ordered two attack divisions shifted from 
Rupprecht's Army Group, further disrupting the plans for the follow-on main attack against,, 
the British. 87 
About 2000 hours LIV Corps finally retook Soissons and the high ground to the west 
and southwest. 88 Several hours later Army Group German Crown Prince issued orders for ,;. 
the next day, designating the main effort for the Seventh Army between Soissons and Fere- 
en-Tardenois in the general direction of Chateau-Thierry. The lead elements of the advance 
were supposed to establish bridgeheads across the Marne, but not cross in force. 89 [Map 5] 
At the end of the third day the Germans had 22 divisions in the battle, 20 in reserve, 
and one enroute. The apex of the German salient was near Fere-en-Tardenois, some 25 miles 
south of the German line of departure on the Ailette. But the frontage of the German line also 
had increased from 36 miles to almost 60.90 Another familiar problem began to surface. 
After German troops liberated the cellars of the villages in the Champagne region, Soissons 
that night was full of drunken Landser, confirming Bose's later assessment. 91 
Midday on 29 May Petain asked Foch for control of the Tenth Army. Petain also 
ordered a counterattack for 31 May, with the objective of pushing the Germans back across 
the Vesle, and then back over the Aisne. 92 
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30 May 
Midmorning on 30 May OHL again enlarged the objective of BLÜCHER-GOERZ, 
hoping to capture Reims through a double envelopment. 93 
The First Army will strengthen, at the expense of its center, its 
right wing south of the Vesle still further, in order to enable it 
to push forward vigorously within its zone of action in a southern . 
and southeastern direction. The objective is to facilitate the 
envelopment of Reims, and not to impede the progress of the left 
wing of the Seventh Army. The possibility of cutting in on Reims 
from the east still farther should also be taken into consideration. 94 
The First Army now had six divisions committed to the attack. Although Wilhelm's 
Army Group dutifully passed the order along, an entry in its war diary expressed a note of 
serious skepticism: "The opinion that Reims will fall without serious fighting does not seem 
justified. " 95 The skepticism, however, was justified. The XV Corps failed to take Reims, and 
the failure to gain control of the rail center resulted in serious ammunition shortages for the 
units committed to BLÜCHER. 96 
On the 30th Ludendorff also issued a reminder that the main purpose of BLÜCHER 
was to "threaten Paris, " and in so doing draw large numbers of Allied reserves in from 
Flanders. 97 At 1510 hours the IV Reserve Corps' 231st Infantry Division reached the Marne 
near Treloup. By the end of the day, German forces had closed along a 20-kilometer stretch 
of the river, from Chateau Thierry to Treloup. 98 Late that night the German Crown Prince's 
Army Group ordered the First and Seventh Armies to continue attacking toward the Marne. 
[Map 5] To control the expanding battle, it inserted the headquarters of the VI Reserve Corps 
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on the right of the First Army. 99 By the end of the fourth day of BLÜCHER the Germans 
had captured some 42,000 prisoners and 400 guns. 100 
On 29 and 30 May the French committed one cavalry and nine infantry divisions to 
the Sixth and Fifth Armies. 101 On the night of 30 May the U. S. 2nd and 3rd Infantry 
Divisions started moving toward Chateau Thierry to reinforce the French. In a meeting with 
Foch that day, Pershing also recommended an early counterattack against the flank of the 
new salient. 102 The French XXX Corps on the extreme western end of the attack zone, 
however, was starting to fall back, widening the base of the salient. Petain, meanwhile, 
continued to pressure Foch for more reinforcements, asking for operational control of the 
divisions of the Army Detachment of the North, and some of the American divisions training 
in the British sector. 103 
31 May 
On 31 May the Eighteenth Army's XXXVIII Reserve Corps and the Seventh Army's_ , 
VII Corps launched YORCK, pushing south across the Oise-Aisne Canal, and extending the 
German attack between Pommiers and Noyon. 104 In the center, the Germans reached and 
crossed the Marne at Dormans and established a small bridgehead of 3 1/2 battalions at 
Jaulgonne. But they made precious little progress on the flanks. On the left they failed to take 
Reims, and on the right they failed to take the forest of Villers-Cotterets. 105 [Map 5] 
That afternoon OHL, Wilhelm's Army Group, and Seventh Army started to send out-, 
conflicting signals. At one point Ludendorff wanted to remove one OFIL reserve division and 
one army-level reserve division from behind the IV Reserve and the LXV Corps, positioning 
those divisions behind the First Army's XV Reserve Corps. On ONL's orders, meanwhile, the 
Seventh Army shifted its main effort west, toward the Villers-Cotterets--La Fertil-Millon line, 
turning the XXV Reserve Corps in that direction. 106 That evening, OIIL ordered two more 
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attack divisions from Rupprecht's Army Group and a division each from Army Groups 
Gallwitz and Duke Albrecht to be shifted to Wilhelm's Army Group. The BLÜCHER- 
GOERZ-YORCK attack continued to grow, but at the at the expense of what was supposed to 
be the subsequent main attack against the British. A Seventh Army order issued to LXV 
Corps stated it was of the highest importance "for the advance toward Paris" that the rail line 
through Reims be opened soon as soon as possible. 107 Late that night OHL ordered the 
control of the LXV Corps transferred from the Seventh Army to the First Army on the 
following day, to reinforce the attack on Reims. 108 Three corps were now attacking Reims 
from two directions. This is supposed to be the point at which the Germans shifted the main 
objective of BLÜCHER to Paris, but the disposition of forces and reserves on 31 May did not 
support such a decision. (See table 8.8) 
At 1030 hours General Franchet d'Esperey authorized General Alfred Micheler, 
commander of the Fifth Army, to evacuate Reims to shorten the French front and reconstitute 
a reserve. Fortunately for the Allies, Micheler did not exercise that option. 109 At 1400 
hours, the French Sixth Army counter attacked with four divisions north toward Soissons, 
and with three divisions northeast toward Fismes. 110 The French counterattacks against the 
Germans flanks that day miscarried, but their continual reinforcement of the units on the 
flanks of the salient prevented the Germans from gaining much more ground near Reims or 
Soissons. The Germans did continue to gain ground between the Marne and the Ourcq, in the 
sector from Chateau Thierry to La Ferte Milon. 111 
At Main's request, Foch ordered the French Tenth Army to shift south to the Marne 
sector from the rear of the British sector near Amiens. 112 Both Foch and Haig continued to 
believe that the Germans were still waiting for the right opportunity to launch the main attack 
against the BEF with Rupprecht's Army Group. British intelligence was reporting that only 
two divisions had been withdrawn from Rupprecht's Army Group, and he still had more than 
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30 divisions in reserve. Petain, on the other hand, believed the German main thrust was 
against Paris. 
113 
The British at that point were still making plans for the worst. Two days earlier the 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Henry Wilson, had issued orders to start the, 
detailed planning for the evacuation of the BEF from the Continent. 114 That evening in 
Paris, Haig and Lloyd George discussed the potential evacuation of Dunkirk with Sir Eric 
Geddes, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, the First Sea 
Lord. By the end of 31 May, 32 French and five British divisions had been committed to the 
battle. Seventeen of those were completely expended, and only 14 more fresh divisions were 
available for commitment over the next ten days. 115 
1 June 
On 1 June the Germans were only 39 miles from Paris. The First Army attacked again : 
on both sides of Reims with nine divisions. The Seventh Army thought its attack was still 
going well. That afternoon it asked the army group for three to four new divisions in order 
to exploit the situation. OHL provided a corps headquarters and another division from Army, 
Group Rupprecht, as well as two divisions from Army Group Gallwitz. The last two were so 
weak that they could only be used in defensive positions along the Marne. 116 About 1500 
hours Ludendorff sent a message to Rupprecht's Army Group: 
The operations of Army Group German Crown Prince are taking 
a favorable course. I therefore ask for further deception operations 
to continue in order to engage the enemy forces at the army group 
front there. Spoiling operations at places sensitive to the enemy 
also might be useful, but our infantry forces should not be wasted. 117 
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OHL also informed Rupprecht's Army Group that HAGEN could not start before the middle 
of July. 118 Thus, the basic objective of drawing off the Allied reserves from the right wing of 
the German Army became subordinate to the objective of advancing the attack of the Seventh 
Army, turning it into an attempt at a decisive operation. 
Later that afternoon an OHL supplemental order noted with alarm; "It appears that the 
attack of the First Army is coming to a standstill. " 119 The success of the First Army attack 
was critical, because without the opening of the rail connections through Reims the logistics 
lifeline of the middle and the left wings of the Seventh Army could not be sustained in the 
long run. The bad news from the First Army prompted Ludendorff to telephone Army Group 
German Crown Prince at 1733 hours. In order to get the First Army attack moving again, he 
said, the Seventh Army would have to cross the Marne in the areas of Jaulgonne and 
Dormans and attack toward Epernay. OHL would provide the necessary forces, including a 
corps headquarters, four divisions, and strong artillery. Reims had to be taken. 120 [Map 5] 
Wilhelm's Army Group did not like the plan. It argued instead that the First Army 
should regroup its right wing by pushing up two to three divisions that so far had been held 
back, and then should continue to attack toward Damery. The First Army should avoid a 
direct attack on Fort de la Pompelle, in order to conserve forces. The main effort of the army 
group should be at the west front of the Seventh Army, where the attack should advance as 
far as possible in order to draw in strong French forces, which in turn would facilitate the 
GNEISENAU attack. Since the Seventh Army needed strong forces on its right wing, and 
since an attack south of the Marne toward Epernay would encounter heavy resistance and 
also would require strong forces, Wilhelm's Army Group recommended strongly against any, 
move south of the Marne--even if the First Army failed. In the face of strong opposition, 
OHL dropped the plan. 121 
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That evening Ludendorff told Kuhl in a telephone conversation that the attack of the,,. . 
Seventh Army appeared to be grinding to a halt, because of the tiredness of the German ;, rb 
troops and the stiffening defense of the Allies. 122 OHUs orders for 2 June clearly stated, 
"The operational direction remains southwest. " 123 The objective was to break the Allied 
defensive resistance between Soissons and Villers-Cotterets, with the XXV Reserve Corps ,. 
taking the latter town. The IV Reserve Corps was ordered to push west along the Marne to 
take Chateau-Thierry. 
The Allies, meanwhile, continued to rush forces into the area. The French inserted the,, 
II Cavalry Corps with two infantry and three cavalry divisions into the line just south of 
Villers-Cotterets, between the Sixth Army's XI and VII Corps. The U. S. 2nd Infantry 
Division took up defensive positions astride the Paris-Chateau-Thierry road. The Allies now 
had 37 divisions, including five British and one American, committed to the battle. 124 
2 June 
At this point the Germans had eight fully fresh divisions behind the Seventh Army,. 
and four more en-route, but BLÜCHER-GEORZ-YORCK clearly had reached culmination. 
At a conference in Rethel, Ludendorff agreed to a pause in the First Army's operations, -, 
because of ammunition shortages and the need to regroup the infantry. When operations did 
resume, however, the First Army had to take Reims first, and then take Fort de la Pompelle to, 
the east of the city. A preliminary attack was scheduled for 6 June, with the main attack to 
follow on 8 June. The final objective line was Chatillon-Coulommes. 125 
That evening, the Seventh Army's orders for 3 June designated VII Corps on the far 
right of Operation YORCK as the main effort. The XXV Reserve Corps was ordered to take 
Villers-Cotterets. The push southwest of Soissons was supposed to take the ground that 
would later facilitate the link-up with the Eighteenth Army's GNEISENAU attack, scheduled 
396 
for 7 June. Just west of Reims, the First Army inserted the headquarters of the VI Reserve 
Corps between the LXV and XV Corps. 126 
3 June 
Since 27 May, the Germans had committed 34 divisions. Five divisions had been 
withdrawn from Rupprecht's Army Group for commitment to BLÜCHER. 127 But on the 
Seventh Army's far right, LIV Corps and Operation YORCK's VII Corps continued to make 
little progress, remaining north of the Aisne. Army Group German Crown Prince 
recommended halting the offensive until the Eighteenth Army could launch GNEISENAU. 
Ludendorff, however, issued instructions to continue operations by using well-prepared, 
limited objective attacks to minimize casualties. 128 For the following day the Seventh Army 
ordered the LIV and VIII Reserve Corps to continue attacking, while the VII, XXV Reserve, 
and IV Reserve Corps consolidated their positions. 129 
On the Allied side, the U. S. 3rd Infantry Division started taking up defensive 
positions near Chateau Thierry. The French, meanwhile, eliminated the German bridgehead 
across the Marne at Jaulgonne. 130 
4-5 June 
The Germans made no significant advances on 4 June, either north of the Aisne or 
southwest of Soissons. The advance on both flanks, around Soissons and Reims, had ground 
to a standstill. With the approval of OHL, the Seventh Army decided to halt and regroup, 
with the intention of resuming operations on 8 or 9 June. The three right-wing corps, however 
(VII, LIV, and VIII Reserve) would continue to make local attacks. The follow-on attacks for 
the 8th or 9th were given the code words BAUMFALLEN and HAMMERSCHLAG. 131 As 
Ludendorff later wrote, "Early in June we stopped our advance. OHL did not intend to attack 
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further, except between the Aisne and the Villers-Cotterets forest. " 132 Operations 
BLOCHER, GOERZ, and YORCK were over. On 5 June the Seventh Army finally ordered 
all its corps to go on the defensive. 133 
On 4 June, Foch requested Haig to shift three divisions of the BEF's general reserve 
astride the Somme to the west of Amiens. Haig in turn, requested the return of British IX 
Corps from west of Reims. Foch also convinced Haig and Pershing to release five U. S. 
divisions training behind the British front. Haig complied with all Foch's requests, but under 
protest. 134 
Fayolle, meanwhile, finally had organized a defense in depth. The French Third Army. . 
now had seven divisions in the first line, five in the second line, and seven infantry and three 
cavalry divisions in the rear. At that point the Allies had committed 35 French Infantry, six 
French Cavalry, five British, two Italian, and two American divisions to the battle, with seven 
still moving up. 135 
ASSESSMENT 
The Results 
On 5 June, OHL issued its own wildly pollyannaish assessment of BLÜCHER: 
One must resist the notion that the offensive did not result in 
a major breakthrough success, but stalled in the end. On the 
contrary, it advanced much farther than its original objective. 
The Allies suffered one of their heaviest defeats. For us it is 
the foundation for future successes. 136 
It is almost impossible to imagine what "future successes" the author of that paragraph could 
have had in mind. Rupprecht noted in his diary on 7 June that Ludendorff was refusing to 
face reality. 137 The Germans were now bogged down south of the Somme in an operational - 
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quagmire that led nowhere, and the attack in the north against the British had been thrown off 
schedule beyond the point of recovery. 
Yet, the results seemed most impressive on the surface. The French had been caught 
almost totally by surprise, and the Germans had advanced an unbelievable 60 kilometers in 
just four days. In the process, they captured some 50,000 prisoners and 600 guns. But they 
also paid a heavy price in irreplaceable casualties. Furthermore, OHL had pulled two corps 
headquarters, five attack divisions, and huge numbers of laborers and support troops away 
from Rupprecht's Army Group--all to the determent of the coming main attack against the 
British. 138 
Table 8.7 
Casualties from Operations BLÜCHER, GOERZ, and YORCK 139 
French 98,160 
British 28,703 
American 474 
Allied Total 127,337 
German 105,370 
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Battle Management 
As in MICHAEL and GEORGETTE, OIIL once again lost control of the battle. What 
was supposed to be a diversion turned into an attempt at a decisive battle, with the original 
objectives being greatly exceeded. As with the two earlier offensives, the planning phase for 
BLOCHER was characterized by what today would be called "mission creep, " as the initial 
objective went from the Aisne, to the Vesle, to the high ground south of the Vesle. During the 
execution phase, the battle was characterized by the same old pattern of what might be called 
"mission leap, " as the offensive expanded rather than concentrated, and in so doing dissipated 
its combat power. By 30 May, and perhaps even earlier, the offensive had again evolved into 
three diverging objectives. On the right it was trying to drive southwest, to "threaten Paris. " 
In the center it was trying to drive south to the Mame. And on the left, it was trying to wheel 
to the southeast to take Reims. 140 But only Reims was a vital objective at that point, because 
of its critical rail center that controlled the only major rail line through the salient. 
Forces and Reserves 
It is difficult to see any clear weighting of the main effort in either the commitment of 
first line units, or the positioning of reserves throughout the battle. As table 8.8 shows, the 
forces were more or less evenly distributed across the front on the first day of the battle. On 
28 May, the IV Reserve Corps, just left of the German center, was designated as the main 
effort. Despite the stated intention to concentrate reserves behind the IV Reserve Corps and 
its supporting units on either side, it did not happen. As the battle progressed, the designated 
main effort increasingly shifted to the German right (west). If anything, the bulk of the OHL 
and army-level reserve divisions remained in the center, or even shifted to the left (east). 
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Table 8.8 
Forces and Reserves 27 May to 4 June 1918 141 
XV VIR LXV IVR XXVR VIIIR LIV VII Total 
27 May 
Front Line 3 
_ 
3 3 3 4 2 2 20 
Corps Res. 0 
- 
1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
Army Res. 1 
- 
0 1 0 0 1 1 4 
OHL Res. 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 8 
28 May ** 
Front Line 3 
_ 
3 4 3 3 3 2 21 
Corps Res. 0 
- 
1 1 1 1 0 0 4 
Army Res. 0 
- 
1 0 0 1 1 1 4 
OHL Res. 0 1 1 1 2 1 0 6 
29 May ** 
Front Line 4 
_ 
3 3 3 4 3 2 22 
Corps Res. 0 
_ 
1 2 1 0 0 0 4 
Army Res. 1 
_ 
1 0 1 1 1 1 6 
OHL Res. I I 1 1 3 2 1 10 
31 May ** 
Front Line 5 3 5 3 4 4 3 27 
Corps Res. 0 
- 
1 1 1 1 0 0 4 
Army Res. 2 
- 
0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
OHL Res. 0 0 2 3 3 0 0 8 
2 June ** 
Front Line 2 3 5 4 3 5 3 5 30 
Corps Res. 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 5 
Army Res. 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
OHL Res. 2 0 1 0 3 2 0 0 8 
4 June ** 
Front Line 2 4 4 5 4 4 3 5 31 
Corps Res. 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 4 
Army Res. 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 0 7 
OHL Res. 3 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 9 
** Designated main effort for the day 
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Logistics 
As noted, the road, rail, and river network between the Chemin des Dames and the 
Marne ran predominantly east-west, perpendicular to the axis of attack. The only major east- 
west rail line into the area was closed at Reims, because the French held the city. The only, 
north-south line, between Soissons and Laon, was blocked at the Vauxaillon tunnel. But, 
Reims was not one of the attack's original objectives, because the Germans had not planned 
to advance any farther than the high ground south of the Vesle. Nor was Soissons an 
objective of the original plan, and the Germans apparently saw no need to get an early start 
on clearing the Vauxaillon tunnel. But once the limited objective attack expanded into a 
decisive attack, the logistics shortsightedness of the Germans came back to haunt them. 
The Germans did make good use of the extensively stocked French depots they 
captured in the attack zone, using their limited road transport assets to move rations and 
ammunition forward. 142 And, once they captured Fismes and Soissons, they had use of the 
rail line between those two cities. But that was not enough. On 29 and 30 May the divisions 
of the LXV and IV Reserve Corps suffered serious ammunition shortages. 143 By the end of 
BLOCHER, the Germans had another huge salient to hold. And largely because of 
inadequate lines of communications, that salient could not be held for any length of time. 
This was one of the major reasons why the Germans concluded they had to launch Operation 
MARNSCHUTZ-REIMS in July, to open the Reims-Soissons rail line into the BLÜCHER 
salient. MARNSCHUTZ-REIMS, of course, just pushed back the attack against the British 
even farther. 
Decision 28 May 
The order issued by OHL at 1300 hours, to advance to Fere en Tardenois on the 
Ourcq River and to the high ground southwest of Soissons, turned BLOCHER from a 
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diversion into an attempt at a decisive battle. But what was the decisive point? There was 
none, or at least there was not one the Germans could reach with their forces available and 
the logistics and mobility constraints in the area of operations. Thus, from that point on the 
attack could only run out to its culminating point. 
Without a doubt, Ludendorff found himself in a difficult position on 28 May. Writing 
in his defense after the war, albeit in a somewhat muted tone, Kuhl noted: 
At the time, however, not one single soldier at the front would 
have understood the reasoning of OHL if it had failed to take 
advantage of the unexpectedly favorable situation, or had not 
endeavored to exploit the victory that had been gained by a 
complete surprise of the enemy, with a view to achieving a 
success as large as possible. 144 
But what was the definition of success? More ground captured? That just meant more ground 
to hold. More Allied troops killed, wounded, or captured? In the cold-blooded calculus of 
mid-1918 that was a price the Allies could afford to pay. 
The issue here is more complicated than saying Ludendorff simply committed the 
cardinal sin of command by grabbing for the easy wrong and the expense of the difficult 
right. The answer lies more in the deeply flawed German notion of the operational level of 
war, and in particular in Ludendorffs own fixation on the tactical level. At the tactical level, 
exploiting success is almost always the best course of action. This is not necessarily so at the 
operational level, as Operations MICHAEL, GEORGETTE, and BLOCHER so clearly 
demonstrate. 
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Decision 30 May 
Crown Prince Wilhelm's Army Group had wanted to include Reims in the scheme of . 
attack from the very start. Ludendorff refused because he didn't want to draw more forces 
away from Rupprecht's Army Group. So long as BLOCHER remained a limited attack to the 
line of the Vesle, the Germans figured they could get by without the rail line between Reims 
and Soissons. Once the attack expanded, access to that rail line became critical, and OHL 
ordered the First Army to take the town and the rail center. 
The attack on Reims however, was handled as an ad hoc mission, cobbled together on 
the fly. Although some four corps eventually tried to take the city through a double 
envelopment, the First Army had started its GOERZ operation critically short of artillery and 
with relatively low quality divisions, such as the 86th Division, recently arrived from the 
Eastern Front. Even after BLÜCHER and YORCK came to a halt on 4 June, the Germans 
were still planning to resume the attack on Reims four or five days later. 
Decision 31 May 
Some historians in describing Operation BLÜCHER suggest that the Germans made a 
specific decision on 30 or 31 May to shift the objective of the attack to Paris. 145 The French 
Deuxieme Bureau at the time estimated that such a decision had been made as early as 28 
May. 146 There is, however, no mention of such a decision in the surviving orders of either 
OHL or Crown Prince Wilhelm's Army Group. One of the last entries for 31 May in the army 
group's war diary notes: "The Seventh Army shifts the main effort now toward the west, and 
for that purpose, turns Group Winkler [XXV Reserve Corps] toward the west. " 147 And 
OHL's orders of 2 June stated, "The operational direction remains southwest. " Thus it appears 
that the Germans were really just following the path of least resistance, or at best trying to 
exploit a tactical opportunity, and that opportunity lay in the gap opening up between the 
404 
French Third and Sixth Armies. On the other hand, a Seventh Army order issued that day 
mentioned "the advance toward Paris. " 148 
The wording of the Seventh Army order might have been based on specific 
instructions in orders from higher headquarters; or it could have been based on an optimistic 
assumption; or it could have been based on Ludendorffs 30 May reminder about the main 
objective of BLÜCHER. A "threat" to Paris and an all-out attack toward Paris are not 
necessarily the same thing. The array of German front-line forces on 31 May (table 8.8) does 
not indicate any weighting for an all-out drive on Paris; but the clear weighting of the OHL 
reserves in the center could. Nonetheless, the shift of the main effort toward Paris has 
become a widely accepted feature of the fifth or sixth day of BLÜCHER. In the final volume 
of the German official history, published in 1944, the writers suggested strongly that such a 
decision had not been made, as indicated by OHL's failure to commit strong reserves to the 
drive. 149 But in case the decision to drive for Paris had in fact been made, they tried to shift 
the blame away from Ludendorff. 
It is debatable whether or not the thought occurred to turn the 
offensive--since it was more successful than expected--into a 
major operation toward Paris. Ludendorff himself would not 
have had such an idea. He probably just wanted to make the 
enemy fear for his capital and draw attention away from Flanders. 
It is possible that Wetzell, Army Group German Crown Prince, 
and the Seventh Army had been thinking about a main operation 
toward Paris. 150 
Decision 1 June 
The events of 1 June make it more likely that the Germans never really intended to 
attempt an all-out attack toward Paris. Although the day started on an optimistic note, it soon 
became clear that the First Army attack on Reims was a failure, and without Reims and 
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control of the rail line to Soissons, the Germans could not hope to sustain a drive into any 
greater depth. As the day wore on, OHL had clear indicators that the Seventh Army attack 
was coming to a halt too, and Ludendorff told Kuhl as much in a phone conversation. 
BLÜCHER-GOERZ-YORCK was reaching culmination, yet OHL that day still pulled 
another division and a corps headquarters from Rupprecht's Army Group. That action 
contradicts what Ludendorff had to say about that point in the battle in his post-war writings: 
"I emphasized the need for not forgetting the necessary formation for defense, and of 
recognizing the moment when the attack must be stopped and the defense resumed. This must 
be felt by the systematic hardening of the enemy's resistance. " 151 
Allied Reactions 
Once again, Ludendorff was out-generalled by Foch. Although the German attack was 
a stunning tactical surprise, Foch almost immediately recognized that it had to be a diversion 
at the operational level. Despite Main's insistence that Foch immediately release to him all 
forces available, Foch skillfully withdrew divisions from his reserve and fed them to Main 
slowly and methodically. Foch's management of the battle later received justified--if 
somewhat grudging--praise from Edmonds in the British official history. Foch understood., 
that time and the numbers were on his side. Although Foch had serious shortcomings as a 
tactician, he was arguably the best the Allies had at the operational level--at least on the 
Western Front. 
Alternatives 
BLÜCHER attacked right into the Allies' depth. It was the wrong attack in the wrong ., 
place. As Crown Prince Wilhelm noted in his post-war writings, "There was no strategic 
objective south of the Marne. " 152 Many post-war critics, including French General Charles 
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Mangin, thought the Germans should have renewed the attack against the British, or at least 
at the junction between the French and the British at Arras. Even small additional advances 
there, he argued, might have cut off the British Second Army and the Belgians. 153 Haig 
certainly thought his situation was desperate at the end of April. 
Writing after the war, Kuhl agreed that a new attack against the British would have 
been the best course of action if the Germans had the available fresh forces to commit, but 
they did not. And after April the Allies assumed the German attack would continue against 
the British, with the initial objective of taking Amiens and separating the British and the 
French. Thus, the Allies massed their reserves on their own left flank, extending from the 
Oise to the northernmost part of Flanders. Any further German attack in that sector would 
have hit the Allied main strength. 154 
Kuhl's argument makes sense in the case of a force-on-force attack designed to 
destroy the enemy's main force--and these are the terms in which the German military 
habitually thought during the first half of the 20th Century. After April 1918 the Germans 
almost certainly did not have the strength available for such an attack. They did, however, 
have enough strength to continue indirect attacks against a key vulnerability, such as the 
BEF's lines of communications--and Amiens and Hazebrouck were the two choke points. The 
British clearly recognized their own vulnerability, and as late as 31 May Haig was still giving 
serious considerations to plans to evacuate Dunkirk. 
If the Germans had continued focused attacks against the two rail centers after April, 
they still might have had a chance for some sort of military victory, although that became an 
increasingly longer shot day by day. But as soon as the Germans turned their attention away 
from the north and toward the Chemin des Dames, the war was effectively lost for them 
militarily. The Chemin des Dames sector may have been a softer target, but it was one that 
led nowhere, while at the same time giving the British in the north much-needed recovery 
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time. In a certain sense, the whole thing was an eerie foreshadowing of the German decision 
on 7 September 1940 to shift their main effort during the Battle of Britain away from the 
RAF's airfields to the British cities. In the end, BLÜCHER turned into a quagmire for the 
Germans, one that led in a direct line to Operations GNIESENAU and MARNSCHUTZ- 
REIMS, and then to the Allied counterattack of 18 July, and the British attack at Amiens on 8 
August. 
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The actions of the Eighteenth Army had 
not altered the strategic situation created 
by the attack of the Seventh Army, nor had 
it produced any tactical results. 1 
General of Infantry Erich Ludendorff 
Chapter IX 
Operations GNEISENAU and HAMMERSCHLAG 
(9-15 June 1918) 
PLANS 
With the failure of Operation BLÜCHER, the Germans were caught in an operational 
bind of their own making. Ludendorff and all the planners at OHL believed the Allies were 
still too strong in the north for the final decisive attack against the BEF to have any real 
chance at success. On the other hand, the tactical advances made by BLÜCHER had created a 
huge salient that was difficult to defend, and even more difficult to supply. The large wooded 
areas on the western flank of the BLÜCHER salient, especially the forests of Villers-Cotterets 
and Compiegne, provided ideal cover for an Allied counterattack force. Meanwhile, without 
gaining control of Reims or Compiegne, the Germans could make little use of the vital rail 
line that ran between those points and through Soissons. [Map 6] 
The Germans at that point had no other real options but to attack in an attempt to 
improve their dangerously overextended tactical position. Although Crown Prince Wilhelm 
later wrote about, "our jumping off point for an attack on Paris, "2 the German focus was 
certainly more limited in the early days of June. As Ludendorff himself noted: 
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We wanted to gain more ground to the west, on account of 
the rail line that leads from the Aisne valley east of Soissons 
into that of the Vesle, and be in a position to give tactical 
support to the Eighteenth Arm}, from the line Noý, on-Montdidter. 
3 
An attack east of Soissons would also give the Germans another advantage. The two 
huge salients created by MICHAEL and BLÜCHER roughly resembled a loose "M" on the 
map. By straightening the line between the points of the two salients. the Germans could 
reduce the length of the line they had to hold and thereby free-up some forces. ' 
As early as 31 March, Ludendorff had ordered the Eighteenth Army to make "a purely 
theoretical consideration" for an attack between Montdidier and Novon that would be an 
exploitation of the Seventh Army's ERZENGEL attack. The initial objective of the new 
attack would be the line Domfort--Coivrel--Gournay. 5 After the failure of GEORGETTE, 
the Eighteenth Army's attack, now designated GNEISENAU, became an exploitation attack 
to follow BLÜCHER and YORCK, as Wetzell had proposed in his 28 April assessment. OHL 
planned to launch the Eighteenth Army's attack on 30 May between Montdidier and 
Lassigny, about 12 kilometers west of Noyon. The objective was to reach at least the line 
Montdidier--Compiegne. The attack would start several days after BLITHER, because of 
the time required to shift the necessary artillery. OHI. also anticipated that by that point the 
French reserves in front of the Eighteenth Army would have been shifted to respond to 
BLÜCHER. 6 
The Eighteenth Army submitted its first attack plan on 3 May. The goal was to push 
the Allies back across the Montdidier--Compiegne main road and take the hills around Gury 
and Mareuil. The attack, echeloned in depth in the center and on the left %%ing, as supposed 
to reach the lower Matz on the first day. The base of the attack N% as also extended to the east 
as far as Noyon. The terrain in the attack sector was divided into three distinct areas. In the 
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east, it was heavily wooded up to the Oise River. In the center, the ground was rolling and 
dotted with copses and farms. In the west, the ground was fairly open. The Matz creek itself 
was an insignificant barrier, only eight to ten feet wide, and not more that three feet deep. 7 
[Map 6] 
The Eighteenth Army's planners estimated the force requirements at twelve divisions 
(including three attack divisions), supported by 179 batteries. The planners at the German 
Crown Prince's Army Group, however, did not believe the necessary forces would be 
available, and suggested limiting the depth of the attack. OHL agreed and requested a re- 
calculation of the forces needed for an attack to the line Cuvilly--Ressons--Matz. 8 
A meeting of the chiefs of staff at Avesnes on 16 May confirmed that GNEISENAU 
would be a limited objective attack, and could only be launched after 1 June. 9 Subsequent 
orders from OHL, the German Crown Prince's Army Group, and the Seventh Army stressed 
that GNEISENAU would be a "heavy stroke west of the Oise in the direction of Compiegne" 
It would be a supporting attack for YORCK and BLOCHER "to help the forces fighting in 
the Oise-Aisne angle move toward Compiegne. "to 
On 19 May the Eighteenth Army issued a new attack plan that established the 
Montdidier--Ressons road as the immediate objective, and the line Elincourt-- 
Cambronne--Pipmrez on the Oise as the follow-on objective. As soon as the YORCK attack 
closed in on the Oise, GNIESENAU would then continue to the original objective of the 
Montdidier--Compiegne road. The artillery requirements were now calculated at 120 
batteries. The entire artillery preparation was limited to only one hour. Both the army group 
and OHL agreed with the basic plan, but insisted on a much longer artillery preparation. 
Wetzell issued another operational assessment on 21 May, arguing that if the French 
reserves in Flanders were not drawn off sufficiently by BLÜCHER/YORCK, then 
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GNEISENAU should be cancelled and the French should be attacked again as soon as 
possible in a different sector. Wetzell continued to argue for first destroying the stronger 
army, the French. He continued to advocate an attack in the Verdun sector, because the 
French were very weak there, much weaker than they had been in the spring of 1916. By not 
launching GNEISENAU, he argued, the Germans could launch a significant attack against- 
Verdun without having to draw additional forces from Rupprecht's Army Group. Even a 
small success at Verdun would produce a major psychological blow against the French, who 
in turn could only draw reinforcements from the Flanders sector. Thus, the attack against 
Verdun would set up the conditions for the final main attack in the north. 12 
During Operation BLOCHER, OHL ordered the Seventh Army on 28 May to advance 
with strong forces south of Soissons toward the west. Two days later OHL designated 7 June 
as the start day for GNEISENAU. By 3 June, however, BLÜCHER had clearly reached 
culmination, and Army Group German Crown Prince recommended halting the attack until 
the Eighteenth Army could launch GNEISENAU. As long as the Seventh Army was making 
good progress, OHL had figured that GNEISENAU would need only ten to twelve 
divisions. 13 
By 4 June Ludendorff decided that GNEISENAU was necessary to help the right wing 
of the Seventh Army to advance, and to improve the German positions on the Aisne close to 
Vic. OHL also wanted to put heavy pressure on the Soissons--Crepy-en-Blois--Paris road. 
The problem at that point was the time required to move the necessary supporting artillery. 
The completion of the preparations by 7 June proved impossible, so OHL had to reschedule 
GNEISENAU for 9 June. That two days, however, gave the Allies--who anticipated the 
attack--extra time to move up their own reserves. The delay also effectively severed any 
operational connection between BLÜCHER/ YORCK and GNEISENAU. 14 
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On 4 June Hutier complained in his diary that Ludendorff had been bothering him 
constantly over GNEISENAU's smallest tactical details. Hutier also expressed the concern 
shared by many that Ludendorffs fixation on the small picture obscured his ability to focus 
on the larger operational picture. 15 
The Seventh Army ordered all of its units to go on the defensive on 5 June. 16 OHL, 
meanwhile, considered resuming the Seventh Army's attack with its three right wing corps to 
exploit whatever success GNEISENAU might achieve. At that point, however, the original 
supporting nature of GNEISENAU had changed. GNEISENAU again was extended eastward, 
this time over the Oise, by including divisions of the Seventh Army's right-most VII Corps. In 
the first stage of the attack the Eighteenth Army would push forward five miles to the Matz, 
pivoting on Montdidier. For the second stage, there was no final objective designated, but 
OHL hoped the Eighteenth Army would at least be able to reach the general line of 
Montdidier--Compiegne, which would put the army's left wing six miles beyond the Matz. '? 
[Map 6] 
The Seventh Army now had the mission of setting the stage for GNEISENAU by 
conducting local attacks with its three right-wing corps. Depending on the results of 
GNEISENAU, the Seventh Army would then exploit about 11 June with westward attacks 
north and/or south of the Aisne. The northern attack was codenamed BAUMFALLEN; the 
southern attack was codenamed HAMMERSCHLAG. From the start, however, the Seventh 
Army's commander, General Hans von Boehn, only wanted to attack south of the river 
because of artillery shortages. 18 
The Seventh Army issued the orders on 6 June for the two right-most divisions of its 
right- wing VII Corps to attack on a 12-kilometer front as part of GNEISENAU. The 
remaining divisions of the corps were ordered to support local deception measures. 19 The 
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Seventh Army also issued the optimistic orders for HAMMERSCHLAG, stating, "When the 
progress of GNEISSENAU begins to shake the enemy front, the [LIV] corps must be able 
to... attack immediately in the form of a pursuit. i20 
The following day OHL cancelled the plans for BAUMFALLEN. Instead of an 
exploitation attack north of the Aisne, OHL recommended that the Allied forces there be 
fixed in position with mortar and artillery fire. This was a very questionable course of action, 
considering Boehn's concerns over artillery shortages. Crown Prince Wilhelm's Army Group, 
meanwhile, issued orders that HAMMERSCHLAG exploit GENISENAU by attacking 
beyond tactical depth to the line Verberie--Crepy-en-Valois--Mareuil. That would give the 
Seventh Army the latitude to commit its entire VII Corps in direct support of GNEISENAU, 
rather than in support of HAMMERSCHLAG? ' 
OHL on 8 June approved the plans to support GNEISENAU, and then the Seventh 
Army issued the final orders to the VII, LIV, and VIII Reserve Corps. 22 That same day OHL 
also issued a general directive to all German forces to, "... cause as much damage as possible, 
within the limits of the general situation, to the American units inserted in the front line, as 
they are to form the nucleus for the new [Allied] organizations. " 23 
PREPARATIONS 
This time the Germans were in a rush, and their hasty preparations cost them greatly 
in operational security. The German ammunition and gasoline supplies were in very low. 
Their supply lines ran long distances to the railheads and the roads were in bad shape. The 
Spanish influenza pandemic, which previously had swept over the Allies, now hit the 
Germans-except much harder because of the inferior German diet and their over-strained 
medical system 24 
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Getting the 2,276 guns into position and supplied with ammunition proved to a 
major problem. Bruchmüller was sick, but Ludendorff still pressed him back into 
service to plan the fire support. Bruchmüller was designated overall artillery chief, but 
only up through the first day of the attack. Joining the planning process late, he 
discovered that none of his usual methodical and painstaking measures to shape the 
battlefield had been initiated. Bruchmüller also encountered so much opposition from 
the Eighteenth Army's artillery staff that the normal artillery chief, a lieutenant 
colonel named Stuckenschmidt, had to be sent elsewhere. 25 
Any Allied commander who could read a map and knew something of the conditions 
of the rail lines in the sector could have pinpointed the location of the next German attack 
without too much difficulty. Early in June French aerial observers started to report the troop 
movements. Greatly over-estimating the enemy strength, French intelligence told Foch the 
Germans had 60 divisions in reserve, and were capable of launching an attack of 45 divisions 
between the Oise and the Somme. As the indicators of the coming German attack became 
almost too obvious, Allied intelligence thought it might be part of some grand deception 
plan. 6 
The confirmed indicators continued to grow. On 3 June the French code-breaker 
Georges Panvin decrypted a German radio transmission that detailed an attack scheduled for 
7 June between Montdidier and Compiegne. Finally, on the night of 8 June a German 
deserter revealed the exact date and time of the attack, but the reported start time of the 
artillery preparation was off by 10 minutes. 27 
As early as 3 June Pctain ordered the French Third Army to prepare to conduct a 
defensive battle west of the Oise. The following evening Foch sent Haig a message noting 
that intelligence indicators pointed to "the probability of an immediate attack extending from 
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Noyon to Montdidier. i28 Main also reminded the Third Army commander, General 
Georges Humbert, of Directive Number 4 and ordered him to reduce drastically his front-line 
infantry strength and pull his guns back. Humbert's corps commanders were less than 
enthusiastic about carrying out that order, and when the attack came, the French still had 
nearly half their infantry within 2,000 meters of the front line. 29 
On 6 June, Foch sent Petain a directive designating the Allied strategic objectives as 
the denial of the road to Paris and the covering of the northern ports, while at the same time 
maintaining control of the rail lines necessary to shift forces. Foch closed by again demanding 
a "foot-by-foot defense. " That same day, the U. S. Marine's IV Corps of the U. S. Army's 2nd 
Infantry Division started its attack at Belleau Wood against German Seventh Army's IV 
Reserve Corps. 30 
German Order of Battle 
GNEISENAU was executed by four corps of von Hutier's Eighteenth Army and the 
right- wing VII Corps of von Boehn's Seventh Army. The five corps had 8 attack and 16 
trench divisions available on the first day of the attack. Two more corps in the Seventh Army 
were scheduled to launch the follow-up Operation HAMMERSCHLAG. 
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Table 9.1 
GNEISENAU Divisions on 9 June 1918 31 
Corps 
Eighteenth 
Army 
First and Army . OHL 
Line Reserve Reserve 
5 Trench 7 Trench 3 Trench 
6 Attack 
Total Sector 
Divisions Width 
15 Trench 33 km 
6 Attack 
Seventh 1 Trench 
_1 
Trench 12 km 
Army 2 Attack 2 Attack 
5 Trench 8 Trench 3 Trench 16 Trench 45 km 
8 Attack 8 Attack 
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Table 9.2 
German Corps on 9 and 12 June 1918 32 
(West to East) 
Corps Commander Attack 
Eighteenth Army Hutier 
III LOttwitz No 
XXVI Reserve Watter No 
IX Oetinger GNEISENAU 
XVII Webern GNEISENAU 
VIII Schoeler GNEISENAU 
XXXVIII Reserve Hofmann GNEISENAU 
Seventh Army Boehn 
VII Francois GNEISENAU 
LIV Larisch HAMMERSCHLAG 
VIII Reserve Wichura HAMMERSCHLAG 
XXV Reserve Winckler No 
IV Reserve Conta No 
LXV Schmettow No 
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The GNEISENAU units were supported by 625 artillery batteries and approximately 
500 aircraft. 
Table 9.3 
Guns Supportin! GNEISENAU 33 
Super Total Trench 
Field Heavy Heavy Guns Mortars 
1,492 774 10 2,276 1,000 
Allied Order of Battle 
Humbert's Third Army had four corps facing the attackers. The defenders were 
supported by 146 field and 161 heavy batteries and 165 tanks in four groupments positioned 
behind the western-most XXXV Corps. The French were superior in the air, with four 
groupments plus the RAF's 9th Brigade, for a total of 1,200 aircraft, about half of which were 
bombers. Farther to the rear the French also had seven infantry and three cavalry divisions. 34 
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Table 9.4 
French Order of Battle in the GNEISENAU Sector 35 
Army 
Group 
Front Line Rear Reserve 
Divisions Divisions Divisions 
Third 95 
Army 
EXECUTION 
9 June 
Tank Total Sector 
Groups Guns Width 
4 1,058 33 km 
The German artillery preparation started at 0050 hours. Since Operation MICHAEL 
in March, the German Army on the Western Front had finally come to accept grudgingly 
Bruchmtlller's and Pulkowski's predicted fire techniques, which meant the entire preparation 
could be fired in darkness with the infantry assault coming at first light. The French, 
believing that the German preparation was scheduled to start at 0100 hours, commenced 
firing their own counter-preparation at 0050 hours, believing they were starting 10 minutes 
earlier than the Germans. Thus, the French counter-fire had only a limited effect, also because 
their guns were outnumbered more than two-to-one, and because Bruchmüller's fire plan was 
methodical and complete as usual. The German preparation had only three phases and lasted 
3 hours and 30 minutes. The German gunners fired 1.4 million rounds that day, with 1/3 of 
that total being gas. 36 
The German first wave moved out at 0420 hours, but the start times were ragged 
because of the French counter-preparation. The main effort was with the Eighteenth Army's 
center-left VIII Corps. That unit had an especially difficult task, having to push through 
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wooded and hilly terrain while crossing old defensive positions. By 0600 hours the XXXVIII 
Reserve Corps on the Eighteenth Army's far left reached the Oise River. 37 
At 1040 hours the Seventh Army issued the orders for operation HAMMERSCHLAG 
to begin on 11 June. The objective of that attack was to gain as much ground as possible 
north of Villers-Cotterets, with the LN and VIII Reserve Corps pushing forward without 
limits after reaching the initial objective line Vic--Coeuvres--Longpont. The main effort was 
with the LIV Corps, which was on the right of the attack and to the left of VII Corps, already 
fighting as part of GNEISENAU. The entire artillery of VII Corps, höwever, was to fire in 
support of LIV Corps. 38 
At 1100 hours Eighteenth Army units entered Ressons-sur-Matz, and an hour later 
they controlled the French second lines on a front of more than seven miles. By 1800 hours 
the Germans took Mareuil. On their left wing they had penetrated to a depth of 6.5 miles, 
reaching the north bank of the Matz. [Map 6] At that point the Germans estimated they had 
taken some 5,000 prisoners and had neutralized three French divisions. The German infantry 
halted for the night but the artillery fire continued. That day the German First Army, 
supported by 400 guns, launched what turned out to be an abortive attack against Reims. 39 
The French on 9 June were not routed and fell back under pressure in an orderly 
manner. They actually managed to launch a small counterattack against the Seventh Army's 
VII Corps. Reserve Army Group commander, General Marie Fayolle, shifted one division 
from the Tenth Army's reserve to the Third Army, and he ordered another division to move 
from the Verdun sector to the junction of the Tenth and Third Armies. At 2030 hours Petain 
asked Foch to let him have the British XXII Corps. Foch refused, citing the number of 
divisions remaining in Rupprecht's Army Group, but Foch did ask Haig to send Pdtain one 
division from that corps. 40 
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10 June: 
The German attack resumed at 0500 hours, with the left wing moving to secure the 
Oise crossings. The best way to accomplish that would have been an attack toward the west 
by the 211th Infantry Division of the Seventh Army's VII Corps, thereby encircling with a 
pincer movement the French forces in the wooded area near Carlpont. But with almost all of 
its artillery already either supporting the Eighteenth Army or moving south to support the 
coming HAMMERSCHALG attack, the VII Corps was incapable of moving fast enough to 
spring the trap. Nonetheless, as the Eighteenth Army units pushed forward on the left, the 
French 53rd Infantry Division collapsed, exposing Humbert's right flank. French had planned 
to counter attack into both flanks of GNEISENAU, but now the attack in the east was 
impossible. 41 
By the end of the second day, the Germans had pushed well across the Matz in the 
center. The right wing of the attack, however, was making very little progress. Thirteen 
German divisions were opposing 11 French divisions in the front lines. The Eighteenth 
Army's intent for the next day was to push ahead to reach the Montdidier--Estrees St. Denis-- 
Compiegne rail line, with the main effort being in the center. That evening, however, OHL 
postponed the HAMMERSCHGLAG attack until 12 June, because the necessary artillery 
ammunition was still not in place. 42 
About 1700 hours on the second day, the French put General Charles Mangin in 
charge of a five-division counter-attack force on the French far left. That same day the 
Seventh Army's IV Reserve Corps also continued to encounter heavy American attacks in the 
Belleau Woods area. 43 
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11 June: 
The Seventh Army's VII Corps detected the French pulling back about 0600 hours on 
the third day. The two divisions of that corps started moving west into the former French 
positions, not really attacking so much as following. The Eighteenth Army, meanwhile, 
applied steady pressure along the entire GNEISENAU front. The center-right XVII Corps 
pushed west in order to take Tricot. The right wing of the center-left VIII Corps, which had 
been the main effort, pushed toward Compiegne. as 
At 1230 hours Mangin's force of five divisions attacked into GNEISENAU's west 
flank on both sides of Mery, in the general direction of Ressons. Fayolle originally had 
planned to attack 48 hours later to give the French artillery time to plan and fire a preparation 
to neutralize the German artillery. Mangin, however, pushed for the earlier attack and 
received the backing of Foch. Thus, the French attacked without artillery preparation, but 
preceded by a creeping barrage. Not all of his divisions were ready, but Mangin attacked 
anyway. The counterattack succeeded initially because it was supported by ground-attack 
aircraft and ten groups of tanks, operating in a coordinated manner similar to the British 
counterattack at Cambrai the preceding November. Within a few hours Mangin's force 
cleared the Aronde valley. German artillery eventually halted Magin's counterattack, but the 
Eighteenth Army ordered its IX and XVII Corps on the right wing to halt and assume 
temporary defensive positions. A few hours later the Eighteenth Army ordered the insertion 
of the headquarters of the I Reserve Corps between the IX Corps and XVII Corps. At 2230 
hours OHL ordered the IX and XVII Corps to cease offensive operations, with the exception 
of retaking Mery. 45 
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12 June: 
The HAMMERSCHLAG artillery preparation began at 0330 hours and lasted only 90 
minutes. Anticipating the attack, the French pulled most of their artillery back, avoiding the 
effects of the German fire. 46 At 0500 hours the Seventh Army's LIV and VIII Reserve Corps 
attacked with five divisions in the first line and three in the second south of the Aisne, in a 
westward direction toward Compiegne. The artillery of the Seventh Army's VII Corps (not 
already committed to GNEISENAU) and XXV Reserve Corps fired in support of 
HAMMERSCHLAG's two attacking corps. 47 
At 0430 hours the French resumed their own counterattacks against the right wing of 
the Eighteenth Army. During the night the advance lines and the rear areas of all the German 
corps committed to GNEISENAU had suffered from heavy French artillery fire. OHL, 
nonetheless, repeated its order to retake Mery. The French counterattacks stalled by 
mid-morning after achieving only modest success, but they did succeed in completely 
disrupting the Eighteenth Army's plans for that day. 48 
By noon HAMMERSCHLAG had stalled on both its wings and was making only 
slow progress in the center. [Map 6] As the day drug on, French artillery fire brought the 
attack to a halt. By evening OHL ordered the Eighteenth and Seventh Armies to halt 
temporarily both GNEISENAU and HAMMERSCHLAG and assume defensive positions. 
The operational planners at Crown Prince Wilhelm's Army Group later concluded that 
HAMMERSCHLAG had been doomed from the start because of inadequate ammunition 
supplies. 49 
428 
13-15 June: 
On 13 June the Germans conducted only local attacks to improve their positions. That 
morning Crown Prince Wilhelm's Army Group sent a recommendation to OHL to terminate 
HAMMERSCHLAG because of strong and organized enemy resistance. The following day, 
OHL ordered the end of both GNEISENAU and HAMMERSCHLAG. The Seventh Army's 
IV Reserve Corps did remain heavily engaged at Belleau Woods, and OHL still wanted the 
Eighteenth Army to retake Mery. That order, however, was rescinded on the afternoon of 15 
June. 50 
The fourth of Ludendorffs 1918 offensives was over, but the Allies were still worried 
about the large and potentially dangerous force under the control of Rupprecht's Army Group 
opposite the BEF. The British also believed the French were close to cracking. On 5 June 
General Wilson and British Secretary of State for War, Lord Milner, had attended a meeting 
with the prime minister in London to discuss the possibility that of evacuating the BEF should 
that happen. Milner followed-up by sending a group to France on 13 June to evaluate the 
evacuation plans. 51 
ASSESMENT 
The Results 
Like its three predecessors, Operation GNEISENAU failed to produce any 
operationally significant results that might have lead to strategic advantages. But for the first 
time, one of Ludendorffs attacks had failed to produce any worthwhile tactical results. The 
Germans had failed to reach any of the rail lines they needed to sustain their dangerously 
extended salient, so they were still faced with the same immediate problem they had when 
GNIESENAU started. The five days of fighting cost the Germans some 25,000 casualties, and 
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the French about 35,000. According to the German official history, Ludendorff "... was 
disappointed. Strong German forces had been consumed, and the attack's objective of pulling 
enemy reserves out of Flanders had not been achieved. " 52 
The Objective 
The above passage from the German official history betrays a general sense of 
confusion--at least in the post-war writings--over what the objective of Operation 
GNEISENAU really was. While the official history talked about pulling the Allied reserves 
out Flanders; Crown Prince Wilhelm talked about a "jumping off point for an attack on 
Paris; " and Ludendorff talked about gaining control of the "rail line that leads from the Aisne 
valley east of Soissons into that of the Vesle. " 53 Clearly, with only 24 divisions supported by, 
2,276 guns, that third and very limited objective was the only one GNEISENAU had any 
hope of achieving. Yet, in reading the war diary entries and the morning, noon, and evening 
reports filed during the battle, one gets a strong sense of a German military leadership that 
was floundering, with no real clear sense of purpose at that point. Unlike the first three 
offensives, OHL did not completely loose control of the battle this time; but then, there had 
been no exploitable tactical opportunities to tempt the Germans to deviate from the plan. 
Artillery 
Artillery was the major pacing factor in the planning for both GNEISENAU and 
HAMMERSCHLAG. On 9 June GNEISENAU already had been postponed by two days 
because of the time required to shift the supporting artillery into position, and shortages in 
artillery guns and ammunition continued to handicap the operations of the Eighteenth and 
Seventh Armies between 9 and 13 June. Yet the same day that GNEISENAU started, the First 
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Army's attack against Reims was supported by 400 guns. 
On paper, at least, GNEISENAU did not appear to be an especially under-gunned 
operation. Both GEORGETTE and GNEISENAU were roughly the same for the number of 
guns per division (85 and 95); the number of guns per kilometer of front (50 and 51); and the 
number of rounds fired on the first day (1.4 million for both). But the tactical situations were 
vastly different for the two operations. In June 1918 the Germans no longer had the advantage 
of even tactical surprise; they had no glaring weak point in the Allied line to attack; they did 
not have the advantage of a slow, methodical, and well concealed buildup; and the Allies after 
the first three offensives were finally learning how to anticipate and counter the German 
attack tactics. 
Perhaps the biggest difference between GEORGETTE and GNEISENAU was the lack 
of an operational objective at tactical depth in the latter case. If GEORGETTE had succeeded 
in capturing Hazebrouck, it would have crippled the BEF's logistics network. If 
GNEISENAU had succeeded in reaching the Montdidier--Estrees St. Denis--Compiegne rail 
line, it only would have partially relieved the German problems in supplying the BLÜCHER 
salient. Thus, the 400 guns committed to the First Army's failed attack against Reims could 
not have contributed to GNEISENAU becoming a decisive success, but those guns at least 
might have helped that operation achieve its limited objective. 
Decision 10 and 12 June 
On 10 June OHL decided to postpone HAMMERSCHLAG one day, until 12 June, 
because the required artillery ammunition could not be moved into position on time. That 
decision may have been sound on 10 June, but by 12 June the situation had changed 
completely, and HAMMERSCHLAG no longer made sense. On 11 June Mangin 
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counterattacked, and the entire left wing of the Eighteenth Army had effectively come to a 
halt. By 12 June there was almost no operational linkage left between GNEISENAU and 
HAMMERSCHLAG. To reach Compiegne, the LIV and VIII Reserve Corps had to cover 
almost 30 kilometers, most of it through wooded terrain. Like MARS in relation to 
MICHAEL, HAMMERSCHLAG was too little, too late. 
Allied Reactions 
Unlike the three previous offensives, the Allies anticipated GNIESENAU and took 
their first positive, if only marginally effective steps to counter the German offensive tactics. 
When GNIESENAU started the French still had too many of their forces packed into forward 
positions, and the artillery counter-preparation was too weak and started too late. 
Nonetheless, on the night of 11 June the planners at OHL reviewed the events of the past 
three days and could not decide whether or not the French had avoided the initial German 
attack by withdrawing their front line forces. 54 The next day, it became quite clear the 
French had done exactly that in response to HAMMERSCHLAG. Taken together, the French 
reactions to GNIESENAU and HAMMERSCHLAG, and especially Mangin's counterattack, 
gave an ominous foreshadowing of how the Allies would react to the next major German 
offensive on 15 July. 
On the political and strategic levels, the generally effective response to GNEISENAU 
was something of a psychological turning point for the French that may well have saved 
Clemenceau's government from collapse. And, Foch later wrote that the fact that none of 
Rupprecht's divisions could be identified in the 9 June attack led him to conclude there was 
no necessity to draw forces away from Haig. 55 
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Alternatives 
GNEISENAU was once again the wrong attack in the wrong place, yet it was a direct 
and almost unavoidable result of Operation BLÜCHER and its failure. Writing after the war, 
Crown Prince Wilhelm argued that GNEISENAU would not have been necessary if 
BLÜCHER had been wide enough in the first place. OHL could have accomplished that by 
making "a modest draw on the forces being held to the rear of Rupprecht's Army Group. " 56 
Wilhelm also went on to argue that once BLÜCHER started achieving unexpected results, 
OHL should have exploited the situation to the fullest by "immediately moving up the large 
reserves earmarked for the Flanders offensive and concentrated behind Rupprecht's Army 
Group, and throwing them in without hesitation at the point where we had just broken 
through. " 57 1 
Other post-war writers have suggested that rather than launching GNEISENAU the 
Germans should have continued to reinforce BLÜCHER, and that by building up the 
Eighteenth Army at the Seventh Army's expense, Ludendorff effectively killed BLOCHER's 
momentum. 58 Those arguments, however, fail to account for the realities of the situation. 
With the limited battlefield mobility of the German Army and no operationally significant 
objectives at a realistically reachable depth, the withdrawal of the Allied reserves north of the 
Somme was the only thing the Germans could have hopped to achieve with BLÜCHER. 
When that failed, there was virtually nothing else the Germans could have achieved 
operationally in the BLÜCHER sector. 
Wetzell recognized that when he recommended in his 21 May assessment that if 
BLÜCHER failed to draw in the Allied reserves, then GNEISENAU should be cancelled and 
the French attacked in force at some other point, preferably Verdun. 59 But Wetzell's 
recommendation had been made before the unexpected territorial gains of BLÜCHER. Once 
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the Germans wound up holding a huge, difficult to defend, and even more difficult to supply 
salient, their immediate operational options became very restricted. 
For psychological and morale reasons, it was virtually impossible for the Germans to 
abandon the gains they had just achieved at such cost. Ludendorff at that point believed that 
he had no choice but to continue attacking--somewhere, anywhere. When prior to BLÜCHER' 
some staff officers at OHL tried to argue that Germany could not continue launching large- 
scale offensives indefinitely, Ludendorff snapped at Lieutenant Colonel Albrecht von Thaer, 
"What do you expect me to do? Make peace at any price? " 60 Thus, Ludendorff was forced 
.jw< 
into a position of his own creation where he had to get control of the rail line that ran between 
Reims and Compiegne and through Soissons. His only two real options at the start of June 
were attacks toward Reims or Compiegne. 
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A real improvement to our supply system as 
well as our tactical situation was only possible 
if we captured Reims. In the battles of May 
and June we had not managed to get possession 
of that town. The capture of Reims must now be 
the object of a special operation, but the operation 
thus required fitted into the general framework of 
our plans. 1 
Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg 
We gave orders that [the French second] line should 
be prepared for assault by afresh artillery preparation, 
but at the bottom of my heart I had to admit the bitter 2 truth: the offensive had failed. 
German Crown Prince Wilhelm 
Chapter X 
Operation MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS 
(15 July-3 August 1918) 
PLANS 
At the end of Operation GNEISENAU the German operational situation was no better 
than it had been following Operation BLOCHER. If anything, it was worse. Crown Prince 
Wilhelm's Army Group now held a salient with a perimeter length of more than 100 
kilometers, and a chord of some 60 kilometers. The position was vulnerable to attack from all 
sides, and almost impossible to supply. [Map 7] 
The vital rail junction at Reims was still in French hands, and the only high capacity, 
double-track rail line into the salient running from Laon to Soissons was still blocked at the 
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Vauxaillon tunnel, and would not be back in operation until 7 July, and then with only a 
single track. The only other route was a single-tracked line that ran through the Aisne valley, 
branching off the main line between Laon and Reims. It was put into service on 16 June when 
a new connection was finished about three kilometers northwest of Guignicourt to Bahnwald 
on the main track. That line connected with the lines in the Vesle valley, providing a through 
route to Laon via Crouy (three kilometers northeast of Soissons), as well as via 
Bahnwald--Vailly--Missy to Braisne and farther via Fere-en-Tardenois, or via Fismes toward 
the front. Another connection from Vailly directly to Braisne was under construction, but was 
only scheduled for completion on 30 July. 3 
Although the strategic imperative of defeating the British clearly remained, OHL was 
now in a situation where it had only two immediate alternatives--it could withdraw from the 
Marne salient, or it could try to enlarge it. For political and psychological reasons Ludendorff 
believed he could not order a withdrawal. 
Ludendorffs fifth great offensive had it genesis in the planning leading up to 
Operation MICHAEL. In January the German planners started work on Operation ROLAND 
by the Third Army east of Keims. It was developed as a contingency operation in case 
MICHAEL. bogged-down in the south. On 5 June OHL resurrected ROLAND as a 
contingency operation in the event that GNEISENAU failed to draw the Allied reserves out of 
Flanders. ROLAND would be modified to take Reims from the east by an attack across the 
Vesle. Crown Prince Wilhelm's Army Group gave the order to start stockpiling the necessary 
ammunition for the operation. At the same time, OHL also scaled back the scope of the 
planned attacks directly against Reims by the First Army. 4 
Meanwhile, Crown Prince Wilhelm's Army Group on 1 June had sent OHL a 
recommendation for an operation to follow-up GNEISENAU with an attack south of the 
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Marne west of Reims, conducted by the inner wings of the Seventh and First Armies. 5 OHL 
initially rejected that proposal. On 6 June, Ludendorff, Wetzell, and Kuhl met in Avesnes 
with General Willi von Klewitz, the chief of staff of the Third Army, to try to decide whether 
to launch ROLAND or HAGEN after GNEISENAU. Although the general consensus was 
that any decision would be based on the outcome of GNEISENAU, Kuhl continued to argue 
that only HAGEN could produce decisive results. 6 
Wetzell argued that ROLAND would require 14 to 16 divisions, and take up to four 
additional weeks to prepare, which would push HAGEN back to the end of August. An 
offensive across the Marne with the objective of capturing Epernay and pinching out Reims 
was more feasible, because the French were weak in that sector and the attack would not 
require any HAGEN divisions. Thus, Wetzell proposed an attack of six to eight divisions, 
which could be drawn from the Seventh and Eighteenth Armies. Such an attack could be 
ready for launch between 20 and 25 June. By taking Epernay, "... the French front before 
Reims will loose the railway and roads which supply it. " Wetzell also included a supporting 
attack by the First Army as far east as Prosnes, and he recommended that ROLAND continue 
to be prepared as a follow-on attack after HAGEN. 7 
The First Army was still planning a series of attacks against Reims through 13 June. 8 
On 8 June, meanwhile, OHL in accordance with Wetzell's assessment prepared to replace 
ROLAND with the attack across the Marne and ordered Army Group German Crown Prince 
to have the Seventh Army develop quickly the plan for the attack. The planning guidance 
from the army group stated: 
The objective of the attack is to advance rapidly and with surprise 
south of the Marne against Epernay, to deprive the enemy of his 
most important route of communications in the Reims hills and to 
force him to abandon those hills. 9 
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On 9 June the First Army attacked the high ground west of Reims, but the attackers 
were quickly driven back to their starting positions. OHL immediately canceled the planned 
supporting attacks of Seventh Army's LXV and VI Reserve Corps. As the result of the 
unsuccessful attacks, the First Army requested fresh divisions, with the army group 
concurring. Ludendorff, however, wanted to cancel the local attacks against Reims for the 
time being. 10 
The following day General Bruno von Mudra assumed command of the First Army 
from Below, who had fallen ill. After conferring with OHL, Mudra issued orders placing the 
First Army on the defensive, and on 11 June he ordered the postponement of the attacks 
toward Reims. Preparations for the attacks were supposed to continue, however. By this 
point too, GNEISENAU had failed, and OHL finally began to look at the seriousness of the 
supply situation inside the Marne salient. OHL previously had rejected any suggestions of 
combining the attack by the Seventh Army across the Marne with an attack by the left wing of 
the First Army across the Vesle. OHL had believed that the German Army did not have the 
forces necessary for an attack on such a scale. But somehow the OHL planners now believed 
they could take Reims without the additional forces. 11 
On 11 June the Seventh Army estimated the force requirements for Wetzell's 
proposed attack across the Marne at ten divisions and 700 artillery batteries, with 20 days of 
preparation time. 12 Army Group German Crown Prince passed the preliminary plan on to 
OHL, but also recommended including a supporting attack by the right-wing corps of the First 
Army, "to prevent flanking from the north bank of the Marne, to hold the reserves there, and 
to capture the group of hills northwest of Damery. " 13 
On 12 June Wetzell issued another operational assessment. Noting that the conditions 
were still not right to launch Operation HAGEN, he continued to press for an attack south of 
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the Marne. "In this way, if energetically prepared and executed, the battle for Reims could 
become a new decisive and far-reaching blow to the French Army and the French people, and 
the best foundation for the HAGEN battle. " 14 
Ludendorff held another planning meeting in Roubaix on 14 June. He concluded that 
the failure of GNEISENAU, the heavy losses from BLÜCHER, and the shortage of 
replacements meant that ROLAND was unfeasible for the time being. Instead, the Germans 
would launch two attacks against Reims in one coordinated operation. 15 
Following the meeting, OHL issued the preliminary orders to Army Group German 
Crown Prince. The Seventh Army would launch Operation MARNESCHUTZ (MARNE 
DEFENSE), crossing the Marne east of Chateau-Thierry and advancing to Epernay on both 
banks of the river. The First Army would launch Operation REIMS, attacking east of the city 
in the direction of Chalons. The inner wings of the two forces would meet at Epernay. [Map 
7] The attack date was set for 10 July, with Rupprecht's Army Group to follow-up with 
HAGEN on or about 20 July. The entire attack front was almost 90 kilometers, including the 
sector in front of the city that would not be attacked directly. 16 Wetzell's original attack 
force of six to eight divisions had now grown to more than 20 divisions. 
On 16 June the First Army sent Army Group German Crown Prince an analysis 
recommending a significant expansion of the REIMS attack. In order to link up with the 
Seventh Army at Epernay, the planners argued, the First Army had to penetrate with its center 
to the Marne. Noting that the Seventh Army had advanced 18 kilometers on the first day of 
the BLÜCHER attack, "... a similar advance by our army on the first day would bring us to 
the vicinity of les Garndes Loges--Vadenay. But in this case the terrain is far more favorable' 
than it was in the BLÜCHER attack, so that it is entirely probable that we will reach the 
Marne the very first day. " That would mean a first day advance of 23 kilometers. The First 
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Army also recommended that it be given control of the right-wing corps of the Third Army. 
The expanded attack of the First Army would require some nine additional divisions 
supported by 600 batteries. 17 
Ludendorff approved the lateral extension of the attack to the east the next day. 18 
That same day the Seventh Army submitted a refined plan and force estimate. "On the left 
wing, an advance against Epernay is possible only of we push forward north of the Marne 
simultaneously to at least the hills of Fleury la Riviere. " That would require 18 divisions 
controlled by four corps headquarters. 19 
The operation was again extended during a meeting between Ludendorff and the staff 
chiefs of Army Group German Crown Prince and the Seventh, First, and Third Armies in 
Rethel on 18 June. Klewitz argued that the Third Army should have a larger role in the 
operation. The Third Army was supposed to screen the flank of the attack against any 
counterattack from the east and the southeast. Schulenburg, the chief of staff of Army Group 
German Crown Prince, supported the Third Army recommendation as a means of reaching 
the Marne on as broad a front as possible, while maintaining a straight and strong front line. 
Ludendorff accepted the recommendation--over the objections of Wetzell, who pointed out 
the expansion would delay the start of the attack and would require forces that were not . 
available. 20 Nonetheless, OHL issued the order expanding operation REIMS to the east into 
Champagne, "as far as the Wetterecke. " 21 The following day Ludendorff postponed 
MARNSCHUTZ-REIMS until 14 July. 22 As Hindenburg later explained the decision in his 
memoirs: 
After we had originally decided to limit our operation practically 
to the capture of Reims, our plan was extended in the course of 
various conferences by adding an attack eastward and right into 
Champagne. On the one hand our motive was an intention to cut 
off the Reims salient from the southeast also. On the other, we 
believed that in view of our recent experiences, we might perhaps 
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reach Chalons-sur-Marne, attracted as we were by the prospect 
of great captures of prisoners and war material, if an operation on 
such a scale succeeded. We therefore decided to risk the weakening 
of our forces at decisive points [emphasis added] for the sake of 
securing a broad front of attack. 23 
Like Operations BL10CHER and GNEISENAU, the overall frontline trace ran east and 
west in the MARNSCHUTZ-REIMS sector, which meant the Germans would be attacking 
from north to south. West of Reims much of the line of departure ran along the Marne River. 
The German Seventh Army would have to start its attack with a deliberate river crossing. 
The Marne there was 70 to 80 meters wide and three to four meters deep. Both banks were 
firm, but 1 to 1.5 meters high. The hills of the valley rose to 170 meters in places. After 
crossing the river, the next major obstacle was a railroad embankment. East of Reims, in 
Champagne, the Marne was anywhere from 20 to 30 kilometers south of the line of departure. 
The German First and Third Armies would have to attack over relatively open ground and 
then conduct a hasty crossing of the Marne. The Vesle was the only major water obstacle 
short of the Marne, but the flat, open ground gave the French good observation. The heavily 
cratered ground from previous battles also made it more difficult for the attacker, especially 
moving artillery and supplies forward. [Map 7] On 20 June the First Army issued its attack 
order for REIMS: 
The First Army will penetrate the enemy position between Prunay 
and the Suippe and will reach the Marne on the first day without 
stopping. In conjunction with the Seventh Army, it will annihilate 
the enemy in Reims and the Reims hills. The right wing of the 
Third Army will attack simultaneously between the Suippe and the 
Wetterecke southeast of Tahure and will reach the general line St. 
Etienne--Mont des Vignes--Suippes--Perthes.... When the Marne is 
reached it is planned to cross it in a southwesterly direction. 24 
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A follow-on order issued the next day filled in the details. The main effort of the First 
Army attack was to be XIV Corps, which after crossing the Marne would advance along both 
banks to link up with the Seventh Army at Epernay. The VII Reserve Corps north of the river 
would screen the right flank of the advance against any attack from the Reims hills. 25 But 
that same day Ludendorff also altered the basic plan of Army Group German Crown Prince. 
"The question how the operation is to be continued depends on our own forces and very 
strongly on the enemy's resistance. The goal is to weaken the enemy in men and material.... 
The army group therefore can limit itself toward the south with smaller goals and they have to 
make major progress toward the southeast. " 26 The basic objective of MARNESCHUTZ- 
REIMS now had shifted from taking Reims to secure rail lines into the Marne salient, to the 
typical force-on-force battle that so dominated German military thinking. The total attack 
force had grown to 39 divisions by that point. Ludendorff had convinced himself that another 
massive tactical victory in July in this otherwise non-decisive sector would collapse French 
morale and cause them to sue for peace. As he wrote later: 
A victory on 15 July was apt to undermine the morale of 
the enemy armies much more than any of the successes in 
the previous year. It alone could cause the peace germs 
found on the side of the Entente to bud forth and mature. 
Only a victory was able to tide us over our internal differences. 27 
On 21 June Army Group German Crown Prince issued revised orders for the 
operation. But the stated objective was not quite consistent with Ludendorffs message of the 
previous day. 
The principle objective of the attack is to cut off the enemy forces 
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in the Reims hills. " 
[Seventh Army] penetrates the enemy positions between Gland 
and Chambrecy, takes the crossings at Epernay and the hills 
southwest of the city, and disregarding limits, pushes forward on 
both banks of the Marne southeastward until contact is established 
with the First Army. 
[First Army] penetrates the enemy position between Prunay and 
Auberive, pushes forward against Epernay with strong forces on 
both banks of the Marne, and establishes contact with the Seventh 
Army. 
[Third Army] covers the left flank of the operation, taking the 
general line of the hills east of St. Etienne--southeastern slopes 
of the Piemont--Somme Suippes--hills southeast of Perthes... so as 
to secure the Marne crossings for the First Army against the east. 
Rapid execution of the attack is the prerequisite for success. The 
first two days of the attack and the first night are decisive. 28 
On 23 June OHL ordered the insertion of the headquarters of the Ninth Army on the 
right flank of the Seventh Army. Assuming command of the weak VII, XXXIX Reserve, and 
XIII Corps effective 5 July, the Ninth Army's mission would be to secure the right flank of 
the operation against an Allied counterattack from the west. 29 [Map 7] Two days later 
Ludendorff sent a message to the German senior commanders reiterating that the war could 
only be won by more large-scale attacks. He rejected completely any assumption of a 
defensive strategy. 30 
A Seventh Army order issued on 25 June also specified more tasks for the corps. VIII 
Corps and XXV Reserve Corps, which were on the Seventh Army's far right and were not 
making the MARNESCHUTZ attack, had the mission of covering, in coordination with the 
Ninth Army, the right flank and rear of the Seventh Army by holding their positions. In the 
center of the now five attacking corps, the IV Reserve Corps had the mission of pushing in an 
easterly direction south of the Marne to link up with the First Army. That maneuver, however, 
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would cause an elongation of the right flank of that corps, which the VIII Reserve Corps to its 
right south of the Marne would not have sufficient forces to secure. Thus, as the attack 
progressed, a new corps would be inserted between the IV and VIII Reserve Corps. North of 
the Marne, the LXV Corps and the right wing of the First Army were to push toward each 
other as enemy resistance slackened. 31 
On 28 June the First Army modified its attack order of 20 June. The XIV Corps would 
still cross the Marne, but its mission was now to screen the southern flank of the VII Reserve 
Corps, which would affect the link-up with Seventh Army. "No daily objective will be 
established, but I expect that the center of the army will reach and cross the Marne on the first 
day. " 32 The XV Corps, directly in front of Reims would not attack the city frontally, but 
would be prepared to move forward as soon as any Allied retrograde movement was detected. 
"There is no question here of a frontal attack on Reims. " 33 Two days later, however, Army 
Group German Crown Prince changed the First Army's 28 June operations order. XIV Corps 
was again ordered to advance on both sides of the Marne. In effect, the army group restored 
the scheme of maneuver established in the First Army's operations order of 21 June. 34 
Ludendorff approved the final plan of Army Group German Crown Prince on 1 July. 35 
The army group also issued orders to the Ninth Army to secure the flank of the Seventh 
Army's MARNSCHUTZ attack by establishing "defensive positions in great depth and strong 
reserves. " During the artillery preparation the Ninth Army was ordered to fire a deceptive 
preparation in its sector, to include the final saturation fire phase simultaneous with that of the 
Seventh Army. 36 
On 3 July OHL set Y-Day back one more day to 15 July. 37 The following day Crown 
Prince Rupprecht noted evidence of a British attack against the Sixth and Fourth Armies to 
take pressure off the coming attack around Reims. 38 On 6 July the First Army approved the 
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plan of XV Corps to move into the city of Reims once the French started to withdraw. The 
objective remained to take the town without fighting. "The question will merely be to occupy 
the city gates with Landsturm sentries. " 39 
On 7 July the Seventh Army issued specific orders to its attacking corps to dig in and 
establish defensive zones in depth upon reaching their attack objectives. The orders for all 
four previous major offensives of 1918 required the attacking units to continue moving 
forward, and not assume the defensive until specifically ordered to do so. The 
MARNESCHUTZ attack was different in this respect, at least. 40 Three days later, however, 
orders from Army Group German Crown Prince contradicted the 7 July orders to a certain 
extent, indicating an intent to exploit the attack beyond the Marne: "When the Seventh and 
First Armies reach their initial objectives and link-up on the Marne, their interior wings will 
have to turn south and gain ground to defeat any enemy attempts at relief. This will guarantee 
the destruction of the enemy forces in the Reims hills. " 41 
On 11 July the Ninth Army requested reinforcements of at least four fresh divisions to 
meet an anticipated French counterattack in their sector. Ludendorff refused, not wanting to 
divert forces from the main attack. But OHL did guarantee that the artillery and pioneer units 
of the Ninth Army that were tasked to support the initial stage of MARNESCHUTZ would be 
released back to the Ninth Army on the 15th, as soon as their assigned missions had been 
accomplished. The Ninth Army also was ordered to weaken its right wing significantly in 
order to reinforce its sector south of the Aisne, and to secure artillery flanking fire positions 
from the northern river boundary. 42 
About 2300 hours on the night of 14 July, Crown Prince Wilhelm went to a forward 
observation post to witness the artillery preparation. Upon his arrival the sector artillery 
commander reported that the German lines were receiving only normal harassing fire. The 
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crown prince did not believe the report. "I had, on the contrary, a decided impression that the 
French were keeping up a very lively fire on our rear areas. Many explosions were heard, and 
we could see several of our ammunition dumps on fire. My doubts increased. " 43 
PREPARATIONS 
Initially the operation south of the Marne was supposed to be a smaller scale, hastily 
prepared attack for the sole purpose of cutting off Reims. As the attack grew in size and its 
objective shifted to inflicting a large-scale tactical defeat on the French, the preparations grew 
more complicated and required more time. Instead of the 14 to 19 days of preparation time 
Wetzell had first estimated, MARNSCHUTZ-REIMS required 37 days of preparation from 
the time the Seventh Army received the initial warning order on 8 June. The Allies, of course, 
did not sit idle during that period. 
Security, Surprise, and Deception 
Like GNIESENAU, the Germans failed to achieve the same level of surprise they had 
for Operations MICHEAL, GEORGETTE, or BLOCHER. They had sufficient time, but the 
conditions did not favor secrecy. The short, bright nights aided Allied observation, and the 
prevailing northeasterly winds carried the sounds from the German lines. The Germans tried 
to mask the preparation sounds with dummy activities, but with little success. as 
Nonetheless, the Germans identified and attempted to enforce stringent security 
precautions. Telephones in the front line positions were not to be used prior to the start of the 
attack except to test the circuits using the buzzers. 45 Special security restrictions were 
imposed on German troops from Alsace and Lorraine, who were considered high security 
risks. 46 Generals and general staff officers making personal reconnaissance in forward areas 
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were required to wear privates' uniforms and carry rifles or spades. 
47 Information was 
restricted, but one set of orders wisely noted that the number of officers with access to the 
plans should not be too low. "Those who do know... are far more cautious than those who 
merely suppose things. " 48 In the Seventh Army, even the name of the MARNSCHUTZ 
operation was given the cover name of STRASSENBAU (ROAD CONSTRUCTION). 49 
Despite the stringent German security measures, most Allied commanders who could 
read a map could have predicted the general if not the exact area where the next blow would 
fall. Allied air superiority made it difficult for the Germans to conduct effective aerial 
reconnaissance, which in turn helped mask the Allied counter-preparations. 
50 Right up until 
the start of the attack the senior German commanders worried that the Allies would detect 
their preparations. They did, of course, but they also effectively kept that knowledge from the 
Germans. An entry for 14 July in the Seventh Army War Diary noted that all indicators were 
that the French had not detected the German preparations, and the attack the next day would 
achieve surprise. 51 Writing in his memoirs after the war, Crown Prince Wilhelm noted, "As 
late as the evening of 14 July I rang up the chiefs of staff of the First and Third Armies.... to 
make certain whether surprise was assured. Both were confident that the enemy had so far 
noticed noting. " 
52 
Artillery and Air Preparations 
` Turning to his old artillery workhorse, Ludendorff put Bruchmüller in overall charge 
of the artillery for Army Group German Crown Prince. 53 This time, however, Bruchmüller 
did not get all the artillery he estimated he needed. The German Army was starting to run out 
of artillery. The industrial base could no longer keep up with the rate of wear and tear from 
combat operations. Simultaneously, Ludendorff also ordered additional artillery moved north 
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in preparation for a quick shift to HAGEN. To make up part of the shortage most of the 
training batteries inside Germany were stripped of their guns, which were sent to the Western 
Front to become the fifth and sixth guns for the batteries in place. sa 
The burden of the attack fell especially heavily on the artillery units. Some, like the 
5th Field Artillery Regiment, were making their third major attack in four months. 55 One 
major problem was that the artillery ammunition could not be moved to the front as fast as it 
arrived at the forward-most railheads. 56 Much work was needed to prepare roads into the 
forward areas and the artillery positions. The ammunition supply problems made the buildup 
especially difficult to conceal. With a planned density of 25 batteries per kilometer of front, 
the huge amounts of artillery ammunition to be moved up required one route of approach 
every 125 meters. 57 The road network in the area was not sufficient, causing traffic jams of 
ammunition columns that Allied aerial reconnaissance spotted easily. In the Third Army's I 
Bavarian Corps alone, artillery ammunition supply transport required 2,000 wagons and 
10,000 horses. S$ 
The Germans also had to deal with the difficulty of ammunition supply after the start 
of the attack. A First Army order of 2 July addressed the problem of the chronic shortage of 
horses to support the advance. Guns and artillery vehicles that had to be left behind would be 
collected by special details at the gun positions. "Considering the difficulties of bringing up 
ammunition, it is better to leave a gun behind than a caisson. " 59 
Despite the difficulties, Bruchmüller proceeded with his methodical preparations. The 
army and army group artillery orders made it clear that fire would open without registration or 
ranging shots. Corps headquarters were ordered to coordinate schools in the Pulkowski 
Method for their battalion and battery commanders. 60 Newly arriving reinforcing batteries 
and individual guns were sent off immediately to calibrate. The individual guns were then 
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assigned to batteries as fifth and sixth guns based on as close a match as possible to the 
battery's average muzzle velocity error. Each newly arriving battery commander was handed 
a detailed list of instructions containing everything he needed to know. The Seventh Army 
ordered the artillery commanders of the attack divisions to give personally the Bruchmtlller- 
type briefings to the divisions' infantry regiments, while Bruchmüller personally delivered a 
two-hour briefing to the staff of the Third Army at Vouziers. 61 
In the air, the Germans had lost the edge they had in the earlier offensives. On 17 June 
the Seventh Army estimated its air requirements as only 13 observation squadrons and four 
fighter squadrons. Considering the more than 42 squadrons that supported the Seventh Army 
during Operation BLOCHER, that estimate must have been based on severely constrained 
resources. 62 A 19 June message from the 40th Infantry Division indicated severe aircraft 
maintenance and repair part problems. 
63 
Organization, Equipment, and Training 
The attacking MARNESCHUTZ units faced a more significant water barrier than in 
any of the previous four offensives, and the deliberate river crossing was vital to the success 
of the operation. On 21 June the Seventh Army issued the engineer orders for the crossing. 
All the necessary bridging material had to be pre-positioned as close as possible to the river. 
The initial crossings would be made with pontoon bridges, followed by the construction of 
footbridges. At least three pontoon bridges or ferries were required for each division sector. In 
some places it would be necessary to cut down the banks for the horses, but that could only be 
done on the night just before the start of the assault. 64 
A5 July follow-on order specified that the bridge construction during the assault 
phase would be executed primarily by the engineers of the second- and third-line divisions. 
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Because of transportation bottlenecks, the bridge trains were scheduled to arrive just before 
the start of the assault, which would require detailed and precise planning. The assault troops, 
(meanwhile, rehearsed the crossing on the Vesle, near Fismes. 65 
Allied Actions 
Almost immediately after the failure of GNEISENAU the French started a series of 
Local attacks between Soissons and Chateau-Thierry in an effort to push the Germans back. 
Between 6 June and 13 July the French launched some 40 attacks against the west side of the 
Marne salient. Some of the attacks were as small as a few battalions; some were as large as 
several divisions. The French launched larger attacks on 15,16,18,24,25,28, and 29 June, 
on I through 3 July, and again starting on 8 July. Their objective was to clear lanes in the 
high ground at Coeuvres against Soissons and in the woods at Villers-Cotterets to secure the 
muddy area of the Savieres River, (from Longpont via Faverolle to the Ourcq), which was a 
key obstacle for tanks. 66 
On 15 June Clemenceau, Main, and Weygand met at Foch's headquarters to consider 
the defense of Paris. Foch ordered Main to develop plans for an attack by the Tenth Army 
against the west side of the salient to seize the high ground west of Soissons. The Allied 
generalissimo clearly recognized Soissons for the communications and logistics choke-point 
it was. If Soissons could be neutralized by Allied artillery fire, "any German offensive in the 
direction of Chateau-Thierry would be deprived of its lifeblood. " On 20 June Mangin 
submitted his initial attack plan to Main. 67 
On 28 June the Deuxieme Bureau estimated with great accuracy that the Germans 
would not be able to attack before 15 July. On 1 July Foch sent Main and Haig General 
Directive Number 4, concerning future operations. According to Foch, the two most 
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dangerous directions the Germans could attack were toward Paris and Abbeville (Amiens). A 
major advance in any other direction would fail to produce any worthwhile operational results 
for the Germans. When the Germans did attack, therefore, the French would have the mission 
of covering Paris, and the British would cover Abbeville. Both armies had to be prepared to 
support each other. 68 
On 5 July Mangin recommended expanding the attack against the entire 
Chateau-Thierry salient. Three days later General Jean Degoutte's Sixth Army submitted an 
attack plan to support the Tenth Army by attacking the southern tip of the salient. At a 
meeting in Provins on 9 July, Foch ordered Main to coordinate the Tenth Army's attack with 
an attack by the Fifth Army against the eastern flank of the salient. Three days later Main 
issued his commander's intent for the coordinated attack against the Marne salient. The 
objective of the operation would be to eliminate the Chateau-Thierry pocket by lateral thrusts 
from the west and the east toward the high ground north of Fere--en-Tardenois. 69 
As Operation MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS was planned, the French Fifth and Fourth 
Armies, west and east of Reims respectively, would bear the brunt of the German attack. The 
Tenth Army on the west side of the salient was not in the line of attack. Between the Tenth 
and the Fifth Armies, the center and right wing of the French Sixth Army was in the line of 
the attack. Initially French intelligence had estimated that the attack would be in the direction 
of Amiens, with the objective of separating the French and the British. As the indicators 
began to point to Reims as the objective of the attack, the Deuxieme Bureau came to believe 
that the main attack would fall east of Reims, in the Champagne region. Finally, on 14 July 
French aerial observers reported large numbers of small parties moving in the German sector 
west of Reims, which now convinced French intelligence that the main blow would fall west 
of Reims, rather than east of the city. 70 
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In the Fourth and Fifth Army sectors the French skillfully and secretly established 
defensive systems in great depth. The First (Red) Line consisted of thinly held observation 
posts. The Main Line of Defense (Yellow) was at least 2,000 meters from the German lines. 
Roughly 2/3 of the Allied infantry and 3/4 of the artillery were in this position. Behind the 
Yellow Line was the Second Line of Defense (Green). The reserves were to the rear of the 
Green Line. Overall, the defenses of the eastern-most Fourth Army were far better prepared 
than those of the Fifth Army. 71 With an accurate estimate of when and where the Germans 
would attack, Foch set 18 July as the counterattack date. Mangin's Tenth Army started to 
deploy on 14 July. 72 
German Order of Battle 
French intelligence on 15 June estimated that the Germans had 54 divisions in 
reserve; 61 reserve divisions on 20 June; and 75 reserve divisions on 30 June--55 of which 
were fresh. " While still holding a sizeable reserve in Flanders for the HAGEN attack, the 
Germans managed to assemble 48 divisions over the 119-kilometer front for 
MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS. The attacking divisions were organized into eleven corps, 
controlled by three armies. 
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Table 10.1 
German Divisions on 15 July 1918 74 
First Second Third Total Sector 
Line Line Line Divisions Width 
Seventh * 12 3 3 OHL 22 33 km 
Army 4 Army 
First # 8 2 1 OHL 14 54 km 
Army 3 Army 
Third § 7 1 2 OHL 12 32 km 
Army 2 Army 
27 66 OHL 48 119 km 
9 Army 
* Five of seven corps of the Seventh Army 
# Three of four corps of the First Army 
§ Three corps of the Third Army 
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Table 10.2 
German Corps on 15 July 1918 75 
(West to East) 
Corps Commander Attacking on 15 July 
Ninth Army Eben 
VII Francois No 
XXXIX Staabs No 
XIII Watter No 
Seventh Army Boehn 
XXV Reserve Winkler No 
VIII Schoeler No 
XXIII Reserve Kathen Yes 
VIII Reserve Wichura Yes 
IV Reserve Conta Yes 
LXV Schmettow Yes 
VI Reserve Borne Yes 
First Army Mudra 
XV Ilse No 
VII Reserve Lindequist Yes 
XIV Gontard Yes 
XXIV Reserve Langer Yes 
Third Army Einem 
XII Nidda Yes 
I Bavarian Enders Yes 
XVI Hohenvom Yes 
The MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS divisions, however, were not the same quality as 
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those that launched MICHAEL, GEORGETTE, or even BLÜCHER. Allied intelligence rated 
ten of the 27 divisions in the first line as 1st class; six as 2nd class; nine as 3rd class, and two 
as 4th class. Sixteen had fought in one of the previous offensives, and five had fought in two. 
Of the six completely fresh divisions, Allied intelligence rated four of them as 3rd class, and 
one each 2nd and 1st class. 76 The combat effectiveness ratings of Army Group German 
Crown Prince reported on 13 July were a bit more optimistic, but even that report showed the 
critical weakness of the divisions of the Ninth Army, which would absorb the main force of 
the Allied counterattack on 18 July. 
Table 10.3 
Reported Combat Effectiveness of German Divisions 13 July 1918 77 
2 to 3 
Combat Weeks Rest 
Ready and Training 
Ninth 33 
Army 
Seventh 20 3 
Army 
3 to 4 Capable 
Weeks Rest of Holding 
and Training Positions 
82 
31 
First 923p 
Army 
Despite holding back a great deal of artillery in Flanders for HAGEN, OHL by the 
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start of the attack managed to mass 6,353 guns, with the Seventh Army getting about 45 
percent of the total to support their difficult river crossing operation. The Germans' overall 
tube superiority ratio, however, was only 2: 1, the lowest of any of the five major attacks. 
Despite their significant supply problems, the Germans did muster about 900 aircraft for the 
operation. 
Table 10.4 
Guns Supporting MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS 78 
Super Total Trench 
Field Heavy Heavy Guns Mortars 
Seventh 1,908 895 4 2,807 ? 
Army 
First 1,158 561 32 1,751 ? 
Army 
Third 1,196 591 8 1,795 ? 
Army 
4,262 2,047 44 6,353 2,200 
Allied Order of Battle 
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From east of Chateau-Thierry to east of Reims, the main German attack zone, the 
Allies had 36 divisions (including three American and two Italian) under the right wing of the 
French Sixth Army, and the French Fifth and Fourth Armies. West of Chateau-Thierry the 
main Allied counterattack force consisted of 24 infantry and three cavalry divisions 
(including four American), under the French Tenth Army and the left wing of the Sixth. To 
the rear of the Fourth and Fifth Armies, the general reserve consisted of the French Ninth 
Army, with ten infantry and three cavalry divisions. The ground forces were supported by 42 
French squadrons and nine British squadrons. 79 
Table 10.5 
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Allied O/ýderofßfj/e in the MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS Sectors 80 
First Second Third Heavy Total Sector 
Line Line Line Guns Guns Width 
Sixth S 3 3 2 ? ? 25 km 
Army 
Fifth 0 8 5 0 789 1,440 40 km 
Army 
Fourth § 7 6 2 ? ? 54 km 
Army 
18 14 4 1,560 3,080 119 km 
* Two corps of Sixth Army 
# Three corps Fifth Army 
§ Three corps of Fourth Army 
EXECUTION 
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15 July 
At 0110 hours the Germans started firing the artillery preparation and the pioneer 
troops of the Seventh Army started assembling bridges the pontoon bridges for the crossing. 
On the west side of Reims the preparation took a slightly different form, to accommodate the 
Seventh Army's requirements to move into position for the river crossing. During the long 
fourth phase, the Seventh Army troops started crossing the river, and then the creeping 
barrage started from the far bank. German artillery fired 4.5 million rounds on the first day of 
the attack, including their first large-scale use of artillery delivered smoke. Gas, however, 
made up only 1/8 of the total rounds fired, down significantly from the 1/3 average of the 
81 earlier attacks. 
Table 10.6 
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MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS Artillery Preparations 82 
First and Third Armies 
Phase Duration 
1 10 minutes 
2 75 minutes 
3 90 minutes 
4 
5 
Seventh Army 
1 
2 
3 
4 
15 minutes 
30 minutes 
Effect 
Surprise saturation with blue cross and high explosive. 
Reinforced counterbattery fire with maximum gas. 
IKA attacks infantry targets. 
AKA continues counterbattery fire. 
FEKA attacks deep targets. 
Reinforced counterbattery fire. 
IKA attacks close infantry targets. 
AKA continues counterbattery fire. 
FEKA attacks deep targets. 
10 minutes Surprise saturation fire. 
60 minutes Reinforced counterbattery fire. 
30 minutes Destruction fire against deep targets. 
AKA continues counterbattery fire. 
120 minutes IKA attacks close infantry targets. 
AKA continues counterbattery fire. 
FEKA attacks deep targets. 
Meanwhile, on the night of 14 July a French trench raid had netted 27 German 
prisoners who divulged the attack was scheduled to commence the following morning, with 
the artillery preparation starting at 0110 hours. At 2400 hours the French artillery started an 
increased program of harassing and interdicting fire. At 0120 hours, 10 minutes after the 
German opening time, the French artillery started a full-scale counter-preparation. 83 The fire 
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was far more intense than anything the Germans could have thought possible. The I Bavarian 
Corps War Diary noted; "The activity of the enemy artillery during the period of preparation 
was uniformly strong, altogether contrary to previous experience in our offensive 
operations. 04 Since the French were outnumbered in guns they had decided to forego 
counterbattery fire and concentrate their counter-preparation on the German infantry. As a 
result, the German guns executed their own preparation relatively unhampered. 85 
At 0450 hours the German infantry moved forward behind a double creeping barrage, 
moving at the rate of 40 to 50 minutes per thousand meters. The wind, however, was too 
strong and quickly dissipated the effects of the German gas. On the extreme left of the 
attack, the troops of the Third Army advancing into a strong wind from the south had to 
attack in gas masks. 86 Unlike the previous attacks, the French artillery continued to hit the 
German infantry as they moved forward. On each side of Reims the attackers encountered 
different situations. 
East of Reims the First and Third Armies faced far heavier French artillery fire than 
anticipated, but almost no resistance on the ground. Despite taking stiff casualties the 
German infantry advanced rapidly--at first. About 0730 hours the creeping barrage reached 
its maximum range and lifted. The attackers found themselves facing a fully manned zone 
defense that hardly had been touched by the preparation or the barrage. The German artillery 
fire had struck empty ground mostly. 87 
By not firing on the German guns the French artillery had taken a calculated risk that 
paid off. Long before the start of the attack the Germans had acquired most of the French 
divisional artillery in the line. But just prior to the attack the French divisional artilleries were 
reinforced by additional units that moved up in secrecy. Once in position they used 
meteorological calculations rather than registering. The 43`d Division's reinforcing artillery, 
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for example, occupied their positions on 4 July and remained silent until the Germans 
attacked. When the attack came the 43rd Division's organic three direct support battalions and 
one general support battalion lost 25 percent of their guns to German counter-fire. Only two 
out of the division's nine reinforcing batteries took any German artillery fire at all. 88 
When the German First and Third Armies ran into the solid wall of French resistance 
they immediately called for additional artillery support. The fire requests had to be carried 
back by messenger and took hours to reach the guns. By that time many German batteries 
were already displacing forward and could not find suitable firing locations. Those units that 
were still in position and had the necessary range (heavies and super-heavies for the most 
part) were hesitant to fire based on requests that were several hours old. They feared with 
much justification that any subsequent changes in the tactical situation greatly increased the 
risk of firing on their own troops. 
As the advancing German direct support artillery units got closer to the front, they 
started to come under heavy fire from the French artillery. A large portion of the French guns 
occupied high ground 3,000 to 5,000 meters behind their main line of contact. From that 
position the moving German batteries were easy prey. Even though some of the heavier 
German guns were still in firing position, they were about 9,000 meters on the other side of 
the line of contact--too far back to reach the French guns. 89 The First Army War Diary 
recorded: 
Our batteries, which after the first infantry preparation followed 
up promptly, came under strong enemy artillery fire when crossing 
the shell crater situation on the open high ground of the Champagne 
hills. These batteries were compelled to unlimber under unfavorable 
conditions and suffered heavy losses. This deprived the infantry of 
artillery support. 90 
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By noon the attack east of Reims had pretty much bogged down. At 1300 hours the 
Third Army ordered a resumption of the attack, but that effort too ground to a halt within an 
hour. At 1530 hours the First Army also ordered resumption of the attack, but with little 
results. Only two units, the 203`d Infantry Division and the 15th Bavarian Infantry Division, 
reached the Vesle near Prunay. 91 
West of Reims the French counter-preparation seriously disrupted the Seventh Army's 
river crossing operation. Right from the start the French fire separated the attackers from their 
creeping barrage. The infantry stalled, but the barrage kept moving, which threw off the entire 
synchronization between fire and maneuver. The French fire also played havoc with the 
bridging operation. Materiel failed to arrive at the river in the proper order and created traffic 
jams that prevented the materiel from moving forward. As the bridges finally started going 
up, far behind schedule and under heavy fire, groups of infantry got across the Marne in small 
boats. For the most part they landed in the wrong locations and had little fire support because 
they could not get their artillery across. 92 
By mid-morning the Germans established a shallow bridgehead on either side of 
Dormans. The XXIII Reserve, VIII Reserve, and IV Reserve Corps crossed the river, and the 
LXV Corps north of the river pushed to the east. By noon most of the Seventh Army's forces 
reached the French second positions. 
93 Although OHL wanted to increase the pressure on 
both sides of the Marne, the Allies subjected the German forces in the bridgehead to 
withering artillery fire and air attack. The heavy air strikes killed the Seventh Army's chief of 
engineers as he was observing bridge construction on the river. 94 
By that night the Germans had some six divisions on the south bank of the Marne, but 
hardly any artillery. The bridgehead was about 20 kilometers wide and 5 kilometers deep. 
[Map 7] At that point the French artillery, working in conjunction with their air force, started 
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concentrating on the bridges to cut off the Germans on the south bank. By then it was clear to 
everyone that the German attack was going nowhere. As Hindenburg laconically noted, "The 
results certainly did not correspond to our high hopes. " 95 There was, however, widespread 
agreement on what had gone wrong. The First Army War Diary recorded: "The general 
impression prevailed in the evening of the first day of battle that the enemy, in expectancy of 
our attack which had been communicated to him by prisoners as to the very day and hour, had 
organized his infantry and artillery in depth. " 96 
In a phone conversation with Kuhl, Ludendorff complained of the poor results. Kuhl 
advised him to continue the First and Third Army attacks, but Ludendorff did not think he 
could risk the additional casualties. 97 OHL ordered the continuation of the operation, but 
with the more modest objective of cutting off the Reims salient-which had been Wetzell's 
original proposal. Incredibly, however, OHL did order the start of the planned transfer of 
forces north for HAGEN. Ludendorff still thought he could use the MARNESCHUTZ- 
REIMS operation to scare the Allies into shifting their reserves from Flanders. 98 The 
Seventh Army was ordered to continue the advance along both banks of the Marne. The First 
and Third Armies had the mission of launching holding attacks to pin the Allied units to their 
front, and prevent them from being shifted against the Seventh Army. 99 The First Army 
would resume the attack the next morning at 1100 hours, following a 20-minute fire strike by 
the artillery. The main effort would remain east of Reims. 100 
The Seventh Army, meanwhile, still believed that its attack could accomplish its 
objectives, and it ordered its corps to resume the attack in full force. According to the entry 
in its war diary, "... after the enemy second position had finally been taken, the attack could 
flow along smoothly as if we had not encountered any regular defense formed in great 
depth. i1°' An entry in the war diary of Army Group German Crown Prince was nowhere 
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nearly as optimistic: "It is now clear that the objective of the operation--to cut off the enemy 
in the Reims valley through a junction of the Seventh and First Armies in the vicinity of 
Epernay--cannot be attained. We have to be satisfied with minor success. " 102 
On the Allied side of the line, Main's initial reaction was to order Fayolle to place 
Mangin's attack on hold. Foch, however, told Main to launch Mangin's attack as planned. 
That afternoon, Foch and Haig met at Mouchy-le-Chätel, and Haig agreed to send his XXII 
Corps as reinforcements. Foch also suggested to Haig that he develop an attack east and 
southeast of Amiens. That would later become the 8 August attack, the "Black Day of the 
German Army. " 103 
16 July 
Just after midnight Army Group German Crown Prince ordered the Seventh Army to 
resume the advance on both sides of the Marne in the direction of Epernay. The heights at 
Igny le Jard, Boursault, and Pourcy were the next objective. 104 In the Third Army sector, 
meanwhile, the night had been relatively calm. Einem issued orders at 0200 hours for the 
right wing of the army to advance in support of the First Army's attack. The rest of the army 
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sector was supposed to go over to the defensive. 
On the second day of the operation the Germans made progress only north of the 
Marne. By the end of the day the Third Army terminated the attack of its right-wing XII 
Corps. '06 Now the best the Germans could hope to achieve was to cut off Reims at the base 
of the salient just south of the town. 
107 The First and Third Armies ceased all offensive 
operations by the end of the day. 
108 At 1945 hours Army Group German Crown Prince 
ordered the Seventh Army to halt its attacks south of the Marne, but to continue attacking the 
next day with their two corps north of the Marne against the Reims hills. 109 
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Confident that the German offensive had been stopped, Main now believed that 
Mangin's counter attack could proceed as planned. About midday, the French resumed heavy 
artillery and air attacks against the German bridges and started attacking rear lines of 
communications. Three French divisions and elements of the American 28th Infantry 
Division counterattacked the western end of the bridgehead and drove the Germans back one 
mile. 110 
17 Ju1 
Early on the morning of 17 July OHL came to the conclusion that the 
MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS offensive had to be halted. The city of Reims, however, still had 
to be cut off and taken. A few hours later Army Group German Crown Prince issued the 
orders to continue the advance with the limited objective of taking Reims. The Seventh Army 
was to take the ridge west of Ville Dommange, and the First Army was to push its right wing 
south and turn east. Simultaneously, the First Army would also conduct a supporting attack 
against Fort de la Pompelle on the east side of the city. The attacks would most likely start on 
21 July. Almost immediately, OHL started shifting much of the reinforcing artillery away 
from the Seventh Army to support the planned attacks on Reims. 111 
That afternoon Ludendorff went to the headquarters of the First Army in Rethel to 
discuss the continued attack by the Seventh Army southwest of Reims, supported by an attack 
of the First Army from the area of Prunay toward the southwest. Ludendorff was dismayed 
when the First Army chief of staff told him that it would take several days of preparation "to 
continue even this purely local attack. " 112 Following the meeting with Ludendorff, the Third 
Army issued the orders for all its units to go on the defensive. 113 The First Army issued the 
orders for VII Reserve, XIV, and XXIV Reserve Corps to go over to the defensive. The XV 
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Corps in front of Reims, which previously had not attacked, was ordered to prepare to attack 
in conjunction with the Seventh Army. The VII Reserve Corps was ordered to prepare to 
seize Fort de la Pompelle. 114 
Immediately after the meeting in Rethel, Ludendorff left for Rupprecht's 
headquarters at Tournai for a planning meeting for HAGEN. 115 That same day, Lieutenant 
Colonel Hermann Mertz von Quirnheim, a general staff officer in the OHL Operations 
Section, wrote in his diary; "I am convinced at this moment that neither Ludendorff nor 
Wetzell knows what further action they must take. " 116 That afternoon, Lieutenant Colonel 
Walter Reinhardt, Seventh Army Chief of Staff, went forward to conduct a personal 
reconnaissance of the situation. At 1730 hours he telephoned his counterpart at Army Group 
German Crown Prince to recommend in the strongest terms that the three corps south of the 
' Marne be pulled back immediately. According to Reinhardt, 70 percent of bridge trains had 
been destroyed by Allied artillery fire and the Seventh Army could not continue to hold the 
south bank. Army Group German Crown Prince endorsed Reinhardt's assessment and 
forwarded it to OHL. 117 
At 1930 hours Boehn, acting on his own, halted the attacks and ordered the Seventh 
Army to go on the defensive. 118 By the night of the 17th the entire length of the German line 
was in a state of chaos. The Seventh Army's units south of the Marne were effectively cut off. 
Most of the bridges were down and French artillery and aircraft mercilessly pounded away at 
the trapped units. The First Army, meanwhile, was desperately trying to organize the attack 
to cut off Reims. 
About midnight OHL finally agreed to a withdrawal by echelon of the bridgehead. 119 
The Seventh Army then issued the warning order to prepare for the withdrawal. The artillery 
minus the accompanying batteries wound cross back over on the night of the 18`h and 19`h, 
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with the reserves coming back on the night of the 19th and 20th. 120 Apparently still not 
anticipating a major French attack, OHL sent a message to the Ninth Army stating: 
After the conclusion of the fighting near Reims, it will be 
necessary to affect a regrouping of the forces along the entire 
front of the group of armies. Not until then will it be possible to 
determine how the Ninth Army can be given positive assistance. 
For the time being, it is impossible to brine up fresh divisions, 
on account of the railroad situation alone. 21 
18 Jul 
During the night of the 17`h German troops in the area of Cutry, southwest of Soissons 
heard clearly the sounds of tank engines from the Allied lines. About 0415 in the morning of 
the 18`h two French deserters revealed that the Allied attack would come between 0500 and 
0600 hours. The information came too late to disseminate it up and then back down the chain 
of command across the sector. At 0535 hours the French Tenth Army attacked without 
artillery preparation. [Map 8] The French Sixth Army launched its attack following a 
90-minute artillery preparation. More than 2,000 Allied guns fired along a 40-kilometer front 
to mask the exact attack sector. 122 
The Tenth Army forces came out of the wooded area of Villers-Cotterets, advancing 
on Soissons. The Allied counter attack struck between the Aisne and the Marne, against the 
Ninth Army and the left flank of the Seventh Army. In that sector the Germans had ten 
divisions in the first line--of which only two were fully combat capable--and six divisions in 
the second line. The sixteen German divisions were hit by 24 Allied divisions. 123 Mangin's 
Tenth Army had ten divisions in first line--including the U. S. Is` and 2"d Infantry Divisions- 
and six infantry divisions and a cavalry corps in the second line. The Tenth Army was 
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supported by 346 tanks, 1,545 guns, and 581 aircraft. Degoutte's Sixth Army had seven 
divisions in first line--including one American--and one division in second line. It also had 
on-call priority for three more of the huge American divisions. The Sixth Army was 
supported by 147 tanks, 588 guns, and 562 aircraft. Farther back, the Allies had ten more 
divisions--including two British--and 918 guns and approximately 800 aircraft in army or 
army group reserve. Since the attack came in the same sector that OHL had stripped of most 
of its reinforcing artillery just the day before, the Allies had a tube superiority ratio of 
2.3: 1.124 
Ludendorff, meanwhile, was at Tournai to plan the final details for HAGEN. He 
opened the conference by dismissing all the indicators that the French were massing for a 
counterattack from the forest of Villers-Cotterets. 
Before we start our discussions on Operation HAGEN, I want to 
quell any rumors that the French have major reserves in the Villers- 
Cotterets forest. OHL has a reliable intelligence system. The enemy 
cannot possibly have combat-ready reserves available. We know the 
casualty rates and decreases in strength in the French and British units. 
OHL can state categorically that any such rumors are unfounded. 125 
Almost as soon as he made those remarks the reports started coming in that the Allies 
were attacking in force. Ludendorff immediately ordered the 5th Infantry Division from the 
OHL reserve to be committed northeast of Soissons. By the time that unit reached its assigned 
sector, however, the Allies had the rail stations around Soissons under heavy artillery fire. 
The division had to detrain in the Ailette valley, on the north side of the Chemin des Dames, 
and then move forward on foot. 126 
Ludendorff ended the meeting and immediately returned to OHL, "in the greatest state 
of nervous tension. " 127 Arriving about 1400 hours, he was met at the train station at Avesnes 
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by Hindenburg, who briefed him on the overall situation. A few hours earlier OHL had 
ordered the Seventh Army to establish the main a line of resistance as Soissons-- 
Hartennes--Latilly-- high ground north of Chateau-Thierry. At the same time the Seventh 
Army was ordered to organize a fallback line farther to the rear, but the divisions were not to 
retire to that line until so ordered. 128 
Late in the morning the French attack south of the Aisne started to run out of steam. 
At 1430 hours OHL ordered Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht to transfer immediately 
two of its HAGEN attack divisions to Army Group German Crown Prince. The same order 
halted most of the transport then in progress for HAGEN, and placed all the resources in 
transit at the disposal of the Seventh Army. 129 About 1800 hours Army Group German 
Crown Prince transferred command of the Ninth Army's left wing XIII Corps to the Seventh 
Army. At the same time, the command of the Seventh Army's left wing VI Reserve Corps 
was transferred to the First Army. 130 
By the end of the day the Allies had advanced seven kilometers on a front of some 20 
kilometers. The plan, however, had called for an advance of 12 to 14 kilometers. French tank 
losses were greater than 80 percent, mostly from artillery direct fire. 131 Nonetheless, the 
German situation had become critical. The Soissons--Laon rail line was now within range of 
the Allied guns--including the only broad-gauge bridge over the Aisne in German hands. 
Thus, the entire line of communications system of the Seventh Army was seriously 
threatened. By that afternoon the Allies were able to bring the Laon--Soissons line under fire 
at Crouy. By the end of the day the Allies were only 13 kilometers away from the new spur 
from Sermoise to Missy, which was the rail connection through the Aisne valley to 
Fere-en-Tardenois. 132 Hindenburg summed up the situation nicely in his post-war memoirs. 
Owing to hostile artillery fire from every side, the conduct of 
operations in the salient, which was still very deep, was extremely 
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difficult. The enemy artillery had the critical section of our railway 
east of Soissons under fire. A regular hail of enemy airplane bombs 
descended upon it day and night. We were compelled to detrain the 
arriving reinforcements and reliefs in the neighborhood of Laon and 
far away from the salient. They then proceeded to the battlefield by 
forced marches, which took days. 133 
19 July 
The Allies resumed the attack along the line at 0500 hours on 19 July. OHL was still 
trying to salvage HAGEN, but by the second day of the Allied counterattack the Germans had 
withdrawn four attack divisions from Rupprecht's Army Group. The situation on the Seventh 
Army's right was deteriorating rapidly. The lines of the XIII, XXV Reserve, and VIII Corps 
had all but caved in and those units were in the process of withdrawing to the general line 
from Billy to the high ground east of Courchamps. To shore up the situation the Seventh 
Army inserted the headquarters of the XVII Corps between XXV Reserve and XIII Corps. 134 
Army Group German Crown Prince, meanwhile, ordered the Ninth Army to hold its 
forward-most positions. 135 
The fragile and shallow rail network hampered the German ability to shift 
reinforcements to the Seventh Army sector. Rail movement was all but impossible. Land 
march took too much time. The only workable alternative was to move the troops as far 
forward as possible by truck. Although the troops may have reached their required sectors 
that way, they arrived without their artillery and heavy equipment, and they were still 
exhausted from having to close the final distance on foot. 136 
About noon, Hindenburg uncharacteristically inserted himself into the operational 
planning process by suggesting that all the German reserves in Flanders should be moved 
south immediately, and committed across the Aisne against the left flank of the Allied attack. 
Ludendorff brushed off the idea. Later that evening Hindenburg brought in up again. In a fit 
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of frustration Ludendorff dismissed the idea as "nonsense. " At that point, Hindenburg called 
Ludendorff into his office, presumably to remind him who the commander was. Although 
Hindenburg did mention the basic operational idea, neither of them mentioned in his memoirs 
the blow-up between the two. 137 
Holding back the Allied attacks on its right flank, the Seventh Army continued to 
withdraw its forces across the Marne. But it was clear that the German position in the Marne 
salient would become increasingly untenable even after the evacuation of the south bank. 
About 1600 hours Army Group German Crown Prince ordered the Seventh Army to initiate 
reconnaissance operations in case it became necessary to pull back along the entire front. At 
the same time the order stressed that every voluntary withdrawal would have to be approved 
by higher headquarters. The most advanced positions had to be held. 138 About the same 
time, OHL sent a message requesting recommendations from the armies on a larger-scale 
withdrawal in the event of more major Allied attacks. 139 The Seventh Army's War Diary 
summed up their situation by the end of 19 July: 
Even if the initial push of the attack has been stopped, resistance 
to continued attacks will have to be maintained until such time 
as the troops, equipment, and supplies have been withdrawn over 
the Vesle. This means in terms of the artillery of the approximately 
40 divisions a total length of march of about 600 kilometers. If the 
defense, already weak and undermined, does not hold off the enemy 
during the withdrawal, a catastrophe could still occur. 140 
20 Jul 
On the third day of the Allied counterattack the French Fifth and Ninth Armies hit the 
Germans on the eastern flank of the Marne salient. In back and forth fighting the Germans 
only managed to halt the attackers at the main line of resistance. The preparations for the First 
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Army's attack against the Reims hills south of Virgny and against Fort de la Pompelle east of 
Reims-scheduled for 21 July--were completely disrupted and had to be postponed. The 
Germans were now defending along the entire Marne salient, from the Aisne almost to 
Reims. 141 Estimating that the next attack in its sector would come north of the Aisne, the 
German Ninth Army ordered a defense in depth and requested the insertion of two additional 
divisions into its line. 142 
That day Foch sent a message to Main reminding him that the objective of the 
operation was not merely to push the Germans back, but to cut off and destroy the German 
forces south of the Aisne and the Vesle. Ludendorff, meanwhile, had summoned to OHL 
General Fritz von Lossberg, chief of staff of the Fourth Army, and the German Army's 
acknowledged master of defensive operations. When Lossberg arrived at OHL he found 
Ludendorff in a near panic state and openly blaming Wetzell for the German Army's failures. 
After studying the situation, Lossberg recommended an immediate general withdrawal behind 
the Aisne and the Vesle by the Seventh and Ninth Armies, to be followed three weeks later by 
a pull-back of all German forces on both sides of the Somme. That, of course, would have 
meant giving up the territory won at such a high price in the previous offensives. Lossberg 
also recommended that HAGEN be launched later in a reduced form, but that the withdrawals 
should be made without consideration of conserving supplies for HAGEN. 
Ludendorff was growing increasingly despondent and talked about resigning. 
Lossberg talked him out of it, but later regretted doing that. Ludendorff ordered Lossberg to 
visit the Seventh and Ninth Armies and report back to him. Lossberg left for the front under 
the mistaken impression that Ludendorff would act immediately on his recommendations. 
Both army groups and Wetzell concurred with Lossberg's recommendations. Rupprecht 
believed that the turning point of the war had been reached and that the German Army had no 
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choice but to go on the defensive. Ludendorff, however, had no intention of acting on 
Lossberg's recommendations. 
143 
The Seventh Army, meanwhile, completed the last phase of the withdrawal across the 
Marne. With the flanks holding firm, the center pulled back. The Seventh Army's War Diary 
that day included the following wildly optimistic entry: "July 20`h was a day of battles on a 
very large scale and a complete defensive victory for the Seventh Army. " 144 
21 July 
By dawn on 21 July the last elements of the Seventh Army were back on the north 
bank of the Marne. At 0500 hours the Allies opened with heavy artillery fire on the German 
positions, but there was no follow-up infantry attack. After several hours the Allies attacked 
with tanks, but that push stalled under heavy German fire. 145 
Later that day Kuhl arrived in Avesnes for personal talks with Ludendorff. Still 
resisting Lossberg's recommendations for a general withdrawal from the Marne salient, 
Ludendorff nonetheless recognized the long-term precariousness of the German position. He 
told Kuhl about a planned major attack from both the left and right flanks of the salient that 
would require Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht to give up five more fresh divisions. 146 
flutier, meanwhile, was also recommending a major attack by his Eighteenth Army to relieve 
the pressure on the Seventh. 147 Despite the attacks of the day before by the French Fifth and 
Ninth Armies against the German left flank, Ludendorff still insisted that the First Army's VI 
Reserve Corps execute its attacks with four divisions against the heights south of Reims no 
later than 22 July. On the other hand, OHL told Army Group German Crown Prince to cancel 
the attack on Fort de la Pompelle. 148 
By the end of 21 July the Allies had recaptured Chateau-Thierry, but OHL believed 
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that the French attack finally had been halted. Nonetheless, with both Soissons and Missy 
under heavy artillery fire, it became almost impossible to reinforce or resupply the Seventh 
Army in its current positions. Seventh Army therefore, recommended a general withdrawal 
back from the Marne. Army Group German Crown Prince concurred, and forwarded the 
recommendation to OHL. 149 
22 July 
The Allied counterattack may have been losing momentum, but further attacks on the 
22 "d showed OHL that it had been wrong in its overall assessment. Ludendorff, who was in 
all but a state of shock over what was happening to his army, finally came to the conclusion 
that the Germans had to start pulling back from the Marne salient. He still did not, however, 
agree with Lossberg that the withdrawal should be as far back as the Vesle. That afternoon 
Hindenburg reported the situation to the Kaiser. He explained that the retrograde movement 
was necessary to save troops and to reestablish the German position. 150 
Ludendorff tentatively agreed to a retirement, but only to the general line that ran 
through Fere-en-Tardenois. Army Group German Crown Prince, meanwhile, stressed the 
necessity to clear the sector between the front line and the Chemin des Dames of spent units 
as rapidly as possible. 
151 By the end of the day Army Group German Crown Prince issued 
the orders for a tightly controlled withdrawal. 152 OHL also shortened the army group's span 
of control by transferring command of the Eighteenth Army to Rupprecht's Army Group. 153 
23-24 July 
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On the 23d Seventh Army intelligence estimated that the Allies had available 21 to 23 
French divisions, four to five British divisions, and six to eight American divisions as 
reserves. 154 Despite their precarious situation, the Germans had managed to organize their 
trademark tenacious defense by the sixth day of the Allied counteroffensive. A renewed 
Allied attack on the 23rd with 100 tanks and two fresh British corps made little headway. 155 
Ludendorff at that point began to waffle on the necessity of a withdrawal, believing that the 
situation could be restored through offensive action. OHL postponed the retrograde 
movement and ordered the Ninth Army to prepare to make an attack across the Aisne on a 20- 
kilometer front, and to be prepared to extend that attack to Soissons. That, combined with the 
First Army's attack west of Reims-now scheduled for the 25th-should restore the 
situation. 156 
Wetzell objected to the plan, recommending instead a withdrawal north of the Aisne. 
Lieutenant Colonel Mertz von Quirnheim in a 23 July entry noted in his diary Ludendorffs 
steadily declining mental state: "The real impression is that his Excellency has lost all 
confidence. The army commanders suffer terribly from this... " 157 Also objecting to the plan, 
Army Group German Crown Prince sent OHL a message the following day, reporting that 18 
divisions of the Seventh Army were no longer combat effective and should be relieved 
immediately. The message went on to state: 
If the battle is to continue south of the Aisne and the Vesle, fresh 
forces and more weapons and artillery are essential. We cannot 
provide exact figures, but the above comments on divisional 
attrition give an indicator. 
There can be no doubt that the enemy will continue the battle. He has 
ample resources to do so. 
The army group does not think that it makes any sense under the 
circumstances to continue the battle south of the Vesle. A large 
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part of the armies' forces and transportation assets would be 
destroyed and wasted. 
The forces are not available to continue the operation. Thus, it is 
recommended that the Ninth, Seventh and First Armies be 
withdrawn gradually behind the Aisne and the Vesle. 158 
Even before receiving a response from OHL, the center of the Seventh Army, 
consisting of the VIII Corps, XXIII Reserve, VIII Reserve, and the right wing of IV Reserve 
Corps, started to pull back to the line Coinsy--Beauvardes--1'Herelle--Vincelles. 159 The 
Ninth Army, meanwhile, insisted it could not executed the directed attack without receiving 
five fresh attack divisions and ten fresh trench divisions, along with the necessary number of 
supporting batteries. The army commander estimated that the attack could be launched in 14 
days, but only if additional rail lines could be put in place. OHL agreed to supply the attack 
divisions, but not the trench divisions. 160 
25-26 July 
The First Army's attack west of Reims started well enough on 25 July, but ended up 
losing ground, including the key heights near Virgny. That day Lossberg also returned to 
OHL from the Seventh Army to argue for further withdrawals. 161 Ludendorff finally gave in. 
At midnight on the 25th OHL issued the orders for the withdrawal of the Seventh Army and 
the right wing of the First Army for the night of the 27th. But the withdrawal was not to the 
line of the Aisne and Vesle, but rather to the general line of Burgneuz--Fere en Tardenois-- 
Bois Meuniers-- Romigny--Bligny, an intermediate position to become known as the "Great 
Bridgehead Position. " 162 
Army Group German Crown Prince responded by immediately ordering the Seventh 
and First Armies to start the preparations for the pullback on the night of 26-27 July. 163 
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Shortly thereafter, however, OHL issued another order to start preparation work on another 
line of defense along the north bank of the Vesle and the Aisne as far as Soissons. 164 Army 
Group German Crown Prince then issued orders to establish the line of the Aisne and the 
Vesle as a permanent defense, with strong forces south of the Vesle. 165 On the 26th OHL also 
sent Army Group German Crown Prince a message soliciting recommendations on how a 
potential move to the Aisne-Vesle line would actually be executed by the Ninth, Seventh, and 
First Armies. 166 Lossberg returned to Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht in a state of 
frustration. 167 
Since 18 July, meanwhile, Mangin's Tenth Army had been reinforced with six fresh 
divisions, and two more were moving up. The Allies were pushing the Germans back quite 
successfully, but they were falling far short of their original intent to cut off large German 
forces in the salient. The Allies planed a new push, with the Tenth Army making a three- 
phase attack to the line Buzancy--Droizy--Saponay. 168 
27 Julv 
On the night of 27 July the VIII, XXIII Reserve, VIII Reserve, IV Reserve, and LXV 
Corps completed their withdrawal to the Great Bridgehead Position. [Map 8] The left wing 
of the First Army also pulled back to maintain contact with the Seventh. 169 After initially 
resisting the strong recommendations from its subordinate headquarters, OHL finally 
approved the initiation of the withdrawal of all German forces to the north of the Vesle, with 
the movement to be completed by the night of 1-2 August. 
The Ninth Army would make the withdrawal to what would be called the Blücher 
Position in a single move. Then the artillery and machine guns of the Ninth Army had the 
mission of dominating the Aisne valley between Missy and Conde. The Seventh and First 
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Armies would make the move in two stages. The Seventh Army's assigned intermediate 
position ran from the Aisne west of Sermoise to the southwest of Jonquery; the First Army's 
intermediate position ran from southwest of Jonquery to the Vesle. 170 The start of the 
withdrawal movements was supposed to be based on the state of the preparation work, and 
not the tactical situation. OHL established the evacuation priorities in order as the wounded; 
supplies and equipment; and captured enemy material. Destruction priorities were established 
as all supplies and equipment that could not be evacuated; rail lines; bridges; bunkers and 
fortified positions; and roads. 171 
German intelligence now estimated that the Allies had available ten fresh and 17 spent 
French divisions; four fresh and one spent British divisions; six fresh and one spent American 
divisions; and two spent Italian divisions as reserves. 172 
28 July 
Although the decision had been made already, Hindenburg sent a message to the 
Kaiser formally requesting permission to withdraw to the north of the Vesle. The return 
message from the Kaiser's aide-de-camp said that the Kaiser wanted to see the maps showing 
the new line of defense, and he also wanted to know what would happen to Soissons. The 
Kaiser himself commented: "Before I make a decision which is so weighty in its political 
consequences, it is important for me to know how the new defense is to be conducted. " 173 
The Kaiser gave his approval on 29 July--the day after OHL actually issued the final 
execution order. According to the OHL order, the retrograde movement would give the 
German forces three key advantages: 
1. The difficulty to our rear communications will be eliminated. 
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2. Our troops will be withdrawn from the pocket where they are 
exposed to enemy pressure from all sides, into the shortest line 
which is sufficiently organized for defense. 
3. The shortening of the front will affect considerable economy in 
forces and gain for us strategic freedom of action to employ these 
forces. 174 
29-31 July 
By 29 July the Germans had 23 divisions in the front line between Soissons and 
Reims-13 of which were completely spent. Only eight divisions were available in the 
rear. 175 On 30 July OHL ordered the retrograde movement to start on the night of 1-2 
August. But OHL also wanted to know if the withdrawing forces could hold their assigned 
intermediate positions longer than one day. 176 Army Group German Crown Prince 
immediately told OHL that the Seventh Army objected in the strongest terms to having to 
hold the intermediate position longer than one day--and that the army group concurred. OHL 
quickly concurred as well. 177 On 31 July, Army Group German Crown Prince told the Ninth 
Army that after the withdrawal to the Blücher Position, the right wing of the Ninth Army 
would be the point at which the Allies would most likely try to roll up the German line from 
the flanks. 178 
1-7 August 
The German withdrawal was conducted on schedule and in relatively good order 
despite strong Allied pressure. The Ninth Army's left-wing XXXIX Corps withdrew across 
the Aisne during the night of 1 August, leaving a strong covering force in Soissons. On the 
afternoon of 2 August, the XXXIX Corps withdrew the rest of the Soissons garrison, leaving 
only patrols in the town. The Seventh Army's forces completed crossing the Vesle that night. 
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On 3 August the final elements of the Ninth Army still holding Soissons withdrew to the 
north bank of the Aisne, and the Seventh Army blew all the remaining bridges over the 
Vesle. 179 [Map 7] 
The Germans had been pushed back to roughly their line of advance at the end of the 
first day of the BLOCHER offensive, but they had conducted a skillful fighting withdrawal 
that frustrated the Allied objective of cutting off and trapping large German forces in the 
pocket. On the other hand, the German Army was now at a serious operational disadvantage 
and completely off balance. Furthermore, German intelligence at that point completely failed 
to anticipate the Allies' next move. On 5 August Army Group German Crown Prince sent the 
Operations Section at OHL an assessment of the Allies' most probable courses of action. 
The enemy fully knows that his offensive will come to a stand on 
the Aisne. If he desires not to lose the initiative he has just gained, 
he will as soon as possible start a new attack with a more distant 
objective. That distant objective would be a shock against the Ninth 
Army. He could press against the flank of the Aisne position and 
simultaneously threaten the Eighteenth Army, which is bent forward. 
The other possibility, to envelop the front of the Seventh Army, lies 
in an attack against the First Army. According to reports from our 
agents, the enemy intends to attack via Reims in the direction of 
Berry au Bac. 180 
Both estimates were wrong, of course. Just three days later the Allies launched their 
surprise attack on the German positions east of Amiens. On 7 August the Germans had 67 
divisions in reserve, only 39 of them fresh. The Allies had 77 infantry and ten cavalry 
divisions in reserve-and that number was growing. 18 
ASSESSMENT 
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The Results 
Although none of the 1918 offensives proved to be an operational success for the 
Germans, MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS was the first one that was a complete tactical failure as 
well. Fifty-nine Allied divisions (including seven American, four British, and two Italian) 
defeated 65 German divisions. In terms of raw numbers, the Germans inflicted more 
casualties than they sustained between 15 July and 3 August. The Allied casualties, dead, 
wounded, missing, and captured, amounted to 160,000.182 The Germans estimated their 
own total casualties at about 110,000. But the Allied losses were being made up rapidly by 
American replacements, and the Germans also lost some 600 artillery pieces they could not 
immediately replace. 183 Operationally, the Germans failed to take the rail center at Reims, 
they lost the one at Soissons, and the Allies regained control of the Paris-Chalons rail line. 
By that point, however, it made little difference, because the Germans had been pushed 
almost completely out of the salient they took during Operation BLÜCHER. Before much 
longer they would be pushed back across the Chemin de Dames as well. 
How did it happen? Why was MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS such a failure compared to 
the other four offensives? (Even Operation GNEISENAU had been a minor tactical success. ) 
In his analysis of the offensives conducted for the Reichstag after the war, Kuhl wrote, 
"The principal reason for our reverse must therefore be ascribed to the failure achieve 
surprise. " 184 While that answer is correct as far as it goes, there is much more behind it. 
Predictability of the German Tactics 
The Allies had been stunned when the Germans used their new attack tactics for the 
first time on a large scale on the Western Front during the Cambrai counterattack in 
November 1917. The technical and tactical artillery innovations of the Germans were 
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especially devastating against a linear, rigid, forward defense. Even as late as Operation 
GNEISENAU the Allies still made the mistake of packing far too many of their forces into 
their forward-most lines. By Operation MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS a little more than a month 
later, they finally had learned their hard lesson. 
After the war the failure of MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS became a topic of long-running 
debate in German military circles. Bruchmüller in particular came under criticism for his 
handling of the artillery. In the June 1921 issue of the journal Militär-Wochenblatt, retired 
Major General Hans Waechter blasted Bruchmüller, calling him rigid and dogmatic. 
Waechter laid the blame for the failure of the entire attack on Bruchmüller, because he had 
used the same fire support tactics for the fifth time in a row. Two months later in the same 
journal General Friederich von Bernhardi came to Bruchmüller's defense. Bernhardi chided 
Waechter for merely criticizing Bruchmüller's plan, without suggesting what could have been 
done differently. Bernhardi dismissed the whole argument as a simple case of sour grapes, 
pointing out that Waechter actually had been a subordinate divisional artillery commander 
under Bruchmüller. 185 In his own defense Bruchmüller wrote, "No one objected to the 
contemplated scheme [of fire] for the attack, either verbally or in writing, and no one 
proposed a different plan". 186 
Kuhl was a staunch Bruchmüller supporter in this debate. Writing in the Deutsches 
Offiziersblatt, Kuhl defended the high degree of centralization in Bruchmüller's system as 
necessary for massing. But General Alfred Ziethen, who generally was a Bruchmüller 
supporter, later criticized the high degree of centralization as not being flexible enough to 
react to drastic changes in the tactical situation. 
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The most severe condemnation came in the August 1925 issue ofArtilleristische- 
Rundschau. Lieutenant General Richard von Berendt, who had been the Seventeenth Army 
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artillery commander during Operation MICHAEL, echoed much of Waechter's earlier 
arguments, and then concluded that MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS had failed because of 
Bruchmüller's mishandling of the artillery--and the loss of that battle cost Germany the war. 
Wilhelm Marx, who was then a lieutenant colonel in the post-war Reichswehr, came to the 
defense of his old boss in the following issue. Taking the longer view of things, and including 
the experiences on the Eastern Front, Marx pointed out that Bruchmüller's techniques were 
being used for at least the 13th time by the MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS attack. They were well 
known by the time of Operation BLÜCHER, yet they worked during that attack. The failure 
in July 1918, then, must lay elsewhere. Marx gave the causes as the failure to maintain 
security, combined with the overall weakness of Germany's strategic position by mid-July. 188 
The debate continued almost up to the eve of World War II. Writing in Der KB. Feld- 
Artillerist in 1936, Ferdinand Meier noted that in the Third Army there was a strong suspicion 
the French were positioning at least their artillery in depth. As a result, four days before the 
start of the attack the Third Army issued orders for its own AKA units to attack the French 
guns in depth. That caused a last-minute repositioning of German guns and shifting of 
ammunition forward--all of which could not have helped the Germans maintain secrecy. 189 
The truth probably contains elements of all these arguments. There can be little doubt 
That by July 1918 the Allies finally had developed enough of an understanding of the overall 
German attack techniques to begin to take effective counter-measures. The German Army 
even anticipated this to a degree. The Germany Third Army war-gamed the possibility of a 
French withdrawal from their front lines, but gave the event only a 10 percent probability. 190 
Between 15 and 17 July Ludendorff had many telephone conversations with the 
subordinate chiefs of staff, particularly Kuhl, trying to come up with some new way the 
Germans could modify their offensive tactics to again take the Allies by surprise. On 22 July 
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OHL issued a set of lessons learned from the recent debacle. The list included the need for a 
follow-on phase of reinforced counter-battery fire as soon as the infantry started their assault 
and the need to establish a positive technique to give the infantry control over the creeping 
barrage. 191 These, however, were little more than minor modifications to the existing tactics. 
A strong artillery preparation was the only reliable means the Germans had of achieving the 
initial disruption of the enemy's defensive positions. Without tanks in large numbers, the 
Germans had neither the speed nor the alternate means of firepower. Ludendorff at that point 
finally began to understand the seriousness of the lack of tanks. 192 Or as Kuhl later wrote, 
"At the time, we had found no new methods, nor were we able to adopt any new means of 
warfare. Unfortunately, we were in no position to obtain surprise effect with the aid of a tank 
attack. " 193 
Allied Reaction 
Failure to achieve surprise is only fatal if the enemy exploits it properly, and this time 
the Allies did. By July 1918 the French finally had mastered the defense in depth tactics that 
were the basis of Main's Directive of December 1917. Because of the favorable terrain east 
of Reims, the French defense in depth there was far more effective, and essentially stopped' 
the REIMS portion of the operation cold. 
Anticipating the German move, Foch also shifted eight divisions from Flanders to 
counter the threat. The Allies' defense in depth allowed them to hold off the 48 German 
divisions with only 36. That economy of force then allowed them to build-up their 
counterattack force to 24 divisions, against only ten divisions on the German right flank. 194 
The French counterattack force outnumbered the Germans in sector approximately two-to-one 
in infantry, and more than that in artillery. The Allies had air superiority and a powerful tank 
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force against no German tanks. The attack was perfectly timed to strike the German attack 
precisely at its culminating point. The forward momentum of the MARNESCHUTZ portion 
of the attack had been exhausted, yet defense was not set. Off balance, the Germans were 
unable to shift smoothly to a retrograde movement. The Allied counterattack was even more 
critical because of the shallow proximity of Soissons and its vital rail junction. In the end, 
however, the counterattack never did achieve its primary objective of cutting off and 
destroying large German forces in the Marne pocket. 
German Failure to Anticipate the Allied Counterattack 
The Germans did not completely fail to anticipate the Allied counterattack against the 
Ninth Army and the right flank of the Seventh Army. The indicators were there and they were 
strong. The Germans worked hard at ignoring and explaining them away. As early as 29 June 
an order from Army Group German Crown Prince to the Seventh Army stated: "We must 
count on the French continuing their attacks against the west front of the Seventh Army prior 
to and during MARNESCHUTZ. " 195 The following day the Seventh Army responded with 
the assessment that the French probably would not strip their other sectors to muster the force 
for a large-scale attack. Seventh Army also noted that the most vulnerable area would be the 
vicinity of Soissons, which would threaten all lines of communications for the entire army. 196 
On 1 July an OHL order even noted; "In case of enemy attacks on a large scale, we will have 
to reckon with numerous tank squadrons. " 197 
On 9 July the Seventh Army's War Diary recorded intelligence reports indicating that 
the French would attempt to cut off the German salient between the Aisne and the Marne by 
simultaneous attacks on both flanks. The French national day of 14 July was seen as the most 
likely date of the attack. The following day the Seventh Army War Diary noted French efforts 
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to seize good observation points that would support an offensive in the Soissons--Chäteau- 
Thierry sector. The Ninth Army also reported that large-scale attacks were imminent in its 
sector. 
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On 10 July Ludendorff telephoned Army Group German Crown Prince to order the 
formation of an integrated defense with the Eighteenth and Ninth Armies, and the right wing 
of the Seventh Army. As the indicators of a major Allied attack grew stronger, Army Group 
German Crown Prince issued orders on 11 July to the Ninth and Seventh Armies to assume 
defensive positions in the threatened sectors and to counter the enemy's infantry and artillery 
"with full power. " The Ninth Army was supposed to weaken its right wing substantially in 
favor of the sector south of the Aisne, and to secure artillery flanking fire from the northern 
river boundary. 199 
1 Once the German attack started on 15 July, the possibility of an Allied counterattack 
Seemed to fade from the minds of the German commanders. That day Eben, the commanding 
general of the Ninth Army, withdrew the request he had made on 11 July for reinforcements 
of four fresh attack divisions. He noted, " The situation has since relaxed. The counterattack 
no longer seems probable. I therefore withdraw my request for four fresh divisions. " 200 
Army Group German Crown Prince agreed that there was no immediate danger in front of the 
Ninth Army for the moment. By 16 July, Ludendorff felt confirmed in his opinion that 
MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS had tied down enough of the French forces in order to relieve 
pressure on the front between the Oise and the Marne. During the meeting in Rethel on the 
afternoon of 17 July, Ludendorff told Army Group German Crown Prince to build up reserves 
rapidly for possible commitment in support of the Eighteenth Army and the right wing of the 
Ninth Army. At that point, therefore, he saw less of a threat to the sector directly east of 
Villers-Cotterets, than to the sector farther to the north. 201 
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Nonetheless, there were still General Staff officers raising concerns about the 
indicators of a French counterattack from the forest of Villers-Cotterets. Among them were 
General Hermann von Francois and Major Ludwig Beck. 202 For the most part, however, the 
Germans were genuinely caught by surprise when the Allied blow fell. On the night of 18 
July the War Diary of the Seventh Army recorded an amazingly accurate assessment of the 
situation: 
The enemy was fortunate in a certain sense in attaining operational 
surprise, although the concentration of his assault army in the 
woods of Villers-Cotterets had not been concealed from us. However, 
it appeared now that we did not perceive the numbers of his troops to 
their fullest extent. And, in addition, we expected from our successful 
advance on Reims that it would compel French General Headquarters 
to commit the forces it had intended for the west front of the Seventh 
Army and the southern sector of the Ninth Army, immediately against 
the salient of Epernay--Chalons to prevent annihilation there. This 
assessment was based primarily on the assumption that our offensive 
would overrun with little resistance a weak and surprised enemy, and 
then all available enemy forces would be pulled into their catastrophe 
in the Reims salient. The first assumption was based on the second, 
that the number of divisions opposite Army Group German Crown 
Prince were so low that a concentration of them in the Villers-Cotterets 
woods and simultaneous strong occupation of the Reims sector was 
out of the question. It was believed that the remainder of the enemy 
operational reserves would be held down by threatening Amiens. 
Both assumptions were wrong. 
Finally, we had underestimated the value of the armored fighting 
vehicle. The November 1917 battles at Cambrai should have given 
us some indications what successes might be obtained by the surprise 
mass insertion of tanks in an attack. We now know that our enemies 
grasped that fact, improved their tanks technically, and augmented 
their numbers. On our part, we paid little attention to this auxiliary 
arm and did not think the enemy had done so either. 
During our offensives in March and May 1918 tanks appeared but 
infrequently, as they are primarily an offensive arm and their forces 
could find little employment as our opponent in those days was strictly 
on the defensive. And our placing no high value on tanks as an auxiliary 
arm seemed justified. But 18 July taught us different for the first time. 
The tanks inserted in masses heretofore unknown, and technically 
highly developed, proceeded at their lumbering gait in long lines, 
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connecting the infantry. 203 
Condition of German Units 
Despite all the previous estimates of the poor condition of the troops and the 
premature predictions of the death of the German Army, the Landser and their small unit 
leaders did amazingly well in Operations MICHAEL, GEORGETTE, and BLOCHER. But by 
July 1918 they were truly burned out. As previously noted, the Germans were hit much harder 
than the Allies by the influenza epidemic. Most divisions were reporting between 1,000 and 
2,000 cases. 204 The trench strengths of some companies were down to 65, and in some cases 
even down to 40 and 30. The prestigious 1st Guards Division, which had started the war with 
1,000 soldiers in each of its 12 battalions, was now down to 750 soldiers in each of nine 
battalions. The 4th class 86th Division averaged 525 men per battalion. The actual trench 
strengths were even lower than the reported field strengths. German commanders could not 
know from one day to the next what their unit strength would be on the day of the attack. 205 
Influenza and poor nutrition were not the German Army's only major health problems. 
On 15 and 24 May and again on 13 June the War Diary of Crown Prince Rupprecht's Army 
Group reported cases of typhus in the Sixth and Seventeenth Armies, and in the army group's 
carefully husbanded reserve divisions. 206 Rupprecht himself continually noted the bad 
condition of the troops in his diary. On 1 June he wrote: 
Reims probably would have fallen earlier if the advancing troops 
had not got drunk again on the wine they found in the suburbs. 
The lack of discipline of the troops is serious. Almost every time 
they take a town the troops look for food and wine. Since they 
are exhausted and without food, they get drunk fast. 207 
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Ludendorff in his memoirs also complained about the condition of the German Army, 
especially the morale impact of disaffected troops from the east, the diet, and influenza. "I 
gave serious thought to the question whether, in view of the spirit of the Army and the 
condition of our reserves, it would not be advisable to adopt the defensive. " 208 Ludendorff 
himself didn't do much to help troop morale. Although MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS was the 
operational code name for the offensive, as soon as it was launched it was given the name 
Friedenssturm--Peace Offensive. Ludendorff gave it that name to give the troops the 
impression this would be the last big push that would win the war--even though planners at 
OHL were busily working on HAGEN, and KURFÜRST after it. For the most part, the 
Landser were not fooled. 
Lossberg called 18 July the "precise turning point in the conduct of the war. " 
According to him, OHL's failure to understand that the combat strength of the German Army 
was shattered was the root of the failure, and that ultimately cost Germany the war. 209 
Mission Creel) 
Like MICHAEL and BLÜCHER, and to lesser extents, GEORGETTE and 
GNEISENAU, MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS suffered from mission creep all throughout its 
planning. Wetzell had argued that the Germans did not have the 14 to 16 divisions necessary 
for Operation ROLAND, and the lead-time necessary to prepare it would be to the Allies' 
advantage. On 6 June, therefore, he recommended a six- to eight-division attack conducted by 
a single army. That attack could be ready to launch within 14 to 20 days. By 11 June the 
operation had grown to 10 divisions; by 14 June to 20 divisions; by 17 June to 29 divisions; 
by 20 June to 39 divisions; and by 15 July to 48 divisions controlled by three armies. Instead 
of two to three weeks preparation time, Operation MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS was launched 
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39 days after Wetzell proposed the original attack--time that the Allies used to good 
advantage. 
The basic objective of the operation also expanded as the size of the force grew. 
Wetzell had proposed a limited objective attack to cut off Reims by taking the high ground to 
the south of the town, which in turn would give the Germans control of the rail center and 
ease the near catastrophic supply situation inside the Marne salient. By 15 July, the objective 
of the operation had expanded to include fixing and destroying large Allied forces east of 
Reims, as well as drawing large Allied reserves out of Flanders (which were original 
objectives of ROLAND). In the end, the Germans never seemed to know which objective had 
priority, taking Reims or drawing off the Allied reserves in Flanders. 
Decision 15 July 
In its basic design MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS was the most flawed of all the German 
offensives and the Allies were best prepared to react to it. The decisions made by OHL during 
its execution, therefore, had less to do with its failure than the other offensives. Those 
decisions did, however, contribute to the final collapse of the German Army. 
By the end of the first day it was clear to all that the offensive was a total failure. Yet 
Ludendorff decided to continue the Seventh Army's attack, and to continue with HAGEN. 
(The decision to continue with HAGEN will be discussed in depth in the following chapter. ) 
But in deciding to continue with a reduced form of the MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS attack, 
Ludendorff and OHL failed to recognize that one of their key assumptions on why the 
Germans would not be counterattacked in force on the Seventh Army's right no longer had 
any basis whatsoever. Although the First and Third Armies were supposed to continue 
attacking east of Reims to fix the Allied forces there, it should have been clear that the Allies 
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would have considerable freedom of maneuver behind their own lines in the coming days. It 
would appear that Ludendorff at that point was so fixated on HAGEN that he virtually lost 
interest in MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS as soon as it was clear that it had failed. 
Decision 19 July 
If Ludendorff did loose interest in MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS, the Allied 
counterattack of 18 July refocused his attention wonderfully. He still, however, could not let 
go of HAGEN. Hindenburg's recommendation on 19 July to shift immediately all the German 
reserves in Flanders and to commit those forces across the Aisne against the left flank of the 
Allied attack just might have restored the German position in the Marne salient. But it also 
would have meant that HAGEN would never be launched and the German Army would have 
to assume the strategic and operational defensive. Ludendorff could not force himself to make 
the decision to go on the defensive, but in the end events forced the Germans to do just that. It 
also is interesting to note that the German Army of 1918 may well be the only army in 
modern history where the will of the chief of staff was able to override the will of the 
commander on a decision of this nature--despite the presumed dressing down Ludendorff 
received. 
Decision 22 July 
By the time Lossberg arrived at OHL on 20 July the situation was deteriorating 
rapidly. Ludendorff rejected Lossberg's recommendations to withdraw to the line of the Aisne 
and the Vesle, unable to issue the order to give up voluntarily the territory won so 
spectacularly during Operation BLOCHER. On 22 July, with Soissons now under heavy 
artillery fire, Ludendorff had no choice but to start pulling back. But even then, he continued 
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to waffle for three more days, only issuing the order on midnight of the 25th. And then he did 
not order the withdrawal to the Aisne and the Vesle, but to an intermediate line running 
roughly through Fere-en-Tardenois. It really made no difference at that point. On 27 July the 
situation forced Ludendorff to issue the order to withdraw behind the Vesle. 
Alternatives 
The Germans really had no good alternatives in July 1918. After BLÜCHER and 
GNEISENAU they were in an untenable and over-extended position in the Marne salient. 
Unable to defend or supply it, their only options were to attack further to improve it, or to 
withdraw. Ludendorff felt he could never order a voluntary withdrawal for political and troop 
morale reasons, but that decision may have had more to do with Ludendorffs own psyche. 
Even if MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS had succeeded, it only would have partially 
improved the Seventh Army's position. It only would have eliminated the threat to the eastern 
flank of the Seventh Army between the Marne and Reims; but it would not have eliminated 
the greater danger from the direction of the wooded ground in the area of Villers-Cotterets. 
Control of the Reims rail center might have eased the supply situation in the salient, but the 
resulting rail network still would have been shallow and strained. 
More than likely, MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS also would not have set the up the 
conditions for HAGEN. Too long a pause was required to launch HAGEN in August. The 
British had been under no serious pressure since May, and German manpower at that point 
was so thin, that no matter how hard hit would be the Allied reserves by any diversionary 
attack, the effect on the Germans would be greater proportionally. As Kuhl pointed out in his 
post-war analysis: "The offensive thrust in the direction of Reims constituted the last display 
of force that OHL was still able to make. Inasmuch as it did not aim at the final decision, 
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OHL unconsciously abandoned the [HAGEN] plan definitely, even before Marshal Foch 
wrested the initiative from the Germans. " 210 But then on the same page Kuhl also went on to 
state: "Yet abandoning the offensive would not have altered matters. How was the war to be 
continued then? To discontinue the offensive would have meant to pass to the defensive. 
OHL, being imbued with a strong determination, refused to entertain any such plan, and justly 
so. " 211 This was another example of the German General Staff tradition of seeking 
operational solutions for strategic problems 
Was there any alternative to MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS? Kuhl also suggested that the 
operation might not have been necessary if HAGEN had been launched as early as possible, 
while at the same time the Seventh Army made preparations to fall back to the chord of the 
BLÜCHER salient if it was attacked. 212 It might have worked if Germany's manpower 
situation had been any better. Even at that late stage in the war the British were still worried 
about any threats to the Channel ports. The British Section of the Supreme War Council at 
Versailles continued to develop contingency plans. With the loss of Dunkirk, Calais, or 
Boulogne, British forces would have to be supplied through Dieppe, Rouen, and Le Harve, 
and the planners seriously questioned the capacity of those ports. An even greater threat for 
the Admiralty was the German use of Dunkirk as a naval base for operations in the 
Channel. 213 Fortunately for the Allies, the German Army and the German Navy seemed to 
be fighting two separate wars most of the time. 
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Myfirst objective is to achieve tactical success 
on a broad front in the sector of the Fourth Army. 
This objective can only be achieved by several days 
of fighting. Then we can go forward in God's name. 
Ludendorffs Planning Guidance for HAGEN 
CHAPTER XI 
Operations HAGEN and KURFÜRST 
PLANS 
Ludendorff envisioned Operation HAGEN as a resumption of the GEORGETTE 
offensive in Flanders that had come to a standstill in April. 2 When OHL ordered a halt to 
Operation MICHAEL on 5 April, Ludendorff asked the chiefs of staff of the Seventeenth, 
Second, and Eighteenth Armies when they would be ready to resume offensive operations. 
The Second and Seventeenth Armies replied that they needed three weeks to reconstitute. 
Ludendorff nonetheless ordered the Second Army to be prepared by 12 April to attack with its 
left wing south of the Somme to exploit the results of GEORGETTE. 3 On 9 April, the day 
GEORGETTE started, the staff of Rupprecht's Army Group recommended that if the 
operation bogged down, follow-on operations against the British would be necessary. The 
precise point of the follow-on attack would depend on the results of GEORGETTE. 
Ludendorff agreed and ordered preparations for what essentially would be a continuation of 
MICHAEL on a broad front within two to three weeks time. 4 
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On 12 April Kuhl and Ludendorff met in Avesnes to consider the renewed attack by 
the Second Army. S The following day Rupprecht's Army Group issued an estimate of the 
situation listing two basic options for continuing operations. The first option was a 
resumption of the northern half of Operation MICHAEL, from the Somme to Arras, toward 
Doullens. This attack, called NEU-MICHAEL, would be executed by the inner wings of the 
Second and Seventeenth Armies. A supporting attack called HUBERTUS would be launched 
by the Sixth Army from Bethune toward St. Pol. The two attacks would have a 55-kilometer 
front and require extensive forces. The second option was a renewed attack in Flanders by the 
inner wings of the Fourth and Sixth Armies. Called NEU-GEORG, the attack's initial 
objective would be the line Strazeele--Fletre--Mount Noir--Reninghelst-northern edge of 
Ypres; and the final objective would be the line Borre-Godewearsvedle-Poperinghe- 
Boesinghe. (Borre is 3 kilometers east of Hazebrouck. ) The purpose of NEU-GEORGE was 
to cut off the British Second Army and the Belgians. 6 [Map 9] On 17 April Rupprecht's 
Army Group issued the initial planning order for NEU-MICHAEL, designating the 
Seventeenth Army as the main effort. 7 
On 28 April Wetzell issued one of his operational assessments, in which he argued, 
"In order to be able to strike another great blow against the British, the principal mass of the 
French reserves on the British front must first be withdrawn. " 8 As noted in Chapter VIII, this 
was the genesis of Operation BLÜCHER. The following day Ludendorff met with the army 
group chiefs of staff at Douai. After deciding to conduct an attack at the end of May with 
Army Group German Crown Prince along the Chemin des Dames, the discussion turned to 
the follow-up attack against the British. At that point Kuhl favored NEU-MICHAEL over 
NEU-GEORG. Ludendorff agreed with Kuhl. The Fourth Army was ordered to stand on the 
defensive, and the Seventeenth Army was ordered to start the preparations for an attack 
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toward Doullens, supported by a Sixth Army attack toward St. Pol. The probable date of the 
attacks was mid-June. 9 
On I May, the same day GEORGETTE was terminated, OHL issued new planning 
guidance for the resumption of operations in the north. The overall operational objective of 
defeating the British remained unchanged, and the main attack would follow as soon as 
possible after the BLÜCHER diversion along the Chemin des Dames. "This attack is 
supposed to loosen the present solid front of the Entente opposite the Group of Armies of 
Crown Prince Rupprecht and thereby to restore the possibility for a successful resumption of 
the offensive against the British. " 10 
OHL continued to support the assessment that NEU-MICHAEL would hit the weaker 
sector of the British front, and NEU-GEORG the stronger. But Rupprecht's staff was starting 
to develop serious doubts about NEU-MICHAEL, and sent a message back to OHL. 
The NEU-MICHAEL attack in the direction of Doullens is being 
prepared in conformity with the instructions received. This attack 
will have a comparatively narrow zone of action. Tactically, a 
widening is scarcely possible because on the right is the strong 
trench system of the Arras front, and on the left, the Ancre and 
Somme prevent any extension whatever. From the experience of 
our March offensive, we have learned that only a breakthrough 
on a wide front will yield great results. Accordingly, from NEU- 
MICHAEL we can hardly expect any more than a tactical success 
and a more or less large salient in the enemy line toward Doullens, 
unless specially favorable conditions obtain. If it is the intention to 
achieve a great strategic success, it will be necessary to combine 
NEU-MICHAEL with a second attack [HUBERTUS] on a large 
scale from the region of Bethune in the direction of St. Pol. The 
aim of both attacks must be to make a wide breach in the British 
front, to shake the British Arras front by means of an envelopment, 
and to push the British toward the sea in such a manner as to render 
their situation untenable. 
Both attacks, however, require very strong forces. (Roughly, the 
zone of action of both attacks will cover 55 kilometers in width. ) 
It is very doubtful whether it will be possible to make these forces 
available. 
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If this should prove impracticable, it would be necessary, at least in 
conjunction with NEU-MICHAEL, to stage a limited diversion in the 
vicinity of Bethune and at the same time make a demonstration in 
Flanders. It is, however, doubtful whether this would suffice, to 
make NEU-MICHAEL a great, decisive victory. 
The NEU-MICHAEL offensive will, moreover, prove very difficult 
inasmuch as it will hardly be possible to maintain secrecy regarding 
the preparations in the perfectly open terrain near Bapaume and Albert, 
with the result that surprise is likely to be lost. 
Should the available forces prove insufficient for both the NEU- 
MICHAEL and HUBURTUS attacks, and should we therefore be 
compelled to practice economy with respect to our forces, it is 
recommend that NEU-GEORG be executed. 
Even if our operations elsewhere have drawn away the French and 
our diversions and demonstrations fix the British reserves in other 
places, it is very probable that NEU-GEORG will merely constitute 
a new blow for the British and will create a salient of greater or lesser 
dimension in the direction of Poperinghe--Cassel. Yet, the political- 
military significance of such a success in Flanders must be valued much 
higher than a limited success in the region of Albert. Even assuming 
that NEU-GEORG turns out to be a limited success only, the British 
and the Belgians will be hard hit if we succeed in bombarding effectively 
the coast region as far as Dunkirk--including the valuable British 
supplies stored there--and in menacing Calais. 11 
Kuhl argued that Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht lacked the 55 divisions 
necessary to execute both NEU-MICHAEL and HUBURTUS. NEU-GEORG offered the best 
chance of success. A precondition for its success would be the coming BLÜCHER attack 
against the French to draw their divisions out of Flanders. A feint attack against Doullens 
would also be necessary. 12 
That same day Rupprecht's Army Group issued another planning order to its 
subordinate armies. [Map 9] The objective of NEU-GEORG was to first attack in line from 
Ypres to Vieux Berquin in the direction Poperinghe--Cassel, and then to exploit north of 
Ypres. (Hazebrouck was not specified as an objective in this order. ) The attack would be 
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Source: Based on map accompanying planning order la 7030 (I May 1918), 
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conducted on a front of 24 kilometers with 11 first line divisions, 14 follow-on divisions, and 
10 trench divisions in support. Then the attack front would narrow to six kilometers for the 
exploitation phase. The objective of NEU-MICHAEL was to attack along the line Ayette -- 
Ville sur Ancre, northwest in the direction of Doullens. (Amiens was not specified as an 
objective in this order. ) The attack would be conducted on a front of 30 kilometers with 15 
first line divisions, 14 follow-on divisions, and 10 trench divisions in support. The objective 
of the HUBERTUS supporting attack was the line between St. Venant and Lens, southwest in 
the direction of St. Pol. The attack would be conducted on a front of 27 kilometers with 12 
first line divisions, 15 follow-on divisions, and eight trench divisions in support. Thus, the 
supporting attack for NEU-MICHAEL was almost as large as the main attack itself. 13 
OHL responded to Rupprecht's Army Group on 2 May, noting that the Allies had 
shifted the weight of their defenses to Flanders. NEU-MICHAEL, then, was still expected to 
strike the weaker position, and NEU-GEORG the stronger. But OHL did admit that the 
coming BLOCHER offensive might alter that situation, and it therefore would be necessary to 
conduct full preparations for NEU-MICHAEL, while at the same time setting aside adequate 
labor forces to prepare for NEU-GEORG, if necessary. 14 
Kuhl continued to argue that the HUBURTUS plan was extremely difficult, because it 
would involve an attack on the Loretto heights. It could only succeed if combined with 
NEU-MICHAEL, and the Germans had neither the manpower nor the artillery for both. 
Wetzell also issued another operational estimate on 2 May, in which he unsuccessfully urged 
one large coordinated attack by the Eighteenth, Seventh, and First Armies in the south. That, 
he argued, would "... give us the basis for a subsequent promising offensive in Army Group 
Rupprecht. " 16 
Kuhl and Ludendorff continued to debate the relative merits of NEU-MICHAEL and 
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NEU-GEORG at a chiefs of staff conference in Tournai on 4 May. NEU-MICHAEL, Kuhl 
argued, was too difficult, its zone of action was too narrow, and it was almost impossible to 
widen that zone. But if NEU-GEORG were launched from a line of departure running from, 
northeast of Ypres to Neuf, the attack would have a definite and obtainable objective that 
could be accomplished with the forces available. As a primary condition for success, 
however, it was essential that the BLÜCHER offensive draw the French reserves out of 
Flanders. 17 Ludendorff started to come around to Kuhl's way of thinking. Increasingly drawn 
by the smaller force requirement for NEU-GEORG, Ludendorff noted; "We have without 
doubt weakened our strength in the MICHAEL and GEORGETTE operations. We had very 
high losses. The losses are the reason we have to rethink our tactics. " 18 
Further analysis of NEU-GEORG led to general discussion about the method of 
attack. Commenting on the Fourth Army's preliminary plan, the OHL planners suggested that 
the initial objective, the line Boesinghe--Poperinghe--Godewearsvedle--Borre, which was 
about ten kilometers from the line of departure, could only be reached by advancing in 
bounds. OHL, therefore, wanted to designate an intermediate objective line only a few 
kilometers deep, and then narrow the zone of action north of the line Ypres--Strazeele. The 
Fourth Army and Rupprecht's Army Group countered that the attack should be as broad as 
possible, extending to the right as far as the Flanders flood plane, and left to the Nieppe 
Forest. The objectives also should not be limited. 19 
The following day OHL reversed its previous position and gave NEU-GEORG 
precedence over NEU-MICHAEL for planning and preparations, but still withheld the final 
decision. Rupprecht's Army Group, however, maintained a close hold on that decision and did 
not inform its subordinate armies until 22 May. On 6 May OHL issued a directive designating 
the heights between Poperinghe and Bailleul, as well as the high ground near Hazebrouck as 
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the initial principal objectives. The operation was not to be extended until those objectives 
were secured. 20 Rupprecht's staff continued to protest the restrictive nature of the operation 
to OHL, also pointing out the Fourth Army's need for more artillery. 21 
The Fourth Army sent a memo to Rupprecht's Army Group on 11 May objecting to 
the restrictive nature of the OHL plan. The memo argued that an attack on a large scale had a 
better chance of succeeding with a wider zone of action. A wider zone of action required a 
greater concentration of artillery assets for the attack, and the German AKA units would be 
used to neutralize the enemy artillery battalions and prevent them from delivering flanking 
fire on the attacking infantry. Fourth Army commander Sixt von Arnim, therefore, 
recommended widening the attack zone toward the left as far as the Nieppe Forest, west of 
Merville. (The attack zone was restricted on the right by flooded ground. ) Arnim believed that 
if the attack extended only as far as Meteren or Strazeele, the left wing would come under 
flanking fire from the Nieppe Forest. He also objected to OHL's limited objectives and he 
argued that anyinitial tactical success should be exploited aggressively. 22 
Kuhl sent a memo to OHL on 13 May concurring with Arnim's arguments. 23 OHL, 
meanwhile, had changed the names of the operations on 12 May. Operation NEU-MICHAEL 
became WILHELM. HUBURTUS was renamed as FUCHSJAGD (FOX HUNT). Ironically, 
NEU-GEORG was redesigneted HAGEN, after the character of German legend and 
Wagnerian opera who stabbed Siegfried in the back. 24 
On 15 May Ludendorff replied to Kuhl. He started by insisting that he agreed 
completely with Rupprecht's Army Group and the Fourth Army that broad and deep attacks 
were necessary to defeat the enemy. But then he noted that the width and depth of the attack 
depended on the forces available. If the Germans had to restrict the width of the attack, as 
Ludendorff feared the forces available would dictate, then it was best to limit the northern 
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sector. But Ludendorff did concur that an extension of the attack toward the south was a good, 
idea, and he approved the initial preparations. The final decision, however, would be made 
later. 25 
Concerning the question of the advance by bounds, Ludendorff said that the depth of 
the thrust depended on the forces available as well as the anticipated resistance of the enemy 
and his reserves. Considering the current situation, the Fourth Army had to expect to 
encounter a strong initial resistance as well as strong enemy reserves. The initial strong 
resistance could be overcome by a heavy artillery preparation. The enemy reserves, which 
could come up later, could only be countered by redeploying the artillery forward. The attack, 
therefore, had to be made by bounds with large amounts of artillery and ammunition 
following. Ludendorff did note that if the enemy situation in front of the Fourth Army 
changed, his opinion about the method of the attack would change accordingly. He also 
wanted to keep the debate open on the tactical options. He was worried about the potential 
high losses. "We cannot endure any more disappointments and losses. People are scarce, but 
we have enough munitions. " 26 
The basic plans for HAGEN and WILHELM were essentially complete by 17 May, 
but OHL informed Rupprecht's Army Group the attacks could not be launched before late 
June. 27 Three days later Ludendorff informed Rupprecht personally that the attack would 
start about 1 July. It would not be possible to start earlier because of the time required to 
transfer the required artillery. 28 Rupprecht's Army Group sent OHL another course of action 
analysis on 19 May strongly recommending HAGEN over WILHELM. 29 Kuhl continued to 
push Ludendorff for a final decision, arguing that WILHELM was the more difficult 
operation and had no clear objective. HAGEN was easier and had an achievable objective. In 
a meeting with Kuhl in Zeebrugge on 20 May, Ludendorff finally decided for HAGEN. 30 
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On 21 May Wetzell issued his operational assessment recommending that if 
Operations BLÜCHER and YORCK did not draw sufficient French reserves out of Flanders, 
then Operation GNEISENAU should be cancelled and the French should be attacked at 
Verdun. Wetzell continued to argue for an attack in the Verdun sector, because the French 
were very weak there, much weaker than they had been in the spring of 1916. By not 
launching GNEISENAU, the Germans could launch a significant attack in the Verdun sector 
without having to draw from the forces earmarked for HAGEN. 
31 Commenting on Wetzell's 
recommendation, Rupprecht noted pessimistically in his diary: 
Ludendorff too expects that HAGEN will end with only a partial 
success, but he is hoping that under the circumstances more can 
be achieved even if HAGEN is not a breakthrough success. All other 
offensive actions would have to be halted for the rest of the year. 
The enemy too would not be able to counter with major offensive 
actions. Ludendorffs first adjutant told my adjutant "If the decision 
does not turn before the fall, the war can go on for years. " Before 
the spring attack they were too optimistic and raised hopes back home 
that were not realized. The disappointment that will come if HAGEN 
fails will be all the worse. 32 
On 31 May OHL again renamed Operation WILHELM, previously NEU-MICHAEL, 
as ECKENBRECHER. 33 By the following day, Operation BLÜCHER was 39 miles from 
Paris. The Germans had reached the Marne between Dormans and Chateau-Thierry, but had 
not crossed in force. At 1500 hours Ludendorff issued an order to Rupprecht's Army Group: 
Operations of Army Group German Crown Prince are taking 
a favorable course. I therefore ask for further deception operations 
to continue in order to engage the enemy forces on the front of 
your army group. Limited operations at places sensitive to the 
enemy might also be advantageous, but our infantry forces should 
not be wasted. 
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Because of the heavy attrition, especially among the support columns, 
our preparations for HAGEN will be delayed accordingly. The attack 
won't be launched before mid-July. Since the enemy obviously still 
expects our attack, and the operations of Army Group German Crown 
Prince will be continued, we likewise will continue our decection 
measures beyond 2 June in order to tie down enemy forces. 4 
Thus, the original operational concept of drawing away the enemy reserves in front of 
the right wing of the German Army was now secondary to the objective of advancing the 
attack of the Seventh Army, and possibly turning it into the decisive operation it was never 
intended to be. On 2 June Rupprecht's Army Group also issued a revised version of the plans 
for follow-on operations. For Operation HAGEN the Fourth Army was to attack from the line 
Bultehoek--Wielje against and over the Yser Canal in the direction of Boesinghe--Ypres on a 
37-kilometer front with 15 first line and 16 follow-on divisions. The Sixth Army would 
support the attack from the line Ypres--Bourre River in the vicinity of Merville in the 
direction of Poperinghe--Cassel on a 6-kilometer front with four first line divisions and one 
follow-on division. The Seventeenth Army's ECKENBRECHER attack was reduced to a 17- 
kilometer front on both sides of Bucquoy, with five first line and nine follow-on divisions. 
The supporting FUCHSJAGD attack would be launched on a 7.5-kilometer front to seize 
Festubert--Givenchy--Guinchy with three first line and six follow-on divisions. 35 
By the time Army Group German Crown Prince recommended on 3 June halting the 
BLÜCHER Offensive, five of the HAGEN reserve divisions had been withdrawn from 
Rupprecht's Army Group. 36 That day Rupprecht noted sourly in his diary; "My impression 
is that the attack of the Seventh Army has run its course, and that the [GNEISENAU] attack 
by the Eighteenth Army can hardly produce more success. The delay of HAGEN is a political 
decision. " 37 The following day OHL informed Rupprecht's Army Group that if 
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GNEISENAU failed and it became necessary to execute the ROLAND attack against Reims, 
then HAGEN would have to be postponed until 20 July. 38 
Ludendorff met with the chiefs of staff in Avesnes on 6 June to decide whether 
ROLAND or HAGEN would be the next major operation. Kuhl continued to push for 
HAGEN as the only decisive option. Wetzell's Verdun operation was not even discussed, but 
he did recommend that ROLAND become the follow-on attack after HAGEN. Ludendorff 
concluded that the final decision on HAGEN would be based on the outcome of 
GNEISENAU. OHL, however, started to look seriously at the possible courses of action if 
both the attacks against Reims and in Flanders produced only tactical but not decisive 
results 39 At the meeting Ludendorff had told Kuhl, "HAGEN must bring the decision. " 
Pessimistically, Kuhl later wrote in his diary, "That is not possible. " 40 A couple of days later, 
Rupprecht, who as a commander was not at the Avesnes meeting, recorded in his diary: 
Today my chief of staff told me that Ludendorff had said a little 
while ago in Avesnes that HAGEN should bring the decision. I 
don't believe that. We might be able to take the heights of 
Godewearsvedle, maybe even go all the way to Cassel and across 
Hazebrouck, push the British out of the Ypres salient, and the 
Belgians behind the Loos Canal; but we won't achieve more unless 
extraordinary good luck is with us. Then probably a month-long 
pause in the fighting will occur. Everything else depends on how 
many troops the Americans will be able to transport to Europe. The 
situation for the March offensive was more favorable than the one 
for HAGEN. If they [OHL] would have not turned from the British 
too soon in order to go toward the French, a major breakthrough 
success might have been achieved. 41 
By 10 June, the operations in Army Group German Crown Prince had drawn 13 attack 
divisions and large numbers of support columns and artillery units away from Rupprecht's 
Army Group. At that point in time, HAGEN was impossible with the forces available in the 
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north. 42 Kuhl, meanwhile, complained in his own diary of having to put up for weeks with 
Ludendorffs "nervous excitement, " his constant telephone calls, and his meddling in the most . 
minute tactical details, all of which made careful planning and a logical orders process 
impossible. 43 
In his operational assessment of 12 June, Wetzell noted that the BLÜCHER offensive 
had "succeeded" because of three factors: it achieved surprise; it had struck a weakly-held 
sector; and the Allied reserves were widely dispersed. All three of these conditions, he 
argued, were still lacking for HAGEN, but that his recommended attack across the Marne and 
against Reims would establish those conditions. 44 Two days later Ludendorff held the 
planning session in Roubaix at which ROLAND evolved into MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS, 
scheduled for 10 July. HAGEN was scheduled to follow-up on 20 July. Rupprecht's Army 
Group still wanted to widen the HAGEN attack by extending the Sixth Army's sector to the 
south by a division's width to the Bourre River. OHL, on the other hand, though it was more 
important to precede HAGEN with the Seventeenth Army's ESCHEBRECHER attack as a 
diversion. OHL noted that it would decide that question later. 45 Kuhl was unable at that 
point to convince Ludendorff that the Seventeenth Army attack was neither necessary nor 
feasible. 46 
Still lacking OHL concurrence, Rupprecht's Army Group on 15 June issued an order 
expanding the Sixth Army attack for planning purposes from a 6- to a 9.5-kilometer front, 
with five instead of four divisions in the front line. The Fourth Army attack and the 
Seventeenth Army's ECHENBRECHER attacks remained essentially the same as in the 1 
June order. 47 On 17 June OHL announced that the extension of the HAGEN attack south, as 
well as the ECHENBRECHER deception attack would not be approved because of shortages 
in available infantry and artillery. Ludendorff noted that he fully expected the coming 
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MARNSCHUTZ-REIMS attack to pull not only the French reserves out of Flanders, but 
major British reserves as well. But since a large portion of the army-level artillery assets 
needed for HAGEN would have to be used for MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS, and since 
transportation to Flanders took eight to ten days, it might not be possible to launch HAGEN 
before 1 August. Rupprecht's Army Group was also short seven attack divisions at that 
point 48 
OHL and Rupprecht's Army Group continued the debate over the width of HAGEN, 
exchanging memos on 18 June. The army group noted: "The capture of Hazebrouck is 
critical to the overall success of the attack. " And, "The'taking of Hazebrouck by a single 
envelopment from the north will be very difficult. " 49 In his diary Rupprecht noted: "If we 
don't go farther south to the Lys, it will be very difficult for us to get all the way to 
Hazebrouck. " 50 OHL, on the other hand, maintained that the main effort was on the left wing 
of the Fourth Army, and "it is only necessary to take the high ground north and south of 
Hazebrouck to dominate it. " This was the first time that Hazebrouck was seriously discussed 
as a HAGEN objective. OHL also noted that the ECKENBRECKER diversion was no longer 
possible because of the shortage of necessary infantry and artillery. 51 
On 19 June Ludendorff postponed MARNSCHUTZ-REIMS until 15 July, noting that 
the operation would require more support from HAGEN units. HAGEN was officially 
postponed until 1 August. 52 Ludendorff also sent a message to Rupprecht's Army Group 
agreeing in principle that a double envelopment would be the best way to take Hazebrouck, 
but still refusing to allow the addition of another division. He felt the additional division 
could be better used elsewhere than in the attack through the Nieppe Forest. 53 Kuhl, 
meanwhile, was becoming increasingly gloomy. Rupprecht's Army Group was losing 1,000 
men per day in "wastage" from its trench divisions. The attack divisions could not remain in 
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the rear and allow the trench divisions to absorb the losses. Kuhl thought that the war was at a 
turning point. HAGEN might produce tactical results, but no decision. He wrote cryptically , 
in his diary, "Then the Americans. " 54 
ý.. 
On 20 June the ECKENBRECHER diversionary attack was finally officially cancelled 
and replaced with a much smaller diversionary attack named NÜRNBERG, that was 
supposed to be launched by the Seventeenth Army two days before the start of HAGEN. 
ss 
The following day Rupprecht's Army Group issued an order emphasizing the importance of 
the Sixth Army taking Hazebrouck. 56 The Sixth Army also stressed the importance of 
Hazebrouck in its own operations orders. The plan was to take the town at night, because, 
"The British are not very good at operating in the dark. " 57 
OHL, meanwhile, had been giving serious thought to the German Army's next move if 
HAGEN did not prove decisive. On 22 June Wetzell issued another operational assessment, 
which was based on a situation at end of August if MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS and HAGEN 
"result as favorably as we hope. " Wetzell believed that the British and French Armies would 
be badly shaken and unable to launch large-scale offensive operations, but still able to defend 
their positions with American support. The most logical direction for continued German 
operations would be the line Calais--St. Omer--Lens, but even with support from 
Austria-Hungary it would probably be impossible to mount another major attack in the late 
autumn. 
After reconstituting during the winter, the French and British with American support 
would most likely launch an offensive. How then could the Germans prevent the Allies from 
taking the initiative? Wetzell recommended an attack in Italy. That would require OHL to 
shift 12 to 15 reconstituted divisions from the Western Front, but Wetzell was, "... convinced 
that we should achieve an even greater success there than last year. " German forces might 
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even be able to advance to the Po plain as far as the Italian-French border. "It might make 
possible the complete destruction of the Italian Army. " Wetzell argued that such an operation 
would draw off Allied, and especially American forces from the Western Front. 58 
Even though Wetzell was the chief of the OHL Operations Section, OHL that same 
day issued an order for follow-up operations after HAGEN that bore no resemblance to 
Wetzell's proposal. The order stated: "After the conclusion of the offensive operations 
ordered on 14 June 1918 [MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS and HAGEN], it is contemplated to 
stage an attack between the Somme and the Marne. It will be executed with all available 
forces in the direction of Amiens and Paris... " [Emphasis added] And; "Preparations will be 
pushed in such a manner as to make it possible to begin rail movements for the artillery, 
trench mortars, and divisions approximately in the second half of July. " 59 The OHL order hit 
like a thunderbolt at the lower echelons. In his diary, Kuhl expressed the surprise and 
frustration of the entire staff of Army Group Rupprecht. Everyone thought it would be utterly 
impossible to launch an attack on such a scale after HAGEN. 60 
A 23 June message from OHL to Rupprecht's Army Group emphasized that the 
Germans could no longer expect to achieve surprise, and the method of attack, therefore, had 
to take that reality into consideration. Ludendorff also thought that too much force was being 
concentrated in the Fourth Army. 
61 In frustration, Rupprecht noted in his diary; "I don't 
believe that OHL gives any thought to the execution of HAGEN, since in their message they 
did not answer any one of the major points of our opposition against the weakening the front 
of the Fourth Army.... " Rupprecht also complained that OHL seemed to be waffling on 
whether to launch HAGEN or the newly proposed attack toward Paris after 
MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS. Finally, OHL now completely dropped the notion of a deception 
preceding HAGEN. NÜRNBERG was no longer necessary because MARNESCHUTZ- 
519 
REIMS would draw all the Allied reserves out of Flanders. 62 
On 25 June the chief of staff of the Naval Corps proposed an operation against 
Dixmuide simultaneous with HAGEN. As the northern-most corps in the Fourth Army, the 
Naval Corps was not scheduled to participate in HAGEN. The plan called for an advance 
along the line of dykes and the establishment of bridgehead across the northern Flanders plain 
that had been intentionally flooded by the Allies. Rupprecht noted; "Since the Naval Corps 
will execute the operation with its own forces, there is nothing to be said against it. " The plan, 
however, appears to have died a quick death. 63 
Army Group German Crown Prince issued the warning order for Operation 
KURFÜRST on 26 June. The Eighteenth Army (KURFÜRST I) would attack from the line 
St. Just-en-Chaussee-- Verberie, securing the right flank of the attack from the west to the 
general line Clermont--Creil. The Ninth Army (KURFÜRST II) would attack from the line 
Verberie--Nanteuil-le-Haudoin to the line Creil--Senlis--Foret d'Ermenonville. The main 
effort of the attack would be south of the Aisne, between the Compiegne Forest and the 
Soissons--Villers-Cotterets--Nanteuil road. The Seventh Army (KURFÜRST III) would 
attack with its right wing beyond Nanteuil to the line Ver-le-Plessis--Bellville--Lizy. The 
depth and extension of the entire attack would depend on the situation in July and the 
available forces. OHL wanted to be ready to launch the attack suddenly about the end of July. 
Preliminary plans and force estimates were due by 5 July. "Troops will be used for 
preparatory work only in so far as training, recuperation, and the necessary harvest work does 
not suffer thereby. " 64 
OHL sent Rupprecht's Army. Group another HAGEN order on 27 June. In a change 
from the 18 June order, OHL now identified the main effort of the attack as the right wing of 
the Fourth Army. "The stronger the pressure of the enveloping attack can be made there, the 
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more will the entire operation develop into a knock-out blow. " OHL hoped that the effects of 
the operation would expand into the direction of Dunkirk--Calais and culminate in a decisive 
victory over the British. 65 
Wetzell on 27 June also issued another of his recently steady stream of operational 
assessments. Referring specifically to OHL order Ia 8895 issued on 22 June, Wetzell 
recommended that the Germans immediately follow up MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS and 
HAGEN with an attack toward Paris. Without citing the KÜRFURST plan of Army Group 
German Crown Prince submitted only the day before, Wetzell's proposal was similar, except 
that he placed the main effort with the left-wing Seventh Army. Wetzell also included a force 
estimate of 45 to 51 attack divisions. Where this force would come from, Wetzell did not say. 
"Whether they can be assembled is a question which I shall not attempt to answer at present. " 
Then he fell back on one of his favorite positions, "If we lack the strength for this blow, the 
Entente should be attacked in Italy. " 66 It is difficult to escape the impression that while 
appearing to support the plan enthusiastically, Wetzell was really trying to show how 
impossible it was. 
On 28 June Army Group German Crown Prince sent OHL a proposal to attack Verdun 
with the Third Army, following the conclusion of MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS. But the 
proposal also added the qualifier; "The direction toward the southeast, which is favorable 
operationally, will only be successful if at the same time a strong attack from the front of 
Army Group C can be made. " The message went on to suggest that the forces earmarked for 
HAGEN should be committed to this operation instead. Ludendorff responded that the plan 
had great merit, but he said that there were no forces were available for a simultaneous attack 
by Army Group C. 67 
On 1 July Rupprecht's Army Group issued the final corps combat missions for 
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Operation HAGEN. Although the Sixth Army's XIX Corps had the mission of taking the 
heights west and southwest of Hazebrouck, the town itself and its vital rail center were not 
listed as specific objectives. [Map 10] 
Table 11.1 
Corps Combat Missions for Operation HAGEN 68 
Fourth Army 
Guards Corps: (Five divisions in the first line. ) The Guards Corps provides flanking support 
to the artillery of the XVIII Reserve Corps and attacks over the Yser Canal between Drie-- 
Grachten and the southeastern edge of Ypres. The main effort of the attack will be along the 
canal line between the Staden--Boesinghe railway and the northern edge of Ypres. Along the 
northern edge of the line of attack the flanking effect of the enemy artillery group near 
Hazewind must be considered. Nonetheless, the enemy in that sector must be engaged in 
order to facilitate the envelopment from the south. In order to get our forces quickly into 
position, the artillery main effort must be in the sector north of Ypres. The town itself will be 
cut off from the north by the Guards Corps and from the west by the XVIII Reserve Corps. 
XVIII Reserve Corps: (Three divisions in the first line; two in the second line; one in the 
third line. ) The mission of the XVIII Reserve Corps is to push the enemy quickly into the 
flooded area north of Reiningen--Proven. The left wing of the corps must be strong in order to 
cross the Poperinghe--Ypres road. The follow-on mission of the corps is to cut off the town 
Ypres from the west and to prevent the enemy from defending along the Yser canal north of 
Ypres as he retreats westward. 
X Reserve Corps: (Two divisions in the first line; two in the second line; two in the third 
line. ) The X Reserve Corps has the mission of taking the heights of de Kleit, the 
Scherpenberg, and the eastern slopes of the Mount Rouge with an initial quick rush. The 
corps will then take the city of Poperinghe by enveloping it. The corps will then continue its 
attack toward the line Proven--Waten. 
Guards Reserve Corps: (Two divisions in the first line; two in the second line; two in the 
third line. ) The mission of the Guards Reserve Corps is to take the western slopes of the 
Mount Rouge, the heights of Vidaigne, Mount Noir, and the heights of Godewearsvedle. The 
main effort of the attack must be on the right wing in order to take the mountainous area from 
the east toward the north. Additional objectives of the corps attack are the heights north and 
northeast of Steenvorde. 
III Bavarian Corps: (Two divisions in the first line; two in the second line; two in the third 
line. ) The III Bavarian Corps has the mission of taking the heights of Cassel in a single rush, 
independent of the actions of the Guards Reserve Corps and the Sixth Army. 
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Sixth Army 
XIX Corps: (Two divisions in the first line; two in the second line. ) The XIX Corps will take 
the heights of Hondeghem and the heights west and southwest of Hazebrouck and the trench 
system in that sector before the enemy can organize a new defense. The corps will then 
consolidate its position and be prepared to push forward in support of an advance by the 
Fourth Army. 
LV Corps: (Three divisions in the first line. ) The LV Corps has the mission of ensuring 
freedom of maneuver for the XIX Corps by pivoting out from the baseline of the northern 
corner of Vieux Berquin--les Puresbeques southward, and advancing to the line Morbecque-- 
le Pre a Vin--Bourre River. The corps will commit one division north of the woods of Aval 
toward Tir Anglais and la Motte au Bous, and another division south of the woods of Aval 
toward le Pre a Vin. In order to have enough combat power for the defensive flank near the 
woods, a trench division will be committed to rolling up the enemy position on the left attack 
wing. 
On 2 July OHL issued the orders to both army groups to start preparations for 
KURFÜRST. The main effort would be made by the Eighteenth Army and the right wing of 
the Ninth, attacking across the Aisne toward Breteuil and Villers-Cotterets. The enemy in 
front of the left wing of the Ninth and the Seventh Army would be rolled-up, and then the 
Seventh Army would reinforce the continuing attack of the Ninth Army south of the Villers- 
Cotterets woods. On the far right wing the attack of Army Group German Crown Prince 
would be extended by an attack of Rupprecht's Second Army in the direction of Amiens. Both 
army groups were ordered to coordinate closely the inner wings of the Second and Eighteenth 
Armies. OHL concluded the order by emphasizing that it was only preparatory in nature, and 
that it was not at all clear yet whether the necessary forces would be available. 69 Kuhl 
countered that even if all available forces were concentrated south of the Somme, they would 
still be insufficient. He continued to express doubts that either of the offensives, let alone 
both, would be possible to mount. 70 
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OHL issued an order on 3 July stating conclusively that Operation KURFÜRST would 
be the follow-up to HAGEN. " Rupprecht's Army Group, meanwhile, remained unconvinced 
that a deception attack preceding HAGEN would not be necessary. On 6 July Kuhl and 
Lossberg went to OHL for further discussions on HAGEN. At the end of that meeting 
Ludendorff too seemed to favor a preliminary deception attack, but the forces were just not 
available. 72 
Wetzell on 6 July issued the last of his operational assessments. It was the most 
outlandish of the entire series. Wetzell proposed a follow-on offensive in Lorraine and Alsace 
by Army Group Duke Albrecht, estimating that the German Army can "without too great a 
hazard, employ about one-third of our total army reserves in divisions and artillery for an 
attack in Lorraine or Alsace. " Wetzell proposed a main attack of 20 divisions, supported by a 
10-division attack on the right, and a five-division attack on the left. The required artillery 
would total 1,960 batteries. Only 600 batteries were currently in sector, which meant OHL 
would have to come up with 1,360.73 By this point, WetzelI seems to have lost Ludendorffs 
ear completely, and this recommendation was totally ignored. 
On 9 July the Second Army submitted the force estimate for its KURFÜRST 
supporting attack south of the Somme, designated KURFÜRST-A. The army estimated ten 
fresh divisions in the first line and six in the rear lines. Rupprecht commented; "There won't 
be that many forces for that attack. The offensive is only on paper. " 74 Army Group German 
Crown Prince issued its own estimate for KURFÜRST on 10 July, noting; "A simultaneous 
attack against Amiens and Paris would be difficult and hard to synchronize, because the 
directions of the main attacks toward the northwest and the southwest diverge, and the 
combat lanes correspondingly increase toward the enemy. " It also was impossible to estimate 
if sufficient forces would be left for an attack on such a scale at the conclusion of the current 
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operations. "The question will most likely be an attack toward Paris, or toward Amiens, but 
not both. " The estimated requirement for the Paris attack was 50 divisions. 
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By the second week in July the German Army was suffering heavily from the flu 
epidemic. Rupprecht feared that would force a delay in HAGEN. 
6 On 11 July Rupprecht's 
Army Group sent a warning order to its armies alerting them that the British could be 
expected to launch an attack against the army group to provide relief to the French once 
MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS started. Any such attack had to be defeated without using the 
forces designated for HAGEN. Only if the British launched a major attack in the Cambrai 
sector would the HAGEN forces be committed. 
77 Rupprecht's Army Group also issued its 
priority intelligence requirements for HAGEN. There were two principal questions. 
Following a successful German breakthrough, where would the strongest British resistance 
be? And, where would the British redeploy their artillery ? 
7$ 
Both army groups had serious doubts about KURFÜRST right from the start. On 12 
July OHL told the army groups that they could not attack simultaneously in both directions, 
toward Amiens and Paris. The decision of which attack and to which extent it could be 
mounted could only be decided if there were enough forces after MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS 
and HAGEN, and based on the situation both operations would establish. There was no way 
to launch KURFÜRST before mid-September. 79 Rupprecht noted in his diary; "If HAGEN is 
executed then I'm convinced we'll hardly be able to let KURFÜRST follow that soon, if at 
all. "80 
As the launch date for MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS approached, it appeared that 
Rupprecht's Army Group would have between 31 and 35 attack divisions available for 
HAGEN. On 13 July the army group estimated that the British would almost certainly launch 
some sort of relief attack almost immediately. Patrols and aerial reconnaissance indicated that 
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the British were on a high state of alert in front of the Fourth Army and the right wing of the 
Sixth--precisely the HAGEN sector. 81 
PREPARATIONS 
On 1 May the entire northern sector of the German line passed to the defensive. 
Several days later the Fourth Army issued a warning order to start preparations immediately, 
with an emphasis on building the required roads and rail lines. 82 By the end of May the 
required labor forces had been transferred from the Second and Seventeenth Armies to the 
Fourth and Sixth Armies. All attacking units were to be supplied with four days of 
ammunition and two weeks of rations. 83 
Forces 
As soon as the Germans went on the defensive in the north, 32 attack divisions were 
withdrawn from Rupprecht's Army Group to start reconstituting and training for HAGEN. 
Prior to the start of MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS, 14 of those divisions had been given up to 
support other operations. OHL later made eight more attack divisions available, but 
Rupprecht Army Group had to fill the gaps with 13 trench divisions to bring the attacking 
force up to the 39 required. This greatly weakened the striking power of the HAGEN force. It 
also caused a large increase in the sector width of the trench divisions still in the line. The 
longer HAGEN was delayed, the greater the strain on the already paper-thin trench divisions. 
By May most of Rupprecht's trench divisions were short between 2,000 to 3,000 
troops. At the start of June, Rupprecht's Army Group requested permission from OHL to put 
some of the attack divisions back into the line to relieve the pressure on the trench divisions. 
On 3 June OHL rejected the request, claiming such a move would force the further 
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postponement of HAGEN by several weeks. On 21 May the average battalion strength in 
Rupprecht's Army Group was 700. By 13 July it was down to 673.84 
Artillery and Air Preparations 
By the middle of 1918 the German Army was running short of artillery and the 
industrial base in Germany was falling farther and farther behind in its ability to replace the 
losses from combat operations. For the HAGEN attack the Fourth and Sixth Armies would 
have to use most of the heavy artillery that was being used for MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS. 
Bruchmüller, who after the war French General Freideric Herr called Ludendorffs "traveling 
salesman in methods of massed artillery command, " was again designated as chief of artillery 
for HAGEN. 85 Although Bruchmüller was heavily engaged in the MARNESCHUTZ- 
REIMS planning, he was able to influence the artillery planning in Rupprecht's Army Group 
through liaison officers and members of his own staff. With Kuhl himself being one of 
Bruchmüller's earliest and most ardent supporters, there was little risk his ideas would be 
ignored, as they had been by the Second and Seventeenth Armies in March. As early as 6 May 
the Sixth Army orders made it clear that all guns would be calibrated and the firing would be 
done using the Pulkowski Method. 86 Pulkowski himself shuttled back and forth between the 
army groups, conducting classes in his fire direction system. According to the plan, the heavy 
guns and Bruchmüller along with them would start moving north to Rupprecht's Army Group 
as soon as the MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS preparation had been fired. 87 
The basic plan for the Sixth Army's artillery preparation was issued on 4 July. Unlike 
the simpler and shorter preparations of the last three operations, this one was a bit longer. It 
had more phases, similar to the MICHEAL preparation, and unlike the other preparations this 
one included the creeping barrage as a phase. The main preparation itself was timed to last 
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four hours, with the creeping barrage lasting another three. The ammunition allocation was 
800 rounds for each field gun; 600 for each light field howitzer; 200 for each heavy field '_. 
howitzer and 100mm heavy gun; and 80 rounds for the heavy siege howitzers. 
Table 11.2 
Sixth Army HAGEN Artillery Preparation Plan 88 
Phase Duration Effect 
10 minutes Surprise fire on the enemy HQs and communications centers. ; 
IKA fires against enemy observation posts. 
AKA fires counterbattery. 
FEKA and SCHWEFLA fire against deep targets. 
2 110 minutes Reinforced counterbattery with AKA and IKA. 
FEKA and SCHWEFLA engage deep targets. 
Trench mortars fire against enemy trench mortars. 
3 20 minutes Attack of enemy infantry positions. 
IKA fires against the enemy second positions. 
AKA fires counterbattery with gas. 
FEKA and SCHWEFLA fire deep. 
Trench mortars attack enemy first positions. 
4 20 minutes Like Phase 3, with fire on different enemy infantry positions. 
5 20 minutes Like Phase 3, with fire on different enemy infantry positions. 
6 20 minutes Like Phase 3, with fire on different enemy infantry positions. 
7 20 minutes Reinforced counterbattery, like Phase 2. 
8 20 minutes Like Phase 3, with fire on different enemy infantry positions. 
9 180 minutes IKA fires the creeping barrage. 
AKA continues to fire counterbattery. 
FEKA and SCHWEFLA continue firing deep. 
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On 1 May Rupprecht's Army Group estimated the artillery requirements for HAGEN 
at 772 batteries. By 16 May the estimate had increased to 960 batteries. 89 Over the course of 
the next two months the estimated requirements for artillery and air assets steadily increased. 
Then in the days immediately following the failure of MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS, the 
estimates dropped back sharply to the mid-May level, as the Germans desperately tried to find 
some way to continue with HAGEN. 
Table 11.3 
Artillery and Air Assets for HAGEN 90 
Fourth Army 
Batteries 
Attack Squadrons 
Fighter Squadrons 
Sixth Army 
Batteries 
Attack Squadrons 
Fighter Squadrons 
1 June 29 June 20 July 
998 1,027 806 
22 32 21 
28 32 26 
188 267 211 
683 
8 13 10 
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Force Transfers 
From an operational standpoint, the biggest difficulty with the HAGEN attack was the 
transfer of massive amounts of artillery, air, and support assets from Army Group German 
Crown Prince to Rupprecht's Army Group. For the most part, the infantry forces were in 
place, with the exception of a few divisions that would be shifted within Rupprecht's Army 
Group at the last minute. Most of the support forces, on the other hand, were required in the 
south for MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS, and then had to be shifted north as fast as possible for 
HAGEN. According to the planners, the movement of all required assets from the Marne to 
Flanders would take two weeks. Most of the movements would be made by rail, which would 
put a strain on even the fairly robust rail network behind the German lines. 91 
On 26 May Rupprecht's Army Group issued the orders for the basic transportation 
plan for the forward deployment of the forces already within the command, including the 
approach marches of the attack divisions from the rear to their jumping off positions. The 
few exceptions included a handful of assets from the Eastern Front and from Army Group 
German Crown Prince. The plan also was based on the assumption that the NÜRNBERG 
deception attack would still be mounted. With slight modifications the plan remained in force 
until 16 July. 
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Table 11.4 
Operation HAGEN Force Transfer Plan 92 
I Group (Latest arrival three weeks before the attack. [6-9 July]) 
" Trench mortar companies and the artillery staffs of the attack divisions. 
" Artillery park companies. 
" Pioneer staff officers. 
" Air squadron staffs. 
" Elements of the horse columns. 
" Staffs of the gas launcher battalions. 
" Divisional communications units. 
II Group (Arrival 21 to 17 days before the attach [10-13 Jul]) 
" Attack division advanced parties. 
" Lead elements of divisional staffs. 
" Divisional signal battalions. 
" Divisional engineer staffs. 
" Military police units. 
" Flak unit staffs. 
" Munitions columns. 
" Battery munitions columns. 
" Pioneer battalions 
" Gas launcher battalions. 
" Advance parties of the balloon units 
" Elements of the field bakeries. 
" Traffic control field police. 
Fourth Army 
" Staffs of seven army-level artillery regiments. 
" Staffs of two foot artillery regiments. 
" Eleven light field howitzer battalions from Oberost. 
" Thirty-eight battery columns. 
Sixth Army 
" Staffs of three army-level artillery regiments. 
" Eleven foot artillery battery columns. 
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III Group (Arrival 16 to 14 days before the attack. [14-16 Jul]) 
" Remainder of the horse columns. 
" Medical units. 
" Flak units. 
" Staffs of the fighter squadrons. 
" Lead elements of the attack squadrons. 
" Flame thrower companies. 
" Remainder of the field bakeries. 
Fourth Army 
" Advanced parties of the 4th Guards Division and the Jäger Division. 
" Six foot artillery battalions. 
Sixth Army 
0 Six foot artillery battalions. 
IV Group (Arrival 13 to 10 days before the attack. [17-19 Jul]) 
" Elements of the fighter units. 
" Balloon units. 
" Remainder of the attack squadrons. 
Fourth Army 
" 17th Infantry Division. 
" Artillery of the 18th, 27th, 221st, and 2nd Guards Divisions 
" Artillery staffs and advanced parties of the 24th, 24th Reserve, and 
50th Reserve Divisions. 
" Six army-level artillery regiments. 
Sixth Army 
" Three army-level artillery regiments. 
V Group (Arrival 9 to 6 days before the attack. [20-25 Jul]) 
" Infantry batteries. 
" Remainder of the fighter units. 
" Searchlight units. 
" Army-level medical companies. 
" Elements of the railroad units. 
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Fourth Army 
" 18th, 24th, 27th, and 221st Divisions. 
" Artillery of the 4th Guards and Jäger Divisions. 
" Infantry of the 4th Guards and Jäger Divisions. 
From Army Group German Crown Prince 
" Eighteen field artillery battalions. 
" Two foot artillery battalions. 
" Two trench mortar companies. 
VI Group (Arrival 5 to 1 days before the attack. [26-30 Jul]) 
" Bridge trains. 
" Bulk of the rail units. 
" Collection companies. 
Fourth Army 
" Infantry of the 24th Reserve, 50th Reserve, and 54th Divisions. 
" Reinforcing artillery from NÜRNBERG. 
" Nine field and nine heavy battalions. 
Sixth Army 
" Reinforcing artillery from NÜRNBERG. 
" Nine field and six heavy battalions. 
OHL on 28 June issued the order establishing the priorities and sequencing of the 
transfer of air assets to Rupprecht's Army Group from the other army groups. The units would 
move in the following order: the observation detachments for the first line divisions; the 
observation detachments for the SCHWEFLA units; one fighter wing; all the attack 
squadrons; the remainder of the observation detachments; the remainder of the fighter wings; 
and finally the bomber wings. 
93 On 4 July Army Group German Crown Prince started the 
transfer of 27 attack squadrons and 38 fighter squadrons to Army Group Crown Prince 
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Rupprecht for HAGEN. Since that was 11 days before the start of MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS, 
it can only be assumed those units were not needed for that operation. 94 
With the concurrence of OHL, Rupprecht's Army Group on 12 July issued the final 
plan for the movement of forces from Army Group German Crown Prince. All assets would 
move under the control of a special system designated Y-Transport. Y-Day was the start of 
the MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS attack. On order from OHL the movements would commence 
on the evening of Y+1, and would be completed by Y+12. The plan stressed the necessity of 
maintaining the security of the system. The receiving units included the Second and 
Seventeenth Armies, which were not making the HAGEN attack, but which previously had 
transferred like assets to the Fourth and Sixth Armies. On 14 July additional forces, including 
two divisions, were transferred to Rupprecht's Army Group from Army Group Duke 
95 Albrecht 
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Table 11.5 
Y-Transport Movement of HAGEN Forces from Army Group German Crown Prince 96 
To the Fourth Army 
From the Eighteenth Army 
Y+3&4 
9 Two observation detachments. 
From the Seventh Army 
Y+2 
" Four foot artillery regimental staffs. 
" One foot artillery battalion. 
" Three battery columns. 
" Munitions columns from three army field artillery regiments. 
Y+3&4 
" Staffs and advanced parties of two field artillery regiments and 
two battalions. 
" Battery columns from four foot artillery battalions. 
" One trench mortar battalion. 
Y+5&6 
" One field artillery regiment. 
" Four foot artillery battalions. 
Y+7&8 
" Three foot artillery battalions. 
" One trench mortar battalion. 
" Three observation detachments. 
Y+9&10 
41 Three foot artillery battalions. 
Y+11&12 
" Three foot artillery battalions. 
" Three observation detachments. 
" One attack wing. 
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From the First Army 
Y+1&2 
" Staff and advanced parties from four army field artillery 
regiments. 
" One foot artillery battalion. 
Y+3&4 
" Staff and advanced parties from four foot artillery battalions. 
" One pioneer gas launcher battalion. 
" Four trench mortar battalions. 
" Five trench mortar companies. 
Y+5&6 
" Four foot artillery battalions. 
" Three foot artillery batteries. 
" Four observation detachments. 
" Five attack squadrons. 
Y+7&8 
" One foot artillery battalion. 
" One 150mm battery. 
" One observation detachment. 
" Four fighter squadrons. 
" Four attack squadrons. 
Y+9 
" Three fighter squadrons. 
From the Third Army 
Y+1&2 
" Staff and advanced parties from seven foot artillery battalions. 
" One foot artillery battalion. 
" One 170mm battery. 
Y+3&4 
" Staff and advanced parties from three foot artillery battalions. 
" One pioneer gas launcher battalion. 
Y+5&6 
" Two pioneer flame thrower companies. 
" Five observation detachments. 
" Seven attack squadrons. 
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Y+7&8 
" Two attack squadrons. 
" Twelve fighter groups. 
Y+9 
9 Five fighter wings. 
To the Sixth Army 
From the Eighteenth Army 
Y+3&4 
9 One observation detachment. 
Y+6&7 
" Four fighter squadrons. 
From the Seventh Army 
Y+2 
Y+3 
" Staffs of two foot artillery battalions. 
" One foot artillery battalion. 
Y+5&6 
9 Three foot artillery battalions. 
Y+7&8 
" One foot artillery battalion. 
" One observation detachment. 
" Four attack squadrons. 
Y+9&10 
" One foot artillery battalion. 
" One attack squadron. 
Y+11 
9 One observation detachment. 
From the First Army 
Y+1&2 
9 Staff and advanced party of one foot artillery battalion. 
537 
Y+3&4 
" Staff and advanced parties of four foot artillery battalions. 
" Five trench mortar companies. 
Y+5&6 
" Three foot artillery battalions. 
" One observation detachment. 
" Three attack squadrons. 
Y+7&8 
" One foot artillery battalion. 
" Five fighter squadrons. 
From the Third Army 
Y+1&2 
" Staff and advanced party of one foot artillery battalion. 
Y+3&4 
" Three foot artillery battalions. 
" One pioneer gas launcher battalion. 
" One trench mortar battalion. 
" Three trench mortar companies. 
Y+5&6 
" One foot artillery battalion 
" One observation detachment. 
To the Seventeenth Army 
From the Seventh Army 
Y+2 
Y+12 
To the Second Army 
" One foot artillery battalion. 
" Three fighter squadrons. 
From the Seventh Army 
Y+10 
9 One foot artillery battalion. 
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German Order of Battle 
Prior to the start of MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS, the British estimated that Rupprecht's 
Army Group had a total of 100 divisions. Sixty-three, including 27 in reserve, were fit for 
action; 22 were regenerating and could be fit for action shortly; and 15 were completely 
Despite OHL's 27 June order, the main effort of the Fourth Army was clearly spent 97 
reflected in the weighting of the left wing, rather than the right. The right-most Guards Corps 
had all five of its divisions in the first wave, and no divisions in follow-on waves. Three of 
the five were trench divisions. The left wing III Bavarian Corps and the Guards Reserve 
Corps to its right both had two divisions in each of three waves. Only one of each corps' six 
divisions was a trench division. 
Table 11.6 
HAGEN Divisions on 14 July 1918 98 
First Second Third Total Sector 
Line Line Line Divi sions Width 
Fourth 9 Attack 6 Attack 5 Attack 20 Attack 37 km 
Army * 5 Trench 2 Trench 2 Trench 9 Trench 
Sixth 4 Attack 2 Attack 6 Attack 9.5 km 
Army # 2 Trench 2 Trench 4 Trench 
13 Attack 8 Attack 5 Attack 26 Attack 46.5 km 
7 Trench 2 Trench 4 Trench 13 Trench 
* Five of six corps 
# Two of four corps 
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Table 11.7 
German Corps for HAGEN 99 
(North to South) 
Corps Commander Attacking 
Fourth Army Sixt von Arnim 
Naval Schröder No 
Guard Boeckmann Yes 
XVIII Reserve Sieger Yes 
X Reserve Gabain Yes 
Guard Reserve Marschall Yes 
III Bavarian Stein Yes 
Sixth Army Quast 
XIX Lucius Yes 
LV Bernhardi Yes 
IV Kraewel No 
XL Litzmann No 
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Table 11.8 
Guns Supporting HAGEN 100 
Super Total Trench 
Field Heavy Heavy Guns Mortars 
Fourth 2,052 788 35 2,875 ? 
Army 
Sixth 540 200 14 754 ? 
Army 
2,592 988 49 3,629 
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Allied Order of Battle 
The British at the beginning of June 1918 had 33 divisions in the line, holding an 
average sector of three miles each; eight divisions in army reserve; seven in GHQ reserve; 
five divisions with the French; and eight cadre divisions. North of the Oise the French still 
had two armies; the Third and the First, each with nine divisions in line and three in 
reserve. '0' 
Table 11.9 
Allied Order of Battle in the HAGEN Sector 1 August 1918 102 
First Line Reserve Sector 
Divisions Divisions Width 
Belgian 10 2 42 km 
Army 
British 11 11 * 42 km 
Second 
Army 
21 13 84 km 
*1 cadre and 2 American divisions 
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THE DECISION TO ABORT 
15-17 July 
Despite the disappointing results on the first day of MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS, both 
OHL and Army Group German Crown Prince believed they had to press on, because aborting 
the attack would disrupt the entire operational plan. The consensus at that point was that 
halting MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS would kill HAGEN, because the Germans could not 
achieve surprise in Flanders, and it was therefore absolutely essential to draw off the Allied 
reserves. OHL issued the order to start the Y-Transport shifting forces to Rupprecht's Army 
Group. 103 
On 16 July Rupprecht's Army Group issued the order to initiate the forward 
deployment of its internal HAGEN forces based on the plan issued 26 May. Later that day the 
Y-Transport forces started moving by rail. 104 At that point the Germans still planned to 
launch deception attack NÜRNBERG with two divisions on a 4.5-kilometer front between 
Boiry-Becquerelle and Moyennville. OHL also agreed with the Fourth and Sixth Armies that 
they would need more artillery for HAGEN. los 
Looking at the results of MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS so far, the HAGEN planners 
started to worry about the possibility of the British withdrawing their front line forces in the 
same way the French had done opposite the German Third Army. They immediately 
recognized that would require the artillery to be pushed forward more rapidly. Rupprecht's 
planners concluded that the British had the depth to withdraw in front of the Sixth Army and 
the Fourth Army in the area north of Ypres, behind the Yser Canal, but not from that point 
} 
south toward the left wing of the Fourth Army. A withdrawal in that critical middle sector 
would mean giving up the heights of Scherpenberg, Mount Rouge, and Mount Noir. Late on 
16 July Rupprecht glumly recorded in his diary: 
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According to the information we get this evening, there is little 
chance of continuing the attack east of Reims. That is not a 
good sign for the success of HAGEN, because if the attack 
south of the Marne and east of Reims are finished already, no 
enemy reserves will be fixed there. 106 
Rupprecht's Army Group sent a message to the Fourth, Sixth, Seventeenth, and 
Second Armies on 17 July informing them of the failure of the REIMS portion of the 
attack. The message described the withdrawal of the French first line, but also noted 
that the same technique was not used against the Seventh Army. The message 
concluded with two priority intelligence requirements. Would the British use the same 
technique against HAGEN? If so, where would they reestablish their main position? 107 
That same day Bruchmtiller got the order to proceed to Rupprecht's Army 
Group to assume control of the artillery. Many of the heavy guns required to support 
HAGEN had also started moving north by that point. By the end of 17 July, four foot 
artillery battalions and one 170mm gun battery were already arriving in Rupprecht's 
sector. Four more foot artillery battalions, nine heavy trench mortar battalions, and 
three aerial observation detachments were in transit. Those movements did not escape 
the notice of Allied intelligence. 108 
Still determined to attack the British in Flanders, Ludendorff boarded a train that night , 
for Rupprecht's headquarters at Tournai. The following day he would preside over a chiefs of 
staff planning conference for HAGEN. Rupprecht that night recorded in his diary that the 
Allies obviously knew from the start that MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS was a diversion and that 
the main attack would come in Flanders. He was convinced that the British had accordingly 
strengthened their defenses in the sector that would face the HAGEN attack. 109 
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18 July 
As described in Chapter X, Ludendorff started the conference by dismissing any 
possibility of a major Allied counterattack in the south. The discussion then turned to the 
tactical options if the British attempted the same sort of defense the French had used against 
the Third Army. About noon the first reports of the Allied counterattack started coming in to 
Rupprecht's headquarters. After the initial shock, Ludendorff closed the conference and made 
a hasty return to OHL. 110 At 1430 hours OHL ordered Rupprecht's Army Group to send 
immediately two HAGEN divisions to Army Group German Crown Prince. A few minutes 
later OHL issued another order to both army groups and the Seventh Army: 
1. ) All transports from the Seventh Army destined for HAGEN 
(with the exception of the heavy artillery and trench mortars) must 
be halted and are at the disposal of the Seventh Army. 
2. ) For the time being there will be no continuation of the REIMS 
attack. The attack divisions and artillery should be pulled back 
immediately. Further orders to follow. 
3. ) The fighter squadrons and three observation detachments that 
were supposed to move to HAGEN will remain at the Eighteenth 
Army at the disposal of Army Group German Crown Prince. 111 
Although OHL for the time being kept the heavy artillery and the trench mortars 
moving, it was clear at that point that HAGEN would be affected and possibly postponed. 
Rupprecht wrote in his diary: "There is no doubt that we have passed the zenith of our 
success. Even if we take some territory in Flanders, it will be of no significance. " 112 
Ludendorff, on the other hand, told Kuhl in a phone conversation that night that OHL hoped 
to replace the HAGEN divisions as soon as the situation stabilized in the Ninth and Seventh 
Army sectors. Ludendorff was almost certain that HAGEN could still be executed. 113 
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19 July 
OHL still clung to the plan to execute HAGEN, although by 19 July four of the attack 
divisions had been transferred from Rupprecht's Army Group. That day OHL halted the 
remainder of the Y-Transport movements north, including the heavy artillery and heavy,, 
trench mortars. 114 Ludendorff asked Rupprecht's Army Group if HAGEN could be limited 
in scope if necessary. The army group answered that the attack was still possible with the 
remaining forces if the operation's objective was limited to breaking through toward - 
Poperinghe--Cassel and pushing back the British north wing in the low area south of Dunkirk. 
The attack north of Ypres, however, was no longer possible. But if the situation at Army 
Group German Crown Prince or a British attack in the Seventeenth Army sector drew off any, 
more HAGEN forces, then the objective would have to be limited even further. One option 
would be an attack to seize the line Deibruch--Mount Rouge--Mount Noir--Strazeele. The 
artillery and trench mortar requirement would be about the same, but the number of divisions 
could be reduced. 
Ludendorff initially concurred with that assessment, but he also said that the divisions 
of the third wave should not be committed if a major success did not appear achievable. 
Those units also had to be on alert for rapid deployment elsewhere. Ludendorff did not make 
a final decision at that point. Later that day, when Hindenburg suggested immediately moving 
the reserves of Army Group Rupprecht to the south for commitment against the flank of the 
French counterattack, Ludendorff dismissed that idea out of hand because it would have 
ended HAGEN on the spot. 115 
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20 July 
On 20 July Rupprecht's Army Group sent OHL a message recommending the 
postponement of HAGEN by "a few days. " Noting that 33 batteries had already been 
transferred from the Fourth Army sector and another 24 from the Sixth Army, the staff still 
recommended a reduced version of HAGEN to breakthrough in the direction of Poperinghe- 
Cassel and push the British-Belgian north wing back in the area of Dunkirk. 116 Later that 
afternoon Ludendorff called Kuhl and told him to transfer two more HAGEN divisions to the 
Seventh Army. 117 Meanwhile, Lossberg arrived at OHL, summoned by Ludendorff. As 
noted in Chapter X, Lossberg recommend an immediate withdrawal by the Seventh and Ninth 
Armies behind the Aisne and Vesle, followed by a deliberate withdrawal on both sides of the 
Somme. 
But Lossberg also recommended executing HAGEN with all the divisions still 
available and in fighting condition. Because of their reduced number, however, only a limited 
tactical and not a major operational objective was now possible. If the limited HAGEN attack 
did not even achieve a tactical success, then Lossberg recommended that the Fourth and Sixth 
Armies also should be withdrawn to their original positions, and the entire Western Front had 
to go on the defensive. The time gained by that move had to be used to reconstitute the units. 
Simultaneously, the build-up of a strong defensive zone had been started to the Antwerp-- 
Maas line, as well as the line Metz--Strasbourg-- Rhine. The defensive lines had to be 
established behind areas that could be flooded. 118 
Lossberg made his recommendations in an attempt to salvage HAGEN. But 
Ludendorff could not bring himself to give up all the territory won since 21 March, nor could 
he accept the return to the defensive and the specter of attrition warfare. 119 Kuhl himself did 
not agree completely with Lossberg. He thought it would be a mistake to go completely on 
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the defensive, but he did agree that a reduced form of HAGEN would prevent the Allies from 
wresting the initiative. Kuhl continued to support a HAGEN attack with the more modest 
objective of taking the line of high ground from Dickebusch to Mount Rouge, Mount Noir, 
and Strazeele. 120 Rupprecht thought that, "... without the attack northeast of Ypres, the 
chances for a major success are so minimized that probably what gains would be made would 
not be in proportion to the forces committed. " 121 
By the end of 20 July, seven of the HAGEN attack divisions had been withdrawn from 
Rupprecht's Army Group. That evening OHL issued the order signed by Ludendorff: 
1) The HAGEN operation will not be executed because of 
the situation at Army Group German Crown Prince, which 
probably will require an even larger commitment of forces. 
Considering the possibility of British offensive actions. 
I might come back to the execution of HAGEN if the overall 
situation allows. 
2) Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht goes on the defensive 
on the HAGEN front. 122 
21-31 July 
Rupprecht's Army Group went on the defensive, with orders to hold sectors of the 
western banks of the Ancre and Avre in order to make the German intentions unclear to the 
Allies. The army group also had to alert five more divisions for possible immediate 
deployment by OHL. Those divisions were to be positioned behind the left wing of the 
Second Army, from where they could reach Army Group German Crown Prince by land 
march. 123 
Kuhl went to Avesnes on 21 July to argue the case for a limited objective HAGEN 
that would prevent the British from seizing the initiative. Kuhl thought Ludendorffs swing to 
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the other extreme was the result of the influence of Lossberg, who had argued that a limited 
objective HAGEN attack would require as many forces as the full attack. Ludendorff, 
however, would not be swayed. Even if the Germans halted the French counterattack, he 
argued, the situation would require counterattacks by Army Group German Crown Prince to 
consolidate its situation. The five divisions being assembled behind the Second Army would 
most likely be committed to that. 124 
On the other side of the line, that Allies were a little slow to recognize that the power 
of Rupprecht's Army Group was being eroded quickly. Haig noted in his diary on 21 July; "In 
view of Rupprecht's large reserves, I cannot attack on the Kemmel front unless the enemy 
first attacks and is repulsed. If his reserves remain in my front, I will only carry out local 
attacks. " 125 
On 22 July Rupprecht's Army Group sent Fourth and Sixth Armies a message 
indicating that HAGEN still might be executed. 126 The following day, however, the Sixth 
Army issued an order informing its subordinate units that HAGEN would not be executed. 127 
Haig, now, seemed to have completely changed his assessment of the situation from only 
two days earlier: 
As we are fairly well prepared to meet an attack by Rupprecht 
on my Second Army, it is most likely the attack won't be 
delivered. So I am preparing to take the offensive and have 
approved an operation taking place on Rawlinson's front.... " 128 
Despite the 20 July order canceling the attack, various German headquarters continued 
to discuss the KLEIN-HAGEN option, with the objective of the Flanders hills of 
Scherpenberg, Mount Rouge, and Mount Noir. On 24 July Rupprecht recorded in his diary 
that such an attack was still possible. On 27 July, however, he said a major attack in any form 
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was now out of the question. 129 
1-6 August 
On 2 August Ludendorff sent a personally drafted memo to the army groups of the 
Western Front, only for the eyes of the commanding generals, the chiefs of staff, and the 
operations officers (general staff officers Ia). Ludendorff noted that while the immediate 
situation required the Germans to be on the defensive, they had to return to the offensive as 
soon as possible. After the heavy commitment of forces between the Vesle and the Marne, 
Ludendorff thought major enemy attacks in other sectors were unlikely for the immediate 
future--especially since the Allies still expected the Germans to launch a major attack. 
But the longer the Germans waited, the more likely it was that the Allies would strike 
first. Ludendorff thought the most probable sectors were at Mount Kemmel against the Sixth 
Army; between the Somme and the Oise; toward Soissons; against the high ground at 
Moronvilliels in Champagne; against the southern front of Army Group C close to St, Mihiel; 
and finally against the Lorraine sector. Ironically, except for the general area south of the 
Somme, Ludendorff did not mention Amiens, where the British in fact attacked just six days 
later. Ludendorff ordered: 
While we organize the defensive, we prepare the attack at the same 
time. The options we must consider include: 
1. ) A reduced form of HAGEN. 
2. ) Operation KURFÜRST on both sides of the Oise, roughly 
between Montdidier and Soissons. 
3) Smaller scale attacks east of Reims, against Fort Pompelle, and 
at Vauquois, as well as in the sector of Army Group C. 
4) Attacks from the sector of Army Group Duke Alberecht, in greater 
or lesser width. 130 
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Rupprecht's Army Group reported on 3 August reduced enemy pressure in its sector, 
possibly because of the attacks against Army Group German Crown Prince. But the British 
also recognized that the Ancre and Avre bridgeheads were being withdrawn, and that the 
preparation activity for HAGEN had stopped. It was possible, therefore, that the British had 
sent more fresh reserves to support the French. British activity was now limited to local 
attacks and heavy patrolling. 131 That, of course, was a faulty intelligence assessment. The 
British at that point were preparing to mount their attack at Amiens. 
In response to Ludendorffs 2 August message, Rupprecht's Army Group on 6 August 
submitted to OHL the preliminary attack plans of the Fourth Army for KLEIN-HAGEN, and 
of the Eighteenth Army for a limited KURFÜRST. (The Eighteenth Army had been 
transferred to Rupprecht's Army Group on 22 July. ) But the army group no longer favored 
the HAGEN option. Since the Seventh Army had been pushed back so far, Rupprecht's 
planners now thought the best course of action was for the left wing of the Eighteenth Army 
to attack to the Aisne in support of the Ninth Army. Two days later the British struck at 
Amiens. 132 Operations HAGEN and KURFÜRST had breathed their last. 
ASSESMENT 
Could HAGEN have succeeded? There can be little doubt that the answer is no. As 
Wetzell accurately pointed out in his assessment of 12 June, none of the conditions of the 
previous tactical success were present. Surprise was unlikely; the British had almost three 
months to reconstitute their units and strengthen their defenses; and the Allied reserves were 
well positioned and concentrated. At best MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS could have altered the " 
third condition in favor of the Germans, but not the first two. In addition, HAGEN also would 
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have faced two more difficulties that contributed to the failure of MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS. 
The German Army was truly burned out by July 1918, and the Allies finally understood and 
were developing countermeasures for the new German infantry and artillery offensive tactics. 
Objective 
Like all of the 1918 offensives, HAGEN was designed as a force-on-force operation. 
The objective in this case was the defeat of the British Second Army and the Belgian Army. 
Beyond that, there was no clearly identified operational end-state. As early as the start of 
May, Rupprecht's planners admitted, "It is very probable that NEU-GEORG will merely 
constitute a new blow for the British and will create a salient of greater or lesser dimension in 
the direction of Poperinghe--Cassel. " But then the loner-term results of the operation were 
couched in vague political and psychological terms: "Yet, the political-military significance 
of such a success in Flanders must be valued much higher than a limited success in the region 
of Albert. " 133 
Throughout the German planning process there was little focus and very little 
evidence of any awareness of the vulnerability of the British logistics network. The early May 
assessment did conclude, "... the British and the Belgians will be hard hit if we succeed in 
bombarding effectively the coast region as far as Dunkirk--including the valuable British 
supplies stored there--and in menacing Calais. " 134 This is one of the few mentions of a 
logistics target in any of the surviving German documents. Even so, it was tacked onto the 
end as something of an afterthought, as if to say that the Germans would achieve that much if 
nothing else. Only as late as 9 July did one analysis produced by the Sixth Army really take a 
close look at Hazebrouck as a rail center. 
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From Hazebrouck, two double lines run to Merville, and another 
double line to Isbergues. To the south a double line runs from St. 
Venant via Isbergues to Airs. Lines outside of Hazebrouck connect 
with double lines to Poperinghe, St. Omer, and Cassel. The 
Hazebrouck rail yards have 25 switch sidings and 15 loading platforms. 135 
During the early stages of the planning for NEU-MICHAEL and NEU-GEORG, 
Amiens and Hazebrouck with their critical BEF rail centers were not even identified as 
objectives. The original 1 May NEU-GEORG plan had the Fourth Army attack passing north 
of Hazebrouck. 136 The town did not figure in the HAGEN attack at all until the two right- 
wing corps of the Sixth Army were added to the operation in the 1 June operations order. 
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Following that, Rupprecht's Army Group and OHL between 18 and 21 June continued to 
debate the actual importance of taking Hazebrouck. 
138 Even then the plan never called for 
securing the Nieppe Forest south of Hazebrouck, although that objective had been considered 
important in the early stages of GEORGETTE in April. 
Mission Creep 
One of the recurring patterns of the 1918 German offensives is their tendency to 
expand, rather than focus, as the plans developed. HAGEN was no different. The original 
plan called for an attack by 25 divisions under the control of one army on a 24-kilometer 
front. Between 1 May and 1 June the Fourth Army's attack zone increased from 24 to 37 
kilometers. The entire operation eventually grew to 39 divisions controlled by two armies on 
a 47-kilometer front. In early May OHL had been concerned about the ability of the attacking 
divisions to reach their initial objectives 10-kilometers deep in a single bound. By 1 July the 
plan called for the III Bavarian Corps to reach Cassel in a single bound, a depth of 16- 
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kilometers. Immediately after the Allied counterattack of 18 July, the HAGEN plan was 
scaled back to 33 divisions on a 40-kilometer front. 
As in the previous operations, the impetus to expand the operations came from the 
armies and army groups, with OHL eventually acquiescing. This time was no different, but 
Rupprecht's Army Group was right to want to widen the operation to the south to include 
Hazebrouck. What was really not necessary in the original plan was the attack north of Ypres. 
As the HAGEN plan was scaled back after 18 July in an attempt to save the operation, that 
was the first element that dropped out. 
Table 11.10 
HAGEN Divisions and Sector Widths 139 
I May 1 June 15 June 14 July 20 July 
Fourth 25 31 31 29 24 
Army 
Sixth 0 5 8 10 9 
Army 
Total 24 km 43 km 47 km 47 km 40 km 
Sector 
Decision 18 July 
Despite the initial failures of 15 and 16 July, Ludendorff decided to go ahead with 
HAGEN. He blamed Wetzell and the Seventh Army for the failure of MARNESCHUTZ- 
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REIMS, and convinced himself that it was just a local reverse. Even after the Allied 
counterattack of 18 July, Ludendorff still clung to the possibility of launching HAGEN in 
some form. For that reason he initially kept the heavy artillery and trench mortars moving 
north after he halted the rest of the Y-Transport movements. According to the German official 
history, OHL held out for HAGEN until the last possible moment, even through it was 
obvious that it could never produce decisive results, because the alternative was to yield the 
initiative to the Allies. "The continuation of the attacks was a risky game, but not more so 
than going over to the defense. " 140 
Decision 20 July 
By the end of 20 July, Ludendorff had no choice but to cancel HAGEN. With seven 
attack divisions having been withdrawn from Rupprecht's Army Group since 16 July, there 
were now only 19 left, and five of those would shortly be placed on alert and moved south to 
the rear of the Second Army. It would have been impossible to mount HAGEN with the 
remaining 14 attack divisions, especially considering the severe manpower shortages in 
Rupprecht's trench divisions that would have to fill the gaps. Even the various versions of 
KLEIN-HAGEN considered by OHL over the next two weeks were impossible. 
Alternatives 
The Germans had no real alternatives at that point. Many of the German commanders 
and planners approached the operations following BLÜCHER with a deep sense of 
pessimism and foreboding. The two principal army group commanders and their respective 
chiefs of staff were among the most pessimistic. Rupprecht, Kuhl, Crown Prince Wilhelm, 
and Schulenberg all believed that HAGEN was almost impossible and KURFÜRST was a 
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pipe dream. And although it could not possibly produce decisive results, "In our opinion, the 
planned MARNSCHUTZ-REIMS offensive constituted, under compulsion of the dynamic 
law, the last great offensive effort of which we were capable. " 141 
In contrast to the field headquarters, the planners at OHL seemed to be living 
increasingly in a dream world after the failure of BLOCHER. The operational assessments of 
Wetzell, which at first had been so logical and penetrating, became increasingly bizarre as the 
German situation deteriorated and he fell increasingly out of favor with Ludendorff. 
(Ludendorff finally fired him in September. ) Wetzell bounced back and forth between 
recommending major offensives at Verdun and in Italy, without ever explaining were the 
supporting artillery would come from. His completely unrealistic 6 July recommendation for 
a major offensive in Alsace never even attempted to suggest where the necessary 35 divisions 
and 1,360 batteries would come from. But Wetzell wasn't alone at OHL. The KURFÜRST 
plan was equally unrealistic. Just where would the German Army come up with 50 divisions 
capable of attacking after MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS, let alone after HAGEN? One is 
tempted here to draw parallels between the state of mind at OHL in July 1918 and the state of 
mind in Hitler's bunker in April 1945, with the Führer moving non-existent divisions around 
on the map. 
Although Kuhl was a HAGEN skeptic from the start, he nonetheless continued to 
argue for mounting the operation, even after 18 July. As he explained it in his postwar 
analysis for the Reichstag: 
Yet abandoning the offensive would not have altered matters. 
How was the war to be continued then? To have discontinued 
the offensive would have meant to pass to the defensive. OHL, 
being imbued with a strong determination, refused to entertain 
any such plan, and justly so. 142 
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This is a classic example of the German Great General Staff tradition of seeking operational 
solutions for strategic problems. Kuhl also wrote: 
In summing up, one can say with regard to our offensive in July 
that considerable objections militated against it. Still, it might 
have succeeded. In that event, it would probably have been 
possible to execute also the HAGEN offensive. 143 
When he was Chief of Staff of the United States Army in the early 1990s, General 
Gordon Sullivan once said, "Hope is not a method. " Hope was about the only method OHL 
had left in July 1918. 
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OHL failed in 1918 because it disregarded one of 
the most important lessons of military history-- 
the interrelationship ofpolitics and war. ' 
Hans Delbrück 
Nothing could illustrate more the mindlessness of 
the efficiency and power of the German empire than 
this great military offensive within a political vacuum. 
Correlli Barnett 
CHAPTER XII 
CONCLUSIONS 
At the end of Ludendorffs offensives in July 1918, the greatest string of tactical 
successes in World War I had failed to produce any significant operational advantage, much 
less strategic victory. Quite the contrary, Germany in August 1918 found itself in a far weaker 
strategic position than it had been in at the start of the year. The German Army in the West 
was weaker than its opponents in manpower and equipment--both qualitatively and 
quantitatively--and its once impressive morale and esprit de corps were on the verge of 
collapse. Operationally, the German Army was overextended, exposed, and vulnerable to 
counterattack along more than one sector of the front. Reasons for this failure can be found on 
all three levels of warfare. 
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THE OPERATIONAL-STRATEGIC DISCONNENT 
On the strategic level Ludendorffs grand scheme was doomed from the start. An 
absolute military victory was impossible for the Germans to achieve in 1918. As Hans 
Delbrück reported to the German Reichstag in 1925, Germany at the start of 1918 only had a 
slight numerical superiority and was inferior in reserves. Much of its equipment was inferior 
and worn out, fuel was in short supply, and the supply system was inadequate. Delbruck 
strongly criticized OHL for rationalizing away these shortcomings. 3 
Delbrück and Hermann von Kuhl argued that with its strong position based on interior 
lines, the German Army might have been able to convince its enemies that it could not be 
defeated militarily. The objective of the 1918 offensives, they argued, should have been a 
negotiated peace that Germany could have entered into from a position of strength by 
achieving a limited military victory. 4 But the precondition for such a negotiated peace in the 
west was German willingness to give up claims to Belgium, which Ludendorff would not do. ' 
Along with this as the strategic objective, the operational goal should have been to orchestrate 
a series of major tactical successes by attacking at the points where success was the easiest. 
This basically was how the Allies won after July 1918. 
If the 1918 offensives had been better designed operationally (as discussed below), the 
Germans more than likely could have split the British from the French. They probably could 
have pushed the BEF off the Continent. The Germans might even have been able to put 
enough pressure on the French to collapse their government. But then what? If Britain had 
been defeated on the Continent it almost certainly would have continued the fight so long as 
the Germans controlled the Belgian coast. The British still held an overwhelming superiority 
at sea, and the blockade had already come close to bringing Germany to its knees at home. 
The American forces streaming toward France could have been redirected to Britain to form a 
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large military base for an eventual counterattack. This essentially is the scenario that played 
out in World War II, and in 1940 the Germans were relatively far stronger than they were in 
1918. 
When an inherent linkage to a strategic objective is not the dominant force in the 
planning process, operational and tactical considerations begin to determine strategy. 
Ludendorff launched a series of major operations without a clear strategic vision of what was 
to be accomplished, or the specific aims that would have to provide the necessary operational 
and tactical linkages. The early tactical success and gains in territory in March through May 
created an illusion that the offensives might lead to victory, and that in turn strengthened the 
political position of the annexationists in Germany. 
5 Instead, the strategic incoherence that 
undermined the campaign became a major factor in the Germany Army culminating before 
any real operational success could be achieved. The offensives also were an example of the 
German General Staffs propensity to attempt operational solutions for strategic problems. As 
Correlli Barnett pointed out, the 1918 offensives were, ... "an attempt by purely military means 
to decide on the battlefield a war involving total national economic, military, social, and 
technical power, a war that Germany was losing. " 6 
Compounding these problems was Ludendorffs own blind spot--phobia even--against 
the operational level of war, and his stunning strategic and political ineptitude. Herbert 
Rosinski pointed out that considering all the political activity of OHL, it is difficult to find an 
instance in which its interference in German internal, economic, or foreign policy did not 
have an exact opposite effect than that intended. 7 Even Ludendorffs own contemporaries 
were harshly critical of his political incompetence. Writing in his diary Bavarian Crown 
Prince Rupprecht noted: "[Ludendorff] lacks any psychological understanding of foreign or 
domestic politics. " 8 And Fritz von Lossberg wrote, "Ludendorff undoubtedly was inwardly 
565 
convinced of the correctness of his decisions at that time, but he had underrated the 
breakdown of the larger part of the German people at home and very much overrated the 
remaining strength of the German Army. " 9 
THE OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL DISCONNECT 
The Germans were responsible for a disproportionately large percentage of the tactical 
innovations to come out of World War I. They won four of the five battles between March 
and July, but they still lost the spring 1918 campaign and the war. As Liddell Hart pointed 
out, Ludendorffs tactical success was his own undoing. He had pushed too far and too long, 
depleting his reserves in the process. By end of June, he had driven in three large wedges, but, 
no place to operational depth. All the Germans had to show for the tremendous expenditure of 
manpower and resources was an extended front with vulnerable salients. 10 And as Martin 
Van Creveld noted, once initial tactical success was achieved it became irrelevant, because 
the entire German strategic posture collapsed within five months. 
On the tactical level, the Germans were formidable opponents. Their discipline, 
training, leadership, and tactical doctrine produced units that were almost impossible to beat 
in anything approaching evenly matched force-on-force encounters, either on the defense or 
the offense. Their innovations in infantry tactics especially changed the way infantry fought 
for most of the remainder of the 20th century. Their artillery innovations too cast a long 
shadow over modern warfare, but the Germans adopted the new fire support methods 
unevenly. During Operation MICHAEL only the Eighteenth Army used the full range of 
Bruchmüller/Pulkowski techniques, and they did not become standard practice across the 
German Army until Operation BLOCHER. During Operation MICHAEL the Germans failed 
to weight the designated main attack with artillery. They never made that mistake again, after 
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Bruchmüller was put in complete charge of the fire support planning for all of the subsequent 
offensives. From mid-July until the end of the war, the Allies themselves increasingly 
adopted the German fire support tactics. 
12 
The German Army's greatest tactical handicap was in its'mobility, which limited its- 
ability to maneuver to operational depth. During World War I mechanical power replaced 
muscle power as the primary source of battlefield mobility, but the Germans were slower to 
adapt than were the Allies. Ludendorff certainly had a blind spot for the tank; but armored 
fighting vehicles in World War I were not the wonder weapons some thought them to be. 
Despite having an overwhelming advantage in tanks at the end of the war, the Allies never 
achieved tactical gains on the levels of MICHAEL or BLÜCHER, or even GEORGETTE. 
Nor did the Allies completely dismount their own cavalry divisions. The Germans did on the 
Western Front, but not necessarily because they recognized that the days of horse cavalry 
were over. Rather, the Germans needed the manpower and the horses for other things. 
Because of the inept management of their war industry, the Germans were chronically short 
of trucks and other motor vehicles. Thus the horses, which were also in short supply, were 
needed for battlefield transportation forward of the railheads. Yet, some historians have 
suggested that dismounting all the cavalry divisions was a major mistake, no matter how 
badly the horses were needed elsewhere. If one or two cavalry divisions had been available in 
the Eighteenth Army sector on 26 and 27 March, they just might have been able to exploit the 
gap at Montdidier to capture Amiens. 
OPERATIONAL DESIGN ASSESSMENT AND ALTERNATIVES 
The single greatest flaw in the 1918 offensives was the lack of clearly defined 
strategic and operational objectives. Neither Hindenburg nor Ludendorff in their post-war 
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books offered a vision of a concrete military objective or a concrete political objective to be 
gained from the offensives. 13 None of the contemporary operations orders offer any such 
objective either. The orders do contain vague references to the BEF's Channel ports, but no, 
clear roadmap or series of intermediate objectives on how to get there. Given the German 
Army's lack of reach and operational mobility, this is not too surprising. Ludendorff clearly 
understood that he wanted to knock the BEF out of the war, but he wasn't quite sure how. 
Throughout the first half of 1918 he seems more concerned with holding onto the military 
initiative in the absence of any other concrete objective. As he wrote after the war, "I 
expected my own Army to be weakened and I hoped it would be less so than the enemy. By 
continuing the attack, we would still retain the initiative. More I could not aim at" 14 
By retaining the initiative without any clear objective Ludendorff was in effect 
attempting to develop the situation in the hope of exploiting any opportunities that might 
arise. He admitted as much when he wrote; "Since I had been able hitherto, to find the proper ; 
strategic remedy in the most serious situations, I had no reason to believe that I would not 
succeed this time. " 15 While such an approach can be useful in certain tactical situations, it is 
almost always a recipe for failure at the operational level. 
In the end, Ludendorffs offensives only managed to gain ground. As Richard Simpkin. 
noted, ground is seldom a viable operational objective except when it holds a geographically 
fixed enemy resource, like a governmental center, air base, navy base, bridge, or a 
topographical feature that provides access to or control of a key resource. 16 There were such 
key pieces of ground in the Allied sector and within German reach, but the Germans never 
really seemed to recognize their significance. The Allies did. 
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Center of Gravity 
At the start of 1918 the BEF clearly was the operational center of gravity of the Allied 
coalition. Although recovering from the mutinies of 1917, the French Army was still shaky, 
and the Americans had not yet arrived in significant numbers to tip irrevocably the strategic 
balance. Despite the fatal flaw in Ludendorffs strategic goal--total military victory as opposed 
to negotiated peace from a position of strength--the operational center of gravity remained the 
same. True centers of gravity are almost always very difficult to attack directly, but that is 
exactly what the Germans tried to do. Operations MICHAEL, GEORGETTE, and HAGEN 
were designed as classic force-on-force encounters to produce the battle of annihilation that 
was so central to German military thinking. Operations BLÜCHER, GNEISENAU, and 
MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS were large-scale diversions to set up the conditions for the success 
of HAGEN. At least, that was the intent behind BLÜCHER before Ludendorff and OHL lost 
control of the operation. Operation KURFÜRST was a half-baked, muddled plan to follow up 
against the French after the success of HAGEN. The plan had almost no grounding in reality, 
and is yet another example of the progressive loss of touch at OHL. 
A force-on-force attack against the BEF was a long shot at best. Although the 
Germans could still muster impressive force ratio superiorities locally, they did not have the 
battlefield mobility, the necessary speed, or the reserves to achieve the large-scale 
Vernichtungsschlacht they so desperately sought. Nor did they have the logistics system and 
resources to sustain it. But there was a way to defeat the BEF without necessarily attacking it 
head-on. The shallow and fragile British logistics system was a crucial vulnerability that 
might have yielded far greater results if the Germans had subjected it to a coordinated and 
sustained attack throughout its depth. By the spring of 1916 the BEF's logistics system was 
on the verge of collapsing under its own weight. On 1 September 1916 the British brought in 
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the civilian expert Sir Eric Geddes to rationalize the system. He largely succeeded, but the 
system remained fragile and strained until the end of the war. 17 
Almost everything that sustained the British Army in the field entered the Continent . 
through three major and four minor ports in the north, and three major ports in the south. The 
BEF's Q-Staff organized the logistics flow into northern and a southern lines of 
communications, with Amiens being the dividing point. The southern ports were the BEF's 
main first-class base ports. 18 In February 1917, for example, the ports handled 168,599 tons 
of supplies, with 56.2 percent of the total coming through the northern ports, and 43.7 percent 
coming through the southern ports. 
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Table 12.1 
Supply Flow Through BEF Channel Ports in February 1917 19 
Northern Ports Percentage of Total 
Dunkirk 17.5% 
Calais 10.1% 
Boulogne 17.3% 
Small Ports 11.3% 
Etaples 
St. Valery 
Treport 
Fecamp 
Southern Ports 
Rouen 22.9% 
Le Harve 14.9% 
Dieppe 5.9% 
Although the various operations orders for MICHAEL, GEORGETTE, and HAGEN 
made vague references to the BEF's Channel ports as long range or follow-on objectives, they 
were generally too deep for the Germans to reach. Nor were the ports necessarily the key 
vulnerabilities in the British logistics system. The actual capacity of a port is based on 
throughput, not on the amount of tonnage that can be unloaded at a given time. A ship can 
always be discharged on the quay faster than the quay itself can be cleared. The quay can be 
cleared much faster than the transit sheds can be cleared. Thus, actual port capacity was 
linked to rail capacity, and British ports in France generally had too many berths and not 
enough railways. 20 
Rail was the primary means of moving supplies from the ports. Rail had to be used to 
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move all supplies to destinations more than 30 miles from the ports. Because of the poor 
conditions and low capacity of the roads of the time, this was the maximum distance for 
motorized or horse-drawn supply columns. It took 150 trucks to equal one train. 21 In 
September 1916 it took 1,934 tons of supplies per mile of front per day so sustain the BEF. 22 
In mid-1916 the British Fourth Army required 70 trains per day of all types. By the close of 
1917 the BEF was using six million gallons of petrol per month, and had to feed 449,880 
horses. In April 1918 the British ran 725 ammunition trains to the front--almost as many as 
during the entire five-month period of the battle of the Somme in 1916. By end of war, the 
BEF was operating 1,486 locomotives in its sector with 18,500 personnel. 23 
Generally, it is difficult to close down, or even temporarily neutralize a rail network. 
While it is relatively easy to destroy signaling and switching equipment, that only slows down 
but does not stop rail movement. The roadbeds and track are much harder to destroy. The key 
vulnerabilities in a rail network are its choke points; tunnels, bridges, switching yards, and 
rail junctions. If a rail network is dense, like the one behind most of the German sector in 
1918, single choke points may have little military significance, because the system has ample 
bypasses and workarounds. But the British sector was shallow to begin with, and the rail 
network in that sector was not robust and had two significant choke points--its two major 
forward marshaling and switching yards at Amiens and Hazebrouck. Amiens formed the hub 
of almost all of the BEF's forward railway operations. Anything that needed to run between 
railheads had to go through Amiens, or be taken back to the regulating stations near the base 
ports. 24 
There can be no doubt that in March and April 1918 the British feared for their 
logistics infrastructure. Around 25 March Q-Staff planners started developing contingency 
plans (Scheme X and Scheme Y) based on having to abandon their northern line of 
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communications. Then they developed Scheme Z to abandon the southern ports and line of 
communications. 25 On 18 April Rawlinson wrote to General Sir Henry Wilson, "There can 
be no question that the Amiens area is the only one in which the enemy can hope to gain such 
a success as to force the Allies to discuss terms of peace. " 
26 The value the British placed on 
Amiens is also indicated by the fact that they counterattacked there first on 8 August 1918. 
Foch too understood very clearly the significance of Amiens, but for some reason the 
Germans never seemed to recognize this key vulnerability. Amiens was never one of the 
original primary objectives of Operation MICHAEL, and only became an objective as 
something of an afterthought after the original plan had fallen apart beyond recovery. Even 
after the end of MICHAEL Ludendorff would not allocate heavy artillery assets to the Second 
Army to bring the rail yards under heavier interdiction fire. Hazebrouck was an original 
objective of the GEORGETTE plan, but then a few days into the battle Ludendorff shifted the 
main effort away from Hazebrouck"and toward Mount Kemmel. 
All the operations orders for and the message traffic during Operations MICHEAL 
and GEORGETTE focus on using deep attack assets to hit the rail lines and rail centers 
primarily to prevent the Allies from shifting reinforcements. Until the planning for Operation 
HAGEN was well developed, there was not even a hint of attacking rail centers for the main 
purpose of strangling the British logistically. Ironically, the Germans found themselves in just 
such a situation after Operation BLOCHER, when the rail center at Soissons was the choke 
point on their only major rail line into the new salient. This condition forced the Germans to 
launch Operations GNEISENAU and MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS to improve the logistics 
flow into the salient. It is about this time, when the attention of the Germans operational 
planners was focused on rail centers, that Hazebrouck was added as a key objective in the 
HAGEN plan. The Allies, of course, clearly recognized the German vulnerability at Soissons, 
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which was one of the principal objectives in the 18 July counteroffensive. 
Decisive Points 
As discussed above, any German offensive operation in which first Amiens and then 
Hazebrouck were the decisive points would have had dire consequences for the British Army, 
on the Continent. These should have been the objectives of Operations MICHAEL and 
GEORGETTE, respectively. If the Germans had taken Amiens, the British would have been 
forced to attack to retake it almost immediately. That in turn would have forced the British to 
weaken their forces in the north, making Hazebrouck that much more vulnerable, and 
GEORGETTE more likely to succeed. Decisive points for follow-on operations could 
possibly have been the secondary rail centers at Abbeville and St. -Omer, but holding on to 
Amiens, or better Amiens and Hazebrouck, for any extended period of time would have made 
the British position on the Continent very tenuous, if not untenable. 
Not all the German staff officers were blind to the significance of Amiens. Writing 
after the war, Major General Max Hoffmann, the chief of staff of the Eastern Front, noted that 
Amiens should have been the decisive point of MICHAEL, although he did not necessarily 
identify its importance as a logistics choke point. 
The attack was not made solely at the point that that was 
considered the most favorable for a breach in the line to be 
made, and it was not made with the whole of the forces that 
could be disposed of. The point that was considered as the 
most favorable was the southern wing of the English Army 
to the north of the Somme. All available forces should have 
been thrown at that one point. Instead of which, attacks were 
made both to the north and the south of the Somme. 
However, we did not succeed in taking Amiens, and thus 
separating the English and French armies-- we almost 
succeeded, we did not win the victory. 27 
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Culmination 
Strategically the Germans probably reached culmination in World War I with the 
failure of the unrestricted U-boat campaign and the entry of America into the war. On the 
tactical level, each of the five offensives culminated before they achieved any significant 
objective. MICHAEL, GEORGETTE, and BLOCHER all reached culmination after 
achieving large scale but irrelevant tactical gains, and then not along the lines of their original 
plans. GNEISENAU and MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS both ran out of steam before they 
accomplished much of anything, especially the REIMS attack to the east of the city that ran 
into a well prepared defense in depth. 
Considering the five offensives as a single integrated campaign, it is a little harder to 
pinpoint just where the Germans culminated on the operational level. Certainly they were 
well beyond their culminating point after Ludendorff tried to exploit the initial successes of 
BLUCHER, and then the operation ground to a halt leaving the Germans holding a large, 
exposed, and almost impossible to supply salient. From that point on HAGEN had no chance 
of accomplishing anything except more attrition. Max Hoffmann argued rather emphatically 
that the Germans reached their culminating point when they failed to take Amiens, even 
though that was not one of MICHAEL's objectives in the original plan. 
At the very moment when OHL saw that they would not get 
Amiens, that they had not been able to break through the enemy's 
front, they ought to have realized that a decisive victory on the 
Western Front was no longer to be expected. If this first attempt, 
which had been made with the best forces they possessed, had 
failed, every succeeding attack that could only be made with ever 
diminishing forces, would likewise have no chance of success. 28 
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After the end of March, however, the Germans just might have had one or two 
chances to recover. One option was a renewed push on Amiens, which was only ten 
kilometers away. Crown Prince Wilhelm recommended such a course of action, but that 
attack could not be prepared and launched before 17 April. Ludendorff wanted to attack 
sooner, so he reached for the radically reduced GEORG plan and launched GEORGETTE on 
9 April. But GEORGETTE was too weak, and in the end it was little more than a waste of 
resources, time, and initiative. When the Germans did try to take Amiens again, on 24 April 
when GEORGETTE was clearly stalling, it was another waste of resources, too little, too late 
--just like MARS and HAMMERSCHLAG. 
Even as light as GEORGETTE was, it just might have succeeded in taking 
Hazebrouck if Ludendorff on 12 April had not shifted the main effort toward the approaches 
to Bailleul. The loss of Hazebrouck would not have hurt the British as badly as the loss of 
Amiens, but it would have knocked their entire logistics system off balance enough to buy the 
Germans some breathing space and more time to mount a stronger push against Amiens. By 
the end of 13 April, however, the British and Australians had formed a defense in front of 
Hazebrouck--one solid enough that the Germans probably could not have overcome it with 
the resources they had immediately at hand. At that point, the Germans most likely reached 
culmination on the operational level. Ludendorff, however, refused to accept that either 
strategic or operational culmination had been reached right up until 8 August, the "Black Day 
of the German Army. " According to Kuhl: "General Ludendorff, who before 8 August still 
had faith in the possibility of a strategic remedy, lost after this date all hope of consolidating 
the situation in our favor by means of a strategic expedient. " 29 
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Lines of Operations 
Strategically the Germans were operating on interior lines. With their robust and deep 
rail network in their rear areas, they had a greater ability to shift forces and resources to 
various points along their own front than did the Allies. (This, of course, did not apply to the 
German forces in the BLÜCHER salient after May 1918. ) Tactically, each of the offensives 
was somewhat different. MICHAEL advanced on divergent lines, clearly to its detriment as 
the operation proceeded. GEORGETTE generally converged--perhaps too much at the end. 
BLÜCHER diverged, especially after it crossed the Vesle. GNEISENAU tried to converge, 
but never really accomplished much. MARNESCHUTZ and REIMS diverged, and even 
within itself, MARNSCHUTZ diverged. HAGEN, as it was planned, was to advance along 
converging lines. 
Generally, but not necessarily always, it is better for an attacking force to converge, so 
that combat power increases as the forces near the objective. Too great a degree of 
convergence, however, can cause congestion and confusion, with too many forces in too little 
space crowding each other out. This is what happened to some degree in the later phases of 
GEORGETTE at the junction of the Sixth and Fourth Armies. MICHAEL, on the other hand, 
clearly diverged too rapidly, especially in the Eighteenth Army sector, as too few forces 
covered too much space and combat power dissipated. In his 1925 report to the Reichstag, 
Delbrück was especially critical of way Operation MICHAEL diverged. 
In order to attain the strategical goal--the separation of the English 
Army from the French and the consequent rolling up of the former-- 
the attack would have to be so arranged so that it followed the course 
of the Somme. Ludendorff, however, had stretched the offensive 
front some four miles farther to the south because the enemy seemed 
especially weak there. 
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The supporting wing of the attack under Hutier broke through at this 
point, and it outpaced the wing of the main attack under Below. Thus, 
it threw the entire operation off balance. The result was ultimately to 
follow through with Hutier's success, which resulted in a dispersal of 
30 the effort. 
Considering the campaign as a whole, the operations advanced along diverging lines 
at the operational level. The focus of the main effort was always supposed to be in the north 
against the British, with the Germans attacking generally from east to west. MICHAEL was 
supposed to start out toward the west, and then wheel to the northwest. Instead, it shifted to 
the southwest. The three offensives in the south threw far too much force into the north to 
south attacks, which further dissipated the German ability to project combat power from east 
to west. BLÜCHER and MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS were supposed to be diversionary 
attacks, but they were both far larger than GEORGETTE or even HAGEN as planned. They 
were 63 and 72 percent as large respectively as MICHAEL in divisions, and 80 percent and 
96 percent as large respectively in artillery. 
During MICHAEL, GEORGETTE, and BLOCHER, Ludendorff shifted the main 
effort in mid-operation. That can be done at the tactical level that by committing the reserve, 
but it is nonetheless difficult. At the operational level it is even more difficult, because it 
means shifting not only the entire logistical tail, but also the critical combat support forces, to 
include artillery, engineers, and air. Delbriick concluded that by following the tactical line of 
least resistance, Ludendorff violated his own stated primary principle of annihilation warfare. 
"A strategy that intends to force the decision must do so at the point of the first successful 
blow. s31 
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Depth 
The Germans in 1918 had an understanding of depth more advanced than most of 
their opponents. They had pioneered the concept of defense in depth, and in the offense their 
storm troop units and their FEKA artillery units had specific deep attack roles--at least at the 
tactical level. The decision to attack in the north against the British was based partly on the 
shallow Allied depth in the area, with the British having their backs almost against the sea. 
On the other hand, when Ludendorff decided to push Operation BLÜCHER beyond the 
Vesle, he made the mistake of attacking into the Allies' depth, a sector where they could more 
easily fall back and absorb the attack--even is it was in the direction of Paris. Foch was quick 
to recognize that BLÜCHER would lead nowhere. Operation MARNESCHUTZ and the 
extreme western arm of REIMS made some sense because the Germans needed the rail center 
at Reims, but the extension of REIMS to the east made no sense at all. There was no place for 
that attack to go. 
Depth has both a spatial and a time component. An enemy's combat and support 
systems can also be attacked in depth. While the Germans probably would have accomplished 
more if they had focused their attacks on the Amiens and Hazebrouck rail centers, a 
simultaneous and sustained attack throughout the entire depth of the BEF's logistics system 
would have produced even greater results. As previously noted throughout this study, such an 
attack would have brought the full weight of the German Navy to bear on the sea-lanes and 
the ports on both sides of the Channel. This would have included the naval batteries on the 
north Flanders coast, and the Wilhelmgeschütze (the so-called Paris Guns that were actually 
manned by Navy crews), that could have been used to shell the Channel ports or even Dover 
if they were in the right position. Such an attack would not have been decisive in itself, but it 
certainly would have increased pressure on the British logistics system, especially if one or 
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both of the key forward rail centers fell. 
Timing, Tempo, and Sequencing 
The Germans had little choice in the timing of the campaign. They knew they had only 
a very narrow window of opportunity, and they had to strike before the arriving Americans 
tipped the balance. That combined with the time required for the buildup and the training, and 
the weather and the condition of the ground in the attack zone, all pointed to no later than the 
end of March for the start of offensive operations. Despite the basic flaws in the operational 
plan itself and Ludendorffs constant meddling and micro-management, the planning, 
organization, and execution of the preparations and training for Operation MICHAEL 
constituted one of the modem masterpieces of military staff work. 
Sequencing and sequential effects are two of the key elements of the operational art 
that distinguish it from tactics. Yet as noted in the introduction to this study, Ludendorff 
started out rejecting the sequential operations that Wetzell recommended. Ludendorffs 
original rationale was that the German Army only had the manpower and resources for one 
major decisive attack. Yet, this clearly was not the case. Ludendorffs initial rejection of 
sequential operations had more to do with his intention to achieve a decisive victory through a 
Vernichtungsschlacht. 
As events played out, the Germans launched five large-scale attacks within a four- 
month period and were still planning two more attacks when the Allies went on the offensive. 
As the following table shows, the Germans launched a total of 235 divisional attacks on the 
initial days of Operations MICHAEL through MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS. Many divisions, of 
course, attacked in two of the operations, and some attached in three. After the start of the 
various operations, OHL committed at least 25 more divisions to MICHAEL; 23 more to 
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GEORGETTE; 15 more to BLÜCHER; five more to GNEISENAU; and six more to 
MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS. 32 OHL also was planning for a combined total of 89 more 
divisional attacks in HAGEN and KURFÜRST. 
Table 12.2 
First Day Force Distributions 
Kilometers Guns Guns 
Total Total Sector per per per 
Divisions Guns Width Division Division Kilometer 
MICHAEL 67 6,608 103km 1.5 99 64 
GEORGETTE 36 2,210 44km 1.2 61 50 
BLÜCHER 42 5,263 100km 2.4 125 53 
GNEISENAU 24 2,276 45km 1.9 95 51 
MARNESCHUTZ- 48 6,353 119km 2.5 132 53 
REIMS 
HAGEN 39 3,629 47km 1.2 93 77 
KURFÜRST 50 
In the end, the German offensives were only haphazardly linked. GEORGETTE was a 
response to the failure of MICHAEL, not a well-planned and coordinated follow-up. HAGEN 
was a response to the combined failure of MICHAEL and GEORGETTE. BLOCHER was 
designed to set the conditions for HAGEN. It not only failed to do that, it caused other major 
problems for the Germans. Despite what Ludendorff and others said in their post-war 
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writings, GNEISENAU and MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS had far more to do with relieving 
problems with the lines of communications into the BLÜCHER salient than they had to do 
with setting up the conditions for HAGEN. Even after MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS had failed 
to take the rail center at Reims or to draw off significant Allied reserves from the north, 
Ludendorff still intended to go ahead with HAGEN within a few weeks time. What would the 
results have been if the five large offensives, totaling at least 309 divisional attacks between 
mid-March and mid-July 1918, had been conducted as a single, integrated, synchronized, and 
sequential campaign? 
Many historians, including Richard Simpkin, have said that the 1918 offensives failed 
because their overall tempo was too slow. The long pauses between each of the attacks gave 
the Allies the opportunity to recover and prepare for the next blow. 33 Although the Germans 
were stretched to the limit on manpower, artillery was really the major pacing factor. Because 
of the inept management of the war industries, the German Army was short on artillery 
throughout the war. Some batteries took part in three and even four of the offensives; and 
some of the heavy and long range batteries that made up the vaunted "Battering Train" were 
committed to all five and were in the process of moving north for HAGEN on 18 July. 
Given the need to commit resources to multiple operations and the transportation 
times required, the tempo, or the time between attacks was a balancing act that required 
tradeoffs. GEORGETTE was launched only four days after the end of MICHAEL. Although 
it achieved surprise, it was too light. BLÜCHER came 29 days after GEORGETTE. The long 
delay allowed the Germans to build-up a sizeable force, but the attack still achieved surprise. 
Four days after BLÜCHER Operation GNEISENAU was neither a surprise nor was it heavily 
weighted enough to achieve much. MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS came 30 days after 
GNEISENAU. Although it was the second largest of the five attacks, it neither achieved 
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surprise nor did it achieve any worthwhile results. HAGEN was scheduled to start about 
twelve days after MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS, and certainly would not have been a surprise to 
the British. Not only did MARNESCHUTZ-REIMS fail to draw off any significant Allied 
reserves in Flanders, the Allied counterattack of 18 July actually drew off HAGEN divisions. 
When the Allies went on the offensive from 18 July 1918 on, they operated within the 
limitations of the speed of a marching infantryman or a horse team pulling a field gun. Rather 
than launching deep penetration battles in an attempt to reach the ever-allusive open warfare, 
the Allies conducted a series of limited objective but logistically sustainable and sequenced 
attacks on a broad front designed to push the German Army steadily back while inflicting 
heavy losses. 34 It was one of history's first successful operational campaigns in the modern 
sense. 
i 
Reach 
Reach and depth are closely related concepts. The armies of World War I, and 
especially the German Army, had limited operational reach because of their limited mobility 
technology. The ability to reach to operational depth, however, is not necessarily rigidly tied 
to mobility and a given linear distance. If the BEF's Channel ports had been the designated 
objectives of MICHAEL, GEORGETTE, or HAGEN, then the Germans certainly did not 
have the reach to achieve those objectives in a single attack. If on the other hand Amiens and 
Hazebrouck had been the designated objectives, then the German Army did have the 
operational reach to achieve those objectives--in March and April at least. The two key rail 
centers were at what normally would be considered tactical depth in terms of linear distance. 
But in terms of the consequences that would have resulted from the British losing either or 
both of the rail centers, they were--or should have been--operational targets. In this specific 
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case, then, the Germans in March and April 1918 had operational reach, albeit very 
situationally dependent. 
THE INFLUENCE OF 1918 
Volumes have been written about how the German Army following World War I 
transformed itself first into the 100,000-man Reichswehr of the Weimar Republic, and then 
into the Wehrmacht of World War II. A complete review of that story is far beyond the scope 
of this study, but a few observations about the German approach to the operational level of 
war are in order. Immediately following World War I and the drastic reduction of the German 
Army under the terms of the Versailles Treaty, General Hans von Seeckt initiated an 
exhaustive and comprehensive analysis of the German Army's performance in the war. Based 
on the recommendations of the many study commissions he formed, Seeckt oversaw the 
transformation of the Reichswehr into a force based on an organization and doctrine for future 
mobile warfare. Seeckt also structured the Reichswehr into a Führerheer--literally a leader 
army--a cadre army upon which a greatly expanded German Army could be built in a short 
period of time. 
Seeckt broke with the traditional German reliance on numbers and mass armies. He 
believed that future wars would be decided by mobile armies, small but of high quality. He 
also rejected the absolute primacy given to the envelopment by the pre-war Schlieffen School. 
Recognizing the technical weakness of the Germans in World War I, as identified in the 
Theobeck Report (see Chapter III), Seeckt placed increased emphasis on technical training for 
officers. He also saw the air force as primarily a ground support weapon, rather than a 
strategic offensive arm. 35 
The most important product of the Seeckt Reforms was the new manual for tactical 
584 
doctrine. Heeresdienstvorschrift 487, Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen 
[Command and Combat of the Combined Arms--universally called "Das FuG"]. Published in 
1921 (Part 1) and 1923 (Part 2), was a remarkable piece of work. Unlike the post-World War 
I doctrinal manuals of almost every other country, Das FuG completely disregarded 
positional, or trench warfare (Stellungskrieg). Instead, it focused on mobile warfare 
(Bewegungskrieg), while at the same time adopting many of the tactical techniques the 
Germans had developed between 1914 and 1918. 
Ten years after the appearance of Das FuG, the German Army issued an updated 
version titled Heeresdienstvorschrift 300, Truppenführung [Unit Command]. The manual, 
published in 1933 (Part 1) and 1934 (Part 2), was written primarily by Generals Ludwig Beck, 
Werner von Fritsch, and Otto von Stuelpnagel. It updated the basic concepts in Das FuG to 
bring them into line with the rapidly emerging potentials of motorized warfare, aviation, and 
electronic communications. The underlying mobile and offensive focus of Das FuG remained 
unchanged, and entire paragraphs and sections were carried over into Truppenführung, which 
remained the German Army's capstone doctrinal manual right until 1945. 
Seeckt reversed Ludendorffs influence and restored the balance between tactics and 
operations in German military thinking. 
36 German operational thinking, however, did not 
advance between the World Wars as nearly as fast as it did in the Soviet Union. German 
operational thinking remained firmly rooted in the pre-World War I concepts of Moltke and 
Schlieffen. The Germans continued to shun sequential operations and cumulative effects, 
associating such an approach with the attritional warfare (Materialschlacht) they feared and 
abhorred. The focus of Das FuG and Truppenführung's, therefore, was almost exclusively 
tactical. As noted in Chapter II of this study, many historians have argued that what passed for 
operational art in the German Army was really little more than tactics on a grand scale. 
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This thinking also contributed to a major blind spot in the German approach to 
logistics. Because sustainment requirements increase with time, the inadequacies in an army's 
logistical system cause far greater problems at the operational level of war than at the tactical. 
Although the Germans were masters of using railway systems for large-scale troop 
movements, most other elements of their logistics system were not robust. This hurt the 
Germans severely in both World Wars. Two of Truppenführung's twenty-three chapters deal 
with logistics matters, but many of those who managed these functions on a divisional staff 
were not even soldiers; rather, they were military civil servants (Wehrmachtsbeamten). 
Captain Harlan N. Hartness attended the Kriegsakadamfe from 1935 to 1937 as an American 
exchange officer. In his after action report to the U. S. Army he noted that the instructor-to- 
student ratio at the school was 1: 20 for tactics, but only 1: 120 for supply and 1: 240 for 
transportation. 37 Without the robust supply and transportation systems to support it, true 
operational maneuver is impossible. The Germans learned that lesson with a vengeance on 
the Eastern Front in World War II. 
In another sense, the 1918 offensives cast a long shadow over German military 
operations in World War II. German strategy in 1939-1945 was certainly no better than it had 
been in World War I, yet, unit for unit the Wehrmacht was tactically superior to any of its 
opponents. 38 On the operational level the Germans still had problems, continuing to 
approach operations as tactics writ large. The Soviets, on the other hand, had a far better 
developed sense of the operational art, and that was their primary means of defeating their 
tactically superior opponent on the Eastern Front. As the German strategic situation 
progressively deteriorated, they fell back into their old familiar pattern of attempting 
operational solutions for strategic problems. 
The parallels between Operation MICHAEL in March 1918 and Operation WACHT 
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AM RHEIN in December 1944 are hard to miss. Both operations were last-ditch gambles; 
both aimed to split two enemies along their boundary and collapse the alliance; and the 
Germans did not have the operational mobility in either case to make it work. Both operations 
featured long-range firepower attacks that were only haphazardly linked to the main 
operations. In 1918 it was the Gotha raids on London and the Wilheimgeschütze shelling 
Paris. In 1944 it was the V-1 and V-2 attacks on London and Antwerp. Both operations were 
followed up immediately with another large-scale, desperate operation that only wasted more 
precious resources--GEORGETTE in April 1918 and NORDWIND in January 1945. As 
General Günther Blumentritt later said about the Ardennes Offensive; "When the documents 
of this period are carefully studied, it seems likely that Hitler will be seen to have been 
thinking in terms of the great March offensive of 1918 in the First World War. " 39 
SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON GENERALSHIP 
No general, as the old saying goes, ever wakes up in the morning and decides that he 
is going to loose a battle that day. Yet for every general who looses a battle, there is another 
one who wins it. Although the "Great Man School of History" has been largely discredited for 
many years, there can be no doubt that the competence, motivation, and decision making on 
the part of the senior-most commander on either side of a battle or a campaign are major 
factors in the outcome. It is impossible, therefore, to analyze the 1918 German offensives 
without considering the generalship of Ludendorff--or for that matter, his primary opponent 
Foch. 
Second guessing a general's decisions--in either peace or war--is one of the great 
spectator sports of military life. Since becoming a general officer myself I am only too well 
aware of this. Yet as a military historian, I would be remiss in not offering my conclusions at 
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the end of this study. I do so, however, fully aware that what may seem perfectly clear to me 
more than 85 years after the fact, and after more than six years of researching and studying 
this nine-month period of German military history, looked totally different to those who were 
there on the spot, on the ground, as events were unfolding. I am not so naive as to think I 
could have done any better, or even as well, in their positions. It is with that qualification that 
I offer these concluding comments. 
As discussed at length in Chapter IV and summarized at the start of this chapter, 
Ludendorff was clearly out of his element when dealing with strategic and especially political, 
social, and economic matters. But as also noted in Chapter II, the German officer education 
system of the time and up through the end of the first half of the 20th century was not 
designed to train officers to think and operate on these levels. Though well beyond the scope 
of this study, I think a strong argument can be assembled to show that Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff expanded their influence into the political, social, and economic spheres more by 
default than anything else, as the weak internal institutions of Wilhelmine Germany collapsed 
under the strain of the world's first industrialized war. Nonetheless, Ludendorff bears a major 
responsibility for the decisions that doomed Germany on the strategic level, especially the 
unrestricted U-boat campaign and the Belgian policy. 
On the tactical level, Ludendorff presents a far more complex picture. He was a gifted, 
if not a truly great tactician, despite his blind spot for the potential of the tank and his general 
disregard for many--but not all--aspects of emerging military technology. Although he could 
be a petty tyrant and a micro-manager, he nonetheless presided over one of the most brilliant 
and innovative sets of tactical reforms in the history of warfare. In accordance with the best 
traditions of the German General Staff, he allowed and even encouraged vigorous debate 
among relatively junior staff officers, resulting in a give and take that produced first the new 
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defensive doctrine based on flexible defense in depth, and then the new offensive doctrine, 
based on non-linear infiltration tactics. When Fritz von Lossberg produced a pamphlet highly 
critical of the new defensive tactics, Ludendorff even had OHL reproduce that pamphlet for 
distribution within the German Army. 40 
In many ways, however, the vaunted German General Staff system began to work 
against itself as the war progressed. Herbert Rosinski noted the tendency in the German Army 
throughout the war for commanders to become marginalized, as the chiefs of staff and the 
General Staff officers in the subordinate units gained more real power through their own 
network. The commanders, on the other hand, tended to be far better in touch with actual 
conditions among their own troops. Thus, when the final breakdown came in the fall of 1918, 
Ludendorff and OHL were caught by surprise. 41 Ludendorff himself was one of the worst 
offenders, routinely interfering directly in the business of the armies over the heads of the 
army group commanders--usually in response to some communication from a junior General 
Staff officer down in the units. 42 
Albrecht von Thaer in his memoirs paints a stark picture of the loss of contact with 
tactical and operational reality at OHL as the offensives progressed. Thaer was a General 
Staff officer who in 1904-05 had worked under Major Ludendorff at the Great General Staff. 
When Thaer was transferred from the field to OHL at end of April 1918, he made a point of 
telling Hindenburg, Ludendorff, and Wetzell about the real conditions in the front lines. 
Hindenburg patronizingly pointed out that Thaer's personal experience of only 12 miles of the 
front was not representative of the bigger picture. Since OHL got reports from the front every 
day, it obviously had a better understanding of the overall situation. Hindenburg was sure that 
Thaer's attitude would soon improve in the more optimistic air at OHL. Ludendorff told Thaer 
bluntly, "If the troops are getting worse, if discipline is slipping, then it is your fault and the 
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fault of all the commanders at the front for not being tough enough. " Thaer also noted that 
right until the very end the operational planners at OHL continued to regard all divisions 
shown on the map as equal. Wetzell, for example, refused to believe that a division that had 
been committed in a recent attack in Thaer's sector was down to an average strength of 30 
riflemen per company. 43 
As discussed throughout this study, the German Army in World War I recognized the 
existence of a level of warfare between the tactical and the strategic, but its understanding of 
the operational level was distorted by their fear of the Materialschlacht and their overriding 
emphasis on the Vernichtungsschlacht. Ludendorff himself, however, had a major prejudice 
against the operational level and operations (Operativ) as opposed to tactics. This prejudice 
comes through again and again in his own words and his writings. Each of the six great 
offensives he planned aimed to produce a large-scale tactical breakthrough, with the follow- 
on actions being ad hoc and determined by the situation. This is the very antithesis of the 
operational art. 
Ludendorff is also open to criticism for his management of the various battles. Time 
and again he shifted the main effort to exploit short-term opportunities at the expense of long- 
term objectives. When the course of the action started to turn against him, he repeatedly made 
erratic and sometimes even irrational decisions. After the Allied counterattack on 18 July, 
Ludendorff was close to a state of psychological collapse. As Richard Simpkin pointed out, 
command decision at the operational level rarely requires physical courage. Moral courage is 
needed to keep judgement unclouded when forced to accept short-term setbacks for the sake 
of long-term gains. An operational-level commander needs moral courage to make the big 
decisions and to stick to them. 44 One can only wonder what might have happened without 
the steadying influence of Hindenburg to shore-up Ludendorff from crisis to crisis. 
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Ludendorff was not the German Army's only gifted tactician. Others were at least as 
good, and may not have had his blind spot for the operational level--at least to quite the same 
debilitating degree. Again, one can only speculate how the spring 1918 campaign would have 
turned out if someone else had been the First Quartermaster General. Officers who come 
immediately to mind include Kuhl, Lossberg, Seeckt, and Hoffmann. In a July 1919 letter to 
Seeckt, Wetzell speculated that Ludendorff might have been talked into a more logical and 
rational approach if Seeckt had been at OHL. 45 
Although the focus of this study is German operational art in the planning and 
execution of the 1918 offensives, it is impossible to ignore completely the responses of the 
Allied forces and commanders in contributing to the German defeat. And while a detailed 
analysis of Allied operational art, decision making, and generalship are the subjects of a 
completely separate study, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that time after time Foch 
simply out-generaled Ludendorff because the Allied Generalissimo had a far better 
understanding of the strategic and operational realities and dynamics during the first half of 
1918. In my final assessment on Ludendorff, I have to conclude that in many ways he was a 
reflection of the German Army as a whole in the first half of the 20th Century: Tactically 
gifted, Operationally flawed; and Strategically bankrupt. 
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